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Profile: Robert Hopkins (New York University)
  1.  71
    Robert Hopkins (1998). Picture, Image and Experience: A Philosophical Inquiry. Cambridge University Press.
    How do pictures represent? In this book Robert Hopkins casts new light on an ancient question by connecting it to issues in the philosophies of mind and perception. He starts by describing several striking features of picturing that demand explanation. These features strongly suggest that our experience of pictures is central to the way they represent, and Hopkins characterizes that experience as one of resemblance in a particular respect. He deals convincingly with the objections traditionally assumed to be fatal to (...)
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  2. Robert Hopkins (2011). How to Be a Pessimist About Aesthetic Testimony. Journal of Philosophy 108 (3):138-157.
    Is testimony a legitimate source of aesthetic belief? Can I, for instance, learn that a film is excellent on your say-so? Optimists say yes, pessimists no. But pessimism comes in two forms. One claims that testimony is not a legitimate source of aesthetic belief because it cannot yield aesthetic knowledge. The other accepts that testimony can be a source of aesthetic knowledge, yet insists that some further norm prohibits us from exploiting that resource. I argue that this second form of (...)
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  3. Robert Hopkins (forthcoming). Imagining the Past: On the Nature of Episodic Memory. In Fiona MacPherson Fabian Dorsch (ed.), Memory and Imagination. OUP
    What kind of mental state is episodic memory? I defend the claim that it is, in key part, imagining the past, where the imagining in question is experiential imagining. To remember a past episode is to experientially imagine how things were, in a way controlled by one’s past experience of that episode. Call this the Inclusion View. I motive this view by appeal both to patterns of compatibilities and incompatibilities between various states, and to phenomenology. The bulk of the (...)
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  4.  91
    Robert Hopkins (2015). The Real Challenge to Photography (as Communicative Representational Art). Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (2):329-348.
    I argue that authentic photography is not able to develop to the full as a communicative representational art. Photography is authentic when it is true to its self-image as the imprinting of images. For an image to be imprinted is for its content to be linked to the scene in which it originates by a chain of sufficient, mind-independent causes. Communicative representational art (in any medium: photography, painting, literature, music, etc.) is art that exploits the resources of representation to achieve (...)
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  5. Robert Hopkins (2007). What is Wrong with Moral Testimony? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):611-634.
    Is it legitimate to acquire one’s moral beliefs on the testimony of others? The pessimist about moral testimony says not. But what is the source of the difficulty? Here pessimists have a choice. On the Unavailability view, moral testimony never makes knowledge available to the recipient. On Unusability accounts, although moral testimony can make knowledge available, some further norm renders it illegitimate to make use of the knowledge thus offered. I suggest that Unusability accounts provide the strongest form of pessimist (...)
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  6. Robert Hopkins (2012). What Perky Did Not Show. Analysis 72 (3):431-439.
    Some philosophers take Perky's experiments to show that perceiving can be mistaken for visualizing and so that the two sometimes match in phenomenology. On Segal’s alternative interpretation Perky’s subjects did not consciously perceive the stimuli at all. I argue that even setting this alternative aside, Perky's results do not prove what the philosophers think. She showed her subjects, not the objects they were asked to visualise, but pictures of them. What they mistook for visualizing was not perceptual consciousness of stimuli, (...)
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  7.  53
    Robert Hopkins (forthcoming). Realism in Film (and Other Representations). In Katherine Thomson-Jones (ed.), Current Controversies in the Philosophy of Film. Routledge
    What is it for a film to be realistic? Of the many answers that have been proposed, I review five: that it is accurate and precise; that is has relatively few prominent formal features; that it is illusionistic; that it is transparent; and that, while plainly a moving picture, it looks to be a photographic recording, not of the actors and sets in fact filmed, but of the events narrated. The number and variety of these options raise a deeper question: (...)
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  8.  96
    Ronald E. Hopkins (forthcoming). Book Review: The Gold Coast Church and the Ghetto: Christ and Culture in Mainline Protestantism. [REVIEW] Interpretation 55 (1):104-106.
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  9.  49
    R. Hopkins (2012). Seeing-in and Seeming to See. Analysis 72 (4):650-659.
    When we see something in a picture, do we enjoy visual experience as of the depicted object? Gombrichians say yes: when viewing ordinary pictures we simultaneously see the picture and seem to see its object. But why, then, isn’t seeing-in contradictory, and how are these two elements somehow integrated into a single experience? Gombrichians’ attempts to answer appeal either to our awareness of the picture’s design, or to the idea that picture and object are not given as in the same (...)
