Search results for 'Question Begging' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  67
    Raffaella de Rosa (2004). Locke's Essay Book I: The Question-Begging Status of the Anti-Nativist Arguments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):37-64.
    In this paper I argue against the received view that the anti-nativist arguments of Book I of Locke’s Essay conclusively challenge nativism. I begin by reconstructing the chief argument of Book I and its corollary arguments. I call attention to their dependence on (what I label) “the Awareness Principle”, viz., the view that there are no ideas in the mind of which the mind either isn’t currently aware or hasn’t been aware in the past. I then argue that the arguments’ (...)
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  2.  21
    Peter Suber (1994). Question-Begging Under a Non-Foundational Model of Argument. Argumentation 8 (3):241-250.
    I find (as others have found) that question-begging is formally valid but rationally unpersuasive. More precisely, it ought to be unpersuasive, although it can often persuade. Despite its formal validity, question-begging fails to establish its conclusion; in this sense it fails under a classical or foundationalist model of argument. But it does link its conclusion to its premises by means of acceptable rules of inference; in this sense it succeeds under a non-classical, non-foundationalist model of argument (...)
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  3.  9
    Henry W. Johnstone (1994). Question-Begging and Infinite Regress. Argumentation 8 (3):291-293.
    InMetaphysics Γ, Ch. 4, Aristotle speaks of both infinite regress and question-begging, but does not explicitly relate them. We get the impression that he thinks that to use one of these arguments to avoid the other is to jump from the frying-pan into the fire. This relationship is illustrated in terms of the ignorant belief that everything can be proved, and of attempts to prove the Law of Noncontradiction.
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  4. C. J. G. Wright (2000). Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey's Paradox and Putnam's Proof. Philosophical Issues 10 (s1):140-63.
  5.  11
    Joshua Gert (2014). Begging the Question: A Qualified Defense. Journal of Ethics 18 (3):279-297.
    This discussion examines two of the central notions at work in Sterba’s From Rationality to Equality: question-beggingness, and the notion of a rational requirement. I point out that, against certain unreasonable positions, begging the question is a perfectly reasonable option. I also argue that if we use the sense of “rational requirement” that philosophers ought to have in mind when defending the idea that morality is rationally required, then Sterba has not succeed in defending this idea. Rather, (...)
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  6.  10
    Matthew W. McKeon (forthcoming). Statements of Inference and Begging the Question. Synthese:1-25.
    I advance a pragmatic account of begging the question according to which a use of an argument begs the question just in case it is used as a statement of inference and it fails to state an inference the arguer or an addressee can perform given what they explicitly believe. Accordingly, what begs questions are uses of arguments as statements of inference, and the root cause of begging the question is an argument’s failure to state (...)
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  7.  10
    Matthew William Mckeon (2015). Inference, Circularity, and Begging the Question. Informal Logic 35 (3):312-341.
    I develop a syntactic concept of circularity, which I call propositional circularity. With respect to a given use of an argument advanced as a statement of inference for the benefit of a reasoner R, if the direct and indirect premises R would have to accept in order to accept the conclusion includes the conclusion, then the collection of premises is propositionally circular. The argument fails to display a type of inference that R can perform. Appealing to propositional circularity, I articulate (...)
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  8.  20
    Douglas Walton (2005). Begging the Question in Arguments Based on Testimony. Argumentation 19 (1):85-113.
    This paper studies some classic cases of the fallacy of begging the question based on appeals to testimony containing circular reasoning. For example, suppose agents a, b and c vouch for d’s credentials, and agents b, d, and e vouch for a’s credentials. Such a sequence of reasoning is circular because a is offering testimony for d but d is offering testimony for a. The paper formulates and evaluates restrictions on the use of testimonial evidence that might be (...)
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  9.  79
    Allan Hazlett (2006). Epistemic Conceptions of Begging the Question. Erkenntnis 65 (3):343 - 363.
    A number of epistemologists have recently concluded that a piece of reasoning may be epistemically permissible even when it is impossible for the reasoning subject to present her reasoning as an argument without begging the question. I agree with these epistemologists, but argue that none has sufficiently divorced the notion of begging the question from epistemic notions. I present a proposal for a characterization of begging the question in purely pragmatic terms.
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  10.  25
    Juho Ritola (2003). Begging the Question: A Case Study. [REVIEW] Argumentation 17 (1):1-19.
    The essay starts by presenting two accounts of begging the question, John Biro's epistemic account and David Sanford's doxastic account. After briefly comparing these accounts, the essay will study an argument suspected of begging the question and subsequently apply the epistemic and doxastic accounts to this test case. It is found that the accounts of Biro and Sanford do not analyse the test case adequately, therefore a new account is developed using the idea of a knowledge-base.
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  11.  10
    Jim Mackenzie (1994). Contexts of Begging the Question. Argumentation 8 (3):227-240.
    In this paper a dialogical account of begging the question is applied to various contexts which are not obviously dialogues: - reading prose, working through a deductive system, presenting a legal case, and thinking to oneself. The account is then compared with that in chapter eight of D. Walton'sBegging the Question (New York; Greenwood, 1991).
