Search results for 'Psychotherapy, Rational-Emotive' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  6
    Arthur Still (2012). The Historical and Philosophical Context of Rational Psychotherapy: The Legacy of Epictetus. Karnac.
    The place of rationality in Stoicism and REBT -- Ellis and Epictetus: dialogue vs. method in psychotherapy -- The intellectual origins of Rational Psychotherapy: twentieth-century writers -- REBT and rationality: philosophical approaches -- Rationality and the shoulds -- When did a psychologist last discuss "chagrin"?: American psychology's continuing moral project -- The social psychology of "pseudoscience": a brief history -- Historical aspects of mindfulness and self-acceptance in psychotherapy -- Marginalisation is not unbearable, is it even undesirable?
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  2.  39
    Donald Robertson (2010). The Philosophy of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (Cbt): Stoic Philosophy as Rational and Cognitive Psychotherapy. Karnac.
    Pt. I. Philosophy and cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) -- Ch. 1. The "philosophical origins" of CBT -- Ch. 2. The beginning of modern cognitive therapy -- Ch. 3. A brief history of philosophical therapy -- Ch. 4. Stoic philosophy and psychology -- Ch. 5. Rational emotion in stoicism and CBT -- Ch. 6 Stoicism and Ellis's rational therapy (REBT) -- Pt. II. The stoic armamentarium -- Ch. 7. Contemplation of the ideal stage -- Ch. 8. Stoic mindfulness of the "here and (...)
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  3. Raymond A. DiGiuseppe, Kristene A. Doyle, Windy Dryden & Wouter Backx (2013). A Practitioner's Guide to Rational-Emotive Behavior Therapy. Oxford University Press Usa.
    Extensively updated to include clinical findings over the last two decades, this third edition of A Practitioner's Guide to Rational-Emotive Behavior Therapy reviews the philosophy, theory, and clinical practice of Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy. This model is based on the work of Albert Ellis, who had an enormous influence on the field of psychotherapy over his 50 years of practice and scholarly writing. Designed for both therapists-in-training and seasoned professionals, this practical treatment manual and guide introduces the basic principles (...)
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  4.  4
    Arthur Still & Windy Dryden (1998). The Intellectual Origins of Rational Psychotherapy. History of the Human Sciences 11 (3):63-86.
    In this paper we attempt to understand the intellectual origins of Albert Ellis' Rational Psychotherapy (now known as Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy). In his therapeutic practice Ellis used a 'lumper' argument to replace the focus of change in psychoanalysis: not the lengthy uncovering and reworking of the individual's personal history, but the demands in self-talk through which the client is currently dis turbed. In constructing around this the persuasive (rhetorical) package that became his therapy, Ellis drew on a number of (...)
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  5. Brad Johnson (2008). Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy and the God Image. In Glendon Moriarty & Louis Hoffman (eds.), God Image Handbook for Spiritual Counseling and Psychotherapy: Research, Theory, and Practice. Haworth Pastoral Press
     
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  6.  14
    Albert Ellis (1990). The Philosophical Basis of Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET). International Journal of Applied Philosophy 5 (2):35-41.
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  7.  7
    Donald Hatcher, Tony Brown & Kelli Gariglietti (2001). Critical Thinking and Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy. Inquiry 20 (3):6-18.
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  8. A. Ellis (1985). Two Forms of Humanistic Psychology: Rational-Emotive Therapy Vs. Transpersonal Psychology. Free Inquiry 15 (4).
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  9.  41
    Asher Moore (1951). The Emotive Theory and Rational Methods in Moral Controversy. Mind 60 (238):233-240.
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  10.  31
    William Ferraiolo (2011). Donald Robertson, The Philosophy of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT): Stoic Philosophy as Rational and Cognitive Psychotherapy. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (2):239-243.
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  11.  4
    Louis C. Charland (2006). La psychopathologie et le statut d'espèce naturelle de l'émotion. Philosophiques 33 (1):217-230.
    La thérapie rationnelle des émotions est basée sur l’hypothèse qu’un trouble de la pensée conduit à des troubles du sentiment qui eux-mêmes conduisent à des troubles de comportement. Du point de vue thérapeutique, la stratégie consiste à corriger les sentiments et le comportement en modifiant le trouble de raisonnement. Cette forme très en vogue de psychothérapie des troubles émotionnels fournit une illustration intéressante des relations nomologiques intriquées qui peuvent exister entre les patrons relativement fixes d’états émotionnels, d’états comportementaux et d’états (...)
