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Randolph Clarke [64]Randolph Kent Clarke [1]
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Profile: Randolph Clarke (Florida State University)
  1. Randolph Clarke (2003). Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This comprehensive study offers a balanced assessment of libertarian accounts of free will.
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  2. Randolph Clarke (2009). Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism. Mind 118 (470):323-351.
    This paper examines recent attempts to revive a classic compatibilist position on free will, according to which having an ability to perform a certain action is having a certain disposition. Since having unmanifested dispositions is compatible with determinism, having unexercised abilities to act, it is held, is likewise compatible. Here it is argued that although there is a kind of capacity to act possession of which is a matter of having a disposition, the new dispositionalism leaves unresolved the main points (...)
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  3. Randolph Clarke (2014). Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
    Philosophical theories of agency have focused primarily on actions and activities. But, besides acting, we often omit to do or refrain from doing certain things. How is this aspect of our agency to be conceived? This book offers a comprehensive account of omitting and refraining, addressing issues ranging from the nature of agency and moral responsibility to the metaphysics of absences and causation. Topics addressed include the role of intention in intentional omission, the connection between negligence and omission, the distinction (...)
     
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  4.  66
    Randolph Clarke (2008). Intrinsic Finks. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):512–518.
    Dispositions can be finkish, prone to disappear in circumstances that would commonly trigger their characteristic manifestations. Can a disposition be finkish because of something intrinsic to the object possessing that disposition? Sungho Choi has argued that this is not possible, and many agree. Here it is argued that no good case has been made for ruling out the possibility of intrinsic finks; on the contrary, there is good reason to accept it.
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  5. Randolph Clarke (2010). Intentional Omissions. Noûs 44 (1):158-177.
    It is argued that intentionally omitting requires having an intention with relevant content. And the intention must play a causal role with respect to one’s subsequent thought and conduct. Even if omissions cannot be caused, an account of intentional omission must be causal. There is a causal role for one’s reasons as well when one intentionally omits to do something.
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  6. Randolph Clarke, Joshua Shepherd, John Stigall, Robyn Repko Waller & Chris Zarpentine (2015). Causation, Norms, and Omissions: A Study of Causal Judgments. Philosophical Psychology 28 (2):279-293.
    Many philosophical theories of causation are egalitarian, rejecting a distinction between causes and mere causal conditions. We sought to determine the extent to which people's causal judgments discriminate, selecting as causes counternormal events—those that violate norms of some kind—while rejecting non-violators. We found significant selectivity of this sort. Moreover, priming that encouraged more egalitarian judgments had little effect on subjects. We also found that omissions are as likely as actions to be judged as causes, and that counternormative selectivity appears to (...)
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  7.  32
    Randolph Clarke (2015). Abilities to Act. Philosophy Compass 10 (12):893-904.
    This essay examines recent work on abilities to act. Different kinds of ability are distinguished, and a recently proposed conditional analysis of ability ascriptions is evaluated. It is considered whether abilities are causal powers. Finally, several compatibility questions concerning abilities, as well as the relation between free will and abilities of various kinds, are examined.
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  8. Randolph Clarke (2005). Agent Causation and the Problem of Luck. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):408-421.
    : On a standard libertarian account of free will, an agent acts freely on some occasion only if there remains, until the action is performed, some chance that the agent will do something else instead right then. These views face the objection that, in such a case, it is a matter of luck whether the agent does one thing or another. This paper considers the problem of luck as it bears on agent‐causal libertarian accounts. A view of this type is (...)
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  9. Randolph Clarke (2012). Absence of Action. Philosophical Studies 158 (2):361-376.
    Often when one omits to do a certain thing, there's no action that is one's omission; one's omission, it seems, is an absence of any action of some type. This paper advances the view that an absence of an action--and, in general, any absence--is nothing at all: there is nothing that is an absence. Nevertheless, it can result from prior events that one omits to do a certain thing, and there can be results of the fact that one omits to (...)
