Search results for 'Rational Motivation' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  38
    Houston Smit (2003). Internalism and the Origin of Rational Motivation. Journal of Ethics 7 (2):183-231.
    What makes a subject''s motivationrational is its originating in her practicalreasoning. I explain the appeal of this thesisabout rational motivation, and explore itsrelation to recent discussions of internalismabout reasons for action. I do so in theservice of clarifying an important meta-ethicaldebate between Humean motivational skeptics andtheir Kantian opponents. This debate is oneover whether, as this skeptic contends andKantians deny, considerations about ourmotivational capacities, together withinternalism, restrict genuine reasons foraction to merely instrumental ones. I arguethat properly adjudicating this debate (...)
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  2.  89
    Ralph Wedgwood (2009). Diotima's Eudaemonism: Intrinsic Value and Rational Motivation in Plato's Symposium. Phronesis 54 (4):297-325.
    This paper gives a new interpretation of the central section of Plato’s Symposium (199d–212a). According to this interpretation, the term ‘καλόν’, as used by Plato here, stands for what many contemporary philosophers call “intrinsic value”; and “love” (ἔρως) is in effect rational motivation, which for Plato consists in the desire to “possess” intrinsically valuable things – that is, according to Plato, to be happy – for as long as possible. An explanation is given of why Plato believes that (...)
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  3.  57
    Ralph Wedgwood (2009). Diotima's Eudaemonism: Intrinsic Value and Rational Motivation in Plato's Symposium. Phronesis 54 (4):297-325.
    This paper gives a new interpretation of the central section of Plato's Symposium (199d-212a). According to this interpretation, the term "καλóν", as used by Plato here, stands for what many contemporary philosophers call "intrinsic value"; and "love" (ἔρως) is in effect rational motivation , which for Plato consists in the desire to "possess" intrinsically valuable things - that is, according to Plato, to be happy - for as long as possible. An explanation is given of why Plato believes (...)
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  4. Melissa Barry (2007). Realism, Rational Action, and the Humean Theory of Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):231-242.
    Realists about practical reasons agree that judgments regarding reasons are beliefs. They disagree, however, over the question of how such beliefs motivate rational action. Some adopt a Humean conception of motivation, according to which beliefs about reasons must combine with independently existing desires in order to motivate rational action; others adopt an anti-Humean view, according to which beliefs can motivate rational action in their own right, either directly or by giving rise to a new desire that (...)
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  5. Sabine A. Döring (2007). Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation. Dialectica 61 (3):363-394.
    Theories of practical reason must meet a psychological requirement: they must explain how normative practical reasons can be motivationally efficacious. It would be pointless to claim that we are subject to normative demands of reason, if we were in fact unable to meet those demands. Concerning this requirement to account for the possibility of rational motivation, internalist approaches are distinguished from externalist ones. I defend internalism, whilst rejecting both ways in which the belief‐desire model can be instantiated. Both (...)
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  6.  1
    Ralph Wedgwood, Diotima's Eudaemonism: Intrinsic Value and Rational Motivation in Plato's Symposium.
    This paper gives a new interpretation of the central section of Plato's _Symposium_. According to this interpretation, the term "καλόν", as used by Plato here, stands for what many contemporary philosophers call "intrinsic values"; and "love" is in effect _rational motivation_, which for Plato consists in the desire to "possess" intrinsically valuable things - that is, according to Plato, to be _happy_ - for as long as possible. An explanation is given of why Plato believes that "possessing" intrinsically valuable things, (...)
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  7.  11
    Hilliard Aronovitch (1978). Social Explanation and Rational Motivation. American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (3):197 - 204.
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  8.  6
    Hilliard Aronovitch (1979). Rational Motivation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (2):173-193.
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  9.  17
    Richard McCarty (1994). Motivation and Moral Choice in Kant's Theory of Rational Agency. Kant-Studien 85 (1):15-31.
  10.  1
    Melissa Barry (2007). Realism, Rational Action, and the Humean Theory of Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):231-242.
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  11. S. P. H. Heap (1999). What a Rational Action!: A Review of Bruno S. Frey's Not Just for the Money: An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation. [REVIEW] Journal of Economic Methodology 6:140-144.
