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  1. R. Jay Wallace (2013). The View From Here: On Affirmation, Attachment, and the Limits of Regret. Oup Usa.
    The View from Here is a study of our must fundamental attitudes toward the past. The book explores the dynamics of affirmation and regret, tracing the connections of each to our ongoing attachments. The focus is on situations in which our attachments commit us to affirming events or decisions that we know to have been unfortunate or regrettable.
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  2. R. Jay Wallace (2012). Constructivism About Normativity : Some Pitfalls. In Jimmy Lenman & Yonatan Shemmer (eds.), Constructivism in Practical Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
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  3. R. Jay Wallace (2012). Duties of Love. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):175-198.
    A defence of the idea that there are sui generis duties of love: duties, that is, that we owe to people in virtue of standing in loving relationships with them. I contrast this non-reductionist position with the widespread reductionist view that our duties to those we love all derive from more generic moral principles. The paper mounts a cumulative argument in favour of the non-reductionist position, adducing a variety of considerations that together speak strongly in favour of adopting it. The (...)
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  4. R. Jay Wallace (2012). Justification, Regret, and Moral Complaint: Looking Forward and Looking Backward on (and in) Human Life. In Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang (eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams. Oxford University Press, Usa.
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  5. R. Jay Wallace (2011). Ought", Reasons, and Vice: A Comment on Judith Jarvis Thomson's "Normativity. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 154 (3):451 - 463.
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  6. R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar & Samuel Richard Freeman (eds.) (2011). Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon. Oxford University Press.
    Reasons and Recognition brings together fourteen new papers on an array of topics from the many areas to which Scanlon has made path-breaking contributions, ...
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  7. R. Jay Wallace (2010). Hypocrisy, Moral Address, and the Equal Standing of Persons. Philosophy and Public Affairs 38 (4):307-341.
  8. R. Jay Wallace (2010). Reasons, Values and Agent-Relativity. Dialectica 64 (4):503-528.
    According to T. M. Scanlon's buck-passing account, the normative realm of reasons is in some sense prior to the domain of value. Intrinsic value is not itself a property that provides us with reasons; rather, to be good is to have some other reason-giving property, so that facts about intrinsic value amount to facts about how we have reason to act and to respond. The paper offers an interpretation and defense of this approach to the relation between reasons and values. (...)
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  9. R. Jay Wallace (2009). The Publicity of Reasons. Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):471-497.
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  10. R. Jay Wallace, Practical Reason. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Practical reason is the general human capacity for resolving, through reflection, the question of what one is to do. Deliberation of this kind is practical in at least two senses. First, it is practical in its subject matter, insofar as it is concerned with action. But it is also practical in its consequences or its issue, insofar as reflection about action itself directly moves people to act. Our capacity for deliberative self-determination raises two sets of philosophical problems. First, there are (...)
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  11. Christine M. Korsgaard, R. Jay Wallace, Gary Watson, Stephen Darwall & David Shoemaker (2007). 10. Thomas C. Schelling, Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays Thomas C. Schelling, Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays (Pp. 176-181). In Laurie DiMauro (ed.), Ethics. Greenhaven Press.
     
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  12. R. Jay Wallace (2007). Reasons, Relations, and Commands: Reflections on Darwall. Ethics 118 (1):24-36.
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  13. R. Jay Wallace (2007). Ressentiment, Value, and Self-Vindication : Making Sense of Nietzsche's Slave Revolt. In Brian Leiter & Neil Sinhababu (eds.), Nietzsche and Morality. Oxford University Press. 110--137.
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  14. R. Jay Wallace (2007). XII-The Argument From Resentment. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):295-318.
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  15. R. Jay Wallace (ed.) (2006). Normativity and the Will: Selected Papers on Moral Psychology and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press.
    Normativity and the Will collects fourteen important papers on moral psychology and practical reason by R. Jay Wallace, one of the leading philosophers currently working in these areas. The papers explore the interpenetration of normative and psychological issues in a series of debates that lie at the heart of moral philosophy. Themes that are addressed include reason, desire, and the will; responsibility, identification, and emotion; and the relation between morality and other normative domains. Wallace's treatments of these topics are at (...)