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  10. Randolph Clarke (2010). Skilled Activity and the Causal Theory of Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):523-550.
    Skilled activity, such as shaving or dancing, differs in important ways from many of the stock examples that are employed by action theorists. Some critics of the causal theory of action contend that such a view founders on the problem of skilled activity. This paper examines how a causal theory can be extended to the case of skilled activity and defends the account from its critics.
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  11.  35
    Randolph Clarke (2012). Responsibility, Mechanisms, and Capacities. Modern Schoolman 88 (1/2):161-169.
    Frankfurt-style cases are supposed to show that an agent can be responsible for doing something even though the agent wasn’t able to do otherwise. Neil Levy has argued that the cases fail. Agents in such cases, he says, lack a capacity that they’d have to have in order to be responsible for doing what they do. Here it’s argued that Levy is mistaken. Although it may be that agents in Frankfurt-style cases lack some kind of capability, what they lack isn’t (...)
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  12. Randolph Clarke (2005). On an Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):13-24.
    Galen Strawson has published several versions of an argument to the effect that moral responsibility is impossible, whether determinism is true or not. Few philosophers have been persuaded by the argument, which Strawson remarks is often dismissed “as wrong, or irrelevant, or fatuous, or too rapid, or an expression of metaphysical megalomania.” I offer here a two-part explanation of why Strawson’s argument has impressed so few. First, as he usually states it, the argument is lacking at least one key premise. (...)
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  13. Randolph Clarke (2011). Omissions, Responsibility, and Symmetry. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):594-624.
    It is widely held that one can be responsible for doing something that one was unable to avoid doing. This paper focuses primarily on the question of whether one can be responsible for not doing something that one was unable to do. The paper begins with an examination of the account of responsibility for omissions offered by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, arguing that in many cases it yields mistaken verdicts. An alternative account is sketched that jibes with and (...)
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  14.  58
    Randolph Clarke (2012). What is an Omission? Philosophical Issues 22 (1):127-143.
    This paper examines three views of what an omission or an instance of refraining is. The view advanced is that in many cases, an omission is simply an absence of an action of some type. However, generally one’s not doing a certain thing counts as an omission only if there is some norm, standard, or ideal that calls for one’s doing that thing.
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  15. Randolph Clarke (2006). Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. Oxford University Press Usa.
    This comprehensive study offers a balanced assessment of libertarian accounts of free will. Bringing to bear recent work on action, causation, and causal explanation, Clarke defends a type of event-causal view from popular objections concerning rationality and diminished control. He subtly explores the extent to which event-causal accounts can secure the things for the sake of which we value free will, judging their success here to be limited. Clarke then sets out a highly original agent-causal account, one that integrates agent (...)
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  16.  98
    Randolph Clarke (2010). Opposing Powers. Philosophical Studies 149 (2):153 - 160.
    A disposition mask is something that prevents a disposition from manifesting despite the occurrence of that disposition’s characteristic stimulus, and without eliminating that disposition. Several authors have maintained that masks must be things extrinsic to the objects that have the masked dispositions. Here it is argued that this is not so; masks can be intrinsic to the objects whose dispositions they mask. If that is correct, then a recent attempt to distinguish dispositional properties from so-called categorical properties fails.
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  17.  79
    Randolph Clarke (1996). Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free Action. Philosophical Topics 24 (2):19-48.
  18.  67
    Randolph Clarke & Justin Capes, Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    To have free will is to have what it takes to act freely. When an agent acts freely—when she exercises her free will—what she does is up to her. A plurality of alternatives is open to her, and she determines which she pursues. When she does, she is an ultimate source or origin of her action. So runs a familiar conception of free will.
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  19.  83
    Randolph Clarke (2013). Some Theses on Desert. Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):153-64.
    Consider the idea that suffering of some specific kind is deserved by those who are guilty of moral wrongdoing. Feeling guilty is a prime example. It might be said that it is noninstrumentally good that one who is guilty feel guilty (at the right time and to the right degree), or that feeling guilty (at the right time and to the right degree) is apt or fitting for one who is guilty. Each of these claims constitutes an interesting thesis about (...)