  12. Arēs Koutounkos (2008). Between the Moral and the Rational: Essays on Meta-Ethics, Moral Beliefs, Values and Desires, Moral Motivation, Rationality and Moral Coherences. Papazissis Publishers.
     
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  13.  82
    Fabian Dorsch (2016). The Phenomenology of Attitudes and the Salience of Rational Role and Determination. Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):114-137.
    The recent debate on cognitive phenomenology has largely focused on phenomenal aspects connected to the content of thoughts. By contrasts, aspects pertaining to their attitude have often been neglected, despite the fact that they are distinctive of the mental kind of thought concerned and, moreover, also present in experiences and thus less contentious than purely cognitive aspects. My main goal is to identify two central and closely related aspects of attitude that are phenomenologically salient and shared by thoughts with experiences, (...)
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  14. John Broome (2009). Motivation. Theoria 75 (2):79-99.
    I develop a scheme for the explanation of rational action. I start from a scheme that may be attributed to Thomas Nagel in The Possibility of Altruism , and develop it step by step to arrive at a sharper and more accurate scheme. The development includes a progressive refinement of the notion of motivation. I end by explaining the role of reasoning within the scheme.
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  15.  57
    Aristophanes Koutoungos (2005). Moral Coherence, Moral Worth and Explanations of Moral Motivation. Acta Analytica 20 (3):59-79.
    Moral internalism and moral externalism compete over the best explanation of the link between judgment and relevant motivation but, it is argued, they differ at best only verbally. The internalist rational-conceptual nature of the link’ as accounted by M. Smith in The Moral Problem is contrasted to the externalist, also rational, link that requires in addition support from the agent’s psychological-dispositional profile; the internalist link, however, is found to depend crucially on a, similarly to the externalist, psychologically (...)
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  16.  29
    Fabian Dorsch (forthcoming). The Phenomenal Presence of Perceptual Reasons. In Fabian Dorsch & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Phenomenal Presence. Oxford University Press
    Doxasticism about our awareness of normative (i.e. justifying) reasons – the view that we can recognise reasons for forming attitudes or performing actions only by means of normative judgements or beliefs – is incompatible with the following triad of claims: -/- (1) Being motivated (i.e. forming attitudes or performing actions for a motive) requires responding to and, hence, recognising a relevant reason. -/- (2) Infants are capable of being motivated. -/- (3) Infants are incapable of normative judgement or belief. -/- (...)
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  17. Nicholas Shackel (2013). Pseudoscience and Idiosyncratic Theories of Rational Belief. In M. Pigliucci & M. Boudry (eds.), The Philosophy of Pseudoscience. University of Chicago Press 417.
    I take pseudoscience to be a pretence at science. Pretences are innumerable, limited only by our imagination and credulity. As Stove points out, ‘numerology is actually quite as different from astrology as astrology is from astronomy’ (Stove 1991, 187). We are sure that ‘something has gone appallingly wrong’ (Stove 1991, 180) and yet ‘thoughts…can go wrong in a multiplicity of ways, none of which anyone yet understands’ (Stove 1991, 190). Often all we can do is give a careful description of (...)
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  18. Christine Clavien (2010). An Affective Approach to Moral Motivation. Journal of Cognitive Science 11 (2):129-160.
    Over the last few years, there has been a surge of work in a new field called “moral psychology”, which uses experimental methods to test the psychological processes underlying human moral activity. In this paper, I shall follow this line of approach with the aim of working out a model of how people form value judgements and how they are motivated to act morally. I call this model an “affective picture”: ‘picture’ because it remains strictly at the descriptive level and (...)
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  19.  36
    Daniel Friedrich (2014). Belief and Motivation. Theoria 80 (3):255-268.
    Humeans claim that all motivation is by desire. Anti-Humeans maintain that some beliefs can motivate all by themselves. This dispute, I argue, hinges on the question whether belief can rationalize motivation. Moreover, I argue belief can rationalize motivation since rationality requires that one be motivated to φ if one believes one has most reason to φ, and it is possible to be motivated to φ because one believes one has most reason to φ and one exercises one's (...)