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  16. R. Jay Wallace (2005). Moral Psychology. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
     
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  17. R. Jay Wallace (2004). Sarah Buss and Lee Overton, Eds., Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes From Harry Frankfurt:Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes From Harry Frankfurt. Ethics 114 (4):810-815.
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  18. R. Jay Wallace (2004). Constructing Normativity. Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):451-476.
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  19. R. Jay Wallace (2004). Normativity and the Will. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:195-216.
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  20. R. Jay Wallace (ed.) (2004). Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford University Press.
    Reason and Value collects 15 new papers by leading contemporary philosophers on themes from the work of Joseph Raz. Raz has made major contributions in a wide range of areas, including jurisprudence, political philosophy, and the theory of practical reason; but all of his work displays a deep engagement with central themes in moral philosophy. The subtlety and power of Raz's reflections on ethical topics make his writings a fertile source for anyone working in this area. Especially significant are his (...)
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  21. R. Jay Wallace (2004). The Rightness of Acts and the Goodness of Lives.”. In , Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford University Press.
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  22. Niko Kolodny & R. Jay Wallace (2003). Promises and Practices Revisited. Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (2):119–154.
    Promising is clearly a social practice or convention. By uttering the formula, “I hereby promise to do X,” we can raise in others the expectation that we will in fact do X. But this succeeds only because there is a social practice that consists (inter alia) in a disposition on the part of promisers to do what they promise, and an expectation on the part of promisees that promisers will so behave. It is equally clear that, barring special circumstances of (...)
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  23. R. Jay Wallace (2003). Explanation, Deliberation, and Reasons. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):429–435.
    Jonathan Dancy’s Practical Reality defends a strikingly nonpsychologistic account of motivating reasons for action. I agree wholeheartedly with Dancy that normative reasons do not in general consist in psychological states. I also agree with Dancy that motivating reasons should be understood in a way that preserves their connection to the kinds of normative consideration that recommend or speak in favor of actions. Despite these significant points of agreement, however, I find myself resisting Dancy’s nonpsychologistic conclusion.
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  24. R. Jay Wallace (2003). Review: Explanation, Deliberation, and Reasons. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):429 - 435.
  25. R. Jay Wallace (2003). Review of Richard Joyce, The Myth of Morality. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (11).
    This book is an impressive and stimulating treatment of central issues in metaethics. It is extremely well-written, combining clarity and precision with an individual style that is engaging and very often witty. It presents a general commentary on the contemporary metaethical debate, on the way to defending a position in that debate—moral fictionalism—that is distinctive and worthy of reaching a wider audience. The book is full of arguments, presenting a wealth of stimulating ideas, objections, and suggestions on all the topics (...)
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  26. R. Jay Wallace (2002). Précis of Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):680–681.
  27. R. Jay Wallace (2002). Replies. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):707–727.
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  28. R. Jay Wallace (2002). Scanlon's Contractualism. Ethics 112 (3):429-470.
    T. M. Scanlon's magisterial book What We Owe to Each Other is surely one of the most sophisticated and important works of moral philosophy to have appeared for many years. It raises fundamental questions about all the main aspects of the subject, and I hope and expect that it will have a decisive influence on the shape and direction of moral philosophy in the years to come. In this essay I shall focus on four sets of issues raised by Scanlon's (...)
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  29. R. Jay Wallace, Gerald Dworkin, John Deigh, T. M. Scanlon, Peter Vallentyne & Alan Patten (2002). 10. William A. Edmundson, Ed., The Duty to Obey the Law: Selected Philosophical Readings William A. Edmundson, Ed., The Duty to Obey the Law: Selected Philosophical Readings (Pp. 614-616). [REVIEW] Ethics 112 (3).
     
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  30. R. Jay Wallace, Gerald Dworkin, John Deigh & Tm Scanlon (2002). TM Scanlon's What We Owe to Each Other. Ethics 112 (3):429-528.
     
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  31. R. Jay Wallace (2001). Moralische Gründe: Aus der Sicht des Handelnden. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 55 (1):3 - 23.
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  32. R. Jay Wallace (2001). Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason. Philosophers' Imprint 1 (4):1-26.
