Search results for 'Psychologism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Ned Block (1981). Psychologism and Behaviorism. Philosophical Review 90 (1):5-43.
    Let psychologism be the doctrine that whether behavior is intelligent behavior depends on the character of the internal information processing that produces it. More specifically, I mean psychologism to involve the doctrine that two systems could have actual and potential behavior _typical_ of familiar intelligent beings, that the two systems could be exactly alike in their actual and potential behavior, and in their behavioral dispositions and capacities and counterfactual behavioral properties (i.e., what behaviors, behavioral dispositions, and behavioral capacities (...)
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  2.  91
    Martin Kusch (1995). Psychologism: A Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge. Routledge.
    In the 1890's, when fields such as psychology and philosophy were just emerging, turf wars between the disciplines were common-place. Philosophers widely discounted the possibility that psychology's claim to empirical truth had anything relevant to offer their field. And psychologists, such as the crazed and eccentric Otto Weinegger, often considered themselves philosophers. Freud, it is held, was deeply influenced by his wife, Martha's, uncle, who was also a philosopher. The tension between the fields persisted, until the two fields eventually matured (...)
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  3.  21
    Jonathan Waskan, Ian Harmon, Zachary Horne, Joseph Spino & John Clevenger (2013). Explanatory Anti-Psychologism Overturned by Lay and Scientific Case Classifications. Synthese 191 (5):1-23.
    Many philosophers of science follow Hempel in embracing both substantive and methodological anti-psychologism regarding the study of explanation. The former thesis denies that explanations are constituted by psychological events, and the latter denies that psychological research can contribute much to the philosophical investigation of the nature of explanation. Substantive anti-psychologism is commonly defended by citing cases, such as hyper-complex descriptions or vast computer simulations, which are reputedly generally agreed to constitute explanations but which defy human comprehension and, as (...)
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  4.  21
    Veli Mitova (2015). Truthy Psychologism About Evidence. Philosophical Studies 172 (4):1105-1126.
    What sorts of things can be evidence for belief? Five answers have been defended in the recent literature on the ontology of evidence: propositions, facts, psychological states, factive psychological states, all of the above. Each of the first three views privileges a single role that the evidence plays in our doxastic lives, at the cost of occluding other important roles. The fifth view, pluralism, is a natural response to such dubious favouritism. If we want to be monists about evidence and (...)
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  5. David Pitt (2009). Intentional Psychologism. Philosophical Studies 146 (1):117-138.
    In the past few years, a number of philosophers ; Horgan and Tienson ; Pitt 2004) have maintained the following three theses: there is a distinctive sort of phenomenology characteristic of conscious thought, as opposed to other sorts of conscious mental states; different conscious thoughts have different phenomenologies; and thoughts with the same phenomenology have the same intentional content. The last of these three claims is open to at least two different interpretations. It might mean that the phenomenology of a (...)
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  6.  37
    John Corcoran (2007). PSYCHOLOGISM. In John Lachs and Robert Talisse (ed.), American Philosophy: an Encyclopedia. ROUTLEDGE 628-9.
    Corcoran, J. 2007. Psychologism. American Philosophy: an Encyclopedia. Eds. John Lachs and Robert Talisse. New York: Routledge. Pages 628-9. -/- Psychologism with respect to a given branch of knowledge, in the broadest neutral sense, is the view that the branch is ultimately reducible to, or at least is essentially dependent on, psychology. The parallel with logicism is incomplete. Logicism with respect to a given branch of knowledge is the view that the branch is ultimately reducible to logic. Every (...)
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  7.  51
    Michael Smith (2003). Humeanism, Psychologism, and the Normative Story. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):460–467.
    Jonathan Dancy’s Practical Reality is, I think, best understood as an attempt to undermine our allegiance to these two purported constitutive claims about action. If we must think that psychological states figure in the explanation of action then, according to Dancy, we should suppose that those psychological states are beliefs rather than desire-belief pairs. Dancy thus prefers pure cognitivism to Humeanism. But in fact he thinks that we have no business accepting any form of psychologism in the first place; (...)
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  8. Hanoch Ben-Yami (2005). Behaviorism and Psychologism: Why Block's Argument Against Behaviorism is Unsound. Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):179-186.