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  12. Warren A. Shibles (1978). Rational Love. Language Press.
  13.  7
    Bradley N. Seeman (2004). Whose Rationality? Which Cognitive Psychotherapy? International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):201-222.
    Richard Brandt’s “Second Puzzle” for utilitarianism asks: What is meant to count as benefit or utility? In addressing this puzzle, Brandt dismisses “objective” theories of utility as prejudging substantive moral issues and opts for “subjective” theories of utility based either on desire-satisfaction or happiness, so as to welcome people with a variety of substantive moral commitments into his utilitarian system. However, subjective theories have difficulties finding principled grounds for elevating one desire over another. Brandt attempts to circumvent the difficulties through (...)
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  14. Mario Jacoby (1999). Jungian Psychotherapy and Contemporary Infant Research: Basic Patterns of Emotional Exchange. Routledge.
    Infant research observations and hypotheses have raised serious questions about previous mainstream psychoanalytic theories of earliest childhood development. In _Jungian Psychotherapy and Contemporary Infant Research,_ Mario Jacoby looks at how these observations are relevant to psychotherapeutic and Jungian analytical practice. Using recent findings in infant research, along with practical examples from therapeutic practice, he shows how early emotional exchange processes, though becoming superimposed in adult life by rational control and various defenses, remain operative and become reactivated in situations of intimacy. (...)
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  15. Jean-Luc Mommaerts & Dirk Devroey (2013). From "Does It Work?" to "What is 'It'?": Implications for Voodoo, Psychotherapy, Pop-Psychology, Regular, and Alternative Medicine. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 56 (2):274-288.
    Historically, "Healing Methods" (HMS) have not been based on rational theories. Of the thousands of HMs that have arisen over the ages, only a small number survive today, drawing their power and longevity mostly from their superior ability to act as a placebo within the context of modern-day culture, rather than through any other mode of action.When it comes to HMs, Western scientific culture has not yet evolved beyond a pre-scientific stage (Fancher 1995). A scientific analysis of the part played (...)
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  16.  20
    Arnold Kozak (1992). The Epistemic Consequences of Pervasive and Embodied Metaphor: Applications to Psychotherapy. Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):137-154.
    Examines the pervasive nature of metaphor in conceptual, rational, and narrative experience and demonstrates that conceptual and communicative meaning is dependent on metaphorical understandings. It is suggested that these understandings are primary and derived from embodied experience and cannot be understood outside of this experience. Metaphors are the expressions of preconceptual experiences that are organized into conceptual thought via image schemata. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).
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  17. Joshua Schechter (2013). Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.
    Closure for justification is the claim that thinkers are justified in believing the logical consequences of their justified beliefs, at least when those consequences are competently deduced. Many have found this principle to be very plausible. Even more attractive is the special case of Closure known as Single-Premise Closure. In this paper, I present a challenge to Single-Premise Closure. The challenge is based on the phenomenon of rational self-doubt – it can be rational to be less than fully confident in (...)
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  18.  3
    Warren Shibles (1994). Humanistic Art. Critical Review 8 (3):371-392.
    The cognitive theory of emotion (also called the rational?emotive theory) clarifies the notion of aesthetic emotion and evaluation, and when combined with Dewey's humanism and a naturalistic theory of valuation provides a basis for a holistic theory of aesthetics. From the holistic perspective, no act is moral unless it is also aesthetic. On this view, the aesthetic is no longer reduced to atomistic or quantitative perspectives, but becomes a part of our total purposive life experience. It expresses itself in gentleness (...)
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  19.  5
    Adrian Opre & Dana Opre (2010). The Gender Sterotype Threat And The Academic Performance Of Women's University Teaching Staff. Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 5 (14):41-50.
    Women working in academic environments that are male dominated are subjected to high levels of occupational stress due to the so called stereotype threat (ST) (Steele, 1997). Stereotype threat is a social-psychological threat that arises when one is in the situation of doing something for which a negative stereotype about his/her group applies. For women's university teaching staff stereotype threat is a source of anxiety that affects their performance, career commitment and overall job satisfaction. Additionally ST accounts, partly, for the (...)
