5 found
Sort by:
  1. Rasmus Thybo Jensen (2013). Merleau-Ponty and McDowell on the Transparency of the Mind. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):470-492.
    McDowell and Merleau-Ponty share a critical attitude towards a certain Cartesian picture of the mind. According to the picture in question nothing which properly belongs to subjectivity can be hidden to the subject herself. Nevertheless there is a striking asymmetry in how the two philosophers portray the problematic consequences of such a picture. They can seem to offer exact opposite views of these consequences, which, given the almost identical characterization of the transparency claim, is puzzling. I argue that a closer (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Rasmus Thybo Jensen (2013). Merleau-Ponty and the Transcendental Problem of Bodily Agency. In Rasmus Thybo Jensen Dermot Moran (ed.), The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity, Contributions to Phenomenology 71. 43-61.
    I argue that we find the articulation of a problem concerning bodily agency in the early works of the Merleau-Ponty which he explicates as analogous to what he explicitly calls the problem of perception. The problem of perception is the problem of seeing how we can have the object given in person through it perspectival appearances. The problem concerning bodily agency is the problem of seeing how our bodily movements can be the direct manifestation of a person’s intentions in the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Rasmus Thybo Jensen & Dermot Moran (2013). Guest Editors' Introduction. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):313-316.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Rasmus Thybo Jensen & Dermot Moran (2012). Introduction: Intersubjectivity and Empathy. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):125-133.
  5. Rasmus Thybo Jensen (2009). Motor Intentionality and the Case of Schneider. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):371-388.
    I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance both with Merleau-Ponty’s general (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation