Search results for 'Psychology' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Cory D. Wright & William P. Bechtel (2007). Mechanisms and Psychological Explanation. In Paul Thagard (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.score: 9.0
    As much as assumptions about mechanisms and mechanistic explanation have deeply affected psychology, they have received disproportionately little analysis in philosophy. After a historical survey of the influences of mechanistic approaches to explanation of psychological phenomena, we specify the nature of mechanisms and mechanistic explanation. Contrary to some treatments of mechanistic explanation, we maintain that explanation is an epistemic activity that involves representing and reasoning about mechanisms. We discuss the manner in which mechanistic approaches serve to bridge levels rather (...)
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  2. William Bechtel & Cory D. Wright (2009). What is Psychological Explanation? In P. Calvo & J. Symons (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge. 113--130.score: 9.0
    Due to the wide array of phenomena that are of interest to them, psychologists offer highly diverse and heterogeneous types of explanations. Initially, this suggests that the question "What is psychological explanation?" has no single answer. To provide appreciation of this diversity, we begin by noting some of the more common types of explanations that psychologists provide, with particular focus on classical examples of explanations advanced in three different areas of psychology: psychophysics, physiological psychology, and information-processing psychology. (...)
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  3. Richard Gray (2001). Cognitive Modules, Synaesthesia and the Constitution of Psychological Natural Kinds. Philosophical Psychology 14 (1):65-82.score: 9.0
    Fodor claims that cognitive modules can be thought of as constituting a psychological natural kind in virtue of their possession of most or all of nine specified properties. The challenge to this considered here comes from synaesthesia. Synaesthesia is a type of cross-modal association: input to one sensory modality reliably generates an additional sensory output that is usually generated by the input to a distinct sensory modality. The most common form of synaesthesia manifests Fodor's nine specified properties of modularity, and (...)
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  4. Thomas D. Senor (1992). Two Factor Theories, Meaning Wholism and Intentionalistic Psychology: A Reply to Fodor. Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):133-151.score: 9.0
    In the third chapter of his book Psychosemantics , Jerry A. Fodor argues that the truth of meaning holism (the thesis that the content of a psychological state is determined by the totality of that state's epistemic liaisons) would be fatal for intentionalistic psychology. This is because holism suggests that no two people are ever in the same intentional state, and so a psychological theory that generalizes over such states will be composed of generalizations which fail to generalize. Fodor (...)
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  5. Eddy Nahmias (forthcoming). The Psychology of Free Will. In The Oxford Handbook on Philosophy of Psychology. Oxford University Press.score: 9.0
    I have argued that the traditional free will debate has focused too much on whether free will is compatible with determinism and not enough on whether free will is compatible with specific causal explanations for our actions, including those offered by empirical psychology. If free will is understood as a set of cognitive and volitional capacities, possessed and exercised to varying degrees, then psychology can inform us about the extent to which humans (as a species and as individuals) (...)
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  6. Cory D. Wright (2007). Is Psychological Explanation Going Extinct? In Huib Looren de Jong & Maurice Schouten (eds.), The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction. Oxford: Blackwell.score: 9.0
    Psychoneural reductionists sometimes claim that sufficient amounts of lower-level explanatory achievement preclude further contributions from higher-level psychological research. Ostensibly, with nothing left to do, the effect of such preclusion on psychological explanation is extinction. Reductionist arguments for preclusion have recently involved a reorientation within the philosophical foundations of neuroscience---namely, away from the philosophical foundations and toward the neuroscience. In this chapter, I review a successful reductive explanation of an aspect of reward function in terms of dopaminergic operations of the mesocorticolimbic (...)
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  7. Joshua Knobe (2003). Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental Investigation. Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):309-325.score: 9.0
    Four experiments examined people’s folk-psychological concept of intentional action. The chief question was whether or not _evaluative _considerations — considerations of good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame — played any role in that concept. The results indicated that the moral qualities of a behavior strongly influence people’s judgements as to whether or not that behavior should be considered ‘intentional.’ After eliminating a number of alternative explanations, the author concludes that this effect is best explained by the hypothesis (...)
