This paper addresses the issue of the relationship between Ralph Johnson’s idea of dialectical tier and the critical scrutiny function in argument. We first give a concise articulation of the critical view of argument, and then probe into both the apparent similarities and deep discrepancies between the critical view of argument and Johnson’s views on the dialectical tier and manifest rationality. On that basis, we disprove the conjecture that the presence of a dialectical tier indicates that the thesis in argument (...) is critically established. However, we also urge to bridge together the critical view of argument and Johnson’s theory of argument, and thereby to make the dialectical tier critical in nature. We argue that this could be a promising proposal, and conclude with some remarks on exploring the critical dimension within our current study of argument. (shrink)
Sydney Shoemaker, developing an idea of Wittgenstein’s, argues that we are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun. Although we might be liable to error when “I” (or its cognates) is used as an object, we are immune to error when “I” is used as a subject (as when one says, “I have a toothache”). Shoemaker claims that the relationship between “I” as-subject and the mental states of which it is introspectively aware is tautological: when, say, we (...) judge that “I feel pain,” we are tautologically aware that feels pain is instantiated and that it is instantiated in oneself. Moreover, he contends that this relationship holds not just for bodily sensations, but also for the sense of agency and for visual perception. But we deny that this relationship is tautological; instead, we treat Shoemaker’s principle (IEM) as a hypothesis. We then proceed to show that certain pathological states and experimentally-induced illusions can be adduced to show that IEM describes not a necessary relationship but a contingent relationship, one that sometimes fails to obtain. That we are not immune to error in the way Shoemaker describes has grave consequences for many aspects of his ideas concerning the first-person perspective. In the course of arguing that these empirical phenomena count against IEM, we also show that not only can the content of conscious experience be misrepresented, so too can the subject: that is, not only can the what of conscious experience be misrepresented, so too can the who. (shrink)
Currently, one of the most influential theories of consciousness is Rosenthal’s version of higher-order-thought (HOT). We argue that the HOT theory allows for two distinct interpretations: a one-componentand a two-component view. We further argue that the two-component view is more consistent with his effort to promote HOT as an explanatory theory suitable for application to the empirical sciences.Unfortunately, the two-component view seems incapable of handling a group of counterexamples that we refer to as cases of radical confabulation. We begin by (...) introducing the HOT theory and by indicating why we believe it is open to distinct interpretations. We then proceed to show that it is incapable of handling cases of radical confabulation. Finally, in the course of considering various possible responses to our position, we show that adoption of a disjunctive strategy, one that would countenance both one-component and two-component versions, would fail to provide any empirical or explanatory advantage. (shrink)
We previously argued that somatoparaphrenia poses a challenge for David Rosenthal’s Thin Immunity Principle (TIP) and his Higher-Order Thought theory of consciousness. Rosenthal responded that this counterexample can be accommodated, without violating TIP, if it is reinterpreted as a concern about subjective bodily location. But Rosenthal’s interpretation fails, because it treats mental ownership as merely derivative from subjective bodily location. Mental ownership—matters pertaining to who experiences a mental state—can be misrepresented. Acknowledging that who experiences a mental state can be misrepresented (...) has profound empirical implications: a research program for the investigation of this neglected phenomenon is needed. (shrink)
According to Rosenthal’s Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, first-order mental states become conscious only when they are targeted by HOTs that necessarily represent the states as belonging to self. On this view a state represented as belonging to someone distinct from self could not be a conscious state. Rosenthal develops this view in terms of what he calls the ‘thin immunity principle’ (TIP). According to TIP, when I experience a conscious state, I cannot be wrong about whether it is (...) I who I think is in that state. We first suggest that TIP is a direct consequence of the HOT theory. Next we argue that somatoparaphrenia—a pathology in which sensations are sometimes represented as belonging to other people—shows that TIP can be violated. This violation of TIP in turn shows that the HOT theory’s claim that conscious states are necessarily represented as belonging to self is in error. Rosenthal’s attempt to account for pathological cases is found to be inadequate when applied to somatoparaphrenia, and other possible defenses are also shown to be incapable of preserving TIP. We further conclude by suggesting that the HOT theory’s failing in this regard is not a failing that is peculiar to this theory of consciousness. (shrink)