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  20. Randolph Clarke (1993). Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will. Noûs 27 (2):191-203.
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  21. Randolph Clarke (2002). Libertarian Views: Critical Survey of Noncausal and Event-Causal Accounts of Free Agency. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press 356--385.
     
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  22.  31
    Randolph Clarke (1994). Ability and Responsibility for Omissions. Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):195 - 208.
    Most philosophers now accept that an agent may be responsible for an action even though she could not have acted otherwise. However, many who accept such a view about responsibility for actions nevertheless maintain that, when it comes to omissions, an agent is responsible only if she could have done what she omitted to do. If this Principle of Possible Action (PPA), as it is sometimes called, is correct, then there is an important asymmetry between what is required for responsibility (...)
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  23.  58
    Randolph Clarke (2014). Agency and Incompatibilism. Res Philosophica 91 (3):519-525.
    This paper is part of a symposium discussing Helen Steward's A METAPHYSICS FOR FREEDOM. Steward argues for what she calls Agency Incompatibilism: agency itself is incompatible with determinism. This paper examines what Steward presents as her main argument for Agency Incompatibilism and finds it wanting.
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  24.  54
    Randolph Clarke (2013). Abilities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):451-458.
    The paper is a contribution to a symposium on Dana Nelkin's MAKING SENSE OF FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY. Nelkin advances accounts of moral freedom--the freedom required for moral responsibility--and deliberative freedom--the freedom that any rational deliberator must believe in. She argues that the two come to fundamentally the same thing. I raise doubt about this claim, and also about whether the kind of ability that Nelkin characterizes suffices for responsibility in all cases.
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  25.  20
    Randolph Clarke (2004). Reflections on an Argument From Luck. Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):47-64.
    An argument from luck purports to show than an undetermined action cannot be a free action. I examine here an argument of this sort recently set out by Alfred Mele. Mele does not endorse the argument; rather, he claims, it constitutes a serious challenge to standard libertarian accounts of free will, and he has some proposals about how the challenge can be met. I offer an assessment of Mele's proposals and some observations on the strengths and weaknesses of the argument (...)
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  26. Randolph Clarke (1996). Contrastive Rational Explanation of Free Choice. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (183):185-201.
  27.  94
    Randolph Clarke (2013). Understanding Human Agency, by Erasmus Mayr. Mind 122 (486):fzt045.
  28.  53
    Randolph Clarke (1997). On the Possibility of Rational Free Action. Philosophical Studies 88 (1):37-57.
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  29. Randolph Clarke (1994). Doing What One Wants Less: A Reappraisal of the Law of Desire. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75 (1):1-11.
     
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  30.  68
    Randolph Clarke (2008). Autonomous Reasons for Intending. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):191 – 212.
    An autonomous reason for intending to A would be a reason for so intending that is not, and will not be, a reason for A-ing. Some puzzle cases, such as the one that figures in the toxin puzzle, suggest that there can be such reasons for intending, but these cases have special features that cloud the issue. This paper describes cases that more clearly favour the view that we can have practical reasons of this sort. Several objections to this view (...)
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  31.  36
    Randolph Clarke (2000). Modest Libertarianism. Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):21-46.
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  32. Randolph Clarke (2011). Alternatives for Libertarians. In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd edition. 329-48.
    This essay examines several varieties of libertarian accounts of free will. Some require free actions to be uncaused, some require agent causation, and some require non-deterministic event causation. Difficulties are raised for all of these varieties.
     
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  33.  16
    Randolph Clarke (1995). Indeterminism and Control. American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (2):125-138.
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  34. Randolph Clarke (1992). Free Will and the Conditions of Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 66 (1):53-72.
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  35. Randolph Clarke (1992). Deliberation and Beliefs About Ones Abilities. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):101-113.
     
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  36.  95
    Randolph Clarke (1999). Nonreductive Physicalism and the Causal Powers of the Mental. Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):295-322.
