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  1. R. D. Rosenkrantz (1997). Review: Isaac Levi, For the Sake of the Argument. Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference, and Nonmonotic Reasoning. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 62 (3):1041-1043.
  2. R. D. Rosenkrantz (1994). Bayesian Confirmation: Paradise Regained. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):467-476.
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  3. R. D. Rosenkrantz (1992). The Justification of Induction. Philosophy of Science 59 (4):527-539.
    We show there is only one consistent way to update a probability assignment, that given by Bayes's rule. The price of inconsistent updating is a loss of efficiency. The implications of this for the problem of induction are discussed.
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  4. R. D. Rosenkrantz (1982). Does the Philosophy of Induction Rest on a Mistake? Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):78-97.
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  5. R. D. Rosenkrantz (1980). Measuring Truthlikeness. Synthese 45 (3):463 - 487.
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  6. R. D. Rosenkrantz (1979). Bayesian Theory Appraisal: A Reply to Seidenfeld. Theory and Decision 11 (4):441-451.
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  7. R. D. Rosenkrantz (1978). Distributive Justice. In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory. D. Reidel. 91--119.
  8. R. D. Rosenkrantz (1977). Support. Synthese 36 (2):181 - 193.
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  9. R. D. Rosenkrantz (1973). Probabilistic Confirmation Theory and the Goodman Paradox. American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (2):157 - 162.
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  10. R. D. Rosenkrantz (1973). Probability Magic Unmasked. Philosophy of Science 40 (2):227-233.
    It has been alleged that Bayesian usage of prior probabilities allows one to obtain empirical statements on the basis of no evidence whatever. We examine this charge with reference to several examples from the literature, arguing, first, that the difference between probabilities based on weighty evidence and those based on little evidence can be drawn in terms of the variance of a distribution. Moreover, qua summaries of vague prior knowledge, prior distributions only transmit the empirical information therein contained and, therefore, (...)
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  11. R. D. Rosenkrantz (1973). The Significance Test Controversy. Synthese 26 (2):304 - 321.
    The pre-designationist, anti-inductivist and operationalist tenor of Neyman-Pearson theory give that theory an obvious affinity to several currently influential philosophies of science, most particularly, the Popperian. In fact, one might fairly regard Neyman-Pearson theory as the statistical embodiment of Popperian methodology. The difficulties raised in this paper have, then, wider purport, and should serve as something of a touchstone for those who would construct a theory of evidence adequate to statistics without recourse to the notion of inductive probability.
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