This essay addresses the problem of how to account for our meeting of minds, for our being able to linguistically express agreement regarding external events despite wild dissimilarity of our nerve nets. An explanation is provided based on the instinct of induction, the instinct of similarity, and natural selection. There are three networks at play in the meeting of minds: perceptual similarity, the intersubjective harmony of similarity standards and thus the relation structuring the intake of perceptions; implication, the relation expressed (...) by the universally quantified conditional and structuring our system of the world; and class membership, the relation structuring the domain of pure mathematics. (shrink)
PHILOSOPHY Supplement: 42 Pages: 171-176 Published: 1997 Conference: Annual Conference of the Royal-Institute-of-Philosophy Location: UNIV READING, READING, ENGLAND Date: SEP , 1996 Sponsor(s): Royal Inst Philos Accession Number: WOS:000071935500009 Document Type: Article; Proceedings Paper Language: English Reprint Address: Quine, WV (reprint author), Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA Addresses: 1. Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA Publisher: CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS, 40 WEST 20TH STREET, NEW YORK, NY 10011-4211 USA Web of Science Category: Philosophy Subject Category: Philosophy IDS Number: YW440 ISSN: (...) 0031-8191. (shrink)
With his customary incisiveness, W. V. Quine presents logic as the product of two factors, truth and grammar-but argues against the doctrine that the logical truths are true because of grammar or language. Rather, in presenting a general theory of grammar and discussing the boundaries and possible extensions of logic, Quine argues that logic is not a mere matter of words.