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  20.  41
    Christoph Lumer (2010). Moral Desirability and Rational Decision. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (5):561-584.
    Being a formal and general as well as the most widely accepted approach to practical rationality, rational decision theory should be crucial for justifying rational morals. In particular, acting morally should also be rational in decision theoretic terms. After defending this thesis, in the critical part of the paper two strategies to develop morals following this insight are criticized: game theoretical ethics of cooperation and ethical intuitionism. The central structural objections to ethics of cooperation are that they (...)
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  21.  20
    Markus Quirin, Martin Beckenkamp & Julius Kuhl (2009). Giving or Taking: The Role of Dispositional Power Motivation and Positive Affect in Profit Maximization. [REVIEW] Mind and Society 8 (1):109-126.
    Socio-economic decisions are commonly explained by rational cost versus benefit considerations, whereas person variables have not much been considered. The present study aimed at investigating the degree to which dispositional power motivation and affective states predict socio-economic decisions. The power motive was assessed both indirectly and directly using a TAT-like picture test and a power motive self-report, respectively. After 9 months, 62 students completed an affect rating and performed on a money allocation task. We hypothesized and confirmed that (...)
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  22.  1
    Fabian Dorsch (2011). Experience and Reason. Rero Doc.
    This collection brings together a selection of my recently published or forthcoming articles. What unites them is their common concern with one of the central ambitions of philosophy, namely to get clearer about our first-personal perspective onto the world and our minds. Three aspects of that perspective are of particular importance: consciousness, intentionality, and rationality. The collected essays address metaphysical and epistemological questions both concerning the nature of each of these aspects and concerning the various connections among them. More generally, (...)
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  23. R. Jay Wallace (1999). Three Conceptions of Rational Agency. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):217-242.
    Rational agency may be thought of as intentional activity that is guided by the agent's conception of what they have reason to do. The paper identifies and assesses three approaches to this phenomenon, which I call internalism, meta-internalism, and volitionalism. Internalism accounts for rational motivation by appeal to substantive desires of the agent's that are conceived as merely given; I argue that it fails to do full justice to the phenomenon of guidance by one's conception of one's (...)
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  24.  47
    James Lenman (1996). Belief, Desire and Motivation: An Essay in Quasi-Hydraulics. American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (3):291-301.
    My concern here is with the Humean claim that no purely cognitive state could, in combination with appropriate other beliefs, but with nothing else, originate a process of rational motivation. The starting point of such motivation must always include some other element: a desire. Let's call this claim, following David McNaughton the belief-desire theory, or BDT for short. The theory is widely believed but intensely controversial. I argue here that it is true.
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  25.  69
    Bennett W. Helm (2001). Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value. Cambridge University Press.
    How can we motivate ourselves to do what we think we ought? How can we deliberate about personal values and priorities? Bennett Helm argues that standard philosophical answers to these questions presuppose a sharp distinction between cognition and conation that undermines an adequate understanding of values and their connection to motivation and deliberation. Rejecting this distinction, Helm argues that emotions are fundamental to any account of value and motivation, and he develops a detailed alternative theory both of emotions, (...)
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  26.  96
    David Christensen (2014). Conciliation, Uniqueness and Rational Toxicity. Noûs 50 (2).
    Conciliationism holds that disagreement of apparent epistemic peers often substantially undermines rational confidence in our opinions. Uniqueness principles say that there is at most one maximally rational doxastic response to any given batch of total evidence. The two views are often thought to be tightly connected. This paper distinguishes two ways of motivating conciliationism, and two ways that conciliationism may be undermined by permissive accounts of rationality. It shows how conciliationism can flourish under certain strongly permissive accounts of (...)
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  27.  8
    David Christensen (2016). Conciliation, Uniqueness and Rational Toxicity1. Noûs 50 (3):584-603.
    Conciliationism holds that disagreement of apparent epistemic peers often substantially undermines rational confidence in our opinions. Uniqueness principles say that there is at most one maximally rational doxastic response to any given batch of total evidence. The two views are often thought to be tightly connected. This paper distinguishes two ways of motivating conciliationism, and two ways that conciliationism may be undermined by permissive accounts of rationality. It shows how conciliationism can flourish under certain strongly permissive accounts of (...)
