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  1. R. G. Swinburne (1989). . Cambridge Univ Pr.
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  2. R. G. Swinburne (1989). Arguments for the Existence of God IN Key Themes in Philosophy. In . Cambridge Univ Pr.
    In an inductive argument data increase the probability of a hypothesis insofar as the hypothesis makes probable the data, the data are otherwise not likely to occur, and the hypothesis is simple. The Cosmological argument from the existence of the universe, the Teleological argument from its conformity to natural law, and other arguments from more detailed features of the universe each increase the probability that there is a God. I thus summarize in simple form the main points of my book (...)
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  3. R. G. Swinburne (1988). Faith and the Existence of God: Arguments for the Existence of God. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 24:121-133.
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  4. R. G. Swinburne (1984). Arguments for the Existence of God. In J. Houston (ed.), Is It Reasonable to Believe in God? Handsel Press. 121 - 133.
    In an inductive argument data increase the probability of a hypothesis insofar as the hypothesis makes probable the data, the data are otherwise not likely to occur, and the hypothesis is simple. The cosmological argument from the existence of the universe, the teleological argument from its conformity to natural law, and other arguments from more detailed features of the universe each increase the probability that there is a God. I thus summarize in a simple form the main points of my (...)
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  5. R. G. Swinburne (1984). The Argument for Design. In J. Houston (ed.), Is It Reasonable to Believe in God? Handsel Press. 199-.
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  6. R. G. Swinburne (1984). The Christian Wager. In J. Houston (ed.), Is It Reasonable to Believe in God? Handsel Press. 217--228.
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  7. R. G. Swinburne (1984). The Subjective View. Philosophical Books 25 (1):55-56.
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  8. R. G. Swinburne (1980). Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind By Paul M. Churchland Cambridge University Press, 1979, 157 Pp., £8.50. [REVIEW] Philosophy 55 (212):273-.
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  9. R. G. Swinburne, Hans Reichenbach, Maria Reichenbach & Robert S. Cohen (1980). Selected Writings, 1909-1953. Philosophical Quarterly 30 (119):152.
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  10. R. G. Swinburne (1978). Reviews. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (3):308-311.
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  11. R. G. Swinburne (1977). John Hick. Death and Eternal Life. Pp. 495.(London: Collins, 1976.) £5.95.Paul Badham. Christian Beliefs About Life After Death. Pp. 174. (London: Macmillan Press, Library of Philosophy and Religion, 1976.) £8.95. [REVIEW] Religious Studies 13 (3):355.
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  12. R. G. Swinburne (1976). The Objectivity of Morality. Philosophy 51 (195):5 - 20.
    The objectivist claims that moral judgments are statements which are true or false. He may be a naturalist or an anti-Naturalist. If a naturalist, He may maintain either that moral properties are natural properties, Or that, Though moral properties are distinct from natural properties, Possession of natural properties sometimes entails possession of moral properties. The only plausible objectivist position is the latter form of naturalism. Various arguments against objectivism are considered, Including the argument that moral matters cannot be settled by (...)
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  13. R. G. Swinburne (1976). Reply to Wallace. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):551 - 552.
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  14. R. G. Swinburne (1976). The Cosmological Argument. Philosophical Books 17 (2):60-62.
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  15. R. G. Swinburne (1975). On What There Must Be By Ross Harrison. Oxford: Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press, 1974, 210 Pp., £4.25. [REVIEW] Philosophy 50 (191):118-.
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  16. R. G. Swinburne (1975). Analyticity, Necessity and Apriority. Mind 84 (334):225-243.
    THE PAPER BEGINS BY CONSIDERING THREE ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF "ANALYTIC," ONE IN TERMS OF LOGICAL TRUTH, ONE IN TERMS OF THE MEANINGS OF WORDS, AND ONE IN TERMS OF SELF-CONTRADICTION OR INCOHERENCE. NEXT, FIVE DEFINITIONS OF "NECESSARY" ARE CONSIDERED, ONE IN TERMS OF ANALYTICITY, AND ONE PICKING OUT THE BROADER KIND OF LOGICAL NECESSITY DISCUSSED BY KRIPKE AND PLANTINGA. FINALLY, THREE DEFINITIONS OF "A PRIORI" ARE CONSIDERED. ONLY ON A FEW OF THESE DEFINITIONS DO THE CATEGORIES OF ANALYTIC, NECESSARY, AND (...)
