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  1. Rae Langton, Whose Right?
    This article has benefited from the thoughtful comments and suggestions of many, including Susan Brison, Gilbert Harman, Sally Haslanger, Richard Holton, Win Kymlicka, Mark van Roojen, Michael Smith, Scott Schon, Katalie Stoljar, and the Editors of Philoso- phy & Public Affairs, I am grateful to them all. r, American Booksellers, Inc, v, Hudnut, 5g8 F. Supp. I327 (S.D. Ind. zgsA) (heresfter Hudnut).
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  2. Rae Langton, Essay 3 Scorekeeping in a Pornographic Language Game.
    If, as many suppose, pornography changes people, a question arises as to how.1 One answer to this question offers a grand and noble vision. Inspired by the idea that pornography is speech, and inspired by a certain liberal ideal about the point of speech in political life, some theorists say that pornography contributes to that liberal ideal: pornography, even at its most violent and misogynistic, and even at its most harmful, is political speech that aims to express certain views about (...)
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  3. Rae Langton (forthcoming). Hate Speech and the Epistemology of Justice. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-9.
    In ‘The Harm in Hate Speech’ Waldron’s most interesting and ground-breaking contribution lies in a distinctive epistemological role he assigns to hate speech legislation: it is necessary for assurance of justice, and thus for justice itself. He regards public social recognition of what is owed to citizens as a public good, contributing to basic dignity and social standing of citizens. His claim that hate speech in the public social environment damages assurance of justice has wider implications, I argue: for hate (...)
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  4. Rae Langton (2013). Excerpts From Kantian Humility. In Stewart Duncan & Antonia LoLordo (eds.), Debates in Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings and Contemporary Responses. Routledge. 323.
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  5. Luvell Anderson, Sally Haslanger & Rae Langton (2012). Language and Race. In Gillian Russell & Delia Graff Fara (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language. Routledge.
  6. Jennifer Hornsby, Louise Antony, Jennifer Saul, Natalie Stoljar, Nellie Wieland & Rae Langton (2012). Review Symposium: Rae Langton, Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification. Jurisprudence 2 (2):379-440.
  7. Rae Langton (2012). Beyond Belief: Pragmatics in Hate Speech and Pornography1. In Mary Kate McGowan Ishani Maitra (ed.), Speech and Harm: Controversies Over Free Speech. 72.
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  8. Rae Langton (2012). Response. Jurisprudence 2 (2):425-440.
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  9. Lauren Ashwell & Rae Langton (2011). Slaves to Fashion? In Jessica Wolfendale & Jeanette Kennett (eds.), Fashion – Philosophy for Everyone: Thinking with Style. Blackwell. 135--150.
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  10. Rae Langton (2010). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. By MIRANDA FRICKER. Hypatia 25 (2):459-464.
  11. Rae Langton (2009). Esteem in the Moral Economy of Oppression. Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):273-291.
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  12. Rae Langton (2009). Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification. OUP Oxford.
    Rae Langton here draws together her ground-breaking work on pornography and objectification. On pornography she argues from uncontroversial liberal premises to the controversial feminist conclusions that pornography subordinates and silences women, and that women have rights against pornography. On objectification she begins with the traditional idea that objectification involves treating a person as a thing, but then shows that it is through a kind of self-fulfilling projection of beliefs and perceptions of women as subordinate that women are made subordinate and (...)
     
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  13. Rae Langton (2008). Symposia on Gender, Race and Philosophy. Philosophy 4 (2).
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  14. Rae Langton (2007). Disenfranchised Silence. In Michael Smith, Robert Goodin & Geoffrey Geoffrey (eds.), Common Minds. Oxford. 199.
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  15. Rae Langton (2007). Objective and Unconditioned Value. Philosophical Review 116 (2):157-185.
    A claim to objectivity about value is sometimes cast as a claim about the value something has in itself, independent of its relations to other things. Goodness is supposed to be “separate from” relations to such irrelevancies as “private and personal advantage”, or “the positive will or command of God”, as Samuel Clarke put it.1 This thought about independence or separateness is also expressed in the idea of intrinsic value, so that it can be tempting to align a commitment to (...)
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  16. Rae Langton (2006). Kant's Phenomena. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):170-185.