    Ned Block. Psychologism and behaviorism. Philosophical Review, 90, 5-43.) argued that a behaviorist conception of intelligence is mistaken, and that the nature of an agent's internal processes is relevant for determining whether the agent has intelligence. He did that by describing a machine which lacks intelligence, yet can answer questions put to it as an intelligent person would. The nature of his machine's internal processes, he concluded, is relevant for determining that it lacks intelligence. I argue against Block that (...)
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  9.  46
    David Godden (2005). Psychologism in the Logic of John Stuart Mill: Mill on the Subject Matter and Foundations of Ratiocinative Logic. History and Philosophy of Logic 26 (2):115-143.
    This paper considers the question of whether Mill's account of the nature and justificatory foundations of deductive logic is psychologistic. Logical psychologism asserts the dependency of logic on psychology. Frequently, this dependency arises as a result of a metaphysical thesis asserting the psychological nature of the subject matter of logic. A study of Mill's System of Logic and his Examination reveals that Mill held an equivocal view of the subject matter of logic, sometimes treating it as a set of (...)
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  10.  3
    Hans Rott (2008). A New Psychologism in Logic? Reflections From the Point of View of Belief Revision. Studia Logica 88 (1):113-136.
    This paper addresses the question whether the past couple of decades of formal research in belief revision offers evidence of a new psychologism in logic. In the first part I examine five potential arguments in favour of this thesis and find them all wanting. In the second part of the paper I argue that belief revision research has climbed up a hierarchy of models for the change of doxastic states that appear to be clearly normative at the bottom, but (...)
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  11.  67
    Terry Dartnall (2000). Reverse Psychologism, Cognition and Content. Minds and Machines 10 (1):31-52.
    The confusion between cognitive states and the content of cognitive states that gives rise to psychologism also gives rise to reverse psychologism. Weak reverse psychologism says that we can study cognitive states by studying content – for instance, that we can study the mind by studying linguistics or logic. This attitude is endemic in cognitive science and linguistic theory. Strong reverse psychologism says that we can generate cognitive states by giving computers representations that express the content (...)
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  12.  4
    William F. Brewer (1999). Scientific Theories and Naive Theories as Forms of Mental Representation: Psychologism Revived. Science and Education 8 (5):489-505.
    This paper analyzes recent work in psychology on the nature of the representation of complex forms of knowledge with the goal of understanding how theories are represented. The analysis suggests that, as a psychological form of representation, theories are mental structures that include theoretical entities (usually nonobservable), relationships among the theoretical entities, and relationships of the theoretical entities to the phenomena of some domain. A theory explains the phenomena in its domain by providing a conceptual framework for the phenomena that (...)
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  13.  63
    Elliott Sober (1978). Psychologism. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 8 (July):165-91.
  14. John Aach (1990). Psychologism Reconsidered: A Re-Evaluation of the Arguments of Frege and Husserl. Synthese 85 (2):315 - 338.
  15.  12
    Bekir S. Gur & David A. Wiley (2009). Psychologism and Instructional Technology. Educational Philosophy and Theory 41 (3):307-331.
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  16.  61
    Jonathan Cohen (1998). Frege and Psychologism. Philosophical Papers 27 (1):45-67.
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  17.  27
    Robert C. Richardson (1982). Turing Tests for Intelligence: Ned Block's Defense of Psychologism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 41 (May):421-6.
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  18.  39
    Jose Luis Bermudez (1999). Psychologism and Psychology. Inquiry 42 (3 & 4):487 – 504.
    This critical notice explores the distinction central to analytic philosophy between the logical study of the normative principles governing rational thought and the psychological study of the processes of thinking. Thomas Nagel maintains (1) that the fundamental principles of reasoning have normative force and make claims to universal validity; (2) that the fundamental principles of reasoning cannot be construed as the expression of contingent forms of life; and (3) that the identification of fundamental principles of reasoning should be completely independent (...)
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  19.  11
    J. D. Mackenzie (1984). Functionalism and Psychologism. Dialogue 23 (June):239-248.
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  20.  20
    Dale Jacquette (2001). Psychologism Revisited in Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology. Metaphilosophy 32 (3):261-278.
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  21. Dale Jacquette (2003). Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychologism Critical and Historical Readings on the Psychological Turn in Philosophy. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
     
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  22. Kent C. Berridge (2010). Remembering Robert Zajonc: The Complete Psychologist. Emotion Review 2 (4):348-352.
