In this paper I make the arguments that I seesupporting a view of how we can come to knowthe world we live in.I start from a position in second ordercybernetics which turns out to be a RadicalConstructivist position. This position isessentially epistemological, and much of thispaper is concerned with the act of knowing,crucial when we try to develop an understandingof what we mean when we discuss a field ofknowing (knowledge), which is at the root ofscience. The argument follows a path (...) in which I discussthe essential role of the observer inobserving, the creation of constancies betweendifferent observings and their exteriorisationas objects which are then represented and usedin communication with and between otherobservers, each unique (and therefore eachobserving in its own way). This leads to theassertion that the qualities we associate withthe objects of our universes are attributes,rather than properties inherent in the objectsthemselves. At each step in the argument I exploreconsequences for how we understand the world,in particular through science. I showlimitations, new insights and understandings,and re-evaluate what we can expect to gain fromscience. One change is the shift from noun toverb in the consideration of processses – forinstance, the study of living rather than life.In this way, I intend to show not only thatRadical Constructivism is sensible, but that itdoes not preclude us having a science. Incontrast, it can enrich science by taking onboard the sensible.In the process, which science is seen to be themore basic is challenged. (shrink)
This essay responds to Esther Reed's recent critique of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle in this journal. It argues that Reed fundamentally misunderstands and misrepresents R2P. Her critique of R2P would have served well as a critique of the earlier concept of humanitarian intervention had it been penned in the late 1990s. But most of the problems and dangers that Reed identifies are in reality the very problems and dangers that R2P seeks to overcome, and I suggest that it (...) does overcome them quite successfully. R2P does not impose Western ideals on the rest of the world, weaken the legal restrictions on the use of force, or promote abusive interventionism. Rather, it offers a bold but carefully constructed framework that holds the promise of promoting the protection of vulnerable populations from mass atrocities. (shrink)
Slippery slope arguments have been important in the euthanasia debate for at least half a century. In 1957 the Cambridge legal scholar Glanville Williams wrote a controversial book, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, in which he presented the decriminalizing of euthanasia as a modern liberal proposal taking its rightful place alongside proposals to decriminalize contraception, sterilization, abortion, and attempted suicide (all of which the book also advocated).1 Opposition to these reforms was in turn presented as exclusively (...) religious and particularly Roman Catholic. Thus Williams asserted that "euthanasia can be condemned only according to religious opinion" (1957, p. 312).The following year, in .. (shrink)
Context: Conversation theory and second order cybernetics both imply that conversation does not entail a transfer of meaning, but a construction of meaning by both of the conversation partners. Problem: This evokes the question of the conditions that may support or enable this construction of understanding. Method: Through recounting a conversation with Ernst von Glasersfeld I identify generosity and flexibility as a basic condition and format of conversational exchanges. I employ linguistic communication across language barriers as well as making music (...) together as illustrative examples. Results: Generosity seems a key ingredient for enabling conversations as well as a personal skill or talent. Bridging the gaps in communication that result from differences in personal experiential worlds is only possible through goodwill enacted in the listener’s direction of his own imagination. This paper extends and connects radical constructivist notions of constraints and experience, as introduced by von Glasersfeld, with Glanville’s description of the role of generosity in conversation and Wittgenstein’s notion of the “Vorstellungsklavier.” Implications: Generosity can be characterized as the ability to move from communicating to appreciating and accommodating the other in conversations. The implications I draw are limited to the scope of my personal reflections and experiences. (shrink)
My essay “Responsibility to Protect and Militarized Humanitarian Intervention: When and Why the Churches Failed to Discern Moral Hazard” (JRE 40.2) called for more questioning engagement with R2P than the broadly uncritical welcome given by the churches to the doctrine between September 2003 and September 2008. In response to Luke Glanville's reply, this essay identifies further reasons for caution before accepting R2P and so-called humanitarian wars alongside defensive wars as paradigmatically justified. It is structured with reference to the tests (...) in A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, the Report by the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, as recommended to the General Assembly when considering whether to authorize or apply military force: seriousness of risk, intention, last resort, proportional means, balance of consequences. (shrink)
I examine Hume’s ‘construal of the basic structure of human agency’ and his ‘analysis of human agency’ as they arise in his investigation of causal power. Hume’s construal holds both that volition is separable from action and that the causal mechanism of voluntary action is incomprehensible. Hume’s analysis argues, on the basis of these two claims, that we cannot draw the concept of causal power from human agency. Some commentators suggest that Hume’s construal of human agency is untenable, unduly skeptical, (...) or uniquely entailed by the limits of empiricism. However, as I argue, these criticisms depend either on a misunderstanding of Hume’s analysis of human agency or on a neglect of the historical context of his view. (shrink)
THE OBJECT OF THIS ARTICLE IS TO SHOW THAT SCEPTICISM IS NOT ALWAYS USED TO CHALLENGE BELIEFS: IT IS SOMETIMES USED TO "FOSTER" CERTAIN BELIEFS. GLANVILL’S SCEPTICISM REGARDING OUR KNOWLEDGE OF NATURAL CAUSES IS BASED ON THE WEAKNESS AND LIMITATIONS OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING. BUT THIS ALLOWS HIM TO ARGUE FOR THE EQUAL POSSIBILITY OF BOTH NATURAL AND NON-NATURAL CAUSES, AND THUS OPENS THE DOOR TO BELIEF IN THE SUPERNATURAL. HUME, HOWEVER, WHOSE SCEPTICISM IS ALSO BASED ON THE LIMITATIONS OF THE (...) UNDERSTANDING, REJECTS ANY EXPLANATION WHICH IS OVER AND ABOVE OUR UNDERSTANDING, THAT IS, EXPLANATIONS IN TERMS OF NON-NATURAL CAUSES. (shrink)