In “Sellars and the ‘Myth of the Given,’” Alston argues against Sellars’s position in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (EPM) that there is no nonconceptual cognition. According to him, Sellars ignores phenomenal look-concepts that capture the phenomenal character of experience. I contend that the Sellarsian can agree that the phenomenal aspect of looks should be accommodated, but he is not thereby forced to concede a form of the nonconceptual Given. I examine some of Alston’s arguments, especially the Fineness of (...) Grain Argument, for the view that the phenomenal character of experience is both nonconceptual and epistemic. I try to show that none of them can be said to have undermined Sellars’s position. (shrink)
This article analyses the tradition of “articulating xing in terms of sheng ” and related other expressions, and also examines the debate between Mencius and Gaozi concerning “ xing is known by sheng .” It claims that while Mencius’ “human nature is good” discourse is influenced by the interpretive tradition of “articulating xing in terms of sheng ”, Mencius also transcends and develops this tradition. Therefore it is only when Mencius’ views about the goodness of human nature are understood in (...) the context of this interpretive tradition that his ideas can be fully understood. Utilizing this framework, the Confucian understanding of rights is then explored. (shrink)
The political philosophy of early Confucianism mainly focuses on the “ shi ± (scholar).” It is built on ideas such as that of “establishing a ruler in consideration of the people,” “taking yi 义 (righteousness) as li 利 (benefit)” and “following the Dao but not the ruler,” which demonstrate the foundations of political legitimacy, justice as a political principle, and principles of a scholar to become an official. Although the political thought of early Confucianism has its historical limitations, such as (...) the lack of both political equality and the universal recognition of rights, there is both a demand for and possibility of democratic politics in the philosophy. Thus, how to extend awareness of scholars to awareness of people and how to transform a focus on virtue into a focus on rights become the crucial theoretical questions that Confucianism faces in the contemporary world. (shrink)
Currently, one of the most influential theories of consciousness is Rosenthal’s version of higher-order-thought (HOT). We argue that the HOT theory allows for two distinct interpretations: a one-componentand a two-component view. We further argue that the two-component view is more consistent with his effort to promote HOT as an explanatory theory suitable for application to the empirical sciences.Unfortunately, the two-component view seems incapable of handling a group of counterexamples that we refer to as cases of radical confabulation. We begin by (...) introducing the HOT theory and by indicating why we believe it is open to distinct interpretations. We then proceed to show that it is incapable of handling cases of radical confabulation. Finally, in the course of considering various possible responses to our position, we show that adoption of a disjunctive strategy, one that would countenance both one-component and two-component versions, would fail to provide any empirical or explanatory advantage. (shrink)
I discuss the so-called “problem of perception” in relation to the Argument from Illusion: Can we directly perceive the external world? According to Direct Realism, at least sometimes perception provides direct and immediate awareness of reality. But the Argument from Illusion threatens to undermine the possibility of genuine perception. In The Problem of Perception (2002), A. D. Smith proposes a novel defense of Direct Realism based on a careful study of perceptual phenomenology. According to his theory, the intentionality of perception (...) is explained in terms of three phenomenological features of perception: phenomenalthree-dimensional spatiality, movement, and the Anstoss. He argues that this account of perceptual intentionality can resist a central premise of the Argument from Illusion, i.e. the “sense-datum inference.” After presenting Smith’s theory, I argue that he fails to distinguish two independent tasks for the direct realist, and that he underestimates the threat of the so-called “sense-datum infection.” My contention is that even if Smith’s theory of perceptual intentionality is correct, Direct Realism has not been saved from the Argument from Illusion. To resist the Argument from Illusion, it is not enough to merely consider how to block the sense-datum inference. The direct realist must also find a way to undermine the sense-datum infection. If so, I suggest, Direct Realism cannot be defended by perceptual phenomenology alone. (shrink)
