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R. M. Sainsbury [73]R. Mark Sainsbury [2]
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Profile: Mark Sainsbury (University of Texas at Austin)
  1. R. M. Sainsbury (2009). Fiction and Fictionalism. Routledge.
    Introduction -- What is fiction? -- Realism about fictional objects -- Fictional objects are nonexistents -- Worlds and truth : fictional worlds, possible worlds, and impossible worlds -- Fictional entities are abstract artifacts -- Irrealism : fiction and intentionality -- Some fictionalists -- Fictionalism about possible worlds -- Moral fictionalism -- Retrospect.
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  2.  4
    R. M. Sainsbury (1995). Paradoxes. Cambridge University Press.
    A paradox can be defined as an unacceptable conclusion derived by apparently acceptable reasoning from apparently acceptable premises. Unlike party puzzles or brain teasers, many paradoxes are serious in that they raise serious philosophical problems, and are associated with crises of thought and revolutionary advances. To grapple with them is not merely to engage in an intellectual game, but to come to grips with issues of real import. The second, revised edition of this intriguing book expands and updates the text (...)
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  3. R. M. Sainsbury (1996). Concepts Without Boundaries. In Rosanna Keefe & Peter Smith (eds.), Vagueness: A Reader. MIT Press 186-205.
  4.  65
    R. M. Sainsbury (1997). Easy Possibilities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):907-919.
  5. R. M. Sainsbury (2005). Reference Without Referents. Clarendon Press.
    Reference is a central topic in philosophy of language, and has been the main focus of discussion about how language relates to the world. R. M. Sainsbury sets out a new approach to the concept, which promises to bring to an end some long-standing debates in semantic theory. Lucid and accessible, and written with a minimum of technicality, Sainsbury's book also includes a useful historical survey. It will be of interest to those working in logic, mind, and metaphysics as well (...)
     
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  6. R. M. Sainsbury (2010). Intentionality Without Exotica. In Robin Jeshion (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought.
    The paper argues that intensional phenomena can be explained without appealing to "exotic" entities: one that don't exist, are merely possible, or are essentially abstract.
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  7. R. M. Sainsbury (2001). Logical Forms: An Introduction to Philosophical Logic. Blackwell Publishers.
  8. R. M. Sainsbury (2008). The Essence of Reference. In Ernest Lepore & Barry Smith (eds.), he Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Language. OUP Oxford
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  9. R. M. Sainsbury (2001). Two Ways to Smoke a Cigarette. Ratio 14 (4):386–406.
    In the early part of the paper, I attempt to explain a dispute between two parties who endorse the compositionality of language but disagree about its implications: Paul Horwich, and Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore. In the remainder of the paper, I challenge the thesis on which they are agreed, that compositionality can be taken for granted. I suggest that it is not clear what compositionality involves nor whether it obtains. I consider some kinds of apparent counterexamples, and compositionalist responses (...)
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  10.  8
    R. M. Sainsbury (1979/1999). Russell. Routledge.
    This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection.
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  11. R. M. Sainsbury (2011). Fiction and Acceptance-Relative Truth, Belief and Assertion. In Franck Lihoreau (ed.), Truth in Fiction. Ontos Verlag 38--137.
     
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  12.  57
    R. M. Sainsbury & Michael Tye (2012). Seven Puzzles of Thought: And How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts. OUP Oxford.
    Sainsbury and Tye present a new theory, 'originalism', which provides natural, simple solutions to puzzles about thought that have troubled philosophers for centuries. They argue that concepts are to be individuated by their origin, rather than epistemically or semantically. Although thought is special, no special mystery attaches to its nature.
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  13. R. M. Sainsbury & Michael Tye (2011). An Originalist Theory of Concepts. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):101-124.
    We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the ship seen through different windows, and (...)
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  14. R. M. Sainsbury (2006). Understanding as Immersion. Philosophical Issues 16 (1):246–262.
    Understanding has often been regarded as a kind of knowledge. This paper argues that this view is very implausible for understanding words. Instead, a proper account will be of the “analytic-genetic” variety: it will describe immersion in the practice of using a word in such a way that even those not previously equipped with the concepts the word expresses can become immersed. Meeting this condition requires attention to findings in developmental psychology. If you understand a declarative utterance, you thereby know (...)