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  17. R. G. Swinburne & P. A. Schilpp (1975). The Philosophy of Karl Popper. Philosophical Quarterly 25 (101):365.
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  18. Baruch Brody, R. G. Swinburne, Alex C. Michalos, Gershon Weiler, Geoffrey Sampson, Marcelo Dascal, Shalom Lappin, Yehuda Melzer, Joseph Horovitz, Haim Marantz, Marcelo Dascal, M. Magidor & Michael Katz (1974). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Philosophia 4 (2-3):279-281.
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  19. R. G. Swinburne (1974). Duty and the Will of God. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):213 - 227.
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  20. R. G. Swinburne (1974). Meaningfulness Without Confirmability: A Reply. Analysis 35 (1):22 - 27.
    IN THE COURSE OF "CONFIRMABILITY AND FACTUAL MEANINGFULNESS" ("ANALYSIS" VOL. 33) I ARGUED THAT THE CONFIRMATIONIST PRINCIPLE IS FALSE. THIS IS THE PRINCIPLE THAT A STATEMENT IS FACTUALLY MEANINGFUL IF AND ONLY IF IT IS AN OBSERVATION STATEMENT OR CONFIRMABLE BY OBSERVATION STATEMENTS. MY ARGUMENT CONSISTED IN PRODUCING EXAMPLES OF FACTUALLY MEANINGFUL STATEMENTS WHICH FAIL TO SATISFY THE PRINCIPLE. IN "CONFIRMABILITY AND MEANINGFULNESS" ("ANALYSIS" VOL. 34) R I SIKORA ARGUED THAT MY EXAMPLES DO NOT SUPPORT MY CONCLUSION. HERE I REPHRASE (...)
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  21. R. G. Swinburne (1973). New Books. [REVIEW] Mind 82 (328):624-626.
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  22. R. G. Swinburne (1973). Confirmability and Factual Meaningfulness. Analysis 33 (3):71 - 76.
    THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE CONFIRMATIONIST PRINCIPLE, THAT A STATEMENT IS FACTUALLY MEANINGFUL IF AND ONLY IF IT IS AN OBSERVATION-STATEMENT, OR THERE ARE OBSERVATION STATEMENTS WHICH WOULD CONFIRM OR DISCONFIRM IT. THIS PRINCIPLE IS THE FINAL WEAK CLAIM OF VERIFICATIONISM. EVEN IF TRUE, IT WOULD NOT BE OF GREAT USE IN SORTING OUT THE MEANINGFUL FROM THE MEANINGFULNESS, BUT IT IS SHOWN CONCLUSIVELY TO BE FALSE. A CLAIM THAT THERE IS A DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE BEST EVIDENCE THAT MEN WILL EVER (...)
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  23. R. G. Swinburne (1973). Jonathan Barnes. The Ontological Argument. Pp. 98 (London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd. 1972.) £1·95.Thomas McPherson. The Argument From Design. Pp. 78 (London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd. 1972.) £1·95. [REVIEW] Religious Studies 9 (4):488.
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  24. R. G. Swinburne (1973). Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Philosophical Books 14 (2):17-20.
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  25. R. G. Swinburne (1973). Personal Identity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74:231 - 247.
    EMPIRICIST THEORIES OF PERSONAL IDENTITY STATE THAT THE IDENTITY OF A PERSON OVER TIME IS A MATTER OF BODILY CONTINUITY AND/OR SIMILARITY OF MEMORY AND CHARACTER. IN CONTRAST, THIS PAPER ARGUES THAT WHILE BODILY CONTINUITY AND SIMILARITY OF MEMORY AND CHARACTER ARE EVIDENCE OF PERSONAL IDENTITY, THEY DO NOT CONSTITUTE IT. IT IS SOMETHING UNDEFINABLE. THE DIFFICULTY OF KNOWING WHAT TO SAY IN PUZZLE CASES DOES NOT SHOW THAT PERSONAL IDENTITY EXISTS IN DIFFERENT DEGREES OR THAT WE HAVE TO MAKE (...)
