Search results for 'Psychologism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Ned Block (1981). Psychologism and Behaviorism. Philosophical Review 90 (1):5-43.score: 24.0
    Let psychologism be the doctrine that whether behavior is intelligent behavior depends on the character of the internal information processing that produces it. More specifically, I mean psychologism to involve the doctrine that two systems could have actual and potential behavior _typical_ of familiar intelligent beings, that the two systems could be exactly alike in their actual and potential behavior, and in their behavioral dispositions and capacities and counterfactual behavioral properties (i.e., what behaviors, behavioral dispositions, and behavioral capacities (...)
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  2. Hanoch Ben-Yami (2005). Behaviorism and Psychologism: Why Block's Argument Against Behaviorism is Unsound. Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):179-186.score: 24.0
    Ned Block ((1981). Psychologism and behaviorism. Philosophical Review, 90, 5-43.) argued that a behaviorist conception of intelligence is mistaken, and that the nature of an agent's internal processes is relevant for determining whether the agent has intelligence. He did that by describing a machine which lacks intelligence, yet can answer questions put to it as an intelligent person would. The nature of his machine's internal processes, he concluded, is relevant for determining that it lacks intelligence. I argue against (...)
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  3. David Pitt (2009). Intentional Psychologism. Philosophical Studies 146 (1):117 - 138.score: 24.0
    In the past few years, a number of philosophers (notably, Siewert, C. (The significance of consciousness. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Horgan and Tienson (Philosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 520–533); Pitt 2004) have maintained the following three theses: (1) there is a distinctive sort of phenomenology characteristic of conscious thought, as opposed to other sorts of conscious mental states; (2) different conscious thoughts have different phenomenologies; and (3) thoughts with the same phenomenology have (...)
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  4. Martin Kusch (1995). Psychologism: A Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge. Routledge.score: 24.0
    In the 1890's, when fields such as psychology and philosophy were just emerging, turf wars between the disciplines were common-place. Philosophers widely discounted the possibility that psychology's claim to empirical truth had anything relevant to offer their field. And psychologists, such as the crazed and eccentric Otto Weinegger, often considered themselves philosophers. Freud, it is held, was deeply influenced by his wife, Martha's, uncle, who was also a philosopher. The tension between the fields persisted, until the two fields eventually matured (...)
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  5. Terry Dartnall (2000). Reverse Psychologism, Cognition and Content. Minds and Machines 10 (1):31-52.score: 24.0
    The confusion between cognitive states and the content of cognitive states that gives rise to psychologism also gives rise to reverse psychologism. Weak reverse psychologism says that we can study cognitive states by studying content – for instance, that we can study the mind by studying linguistics or logic. This attitude is endemic in cognitive science and linguistic theory. Strong reverse psychologism says that we can generate cognitive states by giving computers representations that express the content (...)
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  6. Michael Smith (2003). Humeanism, Psychologism, and the Normative Story. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):460–467.score: 24.0
    Jonathan Dancy’s Practical Reality is, I think, best understood as an attempt to undermine our allegiance to these two purported constitutive claims about action. If we must think that psychological states figure in the explanation of action then, according to Dancy, we should suppose that those psychological states are beliefs rather than desire-belief pairs. Dancy thus prefers pure cognitivism to Humeanism. But in fact he thinks that we have no business accepting any form of psychologism in the first place; (...)
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  7. Jonathan Waskan, Ian Harmon, Zachary Horne, Joseph Spino & John Clevenger (2013). Explanatory Anti-Psychologism Overturned by Lay and Scientific Case Classifications. Synthese:1-23.score: 24.0
    Many philosophers of science follow Hempel in embracing both substantive and methodological anti-psychologism regarding the study of explanation. The former thesis denies that explanations are constituted by psychological events, and the latter denies that psychological research can contribute much to the philosophical investigation of the nature of explanation. Substantive anti-psychologism is commonly defended by citing cases, such as hyper-complex descriptions or vast computer simulations, which are reputedly generally agreed to constitute explanations but which defy human comprehension and, as (...)
