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Rachel Cooper [27]Rachel Valerie Cooper [1]
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Profile: Rachel Cooper (Lancaster University)
Profile: Rachel Cooper (San Francisco State University)
  1. Rachel Cooper (2015). Why is the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders so Hard to Revise? Path-Dependence and “Lock-in” in Classification. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 51:1-10.
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  2. Rachel Cooper (2014). Diagnosing the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Karnac.
    Diagnosing the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Karnac, 2014) evaluates the latest edition of the D.S.M.The publication of D.S.M-5 in 2013 brought many changes. Diagnosing the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders asks whether the D.S.M.-5 classifies the right people in the right way. It is aimed at patients, mental health professionals, and academics with an interest in mental health. Issues addressed include: How is the D.S.M. affected by financial links with the pharmaceutical industry? To what extent (...)
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  3. Rachel Cooper (2014). On Deciding to Have a Lobotomy: Either Lobotomies Were Justified or Decisions Under Risk Should Not Always Seek to Maximise Expected Utility. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17 (1):143-154.
    In the 1940s and 1950s thousands of lobotomies were performed on people with mental disorders. These operations were known to be dangerous, but thought to offer great hope. Nowadays, the lobotomies of the 1940s and 1950s are widely condemned. The consensus is that the practitioners who employed them were, at best, misguided enthusiasts, or, at worst, evil. In this paper I employ standard decision theory to understand and assess shifts in the evaluation of lobotomy. Textbooks of medical decision making generally (...)
     
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  4. Rachel Cooper (2014). Psychiatry and Philosophy of Science. Routledge.
    "Psychiatry and Philosophy of Science" explores conceptual issues in psychiatry from the perspective of analytic philosophy of science. Through an examination of those features of psychiatry that distinguish it from other sciences - for example, its contested subject matter, its particular modes of explanation, its multiple different theoretical frameworks, and its research links with big business - Rachel Cooper explores some of the many conceptual, metaphysical and epistemological issues that arise in psychiatry. She shows how these pose interesting challenges for (...)
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  5. Havi Carel & Rachel Valerie Cooper (eds.) (2013). Health, Illness and Disease: Philosophical Essays. Acumen.
    What counts as health or ill health? How do we deal with the fallibility of our own bodies? Should illness and disease be considered simply in biological terms, or should considerations of its emotional impact dictate our treatment of it? Our understanding of health and illness had become increasingly more complex in the modern world, as we are able to use medicine not only to fight disease but to control other aspects of our bodies, whether mood, blood pressure, or cholesterol. (...)
     
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  6. Rachel Cooper (2013). Disease Mongering. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell
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  7. Rachel Cooper (2012). Being Ill and Getting Better: Recovery and Accounts of Disorder. In Abraham Rudnick (ed.), Recovery of People with Mental Illness: Philosophical and Related Perspectives. OUP Oxford 217.
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  8. Rachel Cooper (2012). Comments: Progress and the Calibration of Scientific Constructs: A New Look at Validity. In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry Ii: Nosology. OUP Oxford
     
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  9. Rachel Cooper (2012). Is Psychiatric Classification a Good Thing? In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry Ii: Nosology. OUP Oxford
     
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  10. Rachel Cooper (2012). Psychiatric Classification and Subjective Experience. Emotion Review 4 (2):197-202.
    This article does not directly consider the feelings and emotions that occur in mental illness. Rather, it concerns a higher level methodological question: To what extent is an analysis of feelings and felt emotions of importance for psychiatric classification? Some claim that producing a phenomenologically informed descriptive psychopathology is a prerequisite for serious taxonomic endeavor. Others think that classifications of mental disorders may ignore subjective experience. A middle view holds that classification should at least map the contours of the phenomenology (...)
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  11. Rachel Cooper (2011). For Good or Ill. The Philosophers' Magazine 55 (55):43-47.
    Trying to figure out the contours of the concept of disorder is worthwhile because whether something counts as a disorder frequently makes a huge difference to us in everyday life. Suppose I drink a lot – if I think alcoholism is a disease I may visit a doctor, if I consider it a moral failing I may blame myself for my weakness of will.
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  12. Havi Carel & Rachel Cooper (2010). Introduction: Culture-Bound Syndromes. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 41 (4):307-308.
  13. Rachel Cooper (2010). Are Culture-Bound Syndromes as Real as Universally-Occurring Disorders? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 41 (4):325-332.
    This paper asks what it means to say that a disorder is a “real” disorder and then considers whether culture-bound syndromes are real disorders. Following J.L. Austin I note that when we ask whether some supposed culture-bound syndrome is a real disorder we should start by specifying what possible alternatives we have in mind. We might be asking whether the reported behaviours genuinely occur, i.e. whether the culture-bound syndrome is a genuine phenomenon as opposed to a myth. We might be (...)
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  14. Rachel Cooper (2010). Moody Minds Distempered – By Jennifer Radden. Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (3):322-324.
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  15. Rachel Cooper (2009). Is Psychiatric Research Scientific? In Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (eds.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. OUP Oxford
     
