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Raimo Tuomela [129]Raimo Heikki Tuomela [1]
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Profile: Raimo Tuomela (University of Helsinki)
  1.  26
    Raimo Tuomela (2013). Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents. OUP Usa.
    This volume presents a systematic philosophical theory related to the collectivism-versus-individualism debate in the social sciences. A weak version of collectivism (the "we-mode" approach) that depends on group-based collective intentionality is developed in the book. The we-mode approach is used to account for collective intention and action, cooperation, group attitudes, social practices and institutions as well as group solidarity.
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  2.  35
    Raimo Tuomela (2007). The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View. OUP Usa.
    The Philosophy of Sociality offers new ideas and conceptual tools for philosophers and social scientists in their analysis of the social world.
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  3. Raimo Tuomela (1995). The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social Notions. Stanford University Press.
    This book develops a systematic philosophical theory of social action and group phenomena, in the process presenting detailed analyses of such central social notions as 'we-attitude' (especially 'we-intention' and mutual belief, social norm, joint action, and - most important - group goal, group belief, and group action). Though this is a philosophical work, it presents a unified conceptual framework that may be useful to social scientists, especially social psychologists, as well as philosophers. The book puts forward and defends a number (...)
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  4. Raimo Tuomela (2007). The We-Perspective. In Fabienne Peter (ed.), Rationality and Commitment. Oxford University Press, Usa 227.
     
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  5. Raimo Tuomela (2005). The Philosophy of Social Practices: A Collective Acceptance View. Cambridge University Press.
    This is a systematic philosophical and conceptual study of the notion of a social practice. Raimo Tuomela explains social practices in terms of the interlocking mental states of the agents; he shows how social practices are 'building blocks of society'; and he offers a clear and powerful account of the way in which social institutions are constructed from these building blocks as established, interconnected sets of social practices with a special new social status. His analysis is based on the novel (...)
     
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  6. Raimo Tuomela (2005). We-Intentions Revisited. Philosophical Studies 125 (3):327 - 369.
    This paper gives an up-to-date account of we-intentions and responds to some critics of the author’s earlier work on the topic in question. While the main lines of the new account are basically the same as before, the present account considerably adds to the earlier work. For one thing, it shows how we-intentions and joint intentions can arise in terms of the so-called Bulletin Board View of joint intention acquisition, which relies heavily on some underlying mutually accepted conceptual and situational (...)
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  7. Raimo Tuomela (2000). Belief Versus Acceptance. Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):122 – 137.
    In this paper the problem of the relation between belief and acceptance is discussed in view of recent literature on the topic. Belief and acceptance are characterized in terms of a number of properties, which show both the similarities and the dissimilarities between these notions. In particular it is claimed - contrary to some recently expressed views - that acceptance need not be intentional action and that the differences between belief and acceptance do not boil down to the simple view (...)
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  8. Raimo Tuomela & Kaarlo Miller (1988). We-Intentions. Philosophical Studies 53 (3):367 - 389.
  9. Raimo Tuomela (2007). The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View. Oxford University Press Usa.
    Concepts based on full-blown collective intentionality are central for understanding the social world. The book systematically studies social groups, collective commitment, group intentions, beliefs, and actions, especially authority-based group attitudes and actions, also addressing cooperation, cultural evolution, and responsibility.
     
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  10. Raimo Tuomela (2005). Cooperation and Trust in Group Context. Mind and Society 4 (1):49-84.
    This paper is mainly about cooperation as a collective action in a group context (acting in a position or participating in the performance of a group task, etc.), although the assumption of the presence of a group context is not made in all parts of the paper. The paper clarifies what acting as a group member involves, and it analytically characterizes the ‘‘we-mode’’ (thinking and acting as a group member) and the ‘‘I-mode’’ (thinking and acting as a private person).
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  11. Raimo Tuomela (2002). Collective Goals and Communicative Action. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:29-64.
