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Profile: Roy T Cook (University of Minnesota)
  1.  55
    R. T. Cook (2012). The T-Schema is Not a Logical Truth. Analysis 72 (2):231-239.
    It is shown that the logical truth of instances of the T-schema is incompatible with the formal nature of logical truth. In particular, since the formality of logical truth entails that the set of logical truths is closed under substitution, the logical truth of T-schema instances entails that all sentences are logical truths.
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    R. T. Cook (2012). Conservativeness, Stability, and Abstraction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):673-696.
    One of the main problems plaguing neo-logicism is the Bad Company challenge: the need for a well-motivated account of which abstraction principles provide legitimate definitions of mathematical concepts. In this article a solution to the Bad Company challenge is provided, based on the idea that definitions ought to be conservative. Although the standard formulation of conservativeness is not sufficient for acceptability, since there are conservative but pairwise incompatible abstraction principles, a stronger conservativeness condition is sufficient: that the class of acceptable (...)
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    R. T. Cook (2012). The Force of Argument: Essays in Honor of Timothy Smiley * Edited by Jonathan Lear and Alex Oliver. Analysis 72 (1):175-177.
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    R. T. Cook (2012). RICHARD G. HECK, Jr. Frege's Theorem. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011. ISBN 978-0-19-969564-5. Pp. Xiv + 307. Philosophia Mathematica 20 (3):346-359.