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  8. Stan Klein (2014). What Can Recent Replication Failures Tell Us About the Theoretical Commitments of Psychology? Theory and Psychology 24:326-338.score: 9.0
    I suggest that the recent, highly visible, and often heated debate over failures to replicate the results in the social sciences reveals more than the need for greater attention to the pragmatics and value of empirical falsification. It also is a symptom of a serious issue -- the underdeveloped state of theory in many areas of psychology. While I focus on the phenomenon of “social priming” -- since it figures centrally in current debate -- it is not the only (...)
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  9. Konrad Banicki (2009). The Berlin Wisdom Paradigm: A Conceptual Analysis of a Psychological Approach to Wisdom. History and Philosophy of Psychology 11 (2):25-35.score: 9.0
    The main purpose of this article is to undertake a conceptual investigation of the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm: a psychological project initiated by Paul Baltes and intended to study the complex phenomenon of wisdom. Firstly, in order to provide a wider perspective for the subsequent analyses, a short historical sketch is given. Secondly, a meta-theoretical issue of the degree to which the subject matter of the Baltesian study can be identified with the traditional philosophical wisdom is addressed. The main result yielded (...)
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  10. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2007). Wittgenstein on Psychological Certainty. In , Perspicuous Presentations: Essays on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 9.0
    As is well known, Wittgenstein pointed out an asymmetry between first- and third-person psychological statements: the first, unlike the latter, involve observation or a claim to knowledge and are constitutionally open to uncertainty. In this paper, I challenge this asymmetry and Wittgenstein's own affirmation of the constitutional uncertainty of third-person psychological statements, and argue that Wittgenstein ultimately did too. I first show that, on his view, most of our third-person psychological statements are noncognitive; they stem from a subjective certainty: a (...)
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  11. Jussi Jylkkä, Henry Railo & Jussi Haukioja (2009). Psychological Essentialism and Semantic Externalism: Evidence for Externalism in Lay Speakers' Language Use. Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):37-60.score: 9.0
    Some experimental studies have recently claimed to undermine semantic externalism about natural kind terms. However, it is unclear how philosophical accounts of reference can be experimentally tested. We present two externalistic adaptations of psychological placeholder essentialism, a strict externalist and a hybrid externalist view, which are experimentally testable. We examine Braisby's et al. (1996) study which claims to undermine externalism, and argue that the study fails in its aims. We conducted two experiments, the results of which undermine internalism and the (...)
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  12. David Morrow (2009). Moral Psychology and the Mencian Creature. Philosophical Psychology 22 (3):281-304.score: 9.0
    Recent work in various branches of philosophy has reinvigorated debate over the psychology behind moral judgment. Using Marc Hauser's categorization of theories as “Kantian,” “Humean,” or “Rawlsian” to frame the discussion, I argue that the existing evidence weighs against the Kantian model and partly in favor of both the Humean and the Rawlsian models. Emotions do play a causal role in the formation of our moral judgments, as the Humean model claims, but there are also unconscious principles shaping our (...)
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  13. Huib L. de Jong (2002). Levels of Explanation in Biological Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):441-462.score: 9.0
    Until recently, the notions of function and multiple realization were supposed to save the autonomy of psychological explanations. Furthermore, the concept of supervenience presumably allows both dependence of mind on brain and non-reducibility of mind to brain, reconciling materialism with an independent explanatory role for mental and functional concepts and explanations. Eliminativism is often seen as the main or only alternative to such autonomy. It gladly accepts abandoning or thoroughly reconstructing the psychological level, and considers reduction if successful as equivalent (...)