    This paper gives an account of communicative action from the point of view of communication as a cooperative enterprise. It is argued that this is communication both on the basis of shared collective goals and without them. It is also argued that people can communicate without specifically formed illocutionary communicative intentions. The paper concludes by comparing the account given in the paper with Habermas’s theory of communicative action.
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  12. Raimo Tuomela, Collective Acceptance, Social Institutions, and Social Reality.
    The paper presents an account of social institutions on the basis of collective acceptance. Basically, collective acceptance by some members of a group involves the members’ collectively coming to hold and holding a relevant social attitude (a “we-attitude”), viz. either one in the intention family of concepts or one in the belief family. In standard cases the collective acceptance must be in the “we-mode”, viz. performed as a group member, and involve that it be meant for the group. The participants (...)
     
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  13.  79
    Raul Hakli, Kaarlo Miller & Raimo Tuomela (2010). Two Kinds of We-Reasoning. Economics and Philosophy 26 (3):291-320.
    Page 1. Economics and Philosophy, 26 291--320 Copyright C Cambridge University Press doi: 10.1017 / S0266267110000386 TWO KINDS OF WE-REASONING RAUL HAKLI, KAARLO MILLER AND RAIMO TUOMELA University of Helsinki.
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  14. Raimo Tuomela (1991). We Will Do It: An Analysis of Group-Intentions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (2):249-277.
  15.  80
    Raimo Tuomela (2006). Joint Intention, We-Mode and I-Mode. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):35–58.
    The central topic of this paper is to study joint intention to perform a joint action or to bring about a certain state. Here are some examples of such joint action: You and I share the plan to carry a heavy table jointly upstairs and realize this plan, we sing a duet together, we clean up our backyard together, and I cash a check by acting jointly with you, a bank teller, and finally we together elect a new president for (...)
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  16.  7
    Raimo Tuomela & Pekka Mäkelä (2016). Group Agents and Their Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):299-316.
    Group agents are able to act but are not literally agents. Some group agents, e.g., we-mode groups and corporations, can, however, be regarded as functional group agents that do not have “intrinsic” mental states and phenomenal features comparable to what their individual members on biological and psychological grounds have. But they can have “extrinsic” mental states, states collectively attributed to them—primarily by their members. In this paper, we discuss the responsibility of such group agents. We defend the view that if (...)
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  17.  4
    Raimo Tuomela (1973). Theoretical Concepts. New York,Springer-Verlag.
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  18. Raimo Tuomela (1988). A Theory of Social Action. Noûs 22 (4):624-629.
  19.  94
    Raimo Tuomela (2004). Group Knowledge Analyzed. Episteme 1 (2):109-127.
    The main task of the present paper is to investigate the nature of collective knowledge and discuss what kind of justificatory aspects are involved in it to discuss it from collective belief. The central kind of collective knowledge investigated is normatively binding knowledge attributed to a social group. A distinction is made between natural knowledge and constitutive knowledge related to social (especially institutional) matters. In the case of the latter kind of knowledge, in contrast to the former kind, justification and (...)
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  20. Raimo Tuomela (2000). Collective and Joint Intention. Mind and Society 1 (2):39-69.
    The paper discussed and analyzes collective and joint intentions of various strength. Thus there are subjectively shared collective intentions and intersubjectively shared collective intentions as well as collective intentions which are objectively and intersubjectively shared. The distinction between collective and private intentions is considered from several points of view. Especially, it is emphasized that collective intentions in the full sense are in the “we-mode”, whereas private intentions are in the “I-mode”. The paper also surveys recent discussion in the literature concerning (...)
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  21.  59
    Raimo Tuomela (1992). Group Beliefs. Synthese 91 (3):285-318.
    It is argued in this paper that there can be both normative and nonnormative, merely factual group beliefs. The former involve the whole social group in question, while the latter only relate to the distributions of personal beliefs within the group. The paper develops a detailed theory, called the positional account of group beliefs, to explicate normative, group-involving group beliefs. Normative group beliefs are characterized within this approach in terms of joint acceptances of views by the group members — or (...)
