Search results for 'Rational action' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Melissa Barry (2007). Realism, Rational Action, and the Humean Theory of Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):231-242.score: 180.0
    Realists about practical reasons agree that judgments regarding reasons are beliefs. They disagree, however, over the question of how such beliefs motivate rational action. Some adopt a Humean conception of motivation, according to which beliefs about reasons must combine with independently existing desires in order to motivate rational action; others adopt an anti-Humean view, according to which beliefs can motivate rational action in their own right, either directly or by giving rise to a new (...)
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  2. Good Advice & Rational Action (2000). Universalism, Four Dimensionalism, and Vagueness, HUD. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3).score: 160.0
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  3. Karl-Dieter Opp (2013). Norms and Rationality. Is Moral Behavior a Form of Rational Action? Theory and Decision 74 (3):383-409.score: 150.0
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  4. Edward Pols (2002). Rational Action and the Complexity of Causality. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):1-18.score: 150.0
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  5. Ladislav Tondl (2007). Rational Actions and the Integration of Knowledge. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 38 (1):91 - 110.score: 132.0
    The paper emphasizes the role of knowledge dimensions of an action which could be regarded as rational. Rational action usually results of specific decision — making process including selection, evaluation and acceptance of a preferred alternative. This process should integrate not only various types of knowledge but also the interdisciplinary or interdepartmental knowledge integration. The integration of knowledge may cover various forms, especially integration of knowledge relating to different domains, of different quality, of knowledge connected with (...)
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  6. Robert Audi (1990). Weakness of Will and Rational Action. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (3):270 – 281.score: 120.0
    Weakness of will has been widely discussed from at least three points of view. It has been examined historically, with Aristotle recently occupying centre stage. It has been analysed conceptually, with the question of its nature and possibility in the forefront. It has been considered normatively in relation to both rational action and moral character. My concern is not historical and is only secondarily conceptual: while I hope to clarify what constitutes weakness of will, I presuppose, rather than (...)
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  7. Amy Peikoff (2003). Rational Action Entails Rational Desire: A Critical Review of Searle's Rationality in Action. Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):124 – 138.score: 120.0
    In this paper I contest Searle's thesis that desire-independent reasons for action - 'reasons that are binding on a rational agent, regardless of desires and dispositions in his motivational set' - are inherent in the concept of rationality. Following Searle's procedure, I first address his argument that altruistic reasons for action inhere in the concept of rationality, and then examine his argument for his more general thesis. I conclude that a viable theory of rational action (...)
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  8. Randolph Clarke (1997). On the Possibility of Rational Free Action. Philosophical Studies 88 (1):37-57.score: 120.0
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  9. Jan van Eijck, Collective Rational Action: Is It Possible?score: 120.0
    Individual rational action consists of (i) knowing what you want, (ii) taking proper steps to approach what you want as closely as possible, within the confines of the law. This one can learn, although some people are more skilled in it than others. Modern democracies are set up in such a way that they leave as much room as possible for individual rational action. Education for citizenship is sometimes taken to be: getting young citizens acquainted with (...)
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  10. Stephan Fuchs (1993). Against Essentialism in Theories of Rational Action: A Reply to Raymond Boudon. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (1):37 – 39.score: 120.0
    (1993). Against essentialism in theories of rational action: A reply to Raymond Boudon. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 37-39.
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  11. John A. Lambie (2009). Emotion Experience, Rational Action, and Self-Knowledge. Emotion Review 1 (3):272-280.score: 120.0
    This article examines the role of emotion experience in both rational action and self-knowledge. A key distinction is made between emotion experiences of which we are unaware, and those of which we are aware. The former motivate action and color our view of the world, but they do not do so in a rational way, and their nonreflective nature obscures self-understanding. The article provides arguments and evidence to support the view that emotion experiences contribute to (...) action only if one is appropriately aware of them (because only then does one have the capacity to inhibit one's emotional reactions). Furthermore, it is argued that awareness of emotion increases self-knowledge because it is a source of information about our biases. (shrink)
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  12. Laura C. Dunham (2010). From Rational to Wise Action: Recasting Our Theories of Entrepreneurship. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 92 (4):513 - 530.score: 114.0
    In this article, I argue that if we challenge some tacit assumptions of narrow rationality that endure in much of entrepreneurial studies, we can elevate entrepreneurial ethics beyond mere external constraints on rational action, and move toward fuller integration of ethics as an intrinsic part of the process of value creation itself. To this end, I propose the concept of practical wisdom as a framework for exploring entrepreneurial decision making and action that can broaden the scope of (...)
