Search results for 'Ramsification' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Cory D. Wright (2010). Truth, Ramsification, and the Pluralist's Revenge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):265-283.score: 18.0
    Functionalists about truth employ Ramsification to produce an implicit definition of the theoretical term _true_, but doing so requires determining that the theory introducing that term is itself true. A variety of putative dissolutions to this problem of epistemic circularity are shown to be unsatisfactory. One solution is offered on functionalists' behalf, though it has the upshot that they must tread on their anti-pluralist commitments.
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  2. Panu Raatikainen (2012). Ramsification and Inductive Inference. Synthese 187 (2):569-577.score: 12.0
    An argument, different from the Newman objection, against the view that the cognitive content of a theory is exhausted by its Ramsey sentence is reviewed. The crux of the argument is that Ramsification may ruin inductive systematization between theory and observation. The argument also has some implications concerning the issue of underdetermination.
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  3. Jeffrey Ketland (2004). Empirical Adequacy and Ramsification. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):287-300.score: 12.0
    Structural realism has been proposed as an epistemological position interpolating between realism and sceptical anti-realism about scientific theories. The structural realist who accepts a scientific theory thinks that is empirically correct, and furthermore is a realist about the ‘structural content’ of . But what exactly is ‘structural content’? One proposal is that the ‘structural content’ of a scientific theory may be associated with its Ramsey sentence (). However, Demopoulos and Friedman have argued, using ideas drawn from Newman's earlier criticism of (...)
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  4. George Bealer (2000). Fregean Equivocation and Ramsification on Sparse Theories: Response to McCullagh. Mind and Language 15 (5):500-510.score: 9.0
    This paper begins with a brief summary of the Self-consciousness Argument, developed in the author'ss paper "Self-consciousness.".
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  5. David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (1997). Ramsification and Glymour’s Counterexample. Analysis 57 (3):167–169.score: 9.0
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  6. Jeffrey Ketland (2009). Empirical Adequacy and Ramsification, II. In. In Hieke Alexander & Leitgeb Hannes (eds.), Reduction, Abstraction, Analysis. Ontos Verlag. 29--45.score: 9.0
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  7. Georg Schiemer (2014). Logicism and Ramsification. Metascience 23 (2):255-261.score: 9.0
    This excellent book presents a collection of eleven articles, all but one of which were written by William Demopoulos over the period of the last 19 years. The book comprises eight published articles, some of which have appeared only recently, as well as three new articles. The thematic scope of the topics investigated here is broad and ranges from Frege’s original logicist program outlined in his Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Frege 1884) to Carnap’s mature work on the logical reconstruction of scientific (...)
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  8. Fred Kroon & Robert Nola (2001). Ramsification, Reference Fixing and Incommensurability. In. In Paul Hoyningen-Huene & Howard Sankey (eds.), Incommensurability and Related Matters. Kluwer. 91--121.score: 9.0
  9. Cory D. Wright (2005). On the Functionalization of Pluralist Approaches to Truth. Synthese 145 (1):1-28.score: 6.0
    Traditional inflationary approaches that specify the nature of truth are attractive in certain ways; yet, while many of these theories successfully explain why propositions in certain domains of discourse are true, they fail to adequately specify the nature of truth because they run up against counterexamples when attempting to generalize across all domains. One popular consequence is skepticism about the efficaciousness of inflationary approaches altogether. Yet, by recognizing that the failure to explain the truth of disparate propositions often stems from (...)
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  10. Olaf L. Müller (2002). From Within and From Without. Two Perspectives on Analytic Sentences. In Wolfram Hinzen & Hans Rott (eds.), Belief and meaning: Essays at the interface. Deutsche Bibliothek der Wissenschaften.score: 6.0
    The analytic/synthetic distinction can be conceived from two points of view: from within or from without; from the perspective of one's own language or from the perspective of the language of others. From without, the central question is which sentences of a foreign language are to be classified as analytic. From within, by contrast, the question concerning the synthetic and the analytic acquires a normative dimension: which sentences am I not permitted to reject—if I want to avoid talking nonsense? Both (...)
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  11. Frederick Kroon (2011). Theory-Dependence, Warranted Reference, and the Epistemic Dimensions of Realism. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2):173-191.score: 3.0
    The question of the role of theory in the determination of reference of theoretical terms continues to be a controversial one. In the present paper I assess a number of responses to this question (including variations on David Lewis’s appeal to Ramsification), before describing an alternative, epistemically oriented account of the reference-determination of such terms. The paper concludes by discussing some implications of the account for our understanding of both realism and such competitors of realism as constructive empiricism.
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  12. Sven Rosenkranz (2011). European Functionalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):229 - 249.score: 3.0
    Functionalism about mental phenomena must account for their multiple realizability. According to standard doctrine, this can be achieved by allowing our folk theory's realization formula to be multiply satisfied by distinct physical properties. If at all, uniqueness can then be restored by suitable relativization to populations or worlds. Recent arguments suggest that this is a dead end. Here the attempt is made to devise a novel type of functionalism that accounts for multiple realizability but rejects the standard doctrine and thus (...)
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