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  14. Robert Lockie (2003). Depth Psychology and Self-Deception. Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):127-148.score: 9.0
    This paper argues that self-deception cannot be explained without employing a depth-psychological ("psychodynamic") notion of the unconscious, and therefore that mainstream academic psychology must make space for such approaches. The paper begins by explicating the notion of a dynamic unconscious. Then a brief account is given of the "paradoxes" of self-deception. It is shown that a depth-psychological self of parts and subceptive agency removes any such paradoxes. Next, several competing accounts of self-deception are considered: an attentional account, a constructivist (...)
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  15. Bradley Franks (2005). The Role of "the Environment" in Cognitive and Evolutionary Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):59-82.score: 9.0
    Evolutionary psychology is widely understood as involving an integration of evolutionary theory and cognitive psychology, in which the former promises to revolutionise the latter. In this paper, I suggest some reasons to doubt that the assumptions of evolutionary theory and of cognitive psychology are as directly compatible as is widely assumed. These reasons relate to three different problems of specifying adaptive functions as the basis for characterising cognitive mechanisms: the disjunction problem, the grain problem and the environment (...)
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  16. John D. Greenwood (1992). Against Eliminative Materialism: From Folk Psychology to Volkerpsychologie. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):349-68.score: 9.0
    In this paper it is argued that we would not be logically obliged or rationally inclined to reject the ontology of contentful psychological states postulated by folk psychology even if the explanations advanced by folk psychology turned out to be generally inaccurate or inadequate. Moreover, it is argued that eliminativists such as Paul Churchland do not establish that folk psychological explanations are, or are likely to prove, generally inaccurate or inadequate. Most of Churchland's arguments—based upon developments within connectionist (...)
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  17. Bill Wringe (2002). Is Folk Psychology a Lakatosian Research Program? Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):343-358.score: 9.0
    It has often been argued, by philosophers and more recently by developmental psychologists, that our common-sense conception of the mind should be regarded as a scientific theory. However, those who advance this view rarely say much about what they take a scientific theory to be. In this paper, I look at one specific proposal as to how we should interpret the theory view of folk psychology--namely, by seeing it as having a structure analogous to that of a Lakatosian research (...)
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  18. Michael J. Shaffer & Jeffery Oakley (2005). Some Epistemological Concerns About Dissociative Identity Disorder and Diagnostic Practices in Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):1-29.score: 9.0
    In this paper we argue that dissociative identity disorder (DID) is best interpreted as a causal model of a (possible) post-traumatic psychological process, as a mechanical model of an abnormal psychological condition. From this perspective we examine and criticize the evidential status of DID, and we demonstrate that there is really no good reason to believe that anyone has ever suffered from DID so understood. This is so because the proponents of DID violate basic methodological principles of good causal modeling. (...)
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  19. G. Fletcher (1995). Two Uses of Folk Psychology: Implications for Psychological Science. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):375-88.score: 9.0
    This article describes two uses of folk psychology in scientific psychology. Use 1 deals with the way in which folk theories and beliefs are imported into social psychological models on the basis that they exert causal influences on cognition or behavior (regardless of their validity or scientific usefulness). Use 2 describes the practice of mining elements from folk psychology for building an overarching psychological theory that goes beyond common sense (and assumes such elements are valid or scientifically (...)
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  20. Matthew Rellihan (2012). Adaptationism and Adaptive Thinking in Evolutionary Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):245-277.score: 9.0
    Evolutionary psychologists attempt to infer our evolved psychology from the selection pressures present in our ancestral environments. Their use of this inference strategy?often called ?adaptive thinking??is thought to be justified by way of appeal to a rather modest form of adaptationism, according to which the mind's adaptive complexity reveals it to be a product of selection. I argue, on the contrary, that the mind's being an adaptation is only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for the validity of (...)