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  26. C. J. F. Williams, Anthony Savile, Richard Norman, Robert Black, R. G. Swinburne, David Holdcroft, Eva Schaper, Thomas McPheron & Karl Britton (1973). New Books. [REVIEW] Mind 82 (328):617-638.
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  27. R. G. Swinburne (1972). Cohen on Evidential Support. Mind 81 (322):244-248.
    CENTRAL TO COHEN’S NEW THEORY OF INDUCTION IS THE CLAIM THAT THE SUPPORT GIVEN BY EVIDENCE TO A HYPOTHESIS IS NOT A FUNCTION WHICH OBEYS THE AXIOMS OF THE PROBABILITY CALCULUS. THIS CLAIM DEPENDS ON THE TRUTH OF COHEN’S INSTANTIAL COMPARABILITY PRINCIPLE. UNDER NATURAL INTERPRETATIONS OF ’SUPPORT’, THIS PRINCIPLE IS FALSE. EVEN IF IT IS TRUE UNDER OTHER INTERPRETATIONS OF ’SUPPORT’, THAT DOES NOT SHOW THAT CONFIRMATION IN CARNAP’S SENSE DOES NOT OBEY THE AXIOMS.
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  28. R. G. Swinburne (1972). The Argument From Design - a Defence. Religious Studies 8 (3):193 - 205.
    I DEFEND IN DETAIL AN EXPOSITION OF THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN IN "PHILOSOPHY" 1968 AGAINST A. OLDING’S RECENT ATTACK IN RELIGIOUS STUDIES. I JUSTIFY THE DUALISM UNDERLYING THE ORIGINAL EXPOSITION. I FIND OLDING GUILTY OF TWO INTERESTING FALLACIES OF INDUCTIVE LOGIC - THE SUPERSIMILARITY FALLACY (POSTULATING IN AN ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY SIMILARITIES OF CAUSES IN RESPECTS IN WHICH DIFFERENCES OF EFFECTS SUGGEST DIFFERENCES OF CAUSES) AND THE COMPLETIST FALLACY (CLAIMING THAT AN EXPLANATION OF E BY C IS IMPERFECT UNLESS THE (...)
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  29. R. G. Swinburne (1971). Popper's Account of Acceptability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):167 – 176.
    ACCORDING TO POPPER, SCIENTIFIC THEORIES ARE TO BE ACCEPTED IN SO FAR AS THEY ARE FALSIFIABLE AND IN SO FAR AS THEY HAVE BEEN CORROBORATED. THE CONCEPTS OF FALSIFIABILITY AND CORROBORATION ARE SUBMITTED TO DETAILED ANALYSIS. THE POINT OF ACCEPTING THEORIES, ACCORDING TO POPPER, IS TO OBTAIN THEORIES OF HIGH VERISIMILITUDE. HOWEVER THE BEST WE CAN DO IS TO OBTAIN THEORIES OF HIGH PROBABLE VERISIMILITUDE. POPPER’S CRITERIA FOR ACCEPTING THEORIES WILL ONLY LEAD TO THEORIES OF HIGH PROBABLE VERISIMILITUDE ON NON-POPPERIAN (...)
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  30. R. G. Swinburne (1971). The Implications of Induction. Philosophical Books 12 (1):4-6.
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  31. R. G. Swinburne (1971). The Probability of Particular Events. Philosophy of Science 38 (3):327-343.
    The paper investigates what are the proper procedures for calculating the probability on certain evidence of a particular object e having a property, Q, e.g. of Eclipse winning the Derby. Let `α ' denote the conjunction of properties known to be possessed by e, and P(Q)/α the probability of an object which is α being Q. One view is that the probability of e being Q is given by the best confirmed value of P(Q)/α . This view is shown not (...)
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  32. R. G. Swinburne (1971). The Paradoxes of Confirmation - a Survey. American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (4):318 - 330.
    THE PARADOXES OF CONFIRMATION ARE CONSTITUTED BY THE CONTRADICTIONS ARISING FROM THE CONJUNCTION OF THREE PRINCIPLES OF CONFIRMATION - NICOD’S CRITERION, THE EQUIVALENCE CONDITION, AND WHAT THE PAPER CALLS THE SCIENTIFIC LAWS CONDITION. THE PAPER DISCUSSES IN DETAIL THE VARIOUS SOLUTIONS PROVIDED BY ABANDONING ONE OF THE PRINCIPLES. IN THE END IT FINDS NICOD’S CRITERION FALSE, BUT FINDS THE EXPLANATIONS GIVEN BY H.G. ALEXANDER AND OTHERS OF WHY NICOD’S CRITERION IS FALSE THEMSELVES UNSATISFACTORY. IT THEN PROVIDES A MORE ADEQUATE ACCOUNT (...)
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  33. R. G. Swinburne (1970). Choosing Between Confirmation Theories. Philosophy of Science 37 (4):602-613.
    ON WHAT GROUNDS OUGHT WE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN COMPETING CONFIRMATION THEORIES? THE ARTICLE BEGINS BY DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN CONFIRMATION THEORIES AND OTHER THEORIES WHICH MIGHT BE CONFUSED WITH THEM, SUCH AS THEORIES OF ACCEPTABILITY. IT THEN ARGUES THAT A CONFIRMATION THEORY OUGHT TO ANALYSE RATHER THAN EXPLICATE OUR ORDINARY STANDARDS OF CONFIRMATION. IT WILL DO THIS IN SO FAR AS IT IS COHERENT AND DOES NOT YIELD COUNTERINTUITIVE JUDGMENTS.
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  34. R. G. Swinburne (1970). Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science. Philosophical Books 11 (3):1-2.
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  35. R. G. Swinburne (1970). Reviews. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21 (3):308-311.
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  36. R. G. Swinburne (1969). Anomalies and Scientific Theories. By Willard C. Humphreys. (San Fransisco: Freeman, Cooper and Co. 1968. Pp. 318. No Price Given). [REVIEW] Philosophy 44 (168):166-.
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  37. R. G. Swinburne (1969). Whole and Part in Cosmological Arguments. Philosophy 44 (170):339 - 340.
    IF WE CAN EXPLAIN CAUSALLY EACH EVENT OF A SERIES, CAN WE THEREBY EXPLAIN CAUSALLY THE WHOLE SERIES? THE PRINCIPLES DEVELOPED IN ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION ENTAIL THAT EVEN IF WE CAN EXPLAIN CAUSALLY THE OCCURRENCE OF THE STATE OF THE UNIVERSE AT EACH TEMPORAL INSTANT, THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE CAN EXPLAIN CAUSALLY THE OCCURRENCE OF ALL THOSE STATES.
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  38. R. G. Swinburne (1969). Deity and Morality. Philosophical Books 10 (1):21-22.
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  39. R. G. Swinburne (1969). Modern Science and Zeno's Paradoxes. Philosophical Books 10 (2):8-9.
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  40. R. G. Swinburne (1969). Primary and Secondary Tests. Analysis 29 (6):203 - 205.
    THIS ARTICLE CLARIFIES A DISTINCTION MADE BY ME ELSEWHERE BETWEEN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY TESTS FOR THE APPLICATION OF A CONCEPT. IF THE PRIMARY TESTS ARE SATISFIED, THEN OF LOGICAL NECESSITY THE CONCEPT APPLIES, BUT SATISFACTION OF THE SECONDARY TESTS IS ONLY GOOD EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CONCEPT. THIS ARTICLE IS A REPLY TO ONE BY SLOTE (’A GENERAL SOLUTION TO GOODMAN’S RIDDLE?’ ANALYSIS, DECEMBER 1968) CHALLENGING MY EARLIER USE OF THIS DISTINCTION (’GRUE’ ANALYSIS, MARCH 1968) TO PROVIDE (...)
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  41. R. G. Swinburne (1969). Physical Determinism. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 3:155-168.
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  42. R. G. Swinburne (1969). Projectible predicates. Analysis 30 (1):1 - 11.
    IF "ALL A’S ARE B" AND "ALL A’S ARE C" ARE BOTH EQUALLY WELL SUPPORTED BY OBSERVATIONS SO FAR, YET YIELD CONFLICTING PREDICTIONS, WHICH OUGHT WE TO ADOPT? GOODMAN’S CONFLICT BETWEEN "ALL EMERALDS ARE GREEN" AND "ALL EMERALDS ARE GRUE" IS A SPECIAL CASE OF SUCH CONFLICT, WHICH MAY BE DEALT WITH BY A RULE STATING THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO PROJECT POSITIONAL IN PREFERENCE TO QUALITATIVE PREDICATES. THIS PAPER ATTEMPTS TO ELUCIDATE THE RULES GOVERNING A LARGER CLASS OF SUCH (...)