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  8. Veli Mitova (forthcoming). Truthy Psychologism About Evidence. Philosophical Studies:1-22.score: 24.0
    What sorts of things can be evidence for belief? Five answers have been defended in the recent literature on the ontology of evidence: propositions, facts, psychological states, factive psychological states, all of the above. Each of the first three views privileges a single role that the evidence plays in our doxastic lives, at the cost of occluding other important roles. The fifth view, pluralism, is a natural response to such dubious favouritism. If we want to be monists about evidence and (...)
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  9. John Aach (1990). Psychologism Reconsidered: A Re-Evaluation of the Arguments of Frege and Husserl. Synthese 85 (2):315 - 338.score: 21.0
  10. Elliott Sober (1978). Psychologism. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 8 (July):165-91.score: 21.0
  11. Jonathan Cohen (1998). Frege and Psychologism. Philosophical Papers 27 (1):45-67.score: 21.0
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  12. Robert C. Richardson (1982). Turing Tests for Intelligence: Ned Block's Defense of Psychologism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 41 (May):421-6.score: 21.0
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  13. Dale Jacquette (2001). Psychologism Revisited in Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology. Metaphilosophy 32 (3):261-278.score: 21.0
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  14. J. D. Mackenzie (1984). Functionalism and Psychologism. Dialogue 23 (June):239-248.score: 21.0
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  15. Bekir S. Gur & David A. Wiley (2009). Psychologism and Instructional Technology. Educational Philosophy and Theory 41 (3):307-331.score: 21.0
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  16. Adrian Cussins (1987). Varieties of Psychologism. Synthese 70 (1):123 - 154.score: 18.0
    In section 1 I offer a definition of psychologism which applies to many of the apparently quite disparate uses that philosophers have made of the term. In section 2 I map out some distinct varieties of psychologism. In a short section 3 I indicate how the changing academic climate has injected a new urgency into the debate on psychologism. In section 4 I offer an argument for a variety of psychologism which has important consequences for cognitive (...)
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  17. Luke Jerzykiewicz & Sam Scott (2003). Psychologism and Conceptual Semantics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):682-683.score: 18.0
    Psychologism is the attempt to account for the necessary truths of mathematics in terms of contingent psychological facts. It is widely regarded as a fallacy. Jackendoff's view of reference and truth entails psychologism. Therefore, he needs to either provide a defense of the doctrine, or show that the charge doesn't apply.
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  18. Paul Livingston, Frege on the Context Principle and Psychologism.score: 18.0
    I explore the decisive connection Frege often draws between the context principle and antipsychologism, arguing that his assertion of this connection occupies a central place within the articulation of his linguistic method. In particular, Frege’s appeal to the context principle in the course of describing the epistemology of arithmetic, I argue, connects his doctrine of the nature of judgment with his defense of the objecthood of numbers, showing how an appeal to the special role of judgment in securing truth can (...)
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  19. Tim Crane (2014). Aspects of Psychologism. Harvard University Press.score: 18.0
    Dummett is claiming, then, that Frege's attack on psychologism can be extended to views outside logic. Psycholo- gism in Dummett's discussion is a view about understanding the meanings of words ('grasp of sense'). Psychologism holds that  ...
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  20. José Medina (2003). Wittgenstein and Nonsense: Psychologism, Kantianism, and the Habitus. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (3):293 – 318.score: 18.0
    This paper is a critical examination of Wittgenstein's view of the limits of intelligibility. In it I criticize standard analytic readings of Wittgenstein as an advocate of transcendental or behaviourist theses in epistemology; and I propose an alternative interpretation of Wittgenstein's view as a social contextualism that transcends the false dichotomy between Kantianism and psychologism. I argue that this social contextualism is strikingly similar to the social account of epistemic practices developed by Pierre Bourdieu. Through a comparison between Wittgenstein's (...)