    This article joins with others in the same issue to celebrate the career of Robert B. Zajonc who was a broad, as well as a deeply talented, psychologist. Beyond his well-known focus in social psychology, the work of Zajonc also involved, at one time or another, forays into nearly every other subfield of psychology. This article focuses specifically on his studies that extended into biopsychology, which deserve special highlighting in order to be recognized alongside his many major achievements in emotion (...)
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  23.  21
    Marek Picha (2014). Apriorism, Psychologism, and Conceptualism About Thought Experiments. Dokos 2014 (1):27-47.
    Epistemological optimists about thought experiments hold that imagination could be under certain conditions source of epistemic justification. Their claim is usually based on one of three dominant conceptions about epistemic value of thought experiments. Apriorism states that imagination may serve as unique a priori source of new synthetic knowledge about the actual world. I argue against this view and show that apriorism is either too weak, or too strong or too vague. Psychologism is viable, yet not fully (...)
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  24. Peter Andras Varga (2010). Psychologism as Positive Heritage of Husserl's Phenomenological Philosophy. Studia Phaenomenologica 10:135-161.
    Husserl is famous for his critique of foundational psychologism. However, his relationship to psychologism is not entirely negative. His conception of philosophy is indebted also to nineteenth-century ideas of a psychological foundation of logic and philosophy. This is manifest both in historical influences on Husserl and in debates between Husserl and his contemporaries. These areas are to be investigated, with a particular focus on the Logical Investigations and the works from the period of Husserl’s transition to the transcendental (...)
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  25.  4
    Jonathan Waskan, Intelligibility and the CAPE: Combatting Anti-Psychologism About Explanation.
    Much of the philosophical discussion of explanations has centered around two broad conceptions of what sorts of ‘things’ explanations are – namely, the descriptive and ontic conceptions. Defenders of each argue that scientific psychology has at best little to contribute to the study of explanations. These anti-psychologistic arguments come in two main varieties, the metaphysical and the epistemic. Both varieties trace back to Hempel and recur in the more recent writings of prominent mechanists. The metaphysical arguments attempt to combat (...) about explanation by doubly dissociating explanations themselves from the commonly associated phenomenology of explanation. The epistemic arguments attempt to combat psychologism by doubly dissociating the good-making features of explanations from the CAPE. I focus on the metaphysical arguments here, for only they directly concern the nature of, as opposed to the evaluation conditions for, explanations. The metaphysical arguments are all shown to equivocate over ‘explanation’, and thus they are no threat to the proposal that sometimes explanations just are psychological events. Such arguments do, nonetheless, gesture towards something important – namely, that the CAPE is neither necessary nor sufficient for explanation in any sense. Similar considerations lead another latter-day mechanist to conclude that no phenomenology of any sort is essential for explanation. What all of these thinkers overlook, however, is that there is another important phenomenological correlate of explanation – namely, finding a happening intelligible or understanding how or why-possibly – and it may well be of the very essence of explanation, at least in the psychological sense. I propose a psychomechanistic theory of intelligibility that accounts for how we can, through finite means, make boundless, endlessly qualified inferences about the implications of our explanations. In closing I note that, although finding a happening intelligible does sometimes engender an unjustified confidence in correctness, we should not overlook how attaining this state does at least put us in a kind of epistemic base camp. I also hint at how intelligibility could turn out to be the ultimate source of the descriptive and ontic conceptions of explanation. (shrink)
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  26.  17
    Lilian O’Brien (2015). Beyond Psychologism and Anti-Psychologism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2):281-295.
    What is special about successful action explanation is that it reveals what the agent saw in her action. Most contemporary philosophers assume that this amounts to explanation in terms of the reason for which the agent acted. They also assume that such explanations conform to a realist picture of explanation. What is disputed is whether the reason is a psychological state or a normative state of affairs . I argue that neither psychological states nor their contents suffice to make actions (...)
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  27.  90
    Adrian Cussins (1987). Varieties of Psychologism. Synthese 70 (1):123 - 154.
    In section 1 I offer a definition of psychologism which applies to many of the apparently quite disparate uses that philosophers have made of the term. In section 2 I map out some distinct varieties of psychologism. In a short section 3 I indicate how the changing academic climate has injected a new urgency into the debate on psychologism. In section 4 I offer an argument for a variety of psychologism which has important consequences for cognitive (...)