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  20. Neil Bright (2015). Rethinking Everything: Personal Growth Through Transactional Analysis. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    Combining widely-accepted concepts of human behavior with elements from Rational Emotive Therapy, Positive Psychology, Emotional Intelligence, and most prominently Transactional Analysis, Rethinking Everything explores in immediately understandable terms why we act as we do, how we frequently undermine our relationships, why we often cripple our potential, and how we can take greater control of our lives.
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  21. Neil Bright (2015). Rethinking Everything: Personal Growth Through Transactional Analysis. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    Combining widely-accepted concepts of human behavior with elements from Rational Emotive Therapy, Positive Psychology, Emotional Intelligence, and most prominently Transactional Analysis, Rethinking Everything explores in immediately understandable terms why we act as we do, how we frequently undermine our relationships, why we often cripple our potential, and how we can take greater control of our lives.
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  22.  12
    Fabrizio Macagno & Douglas Walton (2014). Emotive Language in Argumentation. Cambridge University Press.
    This book analyzes the uses of emotive language and redefinitions from pragmatic, dialectical, epistemic and rhetorical perspectives, investigating the relationship between emotions, persuasion and meaning, and focusing on the implicit dimension of the use of a word and its dialectical effects. It offers a method for evaluating the persuasive and manipulative uses of emotive language in ordinary and political discourse. Through the analysis of political speeches and legal arguments, the book offers a systematic study of emotive language in argumentation, rhetoric, (...)
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  23. Fabian Dorsch (2016). The Phenomenology of Attitudes and the Salience of Rational Role and Determination. Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):114-137.
    The recent debate on cognitive phenomenology has largely focused on phenomenal aspects connected to the content of thoughts. By contrasts, aspects pertaining to their attitude have often been neglected, despite the fact that they are distinctive of the mental kind of thought concerned and, moreover, also present in experiences and thus less contentious than purely cognitive aspects. My main goal is to identify two central and closely related aspects of attitude that are phenomenologically salient and shared by thoughts with experiences, (...)
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  24. Jaana Woiceshyn (2011). A Model for Ethical Decision Making in Business: Reasoning, Intuition, and Rational Moral Principles. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 104 (3):311-323.
    How do business leaders make ethical decisions? Given the significant and wide-spread impact of business people’s decisions on multiple constituents, how they make decisions matters. Unethical decisions harm the decision makers themselves as well as others, whereas ethical decisions have the opposite effect. Based on data from a study on strategic decision making by 16 effective chief executive officers, I propose a model for ethical decision making in business in which reasoning and intuition interact through forming, recalling, and applying moral (...)
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  25.  27
    Thomas L. Griffiths, Falk Lieder & Noah D. Goodman (2015). Rational Use of Cognitive Resources: Levels of Analysis Between the Computational and the Algorithmic. Topics in Cognitive Science 7 (2):217-229.
    Marr's levels of analysis—computational, algorithmic, and implementation—have served cognitive science well over the last 30 years. But the recent increase in the popularity of the computational level raises a new challenge: How do we begin to relate models at different levels of analysis? We propose that it is possible to define levels of analysis that lie between the computational and the algorithmic, providing a way to build a bridge between computational- and algorithmic-level models. The key idea is to push the (...)
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  26. Kenneth S. Pope (2007). Ethics in Psychotherapy and Counseling: A Practical Guide. Jossey-Bass.
    Praise for Ethics in Psychotherapy and Counseling, Third Edition "This is absolutely the best text on professional ethics around. . . . This is a refreshingly open and inviting text that has become a classic in the field." —Derald Wing Sue, professor of psychology, Teachers College, Columbia University "I love this book! And so will therapists, supervisors, and trainees. In fact, it really should be required reading for every mental health professional and aspiring professional. . . . And it is (...)
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  27. Jonathan Way (2011). The Symmetry of Rational Requirements. Philosophical Studies 155 (2):227-239.
    Some irrational states can be avoided in more than one way. For example, if you believe that you ought to A you can avoid akrasia by intending to A or by dropping the belief that you ought to A. This supports the claim that some rational requirements are wide-scope. For instance, the requirement against akrasia is a requirement to intend to A or not believe that you ought to A. But some writers object that this Wide-Scope view ignores asymmetries between (...)
