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  1. Quassim Cassam, Foreword to P.F. Strawson's Scepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties.
    In that book I had two different, though not unrelated aims. The first chapter was concerned with traditional scepticisms about, e.g., the external world and induction. In common with Hume and Wittgenstein (and even Heidegger) I argued that the attempt to combat such doubts by rational argument was misguided: for we are dealing here with the presuppositions, the framework, of all human thought and enquiry. In the other chapters my target was different. It was that species of naturalism which tended (...)
     
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  2. Quassim Cassam, Reply to Béatrice Longuenesse.
    (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming).
     
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  3. Quassim Cassam, Reply to Barry Stroud.
    (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming).
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  4. Quassim Cassam, Contemporary Reactions to Descartes' Philosophy of Mind.
    Overview It is widely assumed that Descartes’ philosophy of mind is organized around three major commitments. The first is to substance dualism. The second is to individualism about mental content. The third is to a particularly strong form of the doctrine of privileged firstperson access. Each of these commitments has been questioned by contemporary philosophers of mind. Substance dualism is generally regarded as a non-starter, individualism has come under attack from a number of different quarters, and the doctrine of privileged (...)
     
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  5. Quassim Cassam (forthcoming). What Asymmetry? Knowledge of Self, Knowledge of Others, and the Inferentialist Challenge. Synthese:1-19.
    There is widely assumed to be a fundamental epistemological asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of others. They are said to be ’categorically different in kind and manner’ , and the existence of such an asymmetry is taken to be a primitive datum in accounts of the two kinds of knowledge. I argue that standard accounts of the differences between self-knowledge and knowledge of others exaggerate and misstate the asymmetry. The inferentialist challenge to the asymmetry focuses on the extent to which (...)
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  6. John Campbell & Quassim Cassam (2014). Berkeley's Puzzle: What Does Experience Teach Us? OUP Oxford.
    Sensory experience seems to be the basis of our knowledge of mind-independent things. The puzzle is to understand how that can be: how does our sensory experience enable us to conceive of them as mind-independent? This book is a debate between two rival approaches to understanding the relationship between concepts and sensory experience.
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  7. Quassim Cassam (2014). Self-Knowledge for Humans. OUP Oxford.
    Humans are not model epistemic citizens. Our reasoning can be careless, our beliefs eccentric, and our desires irrational. Quassim Cassam develops a new account of self-knowledge which recognises this feature of human life. He argues that self-knowledge is a genuine cognitive achievement, and that self-ignorance is almost always on the cards.
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  8. Quassim Cassam (2012). Epistemic Self-Audit and Warranted Reasons. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):185-191.
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  9. Quassim Cassam (2011). How We Know What We Think. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 4 (4):553-569.
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  10. Quassim Cassam (2011). 1 Introducing the Puzzle. In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press 18.
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  11. Quassim Cassam (2011). Knowing What You Believe. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):1-23.
    A familiar claim is that knowledge of our own thoughts, beliefs and other attitudes is normally immediate, that is, not normally based on observation, inference or evidence. One explanation of the possibility of immediate self-knowledge turns on the transparency of the question ‘Do I believe that P?’ to the question ‘Is it the case that P?’ This paper explains why occurrent mental states such as passing thoughts do not fall within the purview of the transparency account and proposes a different (...)
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  12. Quassim Cassam (2011). Tackling Berkeley's Puzzle. In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press
     