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  21. Francis J. Pelletier, Renée Elio & Philip Hanson (2008). Is Logic All in Our Heads? From Naturalism to Psychologism. Studia Logica 88 (1):3 - 66.score: 18.0
    Psychologism in logic is the doctrine that the semantic content of logical terms is in some way a feature of human psychology. We consider the historically influential version of the doctrine, Psychological Individualism, and the many counter-arguments to it. We then propose and assess various modifications to the doctrine that might allow it to avoid the classical objections. We call these Psychological Descriptivism, Teleological Cognitive Architecture, and Ideal Cognizers. These characterizations give some order to the wide range of modern (...)
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  22. Wayne Martin, Inverse Psychologism in the Theory of Judgment.score: 18.0
    Outline: 1. Why Judgment? 2. Inverse Psychologism: General Issues 3. Inverse Psychologism in the Phenomeno-Logic of Judgment 4. Judgment and Language 5. [De-]stabilizing Kant’s Inverse Psychologism..
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  23. Hans Rott (2008). A New Psychologism in Logic? Reflections From the Point of View of Belief Revision. Studia Logica 88 (1):113 - 136.score: 18.0
    This paper addresses the question whether the past couple of decades of formal research in belief revision offers evidence of a new psychologism in logic. In the first part I examine five potential arguments in favour of this thesis and find them all wanting. In the second part of the paper I argue that belief revision research has climbed up a hierarchy of models for the change of doxastic states that appear to be clearly normative at the bottom, but (...)
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  24. Jack W. Meiland (1976). Psychologism in Logic: Husserl's Critique. Inquiry 19 (1-4):325 – 339.score: 18.0
    Psychologism in logic holds that logic is a branch of psychology. This view has been vigorously defended by John Stuart Mill and by a number of German philosophers of logic, notably Erdmann. Its chief critics have been Husserl and Frege and, to a lesser extent, Russell. Husserl set forth a profound and detailed critique of psychologism in Logical Investigations. This paper examines this critique. First, I explain why the psychologistic theory is attractive. Then I show that Husserl's critique (...)
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  25. Eric Wiland (2003). Psychologism, Practical Reason and the Possibility of Error. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):68–78.score: 18.0
    Psychologism is the view that practical reasons are psychological states. It is widely thought that psychologism is supported by the following principle governing explanation: TF. The difference between false and true beliefs on A's part cannot alter the form of the explanation which will be appropriate to A's actions. (TF) seems to imply that we always need to cite agents' beliefs when explaining their actions, no matter whether those beliefs are true or false. And this seems to vindicate (...)
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  26. David M. Godden (2005). Psychologism in the Logic of John Stuart Mill: Mill on the Subject Matter and Foundations of Ratiocinative Logic. History and Philosophy of Logic 26 (2):115-143.score: 18.0
    This paper considers the question of whether Mill's account of the nature and justificatory foundations of deductive logic is psychologistic. Logical psychologism asserts the dependency of logic on psychology. Frequently, this dependency arises as a result of a metaphysical thesis asserting the psychological nature of the subject matter of logic. A study of Mill's _System of Logic and his _Examination reveals that Mill held an equivocal view of the subject matter of logic, sometimes treating it as a set of (...)
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  27. David Scott (2008). Malebranche and Descartes on Method: Psychologism, Free Will, and Doubt. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (4):581-604.score: 18.0
    The subject of this paper is Malebranche’s relation to Descartes on the question of method. Using recent commentary as a springboard, it examines whether Malebranche advances a nonpsychologistic account of method, in contrast to the psychologism typically thought to characterize the Cartesian view. I explore this question with respect to two issues of central importance to method generally: doubt and free will. My argument is that, despite superficial differences of emphasis, Descartes and Malebranche adopt positions on doubt and free (...)