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  15.  40
    R. M. Sainsbury (1995). Why the World Cannot Be Vague. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):63-81.
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  16. R. M. Sainsbury (2006). Scott Soames, Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century: Volume 1: The Dawn of Analysis. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 129 (3):637 - 643.
    The review praises the philosophical quality, but is less enthusiastic about the scholarship and historical accuracy.
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  17.  75
    R. M. Sainsbury (1995). Vagueness, Ignorance, and Margin for Error. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):589-601.
  18.  49
    R. M. Sainsbury (1989). What is a Vague Object? Analysis 49 (3):99-103.
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  19.  32
    R. M. Sainsbury (1977). Semantics by Proxy. Analysis 37 (2):86 - 96.
    Many theories provide semantics for English by proxy of semantics for the "logical form" of English sentences. The paper presents a dilemma: if there is no algorithm for moving between English and logical form, English itself has not been given a semantic theory. But if there is an algorithm, it can be incorporated in the theory, which would then apply directly to English. In the worst case, logical form is an obstacle to providing semantics for English. In the best case, (...)
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  20.  30
    R. M. Sainsbury (1996). Review: Crispin Wright: Truth and Objectivity. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):899 - 904.
    This belongs to a symposium about Crispin Wright's Truth\nand Objectivity. Wright entertains the "possibility of a\npluralist view of truth." I suggest that this should not\nentail ambiguity in the word "true." For truth to amount to\ndifferent things for different kinds of subject matter no\nmore entails ambiguity than does the fact that existence\namounts to different things for different kinds of entity.\nTurning to cognitive command, I argue that it is trivially\nsatisfied: if I judge that p and you disagree, then under\nsuitable conditions I must (...)
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  21.  64
    R. M. Sainsbury (1983). On a Fregean Argument for the Distinctness of Sense and Reference. Analysis 43 (1):12 - 14.
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  22.  19
    R. M. Sainsbury (1998). Projections and Relations. The Monist 81 (1):133-160.
    The paper evaluates Hume's alleged projectivism about causation and moral values.
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  23.  24
    R. M. Sainsbury (1986). Degrees of Belief and Degrees of Truth. Philosophical Papers 15 (2-3):97-106.
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  24.  54
    R. M. Sainsbury (2006). Spotty Scope. Analysis 66 (289):17–22.
  25.  59
    R. M. Sainsbury (1995). Review: Vagueness, Ignorance, and Margin for Error. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):589 - 601.
  26.  54
    R. M. Sainsbury (1984). Rejoinder to Rasmussen. Analysis 44 (3):111 - 113.
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  27.  66
    R. M. Sainsbury (1980). Benevolence and Evil. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (2):128 – 134.
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  28.  24
    R. M. Sainsbury (2000). Warrant-Transmission, Defeaters and Disquotation. Noûs 34 (s1):191 - 200.
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  29.  1
    R. M. Sainsbury (1996). Crispin Wright: Truth and Objectivity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):899-904.
  30. R. M. Sainsbury (2004). Referring Descriptions. In Marga Reimer & Anne Bezuidenhout (eds.), Descriptions and Beyond. Oxford University Press 369--89.
     
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  31.  52
    R. Mark Sainsbury (2010). Paderewski Variations. Dialectica 64 (4):483-502.
    How successful are Fregean theories compared with guise-theoretic Millian theories in dealing with a range of problematic propositional attitude ascriptions? The range considered is roughly that of Paderewski puzzles and their relatives. I argue that these fall into two categories: in one category, the Fregean theory looks to be under pressure from guise-theoretic rivals, though I argue that Fregeans can, to advantage, borrow some guise-theoretic machinery. Concerning the other category, which includes Kripke's two Paderewski puzzles, I argue that these puzzles (...)
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  32.  57
    R. M. Sainsbury (1999). Names, Fictional Names, and 'Really': R.M. Sainsbury. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):243–269.
    [R. M. Sainsbury] Evans argued that most ordinary proper names were Russellian: to suppose that they have no bearer is to suppose that they have no meaning. The first part of this paper addresses Evans's arguments, and finds them wanting. Evans also claimed that the logical form of some negative existential sentences involves 'really' (e.g. 'Hamlet didn't really exist'). One might be tempted by the view, even if one did not accept its Russellian motivation. However, I suggest that Evans gives (...)