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  43. R. G. Swinburne (1969). The Language of Time. Philosophical Books 10 (1):9-11.
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  44. R. G. Swinburne (1969). Vagueness, Inexactness, and Imprecision. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (4):281-299.
    THERE IS OFTEN UNCERTAINTY ABOUT WHETHER SOME PREDICATE APPLIES TO SOME PHYSICAL OBJECT OR STATE. THIS UNCERTAINTY MAY HAVE ANY OF THREE SOURCES - VAGUENESS OF A TERM, INEXACTNESS OF A CONCEPT, OR PRACTICAL DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING ITS APPLICABILITY. VARIOUS WAYS IN WHICH CONCEPTUAL INEXACTNESS OR PRACTICAL DIFFICULTY MAY PRODUCE UNCERTAINTY ARE DISTINGUISHED. NEITHER TERMINOLOGICAL VAGUENESS, NOR PRACTICAL DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING THE APPLICABILITY OF A CONCEPT ARE NECESSARY FEATURES OF EVERY LANGUAGE IN EVERY PHYSICAL WORLD, BUT CONCEPTUAL INEXACTNESS IS A (...)
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  45. R. G. Swinburne (1968). The Refutation of Determinism. By M. R. Ayers. (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1968. Price 37s. 6d.). Philosophy 43 (166):390-.
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  46. R. G. Swinburne (1968). Grue. Analysis 28 (4):123 - 128.
    CONTRARY TO GOODMAN’S VIEW, A CLEAR DISTINCTION CAN BE MADE BETWEEN QUALITATIVE AND POSITIONAL PREDICATES. HENCE WE CAN EXPLAIN THAT WE OUGHT TO PROJECT ’GREEN’ RATHER THAN ’GRUE’ BECAUSE THE LATTER IS A POSITIONAL PREDICATE, RATHER THAN BECAUSE THE LATTER IS LESS WELL ENTRENCHED. A PREDICATE IS POSITIONAL IF, TO FIND OUT AS CERTAINLY AS WE CAN WHETHER IT APPLIES TO AN OBJECT, WE HAVE TO FIND OUT THE LATTER’S SPATIO-TEMPORAL LOCATION.
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  47. R. G. Swinburne (1968). Miracles. Philosophical Quarterly 18 (73):320-328.
    (I UNDERSTAND BY A MIRACLE, A VIOLATION OF A LAW OF NATURE BY A GOD.) A VIOLATION OF A LAW OF NATURE IS THE OCCURRENCE OF A NON-REPEATABLE COUNTER-INSTANCE TO IT. CONTRARY TO HUME’S VIEW, THERE COULD BE GOOD HISTORICAL EVIDENCE BOTH THAT A VIOLATION HAD OCCURRED AND THAT IT WAS DUE TO THE ACT OF A GOD.
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  48. R. G. Swinburne (1968). The Argument From Design. Philosophy 43 (165):199 - 212.
    ARGUMENTS FROM DESIGN TO THE EXISTENCE OF GOD MAY TAKE AS THEIR PREMISS EITHER THE EXISTENCE OF REGULARITIES OF COPRESENCE OR THE EXISTENCE OF REGULARITIES OF SUCCESSION. THERE ARE NO VALID FORMAL OBJECTIONS TO A CAREFULLY ARTICULATED ARGUMENT OF THE LATTER TYPE. AGAINST SUCH AN ARGUMENT NONE OF THE OBJECTIONS IN HUME’S "DIALOGUES" HAVE ANY WORTH. THE ARGUMENT MAY HOWEVER GIVE ONLY A SMALL DEGREE OF SUPPORT TO ITS CONCLUSION.
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  49. H. H. Price, William Kneale, Antony Flew, R. G. Swinburne, D. Taylor & C. H. Whiteley (1967). New Books. [REVIEW] Mind 76 (302):287-307.
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  50. R. G. Swinburne (1966). Affecting the Past. Philosophical Quarterly 16 (65):341-347.
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