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  28. Remmel T. Nunn (1979). I. Psychologism, Functionalism, and the Modal Status of Logical Laws. Inquiry 22 (1-4):343-349.score: 18.0
    In a recent article (Inquiry, Vol. 19 [1976]), J. W. Meiland addresses the issue of psychologism in logic, which holds that logic is a branch of psychology and that logical laws (such as the Principle of Non?Contradiction) are contingent upon the nature of the mind. Meiland examines Husserl's critique of psychologism, argues that Husserl is not convincing, and offers two new objections to the psychologistic thesis. In this paper I attempt to rebut those objections. In question are the (...)
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  29. David Godden & Nicholas Griffin (2009). Psychologism and the Development of Russell's Account of Propositions. History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (2):171-186.score: 18.0
    This article examines the development of Russell's treatment of propositions, in relation to the topic of psychologism. In the first section, we outline the concept of psychologism, and show how it can arise in relation to theories of the nature of propositions. Following this, we note the anti-psychologistic elements of Russell's thought dating back to his idealist roots. From there, we sketch the development of Russell's theory of the proposition through a number of its key transitions. We show (...)
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  30. Daniela Mercieca (2009). Working with Uncertainty: Reflections of an Educational Psychologist on Working with Children. Ethics and Social Welfare 3 (2):170-180.score: 18.0
    This paper outlines a typical referral made on behalf of a school to the author, who is an educational psychologist. Regarded as the expert, the psychologist is consulted by the head of school with the expectation that answers can be given as to what works with the child in question. In the context of a runaway world, it is easy to look for that which is certain and for what works. The aim of the paper is to problematize the view (...)
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  31. John Richards (1980). Boole and Mill: Differing Perspectives on Logical Psychologism. History and Philosophy of Logic 1 (1-2):19-36.score: 18.0
    Logical psychologism is the position that logic is a special branch of psychology, that logical laws are descriptíons of experience to be arrived at through observation, and are a posteriori.The accepted arguments against logical psychologism are effective only when directed against this extreme version. However, the clauses in the above characterization are independent and ambiguous, and may be considered separately. This separation permits a reconsideration of less extreme attempts to tie logic to psychology, such as those defended by (...)
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  32. Nicla Vassallo (1997). Analysis Versus Laws Boole's Explanatory Psychologism Versus His Explanatory Anti-Psychologism. History and Philosophy of Logic 18 (3):151-163.score: 18.0
    This paper discusses George Boole?s two distinct approaches to the explanatory relationship between logical and psychological theory. It is argued that, whereas in his first book he attributes a substantive role to psychology in the foundation of logical theory, in his second work he abandons that position in favour of a linguistically conceived foundation. The early Boole espoused a type of psychologism and later came to adopt a type of anti-psychologism. To appreciate this invites a far-reaching reassessment of (...)
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  33. Allen S. Hance (1987). Husserl's Phenomenological Theory of Logic and the Overcoming of Psychologism. Philosophy Research Archives 13:189-215.score: 18.0
    By tracing the general evolution of HusserI’s theory of logic and mathematics, this essay explores Husserl’s identification and strategic overcoming of the two forms of psychologism--Iogical psychologism and transcendental psychologism--that bar the way to rigorous phenomenological inquiry. In the early works “On the Concept of Number” and the Philosophie der Arithmetik Husserl himself falls victim to a particular form of logical psychologism. By the time of the Logical Investigations this problem has been dealt with: the method (...)
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  34. Alastair Hannay (1964). Was Wittgenstein a Psychologist? (II). Inquiry 7 (1-4):379-386.score: 18.0
    The author criticizes mr bogan's article entitled "was wittgenstein a psychologist?" by arguing that mr bogan's non-Psychologistic account of certain of wittgenstein's writings does not require the interpretations which he gave to them. (staff).
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  35. Klaus Puhl & Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (1998). Is Every Mentalism a Kind of Psychologism? Grazer Philosophische Studien 55:213-237.score: 18.0
    First, we argue that Dummett, in his accusing Husserl of psychologism, does not pay sufficient attention to the phenomenological framework of Husserl's philosophy. This framework must be taken into account for understanding why Husserl is not a psychologist in the theory of meaning. Second, it is shown that the thoughts required by Evans' theory of understanding indexical utterances are not to be identified with mental events as understood by psychologism. We then emphasize what Husserl's and Evans' explanation of (...)