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  28. Nick Zangwill (2003). Externalist Moral Motivation. American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (2):143-154.
    “Motivational externalism” is the externalism until they see more of what view that moral judgements have no motisuch a theory would be like. The mere posvational efficacy in themselves, and that sibility of such a theory is not sufficiently when they motivate us, the source of motireassuring, even given strong arguments vation lies outside the moral judgement in against the opposite position. For there may a separate desire. Motivational externalism also be objections to externalism. contrasts with “motivational internalism,” Moral philosophers (...)
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  29.  68
    Simone De Colle & Patricia H. Werhane (2008). Moral Motivation Across Ethical Theories: What Can We Learn for Designing Corporate Ethics Programs? Journal of Business Ethics 81 (4):751 - 764.
    In this article we discuss what are the implications for improving the design of corporate ethics programs, if we focus on the moral motivation accounts offered by main ethical theories. Virtue ethics, deontological ethics and utilitarianism offer different criteria of judgment to face moral dilemmas: Aristotle's virtues of character, Kant's categorical imperative, and Mill's greatest happiness principle are, respectively, their criteria to answer the question "What is the right thing to do?" We look at ethical theories from a different (...)
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  30.  85
    Connie S. Rosati, Moral Motivation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    In our everyday lives, we confront a host of moral issues. Once we have deliberated and formed judgments about what is right or wrong, good or bad, these judgments tend to have a marked hold on us. Although in the end, we do not always behave as we think we ought, our moral judgments typically motivate us, at least to some degree, to act in accordance with them. When philosophers talk about moral motivation, this is the basic phenomenon they (...)
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  31. Bennett W. Helm (2001). Emotions and Practical Reason: Rethinking Evaluation and Motivation. Noûs 35 (2):190–213.
    The motivational problem is the problem of understanding how we can have rational control over what we do. In the face of phenomena like weakness of the will, it is commonly thought that evaluation and reason can always remain intact even as we sever their connection with motivation; consequently, solving the motivational problem is thought to be a matter of figuring out how to bridge this inevitable gap between evaluation and motivation. I argue that this is fundamentally (...)
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  32. Robert N. Johnson (1997). Reasons and Advice for the Practically Rational. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):619-625.
    This paper defends a model of the internalism requirement against Michael Smith's recent criticisms of it. On this "example model", what we have reason to do is what we would be motivated to do were we rational. After criticizing the example model, Smith argues that his "advice model", that what we have reason to do is what we would advise ourselves to do were we rational, is obviously preferable. The author argues that Smith's criticisms can quite easily be (...)
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  33. Jonathan Matheson (2011). The Case for Rational Uniqueness. Logic and Episteme 2 (3):359-373.
    The Uniqueness Thesis, or rational uniqueness, claims that a body of evidence severely constrains one’s doxastic options. In particular, it claims that for any body of evidence E and proposition P, E justifies at most one doxastic attitude toward P. In this paper I defend this formulation of the uniqueness thesis and examine the case for its truth. I begin by clarifying my formulation of the Uniqueness Thesis and examining its close relationship to evidentialism. I proceed to give some (...)
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  34.  20
    Justin Steinberg (2015). Affect, Desire, and Judgement in Spinoza's Account of Motivation. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (1):67-87.
    Two priority problems frustrate our understanding of Spinoza on desire [cupiditas]. The first problem concerns the relationship between desire and the other two primary affects, joy [laetitia] and sadness [tristitia]. Desire seems to be the oddball of this troika, not only because, contrary to the very definition of an affect, desires do not themselves consist in changes in one's power of acting, but also because desire seems at once more and less basic than joy and sadness. The second problem concerns (...)
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  35.  58
    Terence Cuneo (2008). Intuitionism's Burden: Thomas Reid on the Problem of Moral Motivation. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 6 (1):21-44.