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  28.  54
    Scott Edgar (2008). Paul Natorp and the Emergence of Anti-Psychologism in the Nineteenth Century. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (1):54-65.
    This paper examines the anti-psychologism of Paul Natorp, a Marburg School Neo-Kantian. It identifies both Natorp’s principle argument against psychologism and the views underlying the argument that give it its force. Natorp’s argument depends for its success on his view that certain scientific laws constitute the intersubjective content of knowledge. That view in turn depends on Natorp’s conception of subjectivity, so it is only against the background of his conception of subjectivity that his reasons for rejecting psychologism (...)
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  29.  41
    Consuelo Preti (2008). On the Origins of the Contemporary Notion of Propositional Content: Anti-Psychologism in Nineteenth-Century Psychology and G.E. Moore's Early Theory of Judgment. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):176-185.
    I argue that the familiar picture of the rise of analytic philosophy through the early work of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell is incomplete and to some degree erroneous. Archival evidence suggests that a considerable influence on Moore, especially evident in his 1899 paper ‘The nature of judgment,’ comes from the literature in nineteenth-century empirical psychology rather than nineteenth-century neo-Hegelianism, as is widely believed. I argue that the conceptual influences of Moore’s paper are more likely to have had their (...)
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  30.  16
    John Richards (1980). Boole and Mill: Differing Perspectives on Logical Psychologism. History and Philosophy of Logic 1 (1-2):19-36.
    Logical psychologism is the position that logic is a special branch of psychology, that logical laws are descriptíons of experience to be arrived at through observation, and are a posteriori.The accepted arguments against logical psychologism are effective only when directed against this extreme version. However, the clauses in the above characterization are independent and ambiguous, and may be considered separately. This separation permits a reconsideration of less extreme attempts to tie logic to psychology, such as those defended by (...)
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  31.  22
    David Godden & Nicholas Griffin (2009). Psychologism and the Development of Russell's Account of Propositions. History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (2):171-186.
    This article examines the development of Russell's treatment of propositions, in relation to the topic of psychologism. In the first section, we outline the concept of psychologism, and show how it can arise in relation to theories of the nature of propositions. Following this, we note the anti-psychologistic elements of Russell's thought dating back to his idealist roots. From there, we sketch the development of Russell's theory of the proposition through a number of its key transitions. We show (...)
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  32.  40
    Jack W. Meiland (1976). Psychologism in Logic: Husserl's Critique. Inquiry 19 (1-4):325 – 339.
    Psychologism in logic holds that logic is a branch of psychology. This view has been vigorously defended by John Stuart Mill and by a number of German philosophers of logic, notably Erdmann. Its chief critics have been Husserl and Frege and, to a lesser extent, Russell. Husserl set forth a profound and detailed critique of psychologism in Logical Investigations. This paper examines this critique. First, I explain why the psychologistic theory is attractive. Then I show that Husserl's critique (...)
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  33.  88
    Paul Livingston, Frege on the Context Principle and Psychologism.
    I explore the decisive connection Frege often draws between the context principle and antipsychologism, arguing that his assertion of this connection occupies a central place within the articulation of his linguistic method. In particular, Frege’s appeal to the context principle in the course of describing the epistemology of arithmetic, I argue, connects his doctrine of the nature of judgment with his defense of the objecthood of numbers, showing how an appeal to the special role of judgment in securing truth can (...)
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  34.  6
    Wayne Waxman (2000). Kant's Psychologism, Part II. Kantian Review 4 (1):74-97.
    Before surveying examples of Kant's transcendental psychologism, it may prove helpful to return to the model after which they are patterned: Hume's associationism. Contrary to what is often supposed, Hume did not confine his enquiries into representational origins to what exists in the mind prior to and independently of association. When the materials available pre-associationally are insufficient to yield an idea able to perform a certain prescribed function in human thought and reasoning, he then typically looked to the actions (...)
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  35.  14
    Herman Philipse (1987). Psychologism and the Prescriptive Function of Logic. Grazer Philosophische Studien 29:13-33.
    Husserl and Frege did not criticize psychologism on the ground that it deduced the norms of logic from non-normative premises (naturalistic fallacy), as is often supposed. Rather, their refutation of psychologism assumes that such a deduction is possible. Husserl compared the rules of logic to those of technology, on the supposition that they have a purely theoretical basis. This conception of logic is critically examined, and it is argued (contra Follesdal) that Frege held a similar view.