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  21. Robert I. Reynolds (1988). A Psychological Definition of Illusion. Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):217-223.score: 9.0
    The psychological concept of illusion is defined as a process involving an interaction of logical and empirical considerations. Common usage suggests that an illusion is a discrepancy between one's awareness and some stimulus. Following preliminary definitions of classes of stimuli, five definitions of illusion are considered, based upon the possible discrepancies between awareness and a stimulus. It is found that each of these definitions fails to make important distinctions, even to the point of equating all illusory and perceptual phenomena. This (...)
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  22. Kenneth J. Sufka & Derek D. Turner (2005). An Evolutionary Account of Chronic Pain: Integrating the Natural Method in Evolutionary Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):243-257.score: 9.0
    This paper offers an evolutionary account of chronic pain. Chronic pain is a maladaptive by-product of pain mechanisms and neural plasticity, both of which are highly adaptive. This account shows how evolutionary psychology can be integrated with Flanagan's natural method, and in a way that avoids the usual charges of panglossian adaptationism and an uncritical commitment to a modular picture of the mind. Evolutionary psychology is most promising when it adopts a bottom-up research strategy that focuses on basic (...)
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  23. M. Forster & Eric Saidel (1994). Connectionism and the Fate of Folk Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):437-52.score: 9.0
    Abstract Ramsey, Stick and Garon (1991) argue that if the correct theory of mind is some parallel distributed processing theory, then folk psychology must be false. Their idea is that if the nodes and connections that encode one representation are causally active then all representations encoded by the same set of nodes and connections are also causally active. We present a clear, and concrete, counterexample to RSG's argument. In conclusion, we suggest that folk psychology and connectionism are best (...)
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  24. Elizabeth Valentine (1988). Teleological Explanations and Their Relation to Causal Explanation in Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):61-68.score: 9.0
    The relation of teleological to causal explanations in psychology is examined. Nagel's claim that they are logically equivalent is rejected. Two arguments for their non-equivalence are considered: (i) the impossibility of specifying initial conditions in the case of teleological explanations and (ii) the claim that different kinds of logic are involved. The view that causal explanations provide only necessary conditions whereas teleological explanations provide sufficient conditions is rejected: causal explanations can provide sufficient conditions, typically being unable to provide necessary (...)
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  25. William E. Lyons (1992). Intentionality and Modern Philosophical Psychology, III--The Appeal to Teleology. Philosophical Psychology 5 (3):309-326.score: 9.0
    This article is the sequel to 'Intentionality and Modern philosophical psychology, I. The modern reduction of intentionality,' (Philosophical Psychology, 3 (2), 1990) which examined the view of intentionality pioneered by Carnap and reaching its apotheosis in the work of Daniel Dennett. In 'Intentionality and modem philosophical psychology, II. The return to representation' (Philosophical Psychology, 4(1), 1991) I examined the approach to intentionality which can be traced back to the work of Noam Chomsky but which has been (...)
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  26. William S. Robinson (1996). Mild Realism, Causation, and Folk Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 8 (2):167-87.score: 9.0
    Daniel Dennett (1991) has advanced a mild realism in which beliefs are described as patterns “discernible in agents' (observable) behavior” (p. 30). I clarify the conflict between this otherwise attractive theory and the strong realist view that beliefs are internal states that cause actions. Support for strong realism is sometimes derived from the assumption that the everyday psychology of the folk is committed to it. My main thesis here is that we have sufficient reason neither for strong realism nor (...)
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  27. Douglas N. Walton & K. T. Strongman (1998). Neonate Crusoes, the Private Language Argument and Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):443-65.score: 9.0
    This article questions social constructionists' claims to introduce Wittgenstein's philosophy to psychology. The philosophical fiction of a neonate Crusoe is introduced to cast doubt on the interpretations and use of the private language argument to support a new psychology developed by the constructionists. It is argued that a neonate Crusoe's viability in philosophy and apparent absence in psychology offends against the integrity of the philosophical contribution Wittgenstein might make to psychology. The consequences of accepting Crusoe's viability (...)