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  10. Robert Hopkins (2012). Factive Pictorial Experience: What's Special About Photographs? Noûs 46 (4):709-731.
    What is special about photographs? Traditional photography is, I argue, a system that sustains factive pictorial experience. Photographs sustain pictorial experience: we see things in them. Further, that experience is factive: if suchandsuch is seen in a photograph, then suchandsuch obtained when the photo was taken. More precisely, photographs are designed to sustain factive pictorial experience, and that experience is what we have when, in the photographic system as a whole, everything works as it is supposed to. In this respect (...)
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  11.  12
    Robert Hopkins (2010). Its Treatment and Significance. In Catharine Abell Katerina Bantinaki (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives on Depiction. 151.
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  12.  14
    Robert Hopkins (forthcoming). Sartre. In Amy Kind (ed.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Imagination. Routledge 82-93.
    In The Imaginary Sartre offers a systematic, insightful and heterodox account of imagining in many forms. Beginning with four ‘characteristics’ he takes to capture the phenomenology of imagining, he draws on considerations both philosophical and psychological to describe the deeper nature of the state that has those features. The result is a view that remains the most potent challenge to the Humean orthodoxy that to this day dominates both philosophical and psychological thinking on the topic.
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  13. Robert Hopkins (2014). Episodic Memory as Representing the Past to Oneself. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (3):313-331.
    Episodic memory is sometimes described as mental time travel. This suggests three ideas: that episodic memory offers us access to the past that is quasi-experiential, that it is a source of knowledge of the past, and that it is, at root, passive. I offer an account of episodic memory that rejects all three ideas. The account claims that remembering is a matter of representing the past to oneself, in a way suitably responsive to how one experienced the remembered episode to (...)
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  14. Robert Hopkins (2001). Kant, Quasi-Realism, and the Autonomy of Aesthetic Judgement. European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):166–189.
    Aesthetic judgements are autonomous, as many other judgements are not: for the latter, but not the former, it is sometimes justifiable to change one's mind simply because several others share a different opinion. Why is this? One answer is that claims about beauty are not assertions at all, but expressions of aesthetic response. However, to cover more than just some of the explananda, this expressivism needs combining with some analogue of cognitive command, i.e. the idea that disagreements over beuaty can (...)
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  15.  48
    S. Davies, R. Hopkins, J. Robinson & M. Padro (2004). On Richard Wollheim. British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):213-225.
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  16.  17
    Robert Hopkins (2005). Sculpture. In Jerrold Levinson (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics. OUP Oxford 572-582.
    What, if anything, is aesthetically distinctive about sculpture? Some think that sculpture differs from painting in being a specially tactile art. Different things might be meant by this, but it is anyway unhelpful to focus on our means of access to sculpture’s aesthetic properties, rather than those properties themselves. A more promising idea is that, while painting provides its own space, sculpture exists in the space of the gallery. To pursue this thought, I expound and develop the views of Susanne (...)
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  17.  9
    Robert Hopkins (2010). Inflected Pictorial Experience: Its Treatment and Significance. In Catharine Abell & Katerina Bantinaki (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Picturing. Oxford University Press
    Some (Podro, Lopes) think that sometimes our experience of pictures is ‘inflected’. What we see in these pictures involves, somehow, an awareness of features of their design. I clarify the idea of inflection, arguing that the thought must be that what is seen in the picture is something with properties which themselves need characterising by reference to that picture’s design, conceived as such. I argue that there is at least one case of inflection, so understood. Proponents of inflection have claimed (...)
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  18. Robert Hopkins & Robert Stecker (2009). Davies, Stephen; Higgins, Kathleen Marie. British Journal of Aesthetics 49 (4):462.
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  19. Robert Hopkins (2005). Aesthetics, Experience, and Discrimination. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63 (2):119–133.
    Can indistinguishable objects differ aesthetically? Manifestationism answers ‘no’ on the grounds that (i) aesthetically significant features of an object must show up in our experience of it; and (ii) a feature—aesthetic or not—figures in our experience only if we can discriminate its presence. Goodman’s response to Manifestationism has been much discussed, but little understood. I explain and reject it. I then explore an alternative. Doubles can differ aesthetically provided, first, it is possible to experience them differently; and, second, those experiences (...)
