Search results for 'Question Begging' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Raffaella de Rosa (2004). Locke's Essay Book I: The Question-Begging Status of the Anti-Nativist Arguments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):37-64.score: 240.0
    In this paper I argue against the received view that the anti-nativist arguments of Book I of Locke’s Essay conclusively challenge nativism. I begin by reconstructing the chief argument of Book I and its corollary arguments. I call attention to their dependence on (what I label) “the Awareness Principle”, viz., the view that there are no ideas in the mind of which the mind either isn’t currently aware or hasn’t been aware in the past. I then argue that the arguments’ (...)
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  2. Henry W. Johnstone (1994). Question-Begging and Infinite Regress. Argumentation 8 (3):291-293.score: 240.0
    InMetaphysics Γ, Ch. 4, Aristotle speaks of both infinite regress and question-begging, but does not explicitly relate them. We get the impression that he thinks that to use one of these arguments to avoid the other is to jump from the frying-pan into the fire. This relationship is illustrated in terms of the ignorant belief that everything can be proved, and of attempts to prove the Law of Noncontradiction.
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  3. Peter Suber (1994). Question-Begging Under a Non-Foundational Model of Argument. Argumentation 8 (3):241-250.score: 240.0
    I find (as others have found) that question-begging is formally valid but rationally unpersuasive. More precisely, it ought to be unpersuasive, although it can often persuade. Despite its formal validity, question-begging fails to establish its conclusion; in this sense it fails under a classical or foundationalist model of argument. But it does link its conclusion to its premises by means of acceptable rules of inference; in this sense it succeeds under a non-classical, non-foundationalist model of argument (...)
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  4. C. J. G. Wright (2000). Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey's Paradox and Putnam's Proof. Philosophical Issues 10 (s1):140-63.score: 210.0
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  5. Joshua Gert (2014). Begging the Question: A Qualified Defense. Journal of Ethics 18 (3):279-297.score: 204.0
    This discussion examines two of the central notions at work in Sterba’s From Rationality to Equality: question-beggingness, and the notion of a rational requirement. I point out that, against certain unreasonable positions, begging the question is a perfectly reasonable option. I also argue that if we use the sense of “rational requirement” that philosophers ought (and tend) to have in mind when defending the idea that morality is rationally required, then Sterba has not succeed in defending this (...)
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  6. Allan Hazlett (2006). Epistemic Conceptions of Begging the Question. Erkenntnis 65 (3):343 - 363.score: 192.0
    A number of epistemologists have recently concluded that a piece of reasoning may be epistemically permissible even when it is impossible for the reasoning subject to present her reasoning as an argument without begging the question. I agree with these epistemologists, but argue that none has sufficiently divorced the notion of begging the question from epistemic notions. I present a proposal for a characterization of begging the question in purely pragmatic terms.
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  7. Juho Ritola (2003). Begging the Question: A Case Study. [REVIEW] Argumentation 17 (1):1-19.score: 192.0
    The essay starts by presenting two accounts of begging the question, John Biro's epistemic account and David Sanford's doxastic account. After briefly comparing these accounts, the essay will study an argument suspected of begging the question and subsequently apply the epistemic and doxastic accounts to this test case. It is found that the accounts of Biro and Sanford do not analyse the test case adequately, therefore a new account is developed using the idea of a knowledge-base.
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  8. Jim Mackenzie (1994). Contexts of Begging the Question. Argumentation 8 (3):227-240.score: 192.0
    In this paper a dialogical account of begging the question is applied to various contexts which are not obviously dialogues: - reading prose, working through a deductive system, presenting a legal case, and thinking to oneself. The account is then compared with that in chapter eight of D. Walton'sBegging the Question (New York; Greenwood, 1991).
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  9. Moti Mizrahi (2013). Why the Argument From Zombies Against Physicalism is Question-Begging. The Reasoner 7 (8):94-95.score: 180.0
    I argue that the argument from zombies against physicalism is question-begging unless proponents of the argument from zombies can justify the inference from the metaphysical possibility of zombies to the falsity of physicalism in an independent and non-circular way, i.e., a way that does not already assume the falsity of physicalism.