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  13. Stuart Rachels (2009). On Three Alleged Theories of Rational Behavior. Utilitas 21 (4):506-520.score: 108.0
    What behavior is rational? It’s rational to act ethically, some think. Others endorse instrumentalism — it is rational to pursue one’s goals. Still others say that acting rationally always involves promoting one’s self-interest. Many philosophers have given each of these answers. But these answers don’t really conflict; they aren’t vying to describe some shared concept or to solve some mutually acknowledged problem. In so far as this is debated, it is a pseudo-debate. The different uses of ‘ (...) action’ differ merely in meaning. I shall defend the following claims: ‘rational behavior’ is used in ethical, prudential, and instrumental ways (section 1); these uses of ‘rational behavior’ are distinct (section 2); they do not represent competing theories of rational behavior (section 3); we should stop using ‘rational behavior’ ethically and prudentially, but we may continue its instrumental use (section 4). (shrink)
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  14. Vishnu Sridharan (2014). Rational Action and Moral Ownership. Neuroethics 7 (2):195-203.score: 108.0
    In exploring the impact of cognitive science findings on compatibilist theories of moral responsibility such as Fischer and Ravizza’s, most attention has focused on whether agents are, in fact, responsive to reasons. In doing so, however, we have largely ignored our improved understanding of agents’ epistemic access to their reasons for acting. The “ownership” component of Fischer and Ravizza’s theory depends on agents being able to see the causal efficacy of their conscious deliberation. Cognitive science studies make clear that a (...)
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  15. Carlo Jaeger (ed.) (2001). Risk, Uncertainty, and Rational Action. Earthscan.score: 102.0
    Winner of the 2000-2002 outstanding publication award of the Section on Environment and Technology of the American Sociological Association.Risk as we now know ...
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  16. Duncan MacIntosh (1988). Libertarian Agency and Rational Morality: Action-Theoretic Objections to Gauthier's Dispositional Soution of the Compliance Problem. Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):499-525.score: 102.0
    David Gauthier thinks agents facing a prisoner's dilemma ('pd') should find it rational to dispose themselves to co-operate with those inclined to reciprocate (i.e., to acquire a constrained maximizer--'cm'--disposition), and to co-operate with other 'cmers'. Richmond Campbell argues that since dominance reasoning shows it remains to the agent's advantage to defect, his co-operation is only rational if cm "determines" him to co-operate, forcing him not to cheat. I argue that if cm "forces" the agent to co-operate, he is (...)
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  17. David DeMoss (2007). The Connectionist Self in Action. Mind and Society 6 (1):19-33.score: 102.0
    ObjectiveTo demonstrate that the human brain, as a connectionist system, has the capacity to become a free, rational, moral, agent—that is, the capacity to become a self—and that the brain becomes a self by engaging second-order reflection in the hermeneutical task of constructing narratives that rationalise action. StructureSection 2 explains the connectionist brain and its relevant capacities: to categorise, to develop goal-directed dispositions, to problem-solve what it should do, and to second-order reflect. Section 3 argues that the connectionist (...)
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  18. J. David Velleman (1993). The Story of Rational Action. Philosophical Topics 21 (1):229-254.score: 96.0
    Decision theory comprises, first, a mathematical formalization of the relations among value, belief, and preference; and second, a set of prescriptions for rational preference. Both aspects of the theory are embodied in a single mathematical proof. The problem in the foundations of decision theory is to explain how elements of one and the same proof can serve both functions. I hope to solve this problem in a way that anchors the decision-theoretic norms of rational preference in fundamental intuitions (...)