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  28. William E. Lyons (1990). Intentionality and Modern Philosophical Psychology I: The Modern Reduction of Intentionality. Philosophical Psychology 3 (2 & 3):247-69.score: 9.0
    In rounded terms and modem dress a theory of intentionality is a theory about how humans take in information via the senses and in the very process of taking it in understand it and, most often, make subsequent use of it in guiding human behaviour. The problem of intentionality in this century has been the problem of providing an adequate explanation of how a purely physical causal system, the brain, can both receive information and at the same time understand it, (...)
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  29. George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (1988). How to Be Realistic About Folk Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):69-81.score: 9.0
    Folk psychological realism is the view that folk psychology is true and that people really do have propositional attitudes, whereas anti-realism is the view that folk psychology is false and people really do not have propositional attitudes. We argue that anti-realism is not worthy of acceptance and that realism is eminently worthy of acceptance. However, it is plainly epistemically possible to favor either of two forms of folk realism: scientific or non-scientific. We argue that non-scientific realism, while perhaps (...)
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  30. Paul K. Moser (1994). Naturalism and Psychological Explanation. Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):63-84.score: 9.0
    This article explores the possibility of naturalized theory of action. It distinguishes ontological naturalism from conceptual naturalism, and asks whether a defensible theory of action can be either ontologically or conceptually naturalistic. The distinction between conditions for an ontology and conditions for a concept receives support from Donald Davidson's identification of two modes of explanation for action: rational and physical causal explanation. Davidson's action theory provides a naturalized ontology for action theory, but not a naturalized concept of intentional action. This (...)
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  31. Katarzyna Paprzycka (2002). False Consciousness of Intentional Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):271-295.score: 9.0
    According to explanatory individualism, every action must be explained in terms of an agent's desire. According to explanatory nonindividualism, we sometimes act on our desires, but it is also possible for us to act on others' desires without acting on desires of our own. While explanatory nonindividualism has guided the thinking of many social scientists, it is considered to be incoherent by most philosophers of mind who insist that actions must be explained ultimately in terms of some desire of the (...)
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  32. Herbert Spiegelberg (1972). Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry. Evanston [Ill.]Northwestern University Press.score: 9.0
    Phenomenological Psychology in Phenomenological Philosophy [i] Introductory Remarks The chief purpose of the present chapter is to serve as a reminder. ...
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  33. William T. O'Donohue & Richard F. Kitchener (eds.) (1996). The Philosophy of Psychology. Sage Publications.score: 9.0
    This essential book provides a comprehensive explanation of the key topics and debates arising in the philosophy of psychology. In editors William O'Donohue and Richard Kitchener's thoughtful examination, philosophy and psychology converge on several themes of great importance such as the foundations of knowledge, the nature of science, rationality, behaviorism, cognitive science, folk psychology, neuropsychology, psychoanalysis, professionalism, and research ethics. The Philosophy of Psychology also provides an in-depth discussion of ethics in counseling and psychiatry while exploring (...)
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  34. Thomas Sturm & Mitchell G. Ash (2005). The Roles of Instruments in Psychological Research. History of Psychology 8:3-34.score: 9.0
    What roles have instruments played in psychology and related disciplines? How have instruments affected the dynamics of psychological research, with what possibilities and limits? What is a psychological instrument? This paper provides a conceptual foundation for specific case studies concerning such questions. The discussion begins by challenging widely accepted assumptions about the subject and analyzing the general relations between scientific experimentation and the uses of instruments in psychology. Building on this analysis, a deliberately inclusive definition of what constitutes (...)
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  35. George Mandler (2011). Crises and Problems Seen From Experimental Psychology. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):240-246.score: 9.0
    Experimental psychology in the early 20th century was targeted by several authors who described a crisis— often expressed as a lack of theoretical and experimental progress. In the 21st century, the crisis of competing theories has been largely overcome but several current emphases hinder the development of a mature experimental science. Central among these are an ethnocentrism that focuses on Western standards and populations, neuroscientism which often treats neurological evidence independently of mental and behavioral events, and the tendency for (...)