This study explores the research paradigms of contemporary business ethics research in 2001–2008. With citation data from the top two business ethics journals included in the Social Sciences Citation Index, this study conducts citation and co-citation analysis to identify the most important publications, scholars, and research themes in the business ethics area and then maps the intellectual structure of business ethics studies between 2001 and 2008. The results show that current business ethics studies cluster around four major research themes, including (...) morality and social contract theory, ethical decision making, corporate social responsibility, and stakeholder theory. This study helps profile the invisible network of knowledge production in business ethics and provides important insights on current research paradigms of business ethics studies. (shrink)
Liang Shuming once applied the concept of intuition to characterize Chinese culture as a whole. Later, he not only replaced the theoretical position of intuition with the concept of reason, but discarded the term for intuition itself. This essay will answer three questions related to this academic riddle. (1) What does intuition mean to both Bergson and Liang? (2) What does the Chinese cultural heritage contribute to the formation of Liang's intuition? (3) What is the relationship between (...)Liang's intuition and reason? (shrink)
Shuming has been proclaimed the forerunner of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism. However, assessing Liangâs identity appears a much more complicated task. Taking a closer look at his copious writings on religion, this paper shows how Liang conceived the role of religion at the different steps of humanityâs quest. Applying this frame of understanding to twentieth century China, Liang saw a discrepancy between the task required in our present time and what the future was holding. Therefore, while he engaged the world (...) in a certain way, he was still holding privately another belief. This secret of Liang reshuffles traditional boundaries between the secular and transcendence. (shrink)
Wang Yangming argues that the life state of a virtuous person is “forming one body with Heaven, Earth and the myriad things.” For instance, in watching a child fall into a well, he cannot help feeling alarmed and commiserate; In observing the pitiful cries and frightened appearance of animals, he cannot help feeling “unable to bear” their suffering; In seeing plants destroyed or tiles shattered, he cannot help but feel pity and regret and so forth. At the same time, he (...) also stresses that there is a natural order of values with the help of which a human being deals with the myriad things, namely the natural principles of order within the realm of liang zhi. From a practical perspective, Yangming integrated these two aspects into a spontaneously psychological self-consciousness and an intuition of judgment and choice. Under its direction and instruction, human beings cannot only generally care for the myriad things, but also make reasonable use of them. Therefore, the significant reference to “the natural principles of order within the realm of liang zhi” involves the harmony between nature and human beings from life state to ecological consciousness. (shrink)
I believe the material should be utilized as supplemental data for exploring Ch'en Liang's intellectual development.Ch'en's thought evolved through a tao-hsueh ...
Hsieh Liang-tso (c.1050-c.1120, known as master Shang-ts'ai) was one of the leading direct disciples of Ch'eng Hao and Ch'eng I, the two brothers who were the early leaders of the Confucian revival known as Neo-Confucianism in Northern Sung China. Hsieh was thus among the first to recognize and follow the insights of the Ch'eng brothers as definitive of the authentic Confucian tradition, a recognition that became the conviction of the majority of later Confucian scholars and practitioners. The present book (...) is a focused analysis of the core value of Confucian thought, namely jen (humanity or co-humanity), through an investigation of Hsieh Liang-tso's analysis of the Analects of Confucius. Selover argues that Hsieh's handling of key issues in interpreting and applying the Confucian Analects, his experiential reasoning and his deference to scriptural classics and earlier tradition, bear important similarities to the practice of theology in Western religious traditions. The volume also contains a translation of Hsieh's commentary on the Analects, as well as a foreword by the renowned scholar of Confucianism, Tu Wei-ming. (shrink)