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  36. Dale Jacquette (1997). Psychologism the Philosophical Shibboleth. Philosophy and Rhetoric 30 (3):312 - 331.score: 18.0
    Psychologism is the target of vehement disapproval in much of mainstream philosophy from Kant to the present day. Yet although antipsychologistic rhetoric is adamant, there is little substantive argument against psychologism to be discovered in contemporary discussions of the problem. Many recent influential philosophical projects, moreover, including intuitionistic logic, conceptualism in the ontology of mathematics and the program to naturalize epistemology, are in different ways efforts to apply modern psychology in the service of philosophical theory. In this essay, (...)
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  37. Francesca Modenato (1995). Meinong's Theory of Objects: An Attempt at Overcoming Psychologism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 50:87-112.score: 18.0
    I intend to take into account Meinong's theory of objects from a point of view allowed by the author himself, when he agrees that the proper "place" for such a doctrine is the theory of knowledge. According to this suggestion, I think it convenient to explain the doctrine at issue in the light of the definition of knowing as a "double" act, in which the object known is "in front o f the knowing act itself as something comparatively autonomous. From (...)
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  38. Jonathan C. Pettibone, Daniel J. Segrist, Andrew M. Pomerantz & Bailey E. Williams (2010). How Impaired Is Too Impaired? Ratings of Psychologist Impairment by Psychologists in Independent Practice. Ethics and Behavior 20 (2):149-160.score: 18.0
    Although psychologist impairment has received attention from researchers, there is a paucity of empirical data aimed at determining the point at which such impairment necessitates action. The purpose of this study was to provide such empirical data. Members of Division 42 ( n = 285) responded to vignettes describing a psychologist whose symptoms of either depression or substance abuse varied across five levels of severity. Results identified specific levels of impairment at which psychologists were deemed too impaired to practice psychotherapy, (...)
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  39. Peter Andras Varga (2010). Psychologism as Positive Heritage of Husserl's Phenomenological Philosophy. Studia Phaenomenologica 10:135-161.score: 18.0
    Husserl is famous for his critique of foundational psychologism. However, his relationship to psychologism is not entirely negative. His conception of philosophy is indebted also to nineteenth-century ideas of a psychological foundation of logic and philosophy. This is manifest both in historical influences on Husserl and in debates between Husserl and his contemporaries. These areas are to be investigated, with a particular focus on the Logical Investigations and the works from the period of Husserl’s transition to the transcendental (...)
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  40. Bailey E. Williams, Andrew M. Pomerantz, Daniel J. Segrist & Jonathan C. Pettibone (2010). How Impaired is Too Impaired? Ratings of Psychologist Impairment by Psychologists in Independent Practice. Ethics and Behavior 20 (2):149 – 160.score: 18.0
    Although psychologist impairment has received attention from researchers, there is a paucity of empirical data aimed at determining the point at which such impairment necessitates action. The purpose of this study was to provide such empirical data. Members of Division 42 ( n = 285) responded to vignettes describing a psychologist whose symptoms of either depression or substance abuse varied across five levels of severity. Results identified specific levels of impairment at which psychologists were deemed too impaired to practice psychotherapy, (...)
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  41. Kent C. Berridge (2010). Remembering Robert Zajonc: The Complete Psychologist. Emotion Review 2 (4):348-352.score: 18.0
    This article joins with others in the same issue to celebrate the career of Robert B. Zajonc who was a broad, as well as a deeply talented, psychologist. Beyond his well-known focus in social psychology, the work of Zajonc also involved, at one time or another, forays into nearly every other subfield of psychology. This article focuses specifically on his studies that extended into biopsychology, which deserve special highlighting in order to be recognized alongside his many major achievements in emotion (...)