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  20.  10
    Robert Hopkins (2006). The Speaking Image: Visual Communication and the Nature of Depiction. In Matthew Kieran (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art. Blackwell Pub. 135--159.
    This paper summarises the main claims I have made in a series of publications on depiction. Having described six features of depiction that any account should explain, I sketch an account that does this. The account understands depiction in terms of the experience to which it gives rise, and construes that experience as one of resemblance. The property in respect of which resemblance is experienced was identified by Thomas Reid, in his account of ‘visible figure’. I defend the account against (...)
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  21.  72
    Robert Hopkins (2012). Seeing-in and Seeming to See. Analysis 72 (4):650-659.
    When we see something in a picture, do we enjoy visual experience as of the depicted object? Gombrichians say yes: when viewing ordinary pictures we simultaneously see the picture and seem to see its object. But why, then, isn’t seeing-in contradictory, and how are these two elements somehow integrated into a single experience? Gombrichians’ attempts to answer appeal either to our awareness of the picture’s design, or to the idea that picture and object are not given as in the same (...)
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  22.  67
    Stephen Davies, Robert Hopkins, Jenefer Robinson & Elisabeth Schellekens (2004). Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche. British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):304-307.
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  23.  65
    Robert Hopkins (1995). Explaining Depiction. Philosophical Review 104 (3):425-455.
    An account of depiction should explain its key features. I identify six: that depiction is from a point of view; that it represents its objects as having a visual appearance; that it depictive content is always reasonably detailed; that misrepresentation is possible, but only within limits; and that the ability to interpret depictions co-varies, given general competence with pictures, with knowledge of what the depicted objects look like. All this suggests that picturing works by capturing appearances, but how more precisely (...)
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  24. Robert Hopkins (2008). What Do We See in Film? Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 66 (2):149–159.
    Many films are made by a two-tier process: the photographing of events which themselves represent the story the film tells. The latter representation is often illusionistic. I explore two consequences. The first concerns what we see in film. I argue that we sometimes see in such films, not events representing the story told, but simply the events composing that story. The way is thereby opened to a unified aesthetic of film, whether made the two-tier way or not. The second consequence (...)
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  25.  8
    Robert Hopkins (2010). Imagination and Affective Response. In Jonathan Webber (ed.), Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism. Routledge 100-117.
    What is the relation between affective states, such as emotions and pleasure, and imagining? Do the latter cause the former, just as perceptual states do? Or are the former merely imagined, along with suitable objects? I consider this issue against the backdrop of Sartre’s theory of imagination, and drawing on his highly illuminating discussion of it. I suggest that, while it is commonly assumed that imaginative states cause affective responses much as do perceptions, the alternatives merit more careful consideration than (...)
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  26.  82
    Robert Hopkins (2005). Molyneux's Question. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):441-464.
    What philosophical issue or issues does Molyneux’s question raise? I concentrate on two. First, are there any properties represented in both touch and vision? Second, for any such common perceptible, is it represented in the same way in each, so that the two senses support a single concept of that property? I show that there is space for a second issue here, describe its precise relations to Molyneux’s question, and argue for its philosophical significance. I close by arguing that Gareth (...)
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  27.  26
    Robert Hopkins (2003). Pictures, Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. The Monist 86 (4):653-675.
    This paper argues that an account of picturing in terms of the experience it sustains, in particular an experience of resemblance in outline shape, is superior to Dominic Lopes’, view, on which pictures engage our recognitional capacities for the objects they depict. Lopes’ position fails to do the work proper to a philosophical theory of picturing. Lopes argues that the experienced resemblance view pays insufficient attention to empirical work, and that it incurs unwelcome empirical commitments. I refuse the commitments Lopes (...)
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  28.  83
    Robert Hopkins (1994). Resemblance and Misrepresentation. Mind 103 (412):421-438.
    One problem faced by resemblance views of depiction is posed by the misrepresentation. Another is to specify the respect in which pictures resemble their objects. To isolate the first, I discuss resemblance in the context of sculpture, where the solution to the second is, prima facie, obvious. The point of appealing to resemblance is to explain how the representation has the content it does. In the case of misrepresenting sculptures, this means appealing to resemblance, not between the sculpture and the (...)