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  19. Paul Tappenden (2011). Expectancy and Rational Action Prior to Personal Fission. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):299 - 306.score: 96.0
    Some analyses of personal fission suggest that an informed subject should expect to have a distinct experience of each outcome simultaneously. Is rational provision for the future possible in such unfamiliar circumstances? I argue that, with some qualification, the subject can reasonably act as if faced with alternative possible outcomes with precise probabilities rather than multiple actual outcomes.
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  20. John L. Pollock (2002). Rational Choice and Action Omnipotence. Philosophical Review 111 (1):1-23.score: 96.0
    Counterexamples are constructed for the theory of rational choice that results from a direct application of classical decision theory to ordinary actions. These counterexamples turn on the fact that an agent may be unable to perform an action, and may even be unable to try to perform an action. An alternative theory of rational choice is proposed that evaluates actions using a more complex measure, and then it is shown that this is equivalent to applying classical (...)
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  21. Mary Tiles (1999). Balancing Acts: Rational Agency and Efficacious Action. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (3):289 – 300.score: 96.0
    In this paper I try to problematize our conception of rational agency and to suggest that this conception is a matter of some practical and political significance. This is done on the one hand by indicating why more attention should be paid to the role of practical know-how, or skill, in the application of general laws or principles to particular cases, and on the other by looking to a Chinese model of efficacious action, where much attention is paid (...)
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  22. Duncan MacIntosh (1991). Retaliation Rationalized: Gauthier's Solution to the Deterrence Dilemma. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):9-32.score: 92.0
    Gauthier claims: (1) a non-maximizing action is rational if it maximized to intend it. If one intended to retaliate in order to deter an attack, (2) retaliation is rational, for it maximized to intend it. I argue that even on sympathetic theories of intentions, actions and choices, (1) is incoherent. But I defend (2) by arguing that an action is rational if it maximizes on preferences it maximized to adopt given one's antecedent preferences. (2) is (...)
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  23. Ross Harrison (ed.) (1979). Rational Action: Studies in Philosophy and Social Science. Cambridge University Press.score: 92.0
    This volume is concerned with the concept of rationality and the interrelations between rationality, belief and desire in the explanation and evaluation of ...
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  24. John R. Searle (2003). Rationality in Action. MIT Press.score: 90.0
    The study of rationality and practical reason, or rationality in action, has been central to Western intellectual culture. In this invigorating book, John Searle lays out six claims of what he calls the Classical Model of rationality and shows why they are false. He then presents an alternative theory of the role of rationality in thought and action. -/- A central point of Searle's theory is that only irrational actions are directly caused by beliefs and desires—for example, the (...)
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  25. John Broome (2009). Motivation. Theoria 75 (2):79-99.score: 90.0
    I develop a scheme for the explanation of rational action. I start from a scheme that may be attributed to Thomas Nagel in The Possibility of Altruism , and develop it step by step to arrive at a sharper and more accurate scheme. The development includes a progressive refinement of the notion of motivation. I end by explaining the role of reasoning within the scheme.
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  26. Igal Kvart, Rational Assertibility, the Steering Role of Knowledge, and Pragmatic Encroachment.score: 90.0
    Igal Kvart RATIONAL ASSERTIBILITY, THE STEERING ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE, AND PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT Abstract In the past couple of decades, there were a few major attempts to establish the thesis of pragmatic encroachment – that there is a significant pragmatic ingredient in the truth-conditions for knowledge-ascriptions. Epistemic contextualism has flaunted the notion of a conversational standard, and Stanley's subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI) promoted stakes, each of which, according to their proponents, play a major role as pragmatic components in the truth conditions (...)