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  28. Alberto Giubilini (2015). Don't Mind the Gap: Intuitions, Emotions, and Reasons in the Enhancement Debate. Hastings Center Report 45 (5):39-47.
    Reliance on intuitive and emotive responses is widespread across many areas of bioethics, and the current debate on biotechnological human enhancement is particularly interesting in this respect. A strand of “bioconservatives” that has explicitly drawn connections to the modern conservative tradition, dating back to Edmund Burke, appeals explicitly to the alleged wisdom of our intuitions and emotions to ground opposition to some biotechnologies or their uses. So-called bioliberals, those who in principle do not oppose human bioenhancement, tend to rely on (...)
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  29.  19
    Dennis Schulting (forthcoming). Review: Corey Dyck's "Kant and Rational Psychology". [REVIEW] Studi Kantiani 29.
    This is a review of Corey Dyck's "Kant and Rational Psychology" (OUP 2014), in which among other things I criticise Dyck's claim that in the Critique Kant no longer identifies the "I think" with the "I am". (forthcoming in Studi kantiani XXIX 2016).
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  30.  43
    Ruth Chang (2016). “Comparativism: The Ground of Rational Choice,” in Errol Lord and Barry McGuire, Eds., Weighing Reasons , 2016. In B. Maguire & E. Lord (eds.), Weighing Reasons. Oxford 213-240.
    What, normatively speaking, are the grounds of rational choice? This paper defends ‘comparativism’, the view that a comparative fact grounds rational choice. It examines three of the most serious challenges to comparativism: 1) that sometimes what grounds rational choice is an exclusionary-type relation among alternatives; 2) that an absolute fact such as that it’s your duty or conforms to the Categorial Imperative grounds rational choice; and 3) that rational choice between incomparables is possible, and in particular, all that is needed (...)
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  31.  93
    Andrew Reisner (2016). Peer Disagreement, Rational Requirements, and Evidence of Evidence as Evidence Against. In Pedro Schmechtig & Martin Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter 95-114.
    This chapter addresses an ambiguity in some of the literature on rational peer disagreement about the use of the term 'rational'. In the literature 'rational' is used to describe a variety of normative statuses related to reasons, justification, and reasoning. This chapter focuses most closely on the upshot of peer disagreement for what is rationally required of parties to a peer disagreement. This follows recent work in theoretical reason which treats rationality as a system of requirements among an agent's mental (...)
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  32. Richard Bradley & Christian List (2009). Desire-as-Belief Revisited. Analysis 69 (1):31-37.
    On Hume’s account of motivation, beliefs and desires are very different kinds of propositional attitudes. Beliefs are cognitive attitudes, desires emotive ones. An agent’s belief in a proposition captures the weight he or she assigns to this proposition in his or her cognitive representation of the world. An agent’s desire for a proposition captures the degree to which he or she prefers its truth, motivating him or her to act accordingly. Although beliefs and desires are sometimes entangled, they play very (...)
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  33. Edward Hinchman (2013). Rational Requirements and 'Rational' Akrasia. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):529-552.
    On one conception of practical rationality, being rational is most fundamentally a matter of avoiding incoherent combinations of attitudes. This conception construes the norms of rationality as codified by rational requirements, and one plausible rational requirement is that you not be akratic: that you not judge, all things considered, that you ought to ϕ while failing to choose or intend to ϕ. On another conception of practical rationality, being rational is most fundamentally a matter of thinking or acting in a (...)
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  34. Douglas W. Portmore, Acts, Attitudes, and Rational Choice.
    In this paper, I argue that we have obligations not only to perform certain actions, but also to have certain attitudes (such as desires, beliefs, and intentions), and this despite the fact that we rarely, if ever, have direct voluntary control over our attitudes. Moreover, I argue that whatever obligations we have with respect to actions derive from our obligations with respect to attitudes. More specifically, I argue that an agent is obligated to perform an action if and only if (...)
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  35.  9
    Laura C. Dunham (2010). From Rational to Wise Action: Recasting Our Theories of Entrepreneurship. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 92 (4):513 - 530.
    In this article, I argue that if we challenge some tacit assumptions of narrow rationality that endure in much of entrepreneurial studies, we can elevate entrepreneurial ethics beyond mere external constraints on rational action, and move toward fuller integration of ethics as an intrinsic part of the process of value creation itself. To this end, I propose the concept of practical wisdom as a framework for exploring entrepreneurial decision making and action that can broaden the scope of our research to (...)
