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Profile: Raffaella de Rosa (Rutgers University - Campus at Newark)
  1. Raffaella de Rosa & Otávio Bueno, ProtoSociology.
    Bibliografische Information Der Deutschen Bibliothek Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Natio­ nal bibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb. ddb.de abrufbar. Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Das Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Je de Ver­ wertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zu­ stimmung der Zeitschirft und seines Herausgebers unzulässig und strafbar. Das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Über setzungen, Mikroverfil mungen und die Einspeisung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen.
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  2. Raffaella De Rosa (2013). Descartes and the Puzzle of Sensory Representation: Précis. Analytic Philosophy 54 (1):93-96.
    Raffaella De Rosa discusses the theory of sensory perception, especially color perception, offered by René Descartes. She offers a detailed overview of the recent literature on the topic and provides a new reading of Descartes' theory; she also raises questions of great interest in the contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science.
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  3. Raffaella De Rosa (2013). Replies to Vinci and Nelson. Analytic Philosophy 54 (1):117-128.
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  4. Raffaella de Rosa (2011). Rethinking the Ontology of Cartesian Essences. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (4):605 - 622.
    The old and recent debates on Cartesian essences have focused on the question of whether Descartes is a Platonist or a conceptualist about essences. I argue that this is a false dichotomy. An adequate account of Cartesian essences must accommodate and reconcile two central doctrines and texts in Descartes' philosophy. I will argue that recent conceptualist and Platonist interpretations neither accommodate these doctrines nor reconcile these texts. Such failures are not accidental since Descartes' doctrines of divine creation and simplicity render (...)
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  5. Raffaella De Rosa (2010). Descartes and the Puzzle of Sensory Representation. Oup Oxford.
    Raffaella De Rosa discusses the theory of sensory perception, especially color perception, offered by Ren Descartes. She offers a detailed overview of the recent literature on the topic and provides a new reading of Descartes' theory; she also raises questions of great interest in the contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science.
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  6. Raffaella De Rosa (2009). Cartesian Sensations. Philosophy Compass 4 (5):780-792.
    Descartes maintained that sensations of color and the like misrepresent the material world in normal circumstances. Some prominent scholars have argued that, to explain this Cartesian view, we must attribute to Descartes a causal account of sensory representation. I contend that neither the arguments motivating this reading nor the textual evidence offered in its support is sufficient to justify such attribution. Both textual and theoretical reasons point in the direction of an (at least partial) internalist account of Descartes' views on (...)
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  7. Raffaella De Rosa (2008). Material Falsity and Error in Descartes's Meditations (Review). Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (4):pp. 641-642.
    This book aims to overturn the common view of materially false ideas , which is that Descartes’s discussion in Meditation Three generates confusion about his views on truth and falsehood and is irrelevant to the rest of the argument in the Meditations.After introducing MFIs and then criticizing previous interpretations, Wee provides her own account in chapter three. Since a proper understanding of why MFIs fail in their representational function allows Wee to revisit their role in the Meditations, this chapter occupies (...)
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  8. Raffaella De Rosa & Otávio Bueno (2008). Descartes on Mathematical Essences. ProtoSociology: An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research 25:160.
    Descartes seems to hold two inconsistent accounts of the ontological status of mathematical essences. Meditation Five apparently develops a platonist view about such essences, while the Principles seems to advocate some form of “conceptualism”. We argue that Descartes was neither a platonist nor a conceptualist. Crucial to our interpretation is Descartes’ dispositional nativism. We contend that his doctrine of innate ideas allows him to endorse a hybrid view which avoids the drawbacks of Gassendi’s conceptualism without facing the difficulties of platonism. (...)
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  9. Raffaella De Rosa (2007). A Teleological Account of Cartesian Sensations? Synthese 156 (2):311-336.
    Alison Simmons, in Simmons (1999), argues that Descartes in Meditation Six offered a teleological account of sensory representation. According to Simmons, Descartes’ view is that the biological function of sensations explains both why sensations represent what they do (i.e., their referential content) and why they represent their objects the way they do (i.e., their presentational content). Moreover, Simmons claims that her account has several advantages over other currently available interpretations of Cartesian sensations. In this paper, I argue that Simmons’ teleological (...)
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  10. Raffaella De Rosa (2007). Review of Lex Newman (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Locke's "Essay Concerning Human Understanding". [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (9).
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  11. Raffaella de Rosa (2007). The Myth of Cartesian Qualia. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):181�207.
    The standard view of Cartesian sensations (SV) is that they present themselves as purely qualitative features of experience (or qualia). Accordingly, Descartes view would be that in perceiving the color red, for example, we are merely experiencing the subjective feel of redness rather than seeming to perceive a property of bodies. In this paper, I establish that the argument and textual evidence offered in support of SV fail to prove that Descartes held this view. Indeed, I will argue that (...)
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  12. Raffaella de Rosa (2005). Prinz's Problematic Proxytypes. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221):594-606.
    Jesse Prinz has argued that a proxytype theory of concepts provides what he calls the 'intentionality' and 'cognitive content' desiderata better than any current competitor, and that the hybrid nature of proxytypes allows his theory to combine the informational component of informational atomism with the view that concepts are semantically structured entities. In response, I argue that the hybrid character of proxytypes, far from delivering the advantages Prinz claims, generates a threatening dilemma: either his theory is novel but fails to (...)
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  13. Raffaella De Rosa (2004). Descartes on Sensory Misrepresentation: The Case of Materially False Ideas. History of Philosophy Quarterly 21 (3):261-280.
     
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  14. Raffaella de Rosa (2004). Locke's Essay Book I: The Question-Begging Status of the Anti-Nativist Arguments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):37-64.
    In this paper I argue against the received view that the anti-nativist arguments of Book I of Locke’s Essay conclusively challenge nativism. I begin by reconstructing the chief argument of Book I and its corollary arguments. I call attention to their dependence on (what I label) “the Awareness Principle”, viz., the view that there are no ideas in the mind of which the mind either isn’t currently aware or hasn’t been aware in the past. I then argue that the arguments’ (...)
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  15. Raffaella De Rosa & Ernest Lepore (2004). Quine's Meaning Holisms. In Roger F. Gibson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Quine. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  16. Raffaella De Rosa (2002). Innate Ideas and Intentionality Descartes Vs Locke. Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick
    The topic of this dissertation is a discussion of the seventeenth century debate between Descartes and Locke over innate ideas. I propose a novel approach to the study of this debate. I argue that their disagreement over innate ideas is directly related to their differing views of how the content of ideas is determined and of what counts as having an idea in the mind. Approaching the controversy between Descartes and Locke from this perspective has allowed me to conclude that (...)
     
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  17. Raffaella De Rosa (2002). What's Within. Nativism Reconsidered. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):119 – 122.
    Book Information What's Within. Nativism Reconsidered. What's Within. Nativism Reconsidered F. Cowie New York/Oxford Oxford University Press 1999 xvii + 334 Hardback US$35.00 By F. Cowie. Oxford University Press. New York/Oxford. Pp. xvii + 334. Hardback:US$35.00.
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  18. Raffaella de Rosa (2000). On Fodor's Claim That Classical Empiricists and Rationalists Agree on the Innateness of Ideas. Protosociology 14:240-269.
     
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