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  42. Herman Philipse (1987). Psychologism and the Prescriptive Function of Logic. Grazer Philosophische Studien 29:13-33.score: 18.0
    Husserl and Frege did not criticize psychologism on the ground that it deduced the norms of logic from non-normative premises (naturalistic fallacy), as is often supposed. Rather, their refutation of psychologism assumes that such a deduction is possible. Husserl compared the rules of logic to those of technology, on the supposition that they have a purely theoretical basis. This conception of logic is critically examined, and it is argued (contra Follesdal) that Frege held a similar view.
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  43. Chet Sunde (2005). Was Socrates the First Philosophical Practitioner, the First Psychologist, or Both? Philosophical Practice 1 (2):73-74.score: 18.0
    (2005). Was Socrates the first philosophical practitioner, the first psychologist, or both? Philosophical Practice: Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 73-74.
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  44. Majid Amini (2008). Logical Machines: Peirce on Psychologism. Disputatio 2 (24):1 - 14.score: 18.0
    This essay discusses Peirce�s appeal to logical machines as an argument against psychologism. It also contends that some of Peirce�s anti-psychologistic remarks on logic contain interesting premonitions arising from his perception of the asymmetry of proof complexity in monadic and relational logical calculi that were only given full formulation and explication in the early twentieth century through Church�s Theorem and Hilbert�s broad-ranging Entscheidungsproblem.
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  45. Vanessa Lehan-Streisel (2012). Why Philosophy Needs Logical Psychologism. Dialogue 51 (4):575-586.score: 18.0
    In this paper, I argue that social psychologism is the most philosophically appealing form of psychologism. I present two arguments in support of social psychologism. The first is that this form of psychologism allows philosophers to justify normative claims about human reasoning. In the second part of this paper I argue that social psychologism ameliorates historical concerns with psychologism in general. The conclusion I draw from this discussion is that a need to outline and (...)
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  46. James Bogen (1964). Was Wittgenstein a Psychologist? (I). Inquiry 7 (1-4):374-378.score: 16.0
    Certain remarks in the Tractatus, taken together with a passage in a letter Wittgenstein wrote to Russell, suggest that at one time Wittgenstein inclined toward a psychologistic theory of language. But textual considerations with regard to the former and a special interpretation of the latter allow us to interpret these statements in a way that is consistent with Wittgenstein's later views.
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  47. Julie Ann Smith, Andrew M. Pomerantz, Jonathan C. Pettibone & Daniel J. Segrist (2012). When Does a Professional Relationship with a Psychologist Begin? An Empirical Investigation. Ethics and Behavior 22 (3):208 - 217.score: 16.0
    Research on multiple relationships by practicing psychologists has typically presumed the presence of a professional relationship and focused on the ethicality of subsequent, nonprofessional relationships. Instead, this study focused on the question of what, exactly, constitutes the professional relationship in the first place. Practicing psychologists and undergraduates responded to vignettes portraying various early stages of interaction between a therapist and a prospective client. Participants' responses indicated that determinations of professional relationship establishment, and the ethicality of subsequent nonprofessional relationships, depended upon (...)
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  48. Nomy Arpaly (2005). How It is Not "Just Like Diabetes&Quot;: Mental Disorders and the Moral Psychologist. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):282–298.score: 15.0
  49. Lanier R. Anderson (2005). Neo-Kantianism and the Roots of Anti-Psychologism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (2):287 – 323.score: 15.0
  50. Ralph D. Ellis (2006). Phenomenology-Friendly Neuroscience: The Return to Merleau-Ponty as Psychologist. [REVIEW] Human Studies 29 (1):33 - 55.score: 15.0
    This paper reports on the Kuhnian revolution now occurring in neuropsychology that is finally supportive of and friendly to phenomenology – the “enactive” approach to the mind-body relation, grounded in the notion of self-organization, which is consistent with Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on virtually every point. According to the enactive approach, human minds understand the world by virtue of the ways our bodies can act relative to it, or the ways we can imagine acting. This requires that action be distinguished from (...)
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