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  36.  41
    José Medina (2003). Wittgenstein and Nonsense: Psychologism, Kantianism, and the Habitus. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (3):293 – 318.
    This paper is a critical examination of Wittgenstein's view of the limits of intelligibility. In it I criticize standard analytic readings of Wittgenstein as an advocate of transcendental or behaviourist theses in epistemology; and I propose an alternative interpretation of Wittgenstein's view as a social contextualism that transcends the false dichotomy between Kantianism and psychologism. I argue that this social contextualism is strikingly similar to the social account of epistemic practices developed by Pierre Bourdieu. Through a comparison between Wittgenstein's (...)
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  37.  73
    Luke Jerzykiewicz & Sam Scott (2003). Psychologism and Conceptual Semantics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):682-683.
    Psychologism is the attempt to account for the necessary truths of mathematics in terms of contingent psychological facts. It is widely regarded as a fallacy. Jackendoff's view of reference and truth entails psychologism. Therefore, he needs to either provide a defense of the doctrine, or show that the charge doesn't apply.
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  38.  30
    Eric Wiland (2003). Psychologism, Practical Reason and the Possibility of Error. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):68–78.
    Psychologism is the view that practical reasons are psychological states. It is widely thought that psychologism is supported by the following principle governing explanation: TF. The difference between false and true beliefs on A's part cannot alter the form of the explanation which will be appropriate to A's actions. (TF) seems to imply that we always need to cite agents' beliefs when explaining their actions, no matter whether those beliefs are true or false. And this seems to vindicate (...)
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  39.  40
    Allen S. Hance (1987). Husserl's Phenomenological Theory of Logic and the Overcoming of Psychologism. Philosophy Research Archives 13:189-215.
    By tracing the general evolution of HusserI’s theory of logic and mathematics, this essay explores Husserl’s identification and strategic overcoming of the two forms of psychologism--Iogical psychologism and transcendental psychologism--that bar the way to rigorous phenomenological inquiry. In the early works “On the Concept of Number” and the Philosophie der Arithmetik Husserl himself falls victim to a particular form of logical psychologism. By the time of the Logical Investigations this problem has been dealt with: the method (...)
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  40.  9
    Dale Jacquette (1997). Psychologism the Philosophical Shibboleth. Philosophy and Rhetoric 30 (3):312 - 331.
    Psychologism is the target of vehement disapproval in much of mainstream philosophy from Kant to the present day. Yet although antipsychologistic rhetoric is adamant, there is little substantive argument against psychologism to be discovered in contemporary discussions of the problem. Many recent influential philosophical projects, moreover, including intuitionistic logic, conceptualism in the ontology of mathematics and the program to naturalize epistemology, are in different ways efforts to apply modern psychology in the service of philosophical theory. In this essay, (...)
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  41.  21
    Larry Davidson & Lisa Cosgrove (2002). Psychologism and Phenomenological Psychology Revisited, Part II: The Return to Positivity. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 33 (2):141-177.
    The last in a series of examinations, this paper articulates Husserl's mature position on the nature of a phenomenologically informed human science. Falling between the naïve positivity of a naturalistic approach to psychology and the transcendental view of consciousness at the base of phenomenological philosophy, we argue that a human scientific psychology—while not itself transcendental in nature needs to re-arise upon the transcendental ground as an empirical—but no longer transcendentally naïve—discipline through Husserl's notion of the "return to positivity." This notion (...)
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  42.  60
    Francis J. Pelletier, Renée Elio & Philip Hanson (2008). Is Logic All in Our Heads? From Naturalism to Psychologism. Studia Logica 88 (1):3 - 66.
    Psychologism in logic is the doctrine that the semantic content of logical terms is in some way a feature of human psychology. We consider the historically influential version of the doctrine, Psychological Individualism, and the many counter-arguments to it. We then propose and assess various modifications to the doctrine that might allow it to avoid the classical objections. We call these Psychological Descriptivism, Teleological Cognitive Architecture, and Ideal Cognizers. These characterizations give some order to the wide range of modern (...)
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  43.  5
    Jill G. Morawski (2005). Reflexivity and the Psychologist. History of the Human Sciences 18 (4):77-105.