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  29.  61
    Robert Hopkins (2005). Thomas Reid on Molyneux's Question. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):340-364.
    Reid’s discussion of Molyneux’s question has been neglected. The Inquiry discusses the question twice, offering opposing answers. The first discussion treats the underlying issue as concerning common perceptibles of touch and vision, and in particular whether in vision we originally perceive depth. Although it is tempting to treat the second discussion as doing the same, this would render pointless various novel features Reid introduces in reformulating Molyneux’s question. Rather, the issue now is whether the blind can form a reasonable conception (...)
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  30.  73
    Robert Hopkins (2000). Touching Pictures. British Journal of Aesthetics 40 (1):149-167.
    Congenitally blind people can make and understand ‘tactile pictures’ – representations form of raised ridges on flat surfaces. If made visible, these representations can serve as pictures for the sighted. Does it follow that we should take at face value the idea that they are pictures made for touch? I explore this question, and the related issue of the aesthetics of ‘tactile pictures’ by considering the role in both depiction and pictorial aesthetics of experience, and by asking how far the (...)
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  31.  65
    R. Hopkins (2013). Perky, Phenomenal Similarity and Photographs: Reply to Nanay. Analysis 73 (1):77-80.
    In a recent paper, I argue that Perky’s famous experiments do not show what they are often taken to show. Bence Nanay has criticised my argument on two grounds. I argue against both his lines of objection.
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  32. Robert Hopkins (2003). Sculpture and Space. In Matthew Kieran & Dominic Lopes (eds.), Imagination, Philosophy, and the Arts. Routledge 272-290.
    What is distinctive about sculpture as an artform? I argue that it is related to the space around it as painting and the other pictorial arts are not. I expound and develop Langer's suggestive comments on this issue, before asking what the major strengths and weaknesses of that position might be.
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  33.  65
    Robert Hopkins (2006). Painting, History, and Experience. Philosophical Studies 127 (1):19 - 35.
    Two themes run through Wollheim’s work: the importance of history to the practice and appreciation of the arts, and the centrality of experience in appreciation. Prima facie, these are in tension. Reconciling them requires two steps. First, adopt a notion of experience on which features can be experienced even if we must have experience-independent access to the fact that the work exhibits them. Second, state what makes a particular experience appropriate to the work. What does so? Although Wollheim toyed with (...)
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  34.  92
    Robert Hopkins (2010). Intersubjective Validity, Realism and Aesthetics. Analysis 70 (3):557-562.
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  35.  65
    Robert Hopkins (2004). Painting, Sculpture, Sight, and Touch. British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (2):149-166.
    I raise two questions that bear on the aesthetics of painting and sculpture. First, painting involves perspective, in the sense that everything represented in a painting is represented from a point, or points, within represented space; is sculpture also perspectival? Second, painting is specially linked to vision; is sculpture linked in this way either to vision or to touch? To clarify the link between painting and vision, I describe the perspectival structure of vision. Since this is the same structure we (...)
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  36.  82
    Robert Hopkins (2010). Moving Because Pictures? Illusion and the Emotional Power of Film. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 34 (1):200-218.
    Why does cinema exert such power over our emotions? Many have wanted to answer by appeal to the idea that film sustains some illusion concerning the events it narrates. I compare three such views: that film sustains the illusion that those events are before us; that it sustains that illusion, but only partially; and that, though viewers are always fully aware of seeing pictures, those pictures are experienced as the moving photographic record of the narrated events. I identify these positions’ (...)
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  37.  76
    Robert Hopkins (2000). Beauty and Testimony. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 47:209-236.
    Kant claims that the judgement of taste, the judgement that some particular is beautiful, exhibits two ‘peculiarities’. First: [t]he judgement of taste determines its object in respect of delight with a claim to the agreement of every one , just as if it were objective.
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  38.  65
    Robert Hopkins (2001). The Spectator in the Picture. In Rob Van Gerwen (ed.), Richard Wollheim on the Art of Painting. Art as Representation and Expression. CUP 215-231.
    This paper considers whether pictures ever implicitly represent internal spectators of the scenes they depict, and what theoretical construal to offer of their doing so. Richard Wollheim's discussion (Painting as an Art, ch.3) is taken as the most sophisticated attempt to answer these questions. I argue that Wollheim does not provide convincing argument for his claim that some pictures implicitly represent an internal spectator with whom the viewer of the picture is to imaginatively identify. instead, I defend a view on (...)
