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  1. Rachel Cohon (2012). Hume's Moral Sentiments As Motives. Hume Studies 36 (2):193-213.
    There is considerable evidence that Hume thinks the moral sentiments (approval and disapproval) move us to action, at least in some circumstances. For one thing, he relies on the premise that moral evaluations move us to action to argue that moral evaluations are not derived from reason alone, in his most famous anti-rationalist argument. Presumably, this capacity of moral evaluations can be explained by the fact that (as Hume sees it) such evaluations are, or are the product of, moral sentiments. (...)
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  2. Rachel Cohon (2011). University at Albany, State University of New York. Philosophical Review 120 (4).
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  3. Rachel Cohon (2010). Nuovi Libri. Rivista di Filosofia 101 (3).
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  4. Rachel Cohon (2010). Reply to Radcliffe and Garrett. Hume Studies 34 (2):277-288.
    I thank both my critics for their praise, their searching comments and objections, and their careful attention to my book. In the very short time allotted to respond to them both, I will address their objections in an integrated way, following the order of my book.Both Elizabeth Radcliffe and Don Garrett protest that for the last twenty years the noncognitivist reading has not dominated Hume scholarship in the way that I suggest when I include it in the common reading of (...)
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  5. Rachel Cohon (2008). A Very Brief Summary of Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication. Hume Studies 34 (2):253-256.
    Earlier versions of the four articles which follow were presented at a book panel session, on Rachel Cohon's Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication, at the Hume Society meetings in Halifax, Nova Scotia, in August 2009.I am deeply grateful to Lívia Guimarães and Donald L. M. Baxter for planning this session, and to Elizabeth S. Radcliffe and Don Garrett for serving as my critics. I have been asked to begin by summarizing my book in a few minutes.Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication (...)
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  6. Rachel Cohon (2008). Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication. Oxford University Press.
    Rachel Cohon offers an original interpretation of the moral philosophy of David Hume, focusing on two areas.
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  7. Rachel Cohon, Hume's Moral Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Hume's position in ethics, which is based on his empiricist theory of the mind, is best known for asserting four theses: (1) Reason alone cannot be a motive to the will, but rather is the slave of the passions (see Section 3) (2) Moral distinctions are not derived from reason (see Section 4). (3) Moral distinctions are derived from the moral sentiments: feelings of approval (esteem, praise) and disapproval (blame) felt by spectators who contemplate a character trait or action (see (...)
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  8. Rachel Cohon (2008). Reply to Radcliffe and Garrett. Hume Studies 34 (2):277-288.
  9. Rachel Cohon (2006). Hume's Artificial and Natural Virtues. In Saul Traiger (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Hume's Treatise. Blackwell Pub.. 256--275.
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  10. Rachel Cohon (2006). Hume on Promises and the Peculiar Act of the Mind. Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (1):25-45.
    : Hume's account of the virtue of fidelity to promises contains two surprising claims: 1) Any analysis of fidelity that treats it as a natural (nonconventional) virtue is incorrect because it entails that in promising we perform a "peculiar act of the mind," an act of creating obligation by willing oneself to be obligated. No such act is possible. 2) Though the obligation of promises depends upon social convention, not on such a mental act, we nonetheless "feign" that whenever someone (...)
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  11. Rachel Cohon (2001). The Shackles of Virtue: Hume on Allegiance to Government. History of Philosophy Quarterly 18 (4):393 - 413.
  12. Rachel Cohon (2000). The Roots of Reasons. Philosophical Review 109 (1):63-85.
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  13. Rachel Cohon (1997). Hume's Difficulty with the Virtue of Honesty. Hume Studies 23 (1):91-112.
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  14. Rachel Cohon (1997). Is Hume a Noncognitivist in the Motivation Argument? Philosophical Studies 85 (2-3):251-266.
  15. Rachel Cohon (1997). The Common Point of View in Hume's Ethics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):827-850.
    Hume's moral philosophy makes sentiment essential to moral judgment. But there is more individual consistency and interpersonal agreement in moral judgment than in private emotional reactions. Hume accounts for this by saying that our moral judgments do not manifest our approval or disapproval of character traits and persons "only as they appear from [our] peculiar point of view..." Rather, "we fix on some steady and general points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may be (...)
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  16. Rachel Cohon & David Owen (1997). Hume on Representation, Reason and Motivation. Manuscrito 20:47-76.
  17. Rachel Cohon (1994). On an Unorthodox Account of Hume's Moral Psychology. Hume Studies 20 (2):179-194.
    A version of this paper was presented at the symposium on A Progress ofSentirnents by Annette C. Baier, held at the Pacific Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association, Los Angeles, March 1994.
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  18. Rachel Cohon (1993). Internalism About Reasons for Action. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (4):265-288.
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  19. Rachel Cohon (1988). Hume and Humeanism in Ethics. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69.
    Present-Day humeans think hume was largely right that moral judgments cannot be principles of reason because reason alone cannot move us to action. None of the textually supported interpretations of the claim that "reason is inert" can save hume's antirationalist argument; it is either invalid, Or rests upon assumptions that contradict hume's other views and are probably false. Present-Day humeans reject hume's narrow conceptions of reason and desire, And so have a valid version of hume's antirationalist argument and can consistently (...)
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  20. Rachel Cohon (1986). Are External Reasons Impossible? Ethics 96 (3):545-556.