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  22. Raimo Tuomela (2009). Collective Intentions and Game Theory. Journal of Philosophy 106 (5):292-300.
  23.  5
    Raimo Tuomela (1974). Human Action and its Explanation. Institute of Philosophy, University of Helsinki].
  24. Raimo Tuomela (1990). Are Reason-Explanations Explanations by Means of Structuring Causes? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):813-818.
  25.  37
    Raimo Tuomela (1989). Actions by Collectives. Philosophical Perspectives 3:471-496.
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  26. Raimo Tuomela & Maj Tuomela (2003). Acting as a Group Member and Collective Commitments. Protosociology 18:7-65.
    In this paper we will study two central social notions, acting as a group member and collective commitment. Our study of the first of these notions is -- as far as we know -- the first systematic work on the topic. Acting as a group member is a central notion that obviously must be understood when speaking of the "we-perspective", group life, and of social life more generally. Thus, not only philosophy of sociality, philosophy of social science, political and moral (...)
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  27. Ghita Holmström-Hintikka & Raimo Tuomela (1997). Contemporary Action Theory.
  28.  13
    Raimo Tuomela (1978). On the Structuralist Approach to the Dynamics of Theories. Synthese 39 (2):211 - 231.
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  29.  7
    Raimo Tuomela (2013). Who Is Afraid of Group Agents and Group Minds? In Michael Schmitz, Beatrice Kobow & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), The Background of Social Reality. Springer 13--35.
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  30.  18
    Raimo Tuomela (1978). Theory-Distance and Verisimilitude. Synthese 38 (2):213 - 246.
    Measures of theory-Distance are defined for theories formalizable within first-Order predicate logic by using distributive normal forms. The account is applied to give measures of verisimilitude.
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  31.  25
    Raimo Tuomela (2011). An Account of Group Knowledge. In Hans Bernhard Schmid, Daniel Sirtes & Marcel Weber (eds.), Collective Epistemology. Ontos 20--75.
  32.  53
    Raimo Tuomela (1989). Collective Action, Supervenience, and Constitution. Synthese 80 (2):243 - 266.
  33.  54
    Raimo Tuomela (1992). On the Structural Aspects of Collective Action and Free-Riding. Theory and Decision 32 (2):165-202.
    1. One of the main aims of this paper is to study the possibilities for free-riding type of behavior in various kinds of many-person interaction situations. In particular it will be of interest to see what kinds of game-theoretic structures, defined in terms of the participants' outcome-preferences, can be involved in cases of free-riding. I shall also be interested in the related problem or dilemma of collective action in a somewhat broader sense. By the dilemma of collective action I mean, (...)
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  34.  42
    Raimo Tuomela & Wolfgang Balzer (1998). Collective Acceptance and Collective Social Notions. Synthese 117 (2):175-205.
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  35. Raimo Tuomela (2003). The We-Mode and the I-Mode. In F. Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Metaphysics : The Nature of Social Reality. Rowman & Littlefield, 65-91 93--127.
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  36.  29
    Raimo Tuomela (1993). What is Cooperation? Erkenntnis 38 (1):87 - 101.
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  37. Raimo Tuomela, Collective Intentionality and Social Agents.
    In this paper I will discuss a certain philosophical and conceptual program -- that I have called philosophy of social action writ large -- and also show in detail how parts of the program have been, and is currently being carried out. In current philosophical research the philosophy of social action can be understood in a broad sense to encompass such central research topics as action occurring in a social context (this includes multi-agent action); shared we-attitudes (such as we-intention, mutual (...)
     
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  38.  8
    Raimo Tuomela (1976). Morgan on Deductive Explanation: A Rejoinder. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (4):527 - 543.
    This paper is mainly a response to Charles Morgan's criticisms (this journal, pp. 511-25) of the author's model of the (formal aspects of) explanation. It is claimed in the paper that with two modifications and some additional specifications the model withstands Morgan's criticisms.
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  39.  33
    Gabriel Sandu & Raimo Tuomela (1995). Joint Action and Group Action Made Precise. Synthese 105 (3):319 - 345.