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  13. Quassim Cassam (2011). The Embodied Self. In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press 139--157.
  14. Quassim Cassam (2011). The Presidential Address: Knowing What You Believe. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111:1 - 23.
    A familiar claim is that knowledge of our own thoughts, beliefs and other attitudes is normally immediate, that is, not normally based on observation, inference or evidence. One explanation of the possibility of immediate self-knowledge turns on the transparency of the question 'Do I believe that P?' to the question 'Is it the case that P?' This paper explains why occurrent mental states such as passing thoughts do not fall within the purview of the transparency account and proposes a different (...)
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  15. Quassim Cassam (2010). Judging, Believing and Thinking. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):80-95.
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  16. Quassim Cassam (2009). Can the Concept of Knowledge Be Analysed? In Patrick Greenough & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. OUP Oxford
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  17. Quassim Cassam (2009). Knowing and Seeing: Responding to Stroud's Dilemma. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (4):571-589.
    Abstract: Barry Stroud suggests that when we want to explain a certain kind of knowledge philosophically we feel we must explain it on the basis of another, prior kind of knowledge that does not imply or presuppose any of the knowledge we are trying to explain. If we accept this epistemic priority requirement (EPR) we find that we cannot explain our knowledge of the world in a way that satisfies it. If we reject EPR then we will be failing to (...)
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  18. Quassim Cassam (2009). Reply to Duncan Pritchard and John Campbell. Analysis 69 (2):325-333.
    An epistemological how-possible question asks how knowledge, or knowledge of some specific kind, is possible. The main contention of Duncan Pritchard‟s stimulating comments is that what I call „explanatory minimalism‟ appears to offer us just what we are seeking when we ask such a question. This looks like a problem for me given that I defend a version of explanatory anti-minimalism. Pritchard outlines a version of minimalism inspired by the writings of John McDowell and does not find it obvious that (...)
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  19. Quassim Cassam (2009). The Basis of Self-Knowledge. Erkenntnis 71 (1):3 - 18.
    I discuss the claim what makes self-knowledge epistemologically distinctive is the fact that it is baseless or groundless. I draw a distinction between evidential and explanatory baselessness and argue that self-knowledge is only baseless in the first of these senses. Since evidential baselessness is a relatively widespread phenomenon the evidential baselessness of self-knowledge does not make it epistemologically distinctive and does not call for any special explanation. I do not deny that self-knowledge is epistemologically distinctive. My claim is only that (...)
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  20. Quassim Cassam (2009). The Possibility of Knowledge: Reply to Denis Bühler, Daniel Dohrn, David Lüthi, Bernhard Ritter and Simon Sauter. Abstracta 5 (4):100-113.
    How is knowledge of the external world possible? How is knowledge of other minds possible? How is a priori knowledge possible? These are all examples of how-possible questions in epistemology. In this highly original book Quassim Cassam explains how such questions arise and how they should be answered.
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  21. Quassim Cassam (2009). The Possibility of Knowledge • by Quassim Cassam • Oxford University Press, 2007. X + 256 Pp. £32.00 Cloth: Summary. [REVIEW] Analysis 69 (2):307-309.
    An epistemological how-possible question asks how knowledge, or knowledge of some specific kind, is possible. Familiar epistemological how-possible questions include ‘How is knowledge of the external world possible?’, ‘How is knowledge of other minds possible?’ and ‘How is a priori knowledge possible?’ These are the three questions that I tackle in my book. In each case, I explain how and why the question arises and propose a way of answering it. The main negative claim of the book is that transcendental (...)
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  22. Quassim Cassam (2009). What is Knowledge? Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84 (64):101-.
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  23. Quassim Cassam (2008). Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality, by Eric Watkins. European Journal of Philosophy 16 (2):330-332.
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  24. Quassim Cassam (2008). Knowledge, Perception and Analysis. South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):214-226.
    A point that Strawson often emphasises in his writings is that the concepts of knowledge and perception are closely linked. For example, the idea of such a link does important in his exposition and defense of a causal analysis of perception. According to this analysis a material object M is perceived by a subject S only if M causes an experience in S. Why should this be? One reason, according to Strawson, is that such a causal requirement on perception is (...)
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  25. Quassim Cassam (2008). Précis of "The Possibility of Knowledge". [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):507 - 509.
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  26. Quassim Cassam (2008). Reply to Longuenesse. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):525-531.
  27. Quassim Cassam (2008). Reply to Stroud. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):532-538.
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  28. Quassim Cassam (2007). The Possibility of Knowledge. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):125-141.
    I focus on two questions: what is knowledge, and how is knowledge possible? The latter is an example of a how-possible question. I argue that how-possible questions are obstacle-dependent and that they need to be dealt with at three different levels, the level of means, of obstacle-removal, and of enabling conditions. At the first of these levels the possibility of knowledge is accounted for by identifying means of knowing, and I argue that the identification of such means also contributes to (...)
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  29. Quassim Cassam (2007). Ways of Knowing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):339 - 358.
    I know that the laptop on which I am writing these words is dusty. How do I know? I can see that it is dusty. Seeing that it is dusty is a way of knowing that it is dusty. How come? According to what I’m going to call the entailment view, ‘S sees that P’ entails ‘S knows that P’ and it is only because this is so that seeing that the laptop is dusty qualifies as a way of knowing (...)
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  30. Quassim Cassam (2007). XIV-Ways of Knowing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):339-358.
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  31. Quassim Cassam (2005). Space and Objective Experience. In José Luis Bermúdez (ed.), Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. Oxford: Clarendon Press
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  32. Quassim Cassam (2004). Introspection, Perception, and Epistemic Privilege. The Monist 87 (2):255-274.
  33. Quassim Cassam (2003). A Priori Concepts. In Hans-Johann Glock (ed.), Strawson and Kant. Clarendon Press
     