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  16. Rachel Cooper (2008). Are There Natural Kinds in Psychology? In Ruth Groff (ed.), Revitalizing Causality: Realism About Causality in Philosophy and Social Science. Routledge
     
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  17. Rachel Cooper (2007). Can It Be a Good Thing to Be Deaf? Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 32 (6):563 – 583.
    Increasingly, Deaf activists claim that it can be good to be Deaf. Still, much of the hearing world remains unconvinced, and continues to think of deafness in negative terms. I examine this debate and argue that to determine whether it can be good to be deaf it is necessary to examine each claimed advantage or disadvantage of being deaf, and then to make an overall judgment regarding the net cost or benefit. On the basis of such a survey I conclude (...)
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  18. Rachel Cooper (2007). Are There Natural Kinds in Psychology? In Ruth Groff (ed.), Revitalizing Causality: Realism About Causality in Philosophy and Social Science. Routledge
  19. Rachel Cooper (2007). Aristotelian Accounts of Disease—What Are They Good For? Philosophical Papers 36 (3):427-442.
    In this paper I will argue that Aristotelian accounts of disease cannot provide us with an adequate descriptive account of our concept of disease. In other words, they fail to classify conditions as either diseases, or non-diseases, in a way that is consistent with commonplace intuitions. This being said, Aristotelian accounts of disease are not worthless. Aristotelian approaches cannot offer a decent descriptive account of our concept of disease, but they do offer resources for improving on the ways in which (...)
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  20. Rachel Cooper & Chris Megone (2007). Introduction. Philosophical Papers 36 (3):339-341.
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  21. Rachel Cooper, Chris Megone, Jeremy Simon, Anthony Wrigley, Jennifer Radden & Piers Benn (2007). The Concept of Disease. Philosophical Papers 36 (3):343-481.
  22. Rachel Cooper, Mark Pollard & Robin Coningham, What Value a Unicorn's Horn? : A Study of Archaeological Uniqueness and Value.
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  23. Rachel Cooper, Classifying Madness: A Philosophical Examination of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.
    Classifying Madness (Springer, 2005) concerns philosophical problems with the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, more commonly known as the D.S.M. The D.S.M. is published by the American Psychiatric Association and aims to list and describe all mental disorders. The first half of Classifying Madness asks whether the project of constructing a classification of mental disorders that reflects natural distinctions makes sense. Chapters examine the nature of mental illness, and also consider whether mental disorders fall into natural kinds. The (...)
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  24. Rachel Cooper (2004). Can Sociologists Understand Other Forms of Life? Perspectives on Science 12 (1):29-54.
    : Sociologists of Scientific Knowledge sometimes claim to study scientists belonging to other forms of life. This claim causes difficulties, as traditionally Wittgensteinians have taken it to be the case that other forms of life are incomprehensible to us. This paper examines whether, and how, sociologists might gain understanding of another form of life, and whether, and how, this understanding might be passed on to readers. I argue that most techniques proposed for gaining and passing on understanding are inadequate, but (...)
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  25. Rachel Cooper (2004). Why Hacking is Wrong About Human Kinds. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1):73-85.
    is a term introduced by Ian Hacking to refer to the kinds of people—child abusers, pregnant teenagers, the unemployed—studied by the human sciences. Hacking argues that classifying and describing human kinds results in feedback, which alters the very kinds under study. This feedback results in human kinds having histories totally unlike those of natural kinds (such as gold, electrons and tigers), leading Hacking to conclude that human kinds are radically unlike natural kinds. Here I argue that Hacking's argument fails and (...)
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  26. Rachel Cooper (2004). What is Wrong with the DSM? History of Psychiatry 15 (1):5-25.
    The DSM is the main classification of mental disorders used by psychiatrists in the United States and, increasingly, around the world. Although widely used, the DSM has come in for fierce criticism, with many commentators believing it to be conceptually flawed in a variety of ways. This paper assesses some of these philosophical worries. The first half of the paper asks whether the project of constructing a classification of mental disorders that ‘cuts nature at the joints’ makes sense. What is (...)
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  27. Rachel Cooper (2002). Disease. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 33 (2):263-282.
    This paper examines what it is for a condition to be a disease. It falls into two sections. In the first I examine the best existing account of disease (as proposed by Christopher Boorse) and argue that it must be rejected. In the second I outline a more acceptable account of disease. According to this account, by disease we mean a condition that it is a bad thing to have, that is such that we consider the afflicted person to have (...)
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  28. Rachel Cooper (1999). From Thought Experiments to Real Experiments: Methodology in the Philosophy of Mind. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 30 (2):263.
     
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