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  36. Niki Pfeifer & Igor Douven (2013). Formal Epistemology and the New Paradigm Psychology of Reasoning. Review of Philosophy and Psychology (2):1-23.score: 9.0
    This position paper advocates combining formal epistemology and the new paradigm psychology of reasoning in the studies of conditionals and reasoning with uncertainty. The new paradigm psychology of reasoning is characterized by the use of probability theory as a rationality framework instead of classical logic, used by more traditional approaches to the psychology of reasoning. This paper presents a new interdisciplinary research program which involves both formal and experimental work. To illustrate the program, the paper discusses recent (...)
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  37. Bradley Franks (1992). Realism and Folk Psychology in the Ascription of Concepts. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):369-390.score: 9.0
    This paper discusses some requirements on a folk-psychological, computational account of concepts. Although most psychological views take the folk-psychological stance that concept-possession requires capacities of both representation and classification, such views lack a philosophical context. In contrast, philosophically motivated views stress one of these capacities at the expense of the other. This paper seeks to provide some philosophical motivation for the (folk-) psychological stance. Philosophical and psychological constraints on a computational level account provide the context for evaluating two theses. The (...)
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  38. J. W. Osborne & M. J. Mollette (2009). Grand Challenges in Educational Psychology. Frontiers in Psychology 1:157-157.score: 9.0
    Grand Challenges in Educational Psychology.
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  39. Konrad Banicki (2014). Positive Psychology on Character Strengths and Virtues. A Disquieting Suggestion. New Ideas in Psychology 33:21-34.score: 9.0
    The Values in Action (VIA) classification of character strengths and virtues has been recently proposed by two leading positive psychologists, Christopher Peterson and Martin Seligman as “the social science equivalent of virtue ethics.” The very possibility of developing this kind of an “equivalent,” however, is very doubtful in the light of the cogent criticism that has been leveled at modern moral theory by Alasdair MacIntyre as well as the well argued accusations that positive psychology, despite its official normative neutrality, (...)
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  40. P. Weatherall (1996). What Do Propositions Measure in Folk Psychology? Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):365-80.score: 9.0
    In this paper I examine the analogical argument that the use that is made of propositions in folk psychology in the characterisation of propositional attitudes is no more puzzling than the use that is made of numbers in the physical sciences in the measurement of physical properties. It has been argued that the result of this analogy is that there is no need to postulate the existence of sentences in a language of thought which underpin the propositional characterisation of (...)
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  41. Burt C. Hopkins (1998). The Structure, Basic Contents, and Dynamics of the Unconscious in Analytical (Jungian) Psychology and Husserlian Phenomenology: Part Ii. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 29 (1):1-49.score: 9.0
    This paper offers both a phenomenologically psychological and a phenomenologically transcendental account of the constitution of the unconscious. Its phenomenologically psychological portion was published in the previous volume of this journal as Part I, while its phenomenologically transcendental portion is published here as Part II. Part I first clarified the issues involved in Husserl's differentiation of the respective contents and methodologies of psychological and transcendental phenomenology. On the basis of this clarification it showed that, in marked contrast to the prevailing (...)
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  42. S. Mandelkar (1991). An Argument Against the Externalist Account of Psychological Content. Philosophical Psychology 4 (3):375-82.score: 9.0
    Abstract I first suggest some ways in which the externalist account of psychological content can be reconciled with the aspectual character of intentionality. I then give an argument against the externalist account which includes as premises the claims that a system capable of having intentional states must understand a language, and that a system that understands a language must be capable of consciousness. I defend the latter claim by arguing that a correct understanding of observation sentences requires conscious, sensory experience, (...)