    Psychologists tend to examine their activities in experimentation with the same objective scientific attitude as they routinely assume in the experimental situation. A few psychologists have stepped outside this closed expistemic practice to undertake reflexive analysis of the psychologist in the laboratory. Three cases of such critical reflexive analysis are considered to better understand the strategies and consequences of confronting what Steve Woolgar has called ‘the horrors of reflexivity’. Reflexive work of William James, Horace Mann Bond, and Saul Rosenzweig are (...)
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  44.  50
    Wayne Martin, Inverse Psychologism in the Theory of Judgment.
    Outline: 1. Why Judgment? 2. Inverse Psychologism: General Issues 3. Inverse Psychologism in the Phenomeno-Logic of Judgment 4. Judgment and Language 5. [De-]stabilizing Kant ’s Inverse Psychologism.
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  45.  21
    Klaus Puhl & Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (1998). Is Every Mentalism a Kind of Psychologism? Grazer Philosophische Studien 55:213-237.
    First, we argue that Dummett, in his accusing Husserl of psychologism, does not pay sufficient attention to the phenomenological framework of Husserl's philosophy. This framework must be taken into account for understanding why Husserl is not a psychologist in the theory of meaning. Second, it is shown that the thoughts required by Evans' theory of understanding indexical utterances are not to be identified with mental events as understood by psychologism. We then emphasize what Husserl's and Evans' explanation of (...)
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  46.  34
    Thomas Daniel Fallace (2010). The Mind at Every Stage has its Own Logic: John Dewey as Genetic Psychologist. Educational Theory 60 (2):129-146.
    In this essay Thomas Fallace argues that John Dewey can best be described as a pragmatic historicist and a genetic psychologist. This means that Dewey believed that the best way to understand any idea, phenomenon, or entity is to trace its history, that the history of the individual and race pass through distinct stages of development, and that the most effective way to educate was to coordinate the form and content of these phylogenetic and ontogenetic stages to one another. Fallace (...)
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  47.  13
    Nicla Vassallo (1997). Analysis Versus Laws Boole's Explanatory Psychologism Versus His Explanatory Anti-Psychologism. History and Philosophy of Logic 18 (3):151-163.
    This paper discusses George Boole?s two distinct approaches to the explanatory relationship between logical and psychological theory. It is argued that, whereas in his first book he attributes a substantive role to psychology in the foundation of logical theory, in his second work he abandons that position in favour of a linguistically conceived foundation. The early Boole espoused a type of psychologism and later came to adopt a type of anti-psychologism. To appreciate this invites a far-reaching reassessment of (...)
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  48.  27
    David Scott (2008). Malebranche and Descartes on Method: Psychologism, Free Will, and Doubt. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (4):581-604.
    The subject of this paper is Malebranche’s relation to Descartes on the question of method. Using recent commentary as a springboard, it examines whether Malebranche advances a nonpsychologistic account of method, in contrast to the psychologism typically thought to characterize the Cartesian view. I explore this question with respect to two issues of central importance to method generally: doubt and free will. My argument is that, despite superficial differences of emphasis, Descartes and Malebranche adopt positions on doubt and free (...)
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  49.  34
    Hans Rott (2008). A New Psychologism in Logic? Reflections From the Point of View of Belief Revision. Studia Logica 88 (1):113 - 136.
    This paper addresses the question whether the past couple of decades of formal research in belief revision offers evidence of a new psychologism in logic. In the first part I examine five potential arguments in favour of this thesis and find them all wanting. In the second part of the paper I argue that belief revision research has climbed up a hierarchy of models for the change of doxastic states that appear to be clearly normative at the bottom, but (...)
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  50.  3
    Jacob A. Belzen (2009). The Dynamics of Becoming a Psychologist of Religion: The Case of Heije Faber. Archive for the Psychology of Religion 31 (1):35-52.
    This paper offers a psychobiographical study of the connection between the life and work of Heije Faber , the internationally best known Dutch psychologist of religion. Initially, Faber studied theology, qualifying in philosophy of religion; in later years, he studied psychology . As a politically active pastor, he had to hide from the Nazi-occupation of The Netherlands during World War II. In 1970 he became the first professor of the psychology of religion at a Dutch theological faculty. Faber was interested (...)
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