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  34. Quassim Cassam (2003). Can Transcendental Epistemology Be Naturalized? Philosophy 78 (2):181-203.
    Transcendental epistemology is an inquiry into conditions of human knowledge which reflect the structure of the human cognitive apparatus. The dependence thesis is the thesis that a proper investigation of such conditions must lean in important respects on the deliverances of science. I argue that Kant is right to object to the dependence thesis, but that the best objections to this thesis lead to the conclusion that the conditions of knowledge which Kant identifies are not, in any interesting sense, a (...)
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  35. Quassim Cassam (2003). Self-Directed Transcendental Arguments. In Robert Stern (ed.), Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects. Clarendon Press
  36. Quassim Cassam (2002). Representing Bodies. Ratio 15 (4):315-334.
  37. Quassim Cassam (2000). Rationalism, Empiricism, and the A Priori. In Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the a Priori. Oxford University Press 43--64.
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  38. Quassim Cassam (1998). Mind, Knowledge and Reality: Themes From Kant. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43:321-348.
  39. Quassim Cassam (1998). Mind, Knowledge and Reality: Themes From Kant: Quassim Cassam. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43:321-348.
    According to what might be described as ‘humanist’ approaches to epistemology, the fundamental task of epistemology is to investigate the nature, scope and origins of human knowledge. Evidently, what we can know depends upon the nature of our cognitive faculties, including our senses and our understanding. Since there may be significant differences between human cognitive faculties and those of other beings, it would seem that an investigation of the nature, scope and origins of human knowledge must therefore concern itself, in (...)
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  40. Quassim Cassam (1998). Self-Knowledge, A Priori Knowledge, and the Cognitive Structure of the Mind. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press
     
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  41. Quassim Cassam (1997). Subjects and Objects. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):643 - 648.
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  42. Quassim Cassam (1997). Self and World. Oxford University Press.
    Self and World is an exploration of the nature of self-awareness. Cassam rejects the widespread view that the self eludes introspection, and argues that consciousness of our thoughts and experiences involves a sense of our thinking, experiencing selves as shaped, solid, and located physical objects in a world of such objects. This clear, original, and challenging treatment of one of the deepest of intellectual problems will demand the attention of all philosophers and cognitive scientists who are concerned with the self.
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  43. Quassim Cassam (1996). Internalism and Perceptual Knowledge, Bill Brewer. European Journal of Philosophy 4 (3).
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  44. Quassim Cassam (1996). Self-Reference, Self-Knowledge and the Problem of Misconception. European Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):276-295.
  45. Quassim Cassam (1995). Introspection and Bodily Self-Ascription. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. MIT Press 311--336.
  46. Quassim Cassam (1995). Transcendental Self-Consciousness. In P. Kumar (ed.), The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson. Indian Council for Philosophical Research
     
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  47. Quassim Cassam (ed.) (1994). Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    This volume brings together some of the most important and influential recent writings on knowledge of oneself and of one's own thoughts, sensations, and experiences. The essays give valuable insights into such fundamental philosophical issues as personal identity, the nature of consciousness, the relation between mind and body, and knowledge of other minds. Contributions include "Introduction" by Gilbert Ryle, "Knowing One's Own Mind" by Donald Davidson, "Individualism and Self-Knowledge" and "Introspection and the Self" by Sydney Shoemaker, "On the Observability of (...)
     
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  48. Quassim Cassam (1993). Parfit on Persons. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93:17-37.
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  49. Quassim Cassam (1993). Ulrich K. Preuss. European Journal of Philosophy 1 (2).
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  50. Quassim Cassam (1993). Inner Sense, Body Sense, and Kant's "Refutation of Idealism". European Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):111-127.
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