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  43. Mathieu Arminjon (2013). Is Psychoanalysis a Folk Psychology? Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 9.0
    Even as the neuro-psychoanalytic field has matured, the epistemological status of Freudian interpretations still remains problematic. As a result of the resurgence of hermeneutics, the claim has been made that psychoanalysis is an extension of folk psychology. For these “extensionists”, asking psychoanalysis to prove its interpretations would be as absurd as demanding the proofs of the scientific accuracy of folk psychology. I propose to show how Dennett’s theory of the intentional stance allows us to defend an extensionist position (...)
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  44. Lisa Tsoi Hoshmand & Jack Martin (1994). Naturalizing the Epistemology of Psychological Research. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):171-189.score: 9.0
    It is proposed that psychologists need a working theory of knowledge for conceptual and discourse purposes. Arguments are made from a pragmatist view of science for a conception of inquiry practice that may resolve current paradigm conflicts and support a viable methodological pluralism. The suggestion is made that a naturalized approach to research practice, such as historical-descriptive case study, may illuminate the judgments and intentions constitutive of our applied epistemology and methodological choices. Implications of such meta-methodological understanding for research training (...)
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  45. Jessica Dere, Jiahong Sun, Yue Zhao, Tonje J. Persson, Xiongzhao Zhu, Shuqiao Yao, R. Michael Bagby & Andrew G. Ryder (2013). Beyond “Somatization” and “Psychologization”: Symptom-Level Variation in Depressed Han Chinese and Euro-Canadian Outpatients. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 9.0
    The finding that people of Chinese heritage tend to emphasize somatic rather than psychological symptoms of depression has frequently been discussed in the culture and mental health literature since the 1970s. Recent studies have confirmed that Chinese samples report more somatic and fewer psychological depression symptoms compared to ‘Western’ samples. The question remains, however, as to whether or not these effects are attributable to variation in all the constituent symptoms or to a subset. If the latter, there is the additional (...)
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  46. Lois A. Gelfand & Sally Engelhart (2012). Dynamical Systems Theory in Psychology: Assistance for the Lay Reader is Required. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 9.0
    Dynamical Systems Theory in Psychology: Assistance for the Lay Reader is Required.
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  47. Brian M. D. Johnson (2011). Psychoanalytic Treatment of Psychological Addiction to Alcohol (Alcohol Abuse). Frontiers in Psychology 2.score: 9.0
    The DSM-V Committee plans to abolish the distinction between Alcohol Abuse and Alcohol Dependence (DSM5.org). The author presents a case report as a proof of concept that this distinction should be retained. The author has asserted that Alcohol Abuse is a purely psychological addiction, while Alcohol Dependence involves capture of the ventral tegmental dopaminergic SEEKING system (Johnson 2003). In psychological addiction the brain can be assumed to function normally, and ordinary psychoanalytic technique can be followed. For the patient described, transference (...)
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  48. C. R. Legg (1988). Connectionism and Physiological Psychology: A Marriage Made in Heaven? Philosophical Psychology 1 (3):263-78.score: 9.0
    Abstract Physiological psychology has its conceptual roots in stimulus?response behaviourism. The resurgence of cognitive concepts in mainstream psychology has led to a separation between the two, largely due to the failure of most cognitive theories to specify how their explanatory processes could be realised in the nervous system. Connectionism looks as if it may be able to bridge this gap. The problem is that connectionism takes a radically different view of the brain from that adopted in traditional physiological (...)
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  49. Sally Engelhart Lois A. Gelfand (2012). Dynamical Systems Theory in Psychology: Assistance for the Lay Reader is Required. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 9.0
    Dynamical Systems Theory in Psychology: Assistance for the Lay Reader is Required.
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  50. Gian Mauro Manzoni, Giada Pietrabissa & Gianluca Castelnuovo (2012). Psychological and Behavioral Approaches to Cardiac Patients Facing Specific Adjustment Challenges. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 9.0
    Psychological and behavioral approaches to cardiac patients facing specific adjustment challenges.
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