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  12. Moti Mizrahi (2013). Why the Argument From Zombies Against Physicalism is Question-Begging. The Reasoner 7 (8):94-95.
    I argue that the argument from zombies against physicalism is question-begging unless proponents of the argument from zombies can justify the inference from the metaphysical possibility of zombies to the falsity of physicalism in an independent and non-circular way, i.e., a way that does not already assume the falsity of physicalism.
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  13.  30
    Juho Ritola (2006). Justified and Justifiable Beliefs: The Case of Question-Begging. Philosophical Studies 128 (3):565 - 583.
    This paper discusses Lippert-Rasmussen’s [Philosophical Studies 104, (2001) 123–141] claim that there are reasonable question-begging arguments. It is first argued that his arguments devalue the distinction between justifiable and justified beliefs, a distinction that is important for the fallacy theory. Second, it is argued that the role of the argument in the discussed cases can be questioned. In addition, the role of second order beliefs is discussed.
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  14.  15
    Paul K. Moser (2000). Skepticism, Question Begging, and Burden Shifting. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:209-217.
    The most powerful skeptical challenge to knowledge and justification is Pyrrhonian. It challenges nonskeptics to identify non-question begging warrant for their beliefs whereby they will not simply assume a point needing support in light of skeptical questions. The skeptical challenge is comprehensive, bearing on warranting conditions in general. Any answer given to such a comprehensive challenge apparently relies on a warranting condition being questioned. From this two questions emerge. First, is the skeptical challenge itself question begging (...)
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  15.  17
    Raffaella Rosa (2004). Locke's "Essay, Book I": The Question-Begging Status of the Anti-Nativist Arguments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):37 - 64.
    In this paper I argue against the received view that the anti-nativist arguments of Book I of Locke's Essay conclusively challenge nativism. I begin by reconstructing the chief argument of Book I and its corollary arguments. I call attention to their dependence on (what I label) "the Awareness Principle", viz., the view that there are no ideas in the mind of which the mind either isn't currently aware or hasn't been aware in the past. I then argue that the arguments' (...)
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  16. Helen Beebee (2002). Transfer of Warrant, Begging the Question, and Semantic Externalism. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):356-74.
  17. Stewart C. Goetz (2005). Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):83-105.
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  18. David Christensen (2011). Disagreement, Question-Begging, and Epistemic Self-Criticism. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (6).
    Responding rationally to the information that others disagree with one’s beliefs requires assessing the epistemic credentials of the opposing beliefs. Conciliatory accounts of disagreement flow in part from holding that these assessments must be independent from one’s own initial reasoning on the disputed matter. I argue that this claim, properly understood, does not have the untoward consequences some have worried about. Moreover, some of the difficulties it does engender must be faced by many less conciliatory accounts of disagreement.
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  19. Francesco Berto (2013). Coincident Entities and Question-Begging Predicates: An Issue in Meta-Ontology. Metaphysica 14 (1):1-15.
    Meta-ontology (in van Inwagen's sense) concerns the methodology of ontology, and a controversial meta-ontological issue is to what extent ontology can rely on linguistic analysis while establishing the furniture of the world. This paper discusses an argument advanced by some ontologists (I call them unifiers) against supporters of or coincident entities (I call them multipliers) and its meta-ontological import. Multipliers resort to Leibniz's Law to establish that spatiotemporally coincident entities a and b are distinct, by pointing at a predicate F (...)
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  20. Gerald K. Harrison (2005). Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Question Begging Charge. Facta Philosophica 7 (2):273-282.
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  21.  92
    David H. Sanford (1972). Begging the Question. Analysis 32 (6):197-199.
    A primary purpose of argument is to increase the degree of reasonable confidence that one has in the truth of the conclusion. A question begging argument fails this purpose because it violates what W. E. Johnson called an epistemic condition of inference. Although an argument of the sort characterized by Robert Hoffman in his response (Analysis 32.2, Dec 71) to Richard Robinson (Analysis 31.4, March 71) begs the question in all circumstances, we usually understand the charge that (...)
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  22.  24
    J. D. Mackenzie (1979). Question-Begging in Non-Cumulative Systems. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):117 - 133.
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  23.  10
    Carrie Swanson (2015). Begging the Question as a Criticism of an Argument in Itself in Topics 8.11. History and Philosophy of Logic 37 (1):33-77.
    At Topics 8.11 161b19–33 Aristotle lists five criticisms () which may be leveled against a dialectical argument ‘in itself’ (). The five criticisms correspond in many respects to the familiar conditions Aristotle places on syllogism and refutation. However, begging the question —the violation of the condition that the conclusion of a syllogism be something different () from the premises—seems not to appear on the list of five criticisms. That this omission is only apparent becomes clear once it is (...)
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  24. William L. Rowe (1976). The Ontological Argument and Question-Begging. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (4):425 - 432.
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  25.  7
    Sarah K. Brem (2003). Structure and Pragmatics in Informal Argument: Circularity and Question-Begging. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):147-149.