    Hume bequeathed to rational intuitionists a problem concerning moral judgment and the will – a problem of sufficient severity that it is still cited as one of the major reasons why intuitionism is untenable.1 Stated in general terms, the problem concerns how an intuitionist moral theory can account for the intimate connection between moral judgment and moral motivation. One reason that this is still considered to be a problem for intuitionists is that it is widely assumed that the (...)
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  36. Igal Kvart, Rational Assertibility, the Steering Role of Knowledge, and Pragmatic Encroachment.
    Igal Kvart RATIONAL ASSERTIBILITY, THE STEERING ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE, AND PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT Abstract In the past couple of decades, there were a few major attempts to establish the thesis of pragmatic encroachment – that there is a significant pragmatic ingredient in the truth-conditions for knowledge-ascriptions. Epistemic contextualism has flaunted the notion of a conversational standard, and Stanley's subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI) promoted stakes, each of which, according to their proponents, play a major role as pragmatic components in the truth conditions (...)
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  37. Bennett W. Helm (2007). Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value. Cambridge University Press.
    How can we motivate ourselves to do what we think we ought? How can we deliberate about personal values and priorities? Bennett Helm argues that standard philosophical answers to these questions presuppose a sharp distinction between cognition and conation that undermines an adequate understanding of values and their connection to motivation and deliberation. Rejecting this distinction, Helm argues that emotions are fundamental to any account of value and motivation, and he develops a detailed alternative theory both of emotions, (...)
     
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  38. Bennett W. Helm (2011). Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value. Cambridge University Press.
    How can we motivate ourselves to do what we think we ought? How can we deliberate about personal values and priorities? Bennett Helm argues that standard philosophical answers to these questions presuppose a sharp distinction between cognition and conation that undermines an adequate understanding of values and their connection to motivation and deliberation. Rejecting this distinction, Helm argues that emotions are fundamental to any account of value and motivation, and he develops a detailed alternative theory both of emotions, (...)
     
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  39.  11
    John O’Neill (1998). Self-Love, Self-Interest and the Rational Economic Agent. Analyse & Kritik 20 (2):184-204.
    Hume has a special place in justifications of claims made for rational choice theory to offer a unified language and explanatory framework for the social sciences. He is invoked in support of the assumptions characterising the instru-mental rationality of agents and the constancy of their motivations across different institutional settings. This paper explores the problems with the expansionary aims of rational choice theory through criticism of these appeals to Hume. First, Hume does not assume constancy. Moreover, Hume's sensitivity (...)
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  40.  33
    James N. McGuirk (2010). Husserl and Heidegger on Reduction and the Question of the Existential Foundations of Rational Life. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (1):31 – 56.
    Against the oft-repeated claim that Heideggerian authenticity calls for a resoluteness that is either indifferent or inimical to normative rationality, Steven Crowell has recently argued that the phenomenon of conscience in _Sein und Zeit_ is specifically intended to ground normative rationality in the existential ontological account of Dasein so that Heidegger puts forward not a rejection of the life of reason but a more fundamental account of its condition of possibility in terms of self-responsibility. In what follows, I wish to (...)
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  41.  8
    Christine Clavien (2009). Jugements moraux et motivation à la lumière des données empiriques. Studia Philosophica 68:179-206.
    This paper contains an ‘affective picture’: a story, extensively supported by empirical data, about the way I take people to judge and behave morally; a picture in which the respective roles of reflective and affective processes are explained. According to this picture, different sorts of judgements have to be distinguished, some being cognitively more complex than others. ‘Sophisticated judgements’ are displayed at the level of rational considerations and allow for moral thinking, whereas ‘basic value judgements’ are a primitive and (...)
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  42.  14
    M. P. Silverman (1989). Two Sides of Wonder: Philosophical Keys to the Motivation of Science Learning. Synthese 80 (1):43-61.
    Science education is most efficacious and enduring when undertaken within a philosophical framework akin to that of science, itself. This entails recognition that, above all, science is a mode of rational inquiry pursued by those who are curious about the natural world and motivated to seek rational answers to personally meaningful questions. The key to successful science instruction lies in fostering a student' 's self-motivation and productively channeling his innate curiosity. To do this a science educator must (...)
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  43.  12
    Afschin Gandjour (2007). Is It Rational to Pursue Utilitarianism? Ethical Perspectives 14 (2):139-158.