    The paper argues that there are two main kinds of joint action, direct joint bringing about (or performing) something (expressed in terms of a DO-operator) and jointly seeing to it that something is the case (expressed in terms of a Stit-operator). The former kind of joint action contains conjunctive, disjunctive and sequential action and its central subkinds. While joint seeing to it that something is the case is argued to be necessarily intentional, direct joint performance can also be nonintentional. Actions (...)
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  40. Ilkka Niiniluoto & Raimo Tuomela (eds.) (1979). The Logic and Epistemology of Scientific Change. North-Holland Pub. Co..
  41.  1
    Raimo Tuomela (2005). We-Intentions Revisited. Philosophical Studies 125 (3):327-369.
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  42.  34
    Raimo Tuomela (1972). Deductive Explanation of Scientific Laws. Journal of Philosophical Logic 1 (3/4):369 - 392.
  43.  19
    Raimo Tuomela & Kaarlo Miller (1985). We-Intentions and Social Action. Analyse & Kritik 7 (1):26-43.
    In the paper "We-intentions and Social Action" conceptual issues related to intentional social action are studied. By social actions we here mean actions that are performed together by two or more agents. The central concept of we-intention is introduced and applied to the analysis of simple social practical reasoning. An individualistic analysis of the notion of we-intention is proposed on the basis of the agents, I-intentions and beliefs. The need and indespensability of we-intentions and we-attitudes in general in a theory (...)
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  44.  54
    Raimo Tuomela (1989). Ruben and the Metaphysics of the Social World. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (2):261-273.
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  45.  38
    Raimo Tuomela (1989). Methodological Solipsism and Explanation in Psychology. Philosophy of Science 56 (March):23-47.
    This paper is a discussion of the tenability of methodological solipsism, which typically relies on the so-called Explanatory Thesis. The main arguments in the paper are directed against the latter thesis, according to which internal (or autonomous or narrow) psychological states as opposed to noninternal ones suffice for explanation in psychology. Especially, feedback-based actions are argued to require indispensable reference to noninternal explanantia, often to explanatory common causes. Thus, to the extent that methodological solipsism is taken to require the truth (...)
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  46. Raimo Tuomela (2011). Cooperation as Joint Action. Analyse & Kritik 33 (1):65-86.
    The paper studies cooperation as joint action, where joint action can, first, be conceptualized either individualistically in terms of the participants' individual goals and beliefs that the joint action is taken to serve. This is individualistic or 'I-mode' cooperation. Special version of it is 'pro-group I-mode' cooperation, where the goals are shared. Second, cooperation can be of the kind where a group of persons act together as a group in terms of the non-aggregative 'we' that they form. The results of (...)
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  47. Raimo Tuomela, Acting As a Group Member.
    Much of human life consists of acting in a group context. We are members of several social groups – small social groups, organizations, nations, states, etc. As to groups, some of them are capable of action, e.g. teams and task groups, organizations, and states. Such group action is action as a group (in contrast to the group members just acting separately and as private persons toward a shared goal, for instance). Groups can only act through their members’ actions. To give (...)
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  48.  6
    Raimo Tuomela (1991). We Will Do It. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (2):249-277.
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  49. Pekka Mäkelä & Raimo Tuomela (2002). Group Action and Group Responsibility. Protosociology 16.
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  50.  33
    Raimo Tuomela (1996). Philosophy and Distributed Artificial Intelligence: The Case of Joint Intention. In N. Jennings & G. O'Hare (eds.), Foundations of Distributed Artificial Intelligence. Wiley
    In current philosophical research the term 'philosophy of social action' can be used - and has been used - in a broad sense to encompass the following central research topics: 1) action occurring in a social context; this includes multi-agent action; 2) joint attitudes (or "we-attitudes" such as joint intention, mutual belief) and other social attitudes needed for the explication and explanation of social action; 3) social macro-notions, such as actions performed by social groups and properties of social groups such (...)
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