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  26.  51
    Brian Weatherson (1999). Begging the Question and Bayesians. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 30:687-697.
    The arguments for Bayesianism in the literature fall into three broad categories. There are Dutch Book arguments, both of the traditional pragmatic variety and the modern ‘depragmatised’ form. And there are arguments from the so-called ‘representation theorems’. The arguments have many similarities, for example they have a common conclusion, and they all derive epistemic constraints from considerations about coherent preferences, but they have enough differences to produce hostilities between their proponents. In a recent paper, Maher (1997) has argued that the (...)
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  27.  14
    John Woods & Douglas Walton (1982). Question-Begging and Cumulativeness in Dialectical Games. Noûs 16 (4):585-605.
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  28.  59
    William J. Wainwright (1978). The Ontological Argument, Question-Begging, and Professor Rowe. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (4):254 - 257.
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  29.  23
    Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2001). Are QuestionBegging Arguments Necessarily Unreasonable? Philosophical Studies 104 (2):123 - 141.
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  30.  5
    Jim Mackenzie (1984). Confirmation of a Conjecture of Peter of Spain Concerning Question-Begging Arguments. Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (1):35 - 45.
  31.  14
    Peter Kung & Masahiro Yamada (2010). A Neglected Way of Begging the Question. American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (3):287.
    Some arguments beg the question. Question-begging arguments are bad arguments and cannot increase the level of justification one has for the conclusion. Question-begging arguments, unlike some other bad arguments, need not suffer the problem of having unjustified premises. Even if the premises are justified and even if the premises entail the conclusion, a question-begging argument fails to have any force when it comes to increasing one's justification for the conclusion. For example, many regard (...)
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  32.  24
    Mylan Engel (2005). The Equivocal or Question-Begging Nature of Evil Demon Arguments for External World Skepticism. Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (1):163-178.
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  33.  6
    S. K. Wertz (2007). Are Interpretational Constructs Question Begging? Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (2):77-83.
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  34.  13
    Yann Schmitt (2012). Hume on Miracles: The Issue of Question--Begging. Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 17 (1):49-71.
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  35. Crispin Wright (2000). Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey's Paradox and Putnam's Proof. Philosophical Issues 10 (1):140-163.
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  36.  5
    Dale Jacquette (1993). Logical Dimensions of Question-Begging Argument. American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (4):317 - 327.
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  37. Robert Larmer (2003). Is Methodological Naturalism Question-Begging? Philosophia Christi 5 (1):113-130.
     
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  38.  22
    Stephen T. Davis (1976). Anselm and Question-Begging: A Reply to William Rowe. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (4):448 - 457.
  39.  8
    William J. Talbott (2014). The Elusiveness of a Non-Question-Begging Justification for Morality. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (1):191-204.
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  40.  12
    J. J. MacIntosh (1991). Theological Question-Begging. Dialogue 30 (04):531-.
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  41.  7
    John A. Barker (1978). The Nature of Question-Begging Arguments. Dialogue 17 (3):490-498.
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  42.  6
    Andrew Ward (1993). Question-Begging Psychological Explanations. Southwest Philosophical Studies 15:82-94.
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  43. Stephen T. Davis (1976). Anselm And Question-Begging: A Reply To William Rowe'S Comments On Professor Davis' 'Does The Ontological Argument Beg The Question'. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7:448-457.
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  44.  2
    Raffaella Rosa (2004). Locke's Essay, Book I: The Question-Begging Status of the Anti-Nativist Arguments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):37-64.
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  45.  5
    Manuel Perez Otero (2011). Modest Skepticism and Question Begging Proper. Grazer Philosophische Studien 83 (1):9-32.
  46.  1
    Crispin Wright (2000). Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey's Paradox and Putnam's Proof. Noûs 34 (s1):140-163.
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  47.  1
    James Noxon (1968). QuestionBegging. Dialogue 6 (4):571-575.
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  48. Lippert-Rasmussen Kasper (2001). Are Question-Begging Arguments Necessarily Unreasonable? Philosophical Studies 104 (2).
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  49. Gregory Landini (2009). Russell and the Ontological Argument: It is Well Known That in Principia Mathematica Russell Offers a Theory of Definite Descriptions and Holds That ‘Existence’ is Not a Property. It is Less Well Known That in “On Denoting” He Discusses the Version of Anselm’s Ontological Argument for God Formulated by Descartes, Accepting the Premiss “Existence is a Perfection” and Assessing the Argument as Valid but Question-Begging. This is Different From His Later Comments in A History of Western Philosophy Which Find the Argument Invalid. Indeed, Given the Sanctions of Principia, One Might Have Thought He Would Find the Argument Logically Ungrammatical. This Paper Shows How Russell Might Formulate and Evaluate Anselm’s Ontological Argument and the Version Offered by Descartes in a Way That Avoids the Conflict. [REVIEW] Russell 29 (2).
     
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  50. Juho Ritola (2006). Justified and Justifiable Beliefs: The Case of Question-Begging. Philosophical Studies 128 (3):565-583.
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