    The purpose of this paper is to discuss the rational foundation of utilitarianism and the moral motivation to pursue utilitarianism. To this end, the paper discusses a variety of theories including not only utilitarianism and theories of rationality, but also economic theory and evolutionary theories of cooperation.The paper shows that both the rational foundation of utilitarianism and the motivation to pursue utilitarianism are questionable. Agent-relative theories are a recent attempt to attenuate the problem of motivation (...)
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  44.  9
    Kenneth Pahel (1976). Moral Motivation. Journal of Moral Education 5 (3):223-230.
    Abstract: It is claimed that there is a highly contingent and often misleading relationship between (a) giving reasons on a questionnaire and (b) genuine moral understanding. Also, many of the causal factors in shaping moral attitudes are irrelevant to their rational?moral justification, thus creating a lack of harmony between the two. The solution is a balanced programme that gives equal stress to moral reasoning and to opportunities for relevant emotive and evaluative experience. Aspects of Kant and Schopenhauer are discussed (...)
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  45.  8
    Dag Olberg (1995). The Theory of Heroic Defeats: A Mixed Motivation Approach. Sociological Theory 13 (2):178-196.
    The category of heroic action is important in both everyday life and the wider social context. This article argues that interest in the notion of heroic actions and heroic defeats also brings out an important set of sociological problems, such as disagreements on identity, norms, and rational choice explanations. Illustrations are provided from recent analyses of union militancy in Britain and Italy, and of the student movement in Beijing. Different versions of the critique of rational choice theory often (...)
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  46.  6
    R. MacMullen (2004). Historians Take Note: Motivation = Emotion. Diogenes 51 (3):19-25.
    The article focuses on motivation, proposing the equation in its title and opposing the contrary view, that what moves people to action is the rational calculation of their material interests. The latter view is most familiar in economics, where it was for generations seen as the best (meaning, most ‘scientific’) mode of explanation. It had a great deal of influence on historiography and found a great deal of support among psychologists also. From these three areas of research it (...)
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  47. Bennett W. Helm (2009). Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value. Cambridge University Press.
    How can we motivate ourselves to do what we think we ought? How can we deliberate about personal values and priorities? Bennett Helm argues that standard philosophical answers to these questions presuppose a sharp distinction between cognition and conation that undermines an adequate understanding of values and their connection to motivation and deliberation. Rejecting this distinction, Helm argues that emotions are fundamental to any account of value and motivation, and he develops a detailed alternative theory both of emotions, (...)
     
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  48. Glenn Lesses (1980). Desire and Motivation in Plato: Issues in the Psychology of the Early Dialogues and the "Republic". Dissertation, Indiana University
    Chapter VI is an extended sketch of Plato 's psychological theory found in the Republic, especially Book IV. Plato, unlike Socrates, distinguishes among three kinds of desire, corresponding to the three parts of the soul. Plato, however, still agrees with Socrates that all desires are belief-dependent. Furthermore, because Plato is much clearer than Socrates about the nature of goods, he is able to distinguish among three distinct kinds of beliefs about what is good. So Plato also agrees with Socrates that (...)
     
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  49. Rachel G. K. Singpurwalla (2002). A Platonic Theory of Motivation. Dissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder
    In the mid 1700's, David Hume made the extraordinary claim that "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them" . Since then, the issue of whether or not Hume was right has dominated inquiry in moral psychology. Is reason's role in action limited to guiding us towards the means to satisfying our desires, whatever those desires may be? Or can reason tell us (...)
     
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  50. Mark Timmons (1982). Kant's Theory of Moral Motivation: The Construction of a Rationalist Internalism. Dissertation, The University of Nebraska - Lincoln
    My aim in this work is to consider Kant's ethical theory against the background of the main traditions in ethics which Kant opposed, especially ethical empiricism. I argue that the central issue that divided Kant and the opposed traditions concerns moral motivation. As Kant characterized ethical empiricism, and in general all opposed ethical theories, such theories adopted an Aristotelian view of human motivation according to which all action is based on desires. Kant argued that such ethical theories did (...)
     
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