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  10. Juho Ritola (2006). Justified and Justifiable Beliefs: The Case of Question-Begging. Philosophical Studies 128 (3):565 - 583.score: 180.0
    This paper discusses Lippert-Rasmussen’s [Philosophical Studies 104, (2001) 123–141] claim that there are reasonable question-begging arguments. It is first argued that his arguments devalue the distinction between justifiable and justified beliefs, a distinction that is important for the fallacy theory. Second, it is argued that the role of the argument in the discussed cases can be questioned. In addition, the role of second order beliefs is discussed.
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  11. Raffaella Rosa (2004). Locke's "Essay, Book I": The Question-Begging Status of the Anti-Nativist Arguments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):37 - 64.score: 180.0
    In this paper I argue against the received view that the anti-nativist arguments of Book I of Locke's Essay conclusively challenge nativism. I begin by reconstructing the chief argument of Book I and its corollary arguments. I call attention to their dependence on (what I label) "the Awareness Principle", viz., the view that there are no ideas in the mind of which the mind either isn't currently aware or hasn't been aware in the past. I then argue that the arguments' (...)
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  12. Paul K. Moser (2000). Skepticism, Question Begging, and Burden Shifting. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:209-217.score: 180.0
    The most powerful skeptical challenge to knowledge and justification is Pyrrhonian. It challenges nonskeptics to identify non-question begging warrant for their beliefs whereby they will not simply assume a point needing support in light of skeptical questions. The skeptical challenge is comprehensive, bearing on warranting conditions in general. Any answer given to such a comprehensive challenge apparently relies on a warranting condition being questioned. From this two questions emerge. First, is the skeptical challenge itself question begging (...)
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  13. Helen Beebee (2002). Transfer of Warrant, Begging the Question, and Semantic Externalism. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):356-74.score: 168.0
  14. Stewart C. Goetz (2005). Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):83-105.score: 168.0
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  15. Douglas Walton (2005). Begging the Question in Arguments Based on Testimony. Argumentation 19 (1):85-113.score: 168.0
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  16. Francesco Berto (2013). Coincident Entities and Question-Begging Predicates: An Issue in Meta-Ontology. [REVIEW] Metaphysica 14 (1):1-15.score: 162.0
    Meta-ontology (in van Inwagen's sense) concerns the methodology of ontology, and a controversial meta-ontological issue is to what extent ontology can rely on linguistic analysis while establishing the furniture of the world. This paper discusses an argument advanced by some ontologists (I call them unifiers) against supporters of or coincident entities (I call them multipliers) and its meta-ontological import. Multipliers resort to Leibniz's Law to establish that spatiotemporally coincident entities a and b are distinct, by pointing at a predicate F (...)
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  17. Dale Jacquette (1994). Many Questions Begs the Question (but Questions Do Not Beg the Question). Argumentation 8 (3):283-289.score: 160.0
    The fallacy of many questions or the complex question, popularized by the sophism ‘Have you stopped beating your spouse?’ (when a yes-or-no answer is required), is similar to the fallacy of begging the question orpetitio principii. Douglas N. Walton inBegging the Question has recently argued that the two forms are alike in trying unfairly to elicit an admission from a dialectical opponent without meeting burden of proof, but distinct because of the circularity of question-begging (...)
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  18. David Christensen (2011). Disagreement, Question-Begging, and Epistemic Self-Criticism. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (6):unknown.score: 150.0
    Responding rationally to the information that others disagree with one’s beliefs requires assessing the epistemic credentials of the opposing beliefs. Conciliatory accounts of disagreement flow in part from holding that these assessments must be independent from one’s own initial reasoning on the disputed matter. I argue that this claim, properly understood, does not have the untoward consequences some have worried about. Moreover, some of the difficulties it does engender must be faced by many less conciliatory accounts of disagreement (and, more (...)
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  19. William L. Rowe (1976). The Ontological Argument and Question-Begging. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (4):425 - 432.score: 150.0
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  20. William J. Wainwright (1978). The Ontological Argument, Question-Begging, and Professor Rowe. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (4):254 - 257.score: 150.0
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  21. Brian Weatherson (1999). Begging the Question and Bayesians. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 30:687-697.score: 150.0
    The arguments for Bayesianism in the literature fall into three broad categories. There are Dutch Book arguments, both of the traditional pragmatic variety and the modern ‘depragmatised’ form. And there are arguments from the so-called ‘representation theorems’. The arguments have many similarities, for example they have a common conclusion, and they all derive epistemic constraints from considerations about coherent preferences, but they have enough differences to produce hostilities between their proponents. In a recent paper, Maher (1997) has argued that the (...)
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  22. Gerald K. Harrison (2005). Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Question Begging Charge. Facta Philosophica 7 (2):273-282.score: 150.0
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  23. Stephen T. Davis (1976). Anselm and Question-Begging: A Reply to William Rowe. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (4):448 - 457.score: 150.0
  24. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2001). Are QuestionBegging Arguments Necessarily Unreasonable? Philosophical Studies 104 (2):123 - 141.score: 150.0
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  25. David H. Sanford (1972). Begging the Question. Analysis 32 (6):197-199.score: 150.0
    A primary purpose of argument is to increase the degree of reasonable confidence that one has in the truth of the conclusion. A question begging argument fails this purpose because it violates what W. E. Johnson called an epistemic condition of inference. Although an argument of the sort characterized by Robert Hoffman in his response (Analysis 32.2, Dec 71) to Richard Robinson (Analysis 31.4, March 71) begs the question in all circumstances, we usually understand the charge that (...)
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  26. Mylan Engel (2005). The Equivocal or Question-Begging Nature of Evil Demon Arguments for External World Skepticism. Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (1):163-178.score: 150.0
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  27. J. D. Mackenzie (1979). Question-Begging in Non-Cumulative Systems. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):117 - 133.score: 150.0
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  28. Yann Schmitt (2012). Hume on Miracles: The Issue of Question--Begging. Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 17 (1):49-71.score: 150.0
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  29. J. J. MacIntosh (1991). Theological Question-Begging. Dialogue 30 (04):531-.score: 150.0
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  30. John A. Barker (1978). The Nature of Question-Begging Arguments. Dialogue 17 (03):490-498.score: 150.0
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  31. Dale Jacquette (1993). Logical Dimensions of Question-Begging Argument. American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (4):317 - 327.score: 150.0
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  32. John Woods & Douglas Walton (1982). Question-Begging and Cumulativeness in Dialectical Games. Noûs 16 (4):585-605.score: 150.0
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  33. Robert A. Larmer (forthcoming). Is Methodological Naturalism Question-Begging? Philosophia Christi.score: 150.0
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  34. Manuel Perez Otero (2011). Modest Skepticism and Question Begging Proper. Grazer Philosophische Studien 83 (1):9-32.score: 150.0
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  35. William J. Talbott (2014). The Elusiveness of a Non-Question-Begging Justification for Morality. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (1):191-204.score: 150.0
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  36. Jim Mackenzie (1984). Confirmation of a Conjecture of Peter of Spain Concerning Question-Begging Arguments. Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (1):35 - 45.score: 150.0
  37. James Noxon (1968). QuestionBegging. Dialogue 6 (04):571-575.score: 150.0
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  38. Andrew Ward (1993). Question-Begging Psychological Explanations. Southwest Philosophical Studies 15:82-94.score: 150.0
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  39. Sarah K. Brem (2003). Structure and Pragmatics in Informal Argument: Circularity and Question-Begging. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):147-149.score: 150.0
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  40. Stephen T. Davis (1976). Anselm And Question-Begging: A Reply To William Rowe'S Comments On Professor Davis' 'Does The Ontological Argument Beg The Question'. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7:448-457.score: 150.0
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  41. Lippert-Rasmussen Kasper (2001). Are Question-Begging Arguments Necessarily Unreasonable? Philosophical Studies 104 (2).score: 150.0
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  42. S. K. Wertz (2007). Are Interpretational Constructs Question Begging? Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (2):77-83.score: 150.0
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  43. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (1999). Begging the Question. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):174 – 191.score: 144.0
    No topic in informal logic is more important than begging the question. Also, none is more subtle or complex. We cannot even begin to understand the fallacy of begging the question without getting clear about arguments, their purposes, and circularity. So I will discuss these preliminary topics first. This will clear the path to my own account of begging the question. Then I will anticipate some objections. Finally, I will apply my account to a (...)