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  39.  13
    Robert Hopkins (2015). Reproductive Prints as Aesthetic Surrogates. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 73 (1):11-21.
    Reproductive prints allow us to engage with the aesthetic/artistic character of the pictures that are their sources. But prints clearly differ from their sources in various striking ways. How, then, are they able to make engagement possible? I consider various answers. Most treat prints as acting as surrogates for the source: in sharing its aesthetic properties, in resembling it in overall aesthetic character, in being aesthetically transparent to it, or in allowing us to imagine its aesthetic character in sufficiently rich (...)
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  40.  2
    S. Davies, R. Hopkins, J. Robinson & A. Chasid (2004). Win The Pictorial Relation is Not Reference. British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):226-247.
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  41. Stephen Davies, Kathleen Marie Higgins, Robert Hopkins, Robert Stecker & David E. Cooper (eds.) (2009). A Companion to Aesthetics. John Wiley & Sons.
    In this extensively revised and updated edition, 168 alphabetically arranged articles provide comprehensive treatment of the main topics and writers in this area of aesthetics. Written by prominent scholars covering a wide-range of key topics in aesthetics and the philosophy of art Features revised and expanded entries from the first edition, as well as new chapters on recent developments in aesthetics and a larger number of essays on non-Western thought about art Unique to this edition are six overview essays on (...)
     
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  42.  3
    S. Davies, R. Hopkins, J. Robinson & G. Dammann (2004). The Idea of Form: Rethinking Kant's Aesthetics. British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):313-315.
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  43.  54
    Robert Hopkins (2006). Critical Reasoning and Critical Perception. In Matthew Kieran & Dominic Lopes (eds.), Knowing Art. Springer 137-153.
    The outcome of criticism is a perception. Does this mean that criticism cannot count as a rational process? For it to do so, it seems it would have to be possible for there to be an argument for a perception. Yet perceptions do not seem to be the right sort of item to serve as the conclusions of arguments. Is this appearance borne out? I examine why perceptions might not be able to play that role, and explore what would have (...)
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  44.  60
    Robert Hopkins (2008). Reasons for Looking: Lopes on the Value of Pictures. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):556-569.
    In ‘Sight and Sensibility: Evaluating Pictures’ Dominic Lopes attempts two things. First, he attempts to solve the ‘Puzzle of Mimesis’: why do we value looking at pictures over looking at the things they depict? Second, he defends ‘interactionism’: the view that some aesthetic evaluations of pictures imply evaluations in moral and cognitive terms. I argue that the attempt to solve the Puzzle turns on the notion of ‘inflection’, and that that notion is more problematic than Lopes admits. I further argue (...)
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  45.  46
    Robert Hopkins (2003). Perspective, Convention and Compromise. In Heiko Hecht, Margaret Atherton & Robert Schwartz (eds.), Looking Into Pictures: an interdisciplinary approach to pictorial space. MIT Press 145-165.
    What is special about picturing according to the rules of perspectival drawing systems? My answer is at once both radical and conciliatory. I think that depiction essentially involves a distinctive experience, an experience of resemblance. More precisely, the picture must be seen as preserving what Thomas Reid (Enquiry 1764) called the "visible figure" of what is represented. It follows from this, and from some other plausible premises, that if a picture is to depict detailed spatial arrangements, rather than simply to (...)
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  46.  2
    S. Davies, R. Hopkins, J. Robinson & Ian Ground (2004). Environment and the Arts: Perspectives on Environmental Aesthetics. British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):311-313.
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  47.  2
    S. Davies, R. Hopkins, J. Robinson & G. C. Hooper (2004). Music and the Iniffable. British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):309-311.
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  48.  2
    S. Davies, R. Hopkins, J. Robinson & J. Zeimbekis (2004). Propositional Attitudes In Fiction. British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):261-276.
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  49.  2
    S. Davies, R. Hopkins, J. Robinson & C. Samuel Todd (2004). Quasi-Realism, Acquaintance, and The Normative Claims of Aesthetic Judgement. British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):277-296.
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  50.  2
    S. Davies, R. Hopkins, J. Robinson & S. Lintott (2004). The Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature. British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):301-315.
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