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  36.  95
    Marc Champagne (2015). Don’T Be an Ass: Rational Choice and its Limits. Reason Papers 37 (1):137-147.
    Deliberation is often seen as the site of human freedom, but the binding power of rationality seems to imply that deliberation is, in its own way, a deterministic process. If one knows the starting preferences and circumstances of an agent, then, assuming that the agent is rational and that those preferences and circumstances don’t change, one should be in a position to predict what the agent will decide. However, given that an agent could conceivably confront equally attractive alternatives, it is (...)
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  37. Michael Cholbi (2011). The Moral Conversion of Rational Egoists. Social Theory and Practice 37 (4):533-556.
    One principal challenge to the rationalist thesis that the demands of morality are requirements of rationality has been that posed by the "rational egoist." In attempting to answer's the egoist's challenge, some rationalists have supposed that an adequate reply must take the form of a deductive argument that "converts" the egoist by showing that her position is contradictory, arbitrary, or violates some precept that defines practical rationality as such. Here I argue (a) that such rationalist replies will fail to persuade (...)
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  38.  30
    Fredrik Svenaeus (2009). The Ethics of Self-Change: Becoming Oneself by Way of Antidepressants or Psychotherapy? [REVIEW] Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 12 (2):169-178.
    This paper explores the differences between bringing about self-change by way of antidepressants versus psychotherapy from an ethical point of view, taking its starting point in the concept of authenticity. Given that the new antidepressants (SSRIs) are able not only to cure psychiatric disorders but also to bring about changes in the basic temperament structure of the person—changes in self-feeling—does it matter if one brings about such changes of the self by way of antidepressants or by way of psychotherapy? Are (...)
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  39.  57
    John Brunero (2013). Rational Akrasia. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4):546-566.
    It is commonly thought that one is irrationally akratic when one believes one ought to F but does not intend to F. However, some philosophers, following Robert Audi, have argued that it is sometimes rational to have this combination of attitudes. I here consider the question of whether rational akrasia is possible. I argue that those arguments for the possibility of rational akrasia advanced by Audi and others do not succeed. Specifically, I argue that cases in which an akratic agent (...)
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  40.  38
    Michael Cholbi (forthcoming). Paternalism and Our Rational Powers. Mind:fzv205.
    According to rational will views of paternalism, the wrongmaking feature of paternalism is that paternalists disregard or fail to respect the rational will of the paternalized, in effect substituting their own presumably superior judgments about what ends the paternalized ought to pursue or how they ought to pursue them. Here I defend a version of the rational will view appealing to three rational powers that constitute rational agency, which I call recognition, discrimination, and satisfaction. By appealing to these powers, my (...)
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  41. Peter J. Markie (2013). Rational Intuition and Understanding. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):271-290.
    Rational intuitions involve a particular form of understanding that gives them a special epistemic status. This form of understanding and its epistemic efficacy are not explained by several current theories of rational intuition, including Phenomenal Conservatism (Huemer, Skepticism and the veil of perception, 2001 ; Ethical intuitionism, 2005 ; Philos Phenomenol Res 74:30–55, 2007 ), Proper Functionalism (Plantinga, Warrant and proper function, 1993 ), the Competency Theory (Bealer Pac Philos Q 81:1–30, 2000 ; Sosa, A virtue epistemology, 2007 ) and (...)
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  42.  4
    Bernd Giese, Stefan Koenigstein, Henning Wigger, Jan C. Schmidt & Arnim von Gleich (2013). Rational Engineering Principles in Synthetic Biology: A Framework for Quantitative Analysis and an Initial Assessment. Biological Theory 8 (4):324-333.
    The term “synthetic biology” is a popular label of an emerging biotechnological field with strong claims to robustness, modularity, and controlled construction, finally enabling the creation of new organisms. Although the research community is heterogeneous, it advocates a common denominator that seems to define this field: the principles of rational engineering. However, it still remains unclear to what extent rational engineering—rather than “tinkering” or the usage of random based or non-rational processes—actually constitutes the basis for the techniques of synthetic biology. (...)
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  43. Nicholas Shackel (2013). Pseudoscience and Idiosyncratic Theories of Rational Belief. In M. Pigliucci & M. Boudry (eds.), The Philosophy of Pseudoscience. University of Chicago Press 417.