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  27. Houston Smit (2003). Internalism and the Origin of Rational Motivation. Journal of Ethics 7 (2):183-231.score: 90.0
    What makes a subject''s motivationrational is its originating in her practicalreasoning. I explain the appeal of this thesisabout rational motivation, and explore itsrelation to recent discussions of internalismabout reasons for action. I do so in theservice of clarifying an important meta-ethicaldebate between Humean motivational skeptics andtheir Kantian opponents. This debate is oneover whether, as this skeptic contends andKantians deny, considerations about ourmotivational capacities, together withinternalism, restrict genuine reasons foraction to merely instrumental ones. I arguethat properly adjudicating this debate (...)
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  28. Kai Nielsen (1972). Ethical Egoism and Rational Action. Journal of Philosophy 64 (20):698-700.score: 90.0
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  29. Carl G. Hempel (1961). Rational Action. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 35:5 - 23.score: 90.0
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  30. Eric Wiland (2000). Good Advice and Rational Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):561-569.score: 90.0
  31. Kristen R. Monroe, Michael C. Barton & Ute Klingemann (1990). Altruism and the Theory of Rational Action: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe. Ethics 101 (1):103-122.score: 90.0
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  32. Alexander Broadie (1974). Aristotle on Rational Action. Phronesis 19 (1):70 - 80.score: 90.0
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  33. Patrick Maher (1986). The Irrelevance of Belief to Rational Action. Erkenntnis 24 (3):363 - 384.score: 90.0
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  34. Robert Audi (1990). An Internalist Conception of Rational Action. Philosophical Perspectives 4:227-245.score: 90.0
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  35. Roderick M. Chisholm (1983). Two Dimensions of Rational Action. Social Theory and Practice 9 (2/3):223-229.score: 90.0
  36. Gilbert Harman (1983). Rational Action and the Extent of Intentions. Social Theory and Practice 9 (2/3):123-141.score: 90.0
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  37. William K. Frankena (1983). Concepts of Rational Action in the History of Ethics. Social Theory and Practice 9 (2/3):165-197.score: 90.0
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  38. Michael H. Robins (1984). Practical Reasoning, Commitment, and Rational Action. American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1):55 - 68.score: 90.0
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  39. Roger Trigg (1980). Rational Action: Studies in Philosophy and Social Science Edited by Ross Harrison Cambridge University Press, 1979, Xii + 176 Pp., £8.75. [REVIEW] Philosophy 55 (214):559-.score: 90.0
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  40. Milan Zafirovski (1999). The 'Unbearable Lightness' of the Economic Approach to Economic Behavior in the Social Setting: Rational Action and the Sociology of the Economy. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 29 (3):301–334.score: 90.0
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  41. Robert Audi (1972). Psychoanalytic Explanation and the Concept of Rational Action. The Monist 56 (3):444-464.score: 90.0
  42. Ronald E. Beanblossom (1971). Walton on Rational Action. Mind 80 (318):278-281.score: 90.0
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  43. R. B. Brandt (1983). The Concept of Rational Action. Social Theory and Practice 9 (2/3):143-164.score: 90.0
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  44. K. A. Walton (1967). Rational Action. Mind 76 (304):537-547.score: 90.0
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  45. Bruce W. Price (1991). Comment on Bernard Gert's Analysis of Rational Action. Ethics 102 (1):110-116.score: 90.0
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  46. Miguel Vásquez (2012). Intencionalidad, libre albedrío y acción racional: un acercamiento a las posturas de John Searle y Anthony Kenny. Apuntes Filosóficos 20 (38):89-102.score: 90.0
    Resumen El presente trabajo pretende revisar el concepto de intencionalidad de John Searle a la luz de la noción de objetividad de García-Carpintero así como la concepción de libre arbitrio que de dicho concepto podría llegar a desprenderse. Asimismo, y con el fin de esclarecer qué podría entenderse por acción voluntaria nos valdremos de algunos comentarios hechos por Kenny en los cuales el autor intenta explicar qué es exactamente eso que solemos llamar una acción racional. Palabras clave: intencionalidad; objetividad;libre arbitrio;acción (...)
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  47. Ian H. Angus (1979). Toward a Phenomenology of Rational Action. Man and World 12 (3):298-321.score: 90.0
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