    This paper addresses some connections between conceptions of the will and the theory of practical reason. The first two sections argue against the idea that volitional commitments should be understood along the lines of endorsement of normative principles. A normative account of volition cannot make sense of akrasia, and it obscures an important difference between belief and intention. Sections three and four draw on the non-normative conception of the will in an account of instrumental rationality. The central problem is to (...)
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  33. R. Jay Wallace (2000). An Anti-Philosophy of the Emotions? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):469-477.
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  34. R. Jay Wallace (2000). Moral Responsibility and the Practical Point of View. In. In A. van den Beld (ed.), Moral Responsibility and Ontology. Kluwer. 25--47.
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  35. R. Jay Wallace (1999). Addiction as Defect of the Will: Some Philosophical Reflections. [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 18 (6):621–654.
    It is both common and natural to think of addiction as a kind of defect of the will. Addicts, we tend to suppose, are subject to impulses or cravings that are peculiarly unresponsive to their evaluative reflection about what there is reason for them to do. As a result of this unresponsiveness, we further suppose, addicts are typically impaired in their ability to act in accordance with their own deliberative conclusions. My question in this paper is whether we can make (...)
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  36. R. Jay Wallace (1999). Autonomie, Charakter und praktische Vernunft: Überlegungen am Beispiel des Utilitarismus. Analyse and Kritik 21 (2):213-230.
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  37. R. Jay Wallace (1999). Three Conceptions of Rational Agency. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):217-242.
    Rational agency may be thought of as intentional activity that is guided by the agent's conception of what they have reason to do. The paper identifies and assesses three approaches to this phenomenon, which I call internalism, meta-internalism, and volitionalism. Internalism accounts for rational motivation by appeal to substantive desires of the agent's that are conceived as merely given; I argue that it fails to do full justice to the phenomenon of guidance by one's conception of one's reasons. Meta-internalism explains (...)
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  38. Garrett Cullity, Alex Miller, Duncan McFarland, James Griffin, R. Jay Wallace, Iain Law, Ralph Wedgwood, Maggie Little, Nick Zangwill & Elinor Mason (1998). British Society for Ethical Theory 1998 Conference. Journal of Ethics 2 (189).
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  39. R. Jay Wallace, Moral Motivation. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Questions about the possibility and nature of moral motivation occupy a central place in the history of ethics. Philosophers disagree, however, about the role that motivational investigations should play within the larger subject of ethical theory. These disagreements surface in the dispute about whether moral thought is necessarily motivating – ‘internalists’ affirming that it is,‘externalists’ denying this. [...] There are also important questions about the content of moral motivations. A moral theory should help us to make sense of the fact (...)
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  40. R. Jay Wallace (1997). Reason and Responsibility. In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press. 321--345.
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  41. R. Jay Wallace (1997). The Metaphysics of Free Will. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):156-159.
  42. R. Jay Wallace (1996). Book Review:Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology. Owen Flanagan, Amelie Oksenberg Rorty. [REVIEW] Ethics 106 (2):451-.
  43. R. Jay Wallace (1996). Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Harvard University Press.
    R. Jay Wallace argues in this book that moral accountability hinges on questions of fairness: When is it fair to hold people morally responsible for what they do? Would it be fair to do so even in a deterministic world? To answer these questions, we need to understand what we are doing when we hold people morally responsible, a stance that Wallace connects with a central class of moral sentiments, those of resentment, indignation, and guilt. To hold someone responsible, he (...)
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  44. R. Jay Wallace (1994). Book Review:Freedom: A Coherence Theory. Christine Swanton. [REVIEW] Ethics 104 (3):624-.
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  45. R. Jay Wallace (1994). Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 14 (4):264-266.
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  46. R. Jay Wallace (1991). Virtue, Reason, and Principle. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):469-495.
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  47. R. Jay Wallace (1990). How to Argue About Practical Reason. Mind 99 (395):355-385.
    What are the comparative roles of reason and the passions in explaining human motivation and behaviour? Accounts of practical reason divide on this central question, with proponents of different views falling into rationalist and Humean camps. By 'rationalist' accounts of practical reason, I mean accounts which make the characteristically Kantian claim that pure reason can be practical in its issue. To reject this view is to take the Humean position that reasoning or ratiocination is not by itself capable of giving (...)
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  48. R. Jay Wallace (1988). The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason. Philosophical Books 29 (4):225-227.
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