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  33.  31
    R. Mark Sainsbury (2000). Empty Names. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:57-66.
    This paper explores the idea that a name should be associated with a reference condition, rather than with a referent, just as a sentence should be associated with a truth condition, rather than with a truth value. The suggestion, to be coherent, needs to be set in a freelogical framework (following Burge). A prominent advantage of the proposal is that it gives a straight-forward semantics for empty names. A problem discussed in this paper is that of reconciling the rigidity of (...)
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  34. R. M. Sainsbury (2008). Philosophical Logic. In Dermot Moran (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, Abingdon, Routledge 2008: 347–81.
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  35.  34
    R. M. Sainsbury (2002). Departing From Frege: Essays in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge.
    This text argues that we must depart considerably from Frege's own views if we are to work towards an adequate conception of natural language.
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  36.  38
    R. M. Sainsbury (2004). Sameness and Difference of Sense. Philosophical Books 45 (3):209-217.
  37.  6
    R. M. Sainsbury (1996). Crispin Wright. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):899-904.
    This belongs to a symposium about Crispin Wright's Truth and Objectivity. Wright entertains the "possibility of pluralist view of truth." I suggest that this should not entail ambiguity in the word "true." For truth to amount to different things for different kinds of subject matter no more entails ambiguity than does the fact that existence amounts to different things for different kinds of entity. Turning to cognitive command, I argue that it is trivially satisfied: if I judge that p and (...)
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  38. R. M. Sainsbury (2005). Meeting the Hare in Her Doubles : Causal Belief and General Belief. In Marina Frasca-Spada & P. J. E. Kail (eds.), Impressions of Hume. Oxford University Press
  39.  8
    R. M. Sainsbury (1991). Is There Higher-Order Vagueness? Philosophical Quarterly 41 (163):167-182.
    I argue against a standard conception of classification, according to which concepts classify by drawing boundaries. This conception cannot properly account for "higher-order vagueness." I discuss in detail claims by Crispin Wright about "definitely," and its connection with higher-order vagueness. Contrary to Wright, I argue that the line between definite cases of red and borderline ones is not sharp. I suggest a new conception of classification: many concepts classify without drawing boundaries; they are boundaryless. Within this picture, there are no (...)
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  40. R. M. Sainsbury (2006). Facts and Free Logic. ProtoSociology 26:119–27.
    Comment on S. Neale's, "Facts and Free Logic".
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  41.  22
    R. M. Sainsbury (1986). Russell on Acquaintance. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 20:219-244.
  42.  8
    R. M. Sainsbury (2002). What Logic Should We Think With? Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51:1-17.
    Logic ought to guide our thinking. It is better, more rational, more intelligent to think logically than to think illogically. Illogical thought leads to bad judgment and error. In any case, if logic had no role to play as a guide to thought, why should we bother with it? The somewhat naïve opinions of the previous paragraph are subject to attack from many sides. It may be objected that an activity does not count as thinking at all unless it is (...)
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  43.  17
    R. M. Sainsbury (1980). Russell on Constructions and Fictions. Theoria 46 (1):19-36.
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  44.  14
    R. M. Sainsbury (1979). Understanding and Theories of Meaning. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 80:127 - 144.
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  45.  19
    R. M. Sainsbury (1988). Tolerating Vagueness. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89:33 - 48.
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  46.  21
    R. M. Sainsbury (2002). Reference and Anaphora. Noûs 36 (s16):43 - 71.
  47.  6
    R. M. Sainsbury (2012). Of Course there are Fictional Characters. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4:615-630.
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  48.  13
    R. M. Sainsbury (2006). Review: Scott Soames, Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century: Volume 1: The Dawn of Analysis Princeton University Press, 2003. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 129 (3):637 - 643.
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  49.  16
    R. M. Sainsbury (2006). Austerity and Openness. In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), McDowell and his critics. Blackwell Pub. 6--1.
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  50.  15
    R. M. Sainsbury (1986). Evidence for Meaning. Mind and Language 1 (1):64-82.
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