    Nonreductive physicalism is currently one of the most widely held views about the world in general and about the status of the mental in particular. However, the view has recently faced a series of powerful criticisms from, among others, Jaegwon Kim. In several papers, Kim has argued that the nonreductivist's view of the mental is an unstable position, one harboring contradictions that push it either to reductivism or to eliminativism. The problems arise, Kim maintains, when we consider the causal powers (...)
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  37. Randolph Clarke (2004). Review: Motivation and Agency. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (451):565-569.
  38. Randolph Clarke (2002). Libertarian Views: Noncausal and Event-Causal Sccounts of Free Agency. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press
     
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  39.  45
    Randolph Clarke (2000). Libertarianism, Action Theory, and the Loci of Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 98 (2):153-174.
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  40.  79
    Randolph Clarke (2010). Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, by E. J. Lowe. Mind 119 (475):820-823.
  41.  85
    Randolph Clarke (2010). Because She Wanted To. Journal of Ethics 14 (1):27--35.
    Carl Ginet has advanced an account of action explanation on which actions can be entirely uncaused and action explanations need not cite causal factors. Several objections have been raised against this view, and Ginet has recently defended the account. Here it is argued that Ginet’s defense fails to come to grips with the chief problems faced by his view.
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  42.  4
    Randolph Clarke (2010). Because She Wanted To. Journal of Ethics 14 (1):27-35.
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  43.  25
    Randolph Clarke (2007). Commanding Intentions and Prize-Winning Decisions. Philosophical Studies 133 (3):391 - 409.
    It is widely held that any justifying reason for making a decision must also be a justifying reason for doing what one thereby decides to do. Desires to win decision prizes, such as the one that figures in Kavka’s toxin puzzle, might be thought to be exceptions to this principle, but the principle has been defended in the face of such examples. Similarly, it has been argued that a command to intend cannot give one a justifying reason to intend as (...)
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  44.  68
    Randolph Clarke (2010). Determinism and Our Self-Conception. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):242-250.
    This paper is a contribution to a symposium on John Fischer's MY WAY. In much of that work, Fischer says, he aims to show the "resiliency of our fundamental conception of ourselves as possessing control and being morally responsible agents," and particularly the compatibility of that conception with determinism. I argue that his conclusions leave several important aspects of our ordinary conception of our agency hostage to determinism. Further, there is significant tension between certain of his views. I’ll suggest that (...)
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  45.  43
    Randolph Clarke (1999). Free Choice, Effort, and Wanting More. Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):20-41.
    This paper examines the libertarian account of free choice advanced by Robert Kane in his recent book, The Significance of Free Will. First a rather simple libertarian view is considered, and an objection is raised against it the view fails to provide for any greater degree of agent-control than what could be available in a deterministic world. The basic differences between this simple view and Kane's account are the requirements, on the latter, of efforts of will and of an agent's (...)
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  46.  57
    Randolph Clarke (2010). Willing, Wanting, Waiting * by Richard Holton. [REVIEW] Analysis 71 (1):191-193.
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  47.  57
    Randolph Clarke (2001). Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. Alfred R. Mele. [REVIEW] Mind 110 (439):792-796.
  48.  26
    Randolph Clarke (1992). A Principle of Rational Explanation? Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):1-12.
  49.  52
    Randolph Clarke (2007). The Appearance of Freedom. Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):51 – 57.
    This paper develops three points in response to Habermas's ?The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the Problem of Free Will.? First, while Habermas nicely characterizes the appearance of freedom, he misconstrues its connections to deliberate agency, responsibility, and our justificatory practice. Second, Habermas's discussion largely overlooks grave conceptual challenges to our idea of freedom, challenges more fundamental than those posed by naturalism. Finally, a physicalist view of ourselves may be able to save as much of the appearance of freedom (...)
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  50.  22
    Randolph Clarke (1998). The Psychology of Freedom. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 107 (4):634-637.
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