    I take pseudoscience to be a pretence at science. Pretences are innumerable, limited only by our imagination and credulity. As Stove points out, ‘numerology is actually quite as different from astrology as astrology is from astronomy’ (Stove 1991, 187). We are sure that ‘something has gone appallingly wrong’ (Stove 1991, 180) and yet ‘thoughts…can go wrong in a multiplicity of ways, none of which anyone yet understands’ (Stove 1991, 190). Often all we can do is give a careful description of (...)
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  44. Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford (2000). The Rational Analysis of Mind and Behavior. Synthese 122 (1-2):93-131.
    Rational analysis (Anderson 1990, 1991a) is an empiricalprogram of attempting to explain why the cognitive system isadaptive, with respect to its goals and the structure of itsenvironment. We argue that rational analysis has two importantimplications for philosophical debate concerning rationality. First,rational analysis provides a model for the relationship betweenformal principles of rationality (such as probability or decisiontheory) and everyday rationality, in the sense of successfulthought and action in daily life. Second, applying the program ofrational analysis to research on human reasoning (...)
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  45. Don Garrett (2007). Reasons to Act and Believe: Naturalism and Rational Justification in Hume's Philosophical Project. Philosophical Studies 132 (1):1 - 16.
    Is Hume a naturalist? Does he regard all or nearly all beliefs and actions as rationally unjustified? In order to settle these questions, it is necessary to examine their key terms (‘naturalism’ and ‘rational justification’) and to understand the character—especially the normative character—of Hume’s philosophical project. This paper argues (i) that Hume is a naturalist—and, in particular, both a moral and an epistemic naturalist—in quite robust ways; and (ii) that Hume can properly regard many actions and beliefs as “rationally justified” (...)
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  46. Ole Koksvik, Intuition, Belief and Rational Criticisability.
    A simple reductive view of intuition holds that intuition is a type of belief. That an agent who intuits that p sometimes believes that p is false is often thought to demonstrate that the simple reductive view is false. I show that this argument is inconclusive, but also that an argument for the same conclusion can be rebuilt using the notion of rational criticisability. I then use that notion to argue that perception is also not reducible to belief, and that (...)
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  47. Les Todres (2007). Embodied Enquiry: Phenomenological Touchstones for Research, Psychotherapy, and Spirituality. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Drawing on a particular emphasis within the phenomenological tradition as exemplified by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Eugene Gendlin, this book considers the role of the lived body as a way of knowing and being. The author, a psychologist, psychotherapist and qualitative researcher pursues this theme within three practical contexts that illustrate some of the nuances of embodied enquiry: qualitative research, psychotherapy, spirituality. The three sections of the book also provide examples of how embodied enquiry is not just a philosophical perspective but (...)
     
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  48.  88
    Edward McClennen (2010). Rational Choice and Moral Theory. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (5):521-540.
    Contemporary discussions of the positive relation between rational choice and moral theory are a special case of a much older tradition that seeks to show that mutual agreement upon certain moral rules works to the mutual advantage, or in the interests, of those who so agree. I make a few remarks about the history of discussions of the connection between morality and self-interest, after which I argue that the modern theory of rational choice can be naturally understood as a continuation (...)
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  49.  70
    Julian Fink (2010). Asymmetry, Scope, and Rational Consistency. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):109-130.
    Suppose rationality requires you to A if you believe you ought to A. Suppose you believe that you ought to A. How can you satisfy this requirement? One way seems obvious. You can satisfy this requirement by A-ing. But can you also satisfy it by stopping to believe that you ought to A? Recently, it has been argued that this second option is not a genuine way of satisfying the above requirement. Conditional requirements of rationality do not have two ‘symmetric’, (...)
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  50.  14
    Joe Saunders (2014). Kant, Rational Psychology and Practical Reason. Kant Yearbook 6 (1).
    In his pre-critical lectures on rational psychology, Kant employs an argument from the I to the transcendental freedom of the soul. In the (A-edition of the) first Critique, he distances himself from rational psychology, and instead offers four paralogisms of this doctrine, insisting that ‘I think’ no longer licenses any inferences about a soul. Kant also comes alive to the possibility that we could be thinking mechanisms – rational beings, but not agents. These developments rob him of his pre-critical rationalist (...)
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