  17. Rae Langton (2006). Kant's Phenomena: Extrinsic or Relational Properties? A Reply to Allais. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):170–185.
    Kant’s claim that we are ignorant of things in themselves is a claim that we cannot know ‘the intrinsic nature of things’, or so at least I argued in Kantian Humility.2 I’m delighted to find that Lucy Allais is in broad agreement with this core idea, thinking it represents, at the very least, a part of Kant’s view. She sees some of the advantages of this interpretation. It has significant textual support. It does justice to Kant’s sense that we are (...)
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  18. Rae Langton (2005). Feminism in Philosophy. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 231.
  19. Frank Jackson, Graham Priest & Rae Langton (2004). Elusive Knowledge of Things in Themselves. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):129 – 136.
    Kant argued that we have no knowledge of things in themselves, no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of things, a thesis that is not idealism but epistemic humility. David Lewis agrees (in 'Ramseyan Humility'), but for Ramseyan reasons rather than Kantian. I compare the doctrines of Ramseyan and Kantian humility, and argue that Lewis's contextualist strategy for rescuing knowledge from the sceptic (proposed elsewhere) should also rescue knowledge of things in themselves. The rescue would not be complete: for knowledge of (...)
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  20. Rae Langton (2004). Elusive Knowledge of Things in Themselves. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):129 – 136.
    Kant argued that we have no knowledge of things in themselves, no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of things, a thesis that is not idealism but epistemic humility. David Lewis agrees (in 'Ramseyan Humility'), but for Ramseyan reasons rather than Kantian. I compare the doctrines of Ramseyan and Kantian humility, and argue that Lewis's contextualist strategy for rescuing knowledge from the sceptic (proposed elsewhere) should also rescue knowledge of things in themselves. The rescue would not be complete: for knowledge of (...)
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  21. Rae Langton (2004). Intention as Faith. In H. Steward & J. Hyman (eds.), Agency and Action. Cambridge University Press Press. 243-258.
    What, if anything, has faith to do with intention?1 By ‘faith’ I have in mind the attitude described by William James: Suppose...that I am climbing in the Alps, and have had the ill-luck to work myself into a position from which the only escape is by a terrible leap. Being without similar experience, I have no evidence of my ability to perform it successfully; but hope and confidence in myself make me sure I shall not miss my aim, and nerve (...)
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  22. Rae Langton (2004). Projection and Objectification. In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 285--303.
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  23. Rae Langton (2003). Problems From Kant by James Van Cleve. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):211–218.
    According to Van Cleve, Kant distinguishes phenomena from things in themselves, thereby distinguishing the virtual from the real; and Kant makes primary qualities merely spatial. However, phenomena are not the virtual, but the relational; things in themselves are not the real, but the intrinsic. Moreover, to make primary qualities merely spatial is to leave out force, and thereby leave out the feature that makes phenomena relational and real-not just virtual.
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  24. David Lewis & Rae Langton (2002). Comment définir « intrinsèque ». Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 4 (4):511-527.
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  25. Rae Langton (2001). Review: Van Cleve, Problems From Kant. Philosophical Review 110 (3):451-454.
  26. Rae Langton (2001). Virtues of Resentment. Utilitas 13 (02):255-.
    On a consequentialist account of virtue, a trait is virtuous if it has good consequences, vicious if it has bad. Clumsiness and dimness are therefore vices. Should I resent the clumsy and the dim? , says the consequentialist, counterintuitively - at any rate, Yes’ on an accuracy measure of resentment's virtue: resentment should be an accurate response to consequentialist vice, and these are vices. On a usefulness measure of resentment's virtue, the answer may be different: whether resentment is virtuous depends (...)
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  27. Rae Langton & David Lewis (2001). Marshall and Parsons on 'Intrinsic'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):353-355.
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  28. David K. Lewis & Rae Langton (2001). Marshall and Parsons On. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):353-356.
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  29. Rae Langton (2000). Feminism in Epistemology: Exclusion and Objectification. In Miranda Fricker & Jennifer Hornsby (eds.), Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. 127--45.
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  30. Rae Langton (2000). Locke's Relations and God's Good Pleasure. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):75–91.
    Did God give things 'accidental powers not rooted in their natures', powers not rooted in intrinsic properties? For Leibniz, no. For Locke, the answer is disputed. On a voluntarist reading, yes, secondary and tertiary qualities are superadded (Margaret Wilson). On a mechanist reading, no, as for Leibniz (Michael Ayers). Since Locke viewed these qualities as relational, his view of relations ought to bear on the dispute. Locke said relation is 'not contained in the real existence of things'. Bennett says Locke (...)
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  31. Rae Langton (2000). Pornography and Free Speech. The Philosophers' Magazine 11 (11):41-42.
  32. Rae Langton (2000). 1 The Musical, the Magical, and the Mathematical Soul1. In Tim Crane & Sarah Patterson (eds.), History of the Mind-Body Problem. New York: Routledge. 13.
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  33. Rae Langton & Caroline West (1999). Scorekeeping in a Pornographic Language Game. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):303 – 319.
  34. Richard Holton & Rae Langton (1998). Empathy and Animal Ethics. In Dale Jamieson (ed.), Singer and His Critics. Oxford.
    In responding to the challenge that we cannot know that animals feel pain, Peter Singer says: We can never directly experience the pain of another being, whether that being is human or not. When I see my daughter fall and scrape her knee, I know that she feels pain because of the way she behaves—she cries, she tells me her knee hurts, she rubs the sore spot, and so on. I know that I myself behave in a somewhat similar—if more (...)
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  35. Rae Langton (1998). Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves. Oxford University Press.
    Rae Langton offers a new interpretation and defense of Kant's doctrine of things in themselves. Kant distinguishes things in themselves from phenomena, and in so doing he makes a metaphysical distinction between intrinsic and relational properties of substances. Langton argues that his claim that we have no knowledge of things in themselves is not idealism, but epistemic humility: we have no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of substances. This interpretation vindicates Kant's scientific realism, and shows his primary/secondary quality distinction to (...)
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  36. Rae Langton & Jennifer Hornsby (1998). Free Spech and Illocution. Legal Theory 4 (1):21-37.
    We defend the view of some feminist writers that the notion of silencing has to be taken seriously in discussions of free speech. We assume that what ought to be meant by ‘speech’, in the context ‘free speech’, is whatever it is that a correct justification of the right to free speech justifies one in protecting. And we argue that what one ought to mean includes illocution, in the sense of J.L. Austin.
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  37. Rae Langton & David Lewis (1998). Defining 'Intrinsic'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):333-345.
    Something could be round even if it were the only thing in the universe, unaccompanied by anything distinct from itself. Jaegwon Kim once suggested that we define an intrinsic property as one that can belong to something unaccompanied. Wrong: unaccompaniment itself is not intrinsic, yet it can belong to something unaccompanied. But there is a better Kim-style definition. Say that P is independent of accompaniment iff four different cases are possible: something accompanied may have P or lack P, something unaccompanied (...)
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  38. Rae Langton (1997). 33. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), Pornography, Speech Acts, and Silence. Blackwell. 337-49.
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  39. Rae Langton (1997). Love and Solipsism. In Roger E. Lamb (ed.), Love Analyzed. Westview Press. 123--52.
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  40. Rae Langton (1997). Pornography, Speech Acts, and Silence. In Hugh LaFollette - (ed.), Ethics in Practice. Basil Blackwell. 338--349.
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  41. David Armstrong, Rae Langton, Robert Audi, Jerrold Levinson, John Bacon, David Lewis, Rick Benitez, Gary Malinas, John Biro & Jeff Malpas (1995). The Editor and the Associate Editors Thank the Consulting Editors, the Members of the Editorial Board and the Following Philosophers for Their Help with Refereeing Papers During the Period July 1994 to June 1995. Adeney, Douglas Kennett, Jeanette Agar, Nicholas Lamarque, Peter. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (4).
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  42. Rae Langton (1995). Sexual Solipsism. Philosophical Topics 23 (2):149-187.
  43. Rae Langton (1993). Beyond a Pragmatic Critique of Reason. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (4):364 – 384.
  44. Rae Langton (1993). Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts. Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (4):293-330.
  45. Rae Langton (1992). Duty and Desolation. Philosophy 67 (262):481 - 505.
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  46. Rae Langton (1990). Whose Right? Ronald Dworkin, Women, and Pornographers. Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 (4):311-359.