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  44. Douglas N. Walton (1994). Begging the Question as a Pragmatic Fallacy. Synthese 100 (1):95 - 131.score: 144.0
    The aim of this paper is to make it clear how and why begging the question should be seen as a pragmatic fallacy which can only be properly evaluated in a context of dialogue. Included in the paper is a review of the contemporary literature on begging the question that shows the gradual emergence over the past twenty years or so of the dialectical conception of this fallacy. A second aim of the paper is to investigate (...)
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  45. Douglas Walton (2006). Epistemic and Dialectical Models of Begging the Question. Synthese 152 (2):237 - 284.score: 144.0
    This paper addresses the problem posed by the current split between the two opposed hypotheses in the growing literature on the fallacy of begging the question the epistemic hypothesis, based on knowledge and belief, and the dialectical one, based on formal dialogue systems. In the first section, the nature of split is explained, and it is shown how each hypothesis has developed. To get the beginning reader up to speed in the literature, a number of key problematic examples (...)
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  46. D. A. Truncellito (2004). Running in Circles About Begging the Question. Argumentation 18 (3):325-329.score: 144.0
    In a published exchange, Richard Robinson and Roy A. Sorenson debate the matter of whether begging the question is a fallacy; Robinson thinks it is not, but Sorenson argues that it is. Norman Ten attempts to resolve this debate by making a distinction between begging the question and fallaciously begging the question. While Teng is right to note that Robinson and Sorenson are talking past each other, he incorrectly diagnoses the source of this miscommunication. (...)
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  47. David H. Sanford (1988). Begging the Question as Involving Actual Belief and Inconceivable Without It. Metaphilosophy 19 (1):32–37.score: 144.0
    This article answers John Biro's "Knowability, Believability, and Begging the Question: a Reply to Sanford" in "Metaphilosophy" 15 (1984). Biro and I agree that of two argument instances with the same form and content, one but not the other can beg the question, depending on other factors. These factors include actual beliefs, or so I maintain (against Biro) with the help of some analysed examples. Brief selections from Archbishop Whatley and J S Mill suggest that they also (...)
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  48. David H. Sanford (1977). The Fallacy of Begging the Question: A Reply to Barker. Dialogue 16 (03):485-498.score: 144.0
    According to John A Barker, whether an argument begs the question is purely a matter of logical form (Dialogue, 1976). According to me, it is also a matter of epistemic conditions; some arguments which beg the question in some contexts need not beg the question in every context (Analysis, 1972). I point out difficulties in Barker's treatment and defend my own views against some of his criticisms. In the concluding section, "Alleged difficulties with disjunctive syllogism," I defend (...)
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  49. Dilip K. Basu (1994). Begging the Question, Circularity and Epistemic Propriety. Argumentation 8 (3):217-226.score: 144.0
    In this paper we shall try to understand what it is to beg the question, and since begging the question is generally believed to be linked with circularity, we shall also explore this relationship. Finally, we shall consider whether certain forms of valid argument can go through smoothly in anepistemio context without begging the question. We shall consider, especially, the claims of the disjunctive syllogism in this regard.
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  50. J. Tim O'Meara (1999). Begging the Question of Causation in a Critique of the Neuron Doctrine. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):846-846.score: 144.0
    Gold & Stoljar's argument rejecting the “explanatory sufficiency” of the radical neuron doctrine depends on distinguishing it from the trivial neuron doctrine. This distinction depends on the thesis of “supervenience,” which depends on Hume's regularity theory of causation. In contrast, the radical neuron doctrine depends on a physical theory of causation, which denies the supervenience thesis. Insofar as the target article argues by drawing implications from the premise of Humean causation, whereas the radical doctrine depends on the competing premise of (...)
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