Search results for 'Rational egoism' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Jyl Gentzler (2012). How Should I Be? A Defense of Platonic Rational Egoism. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):n/a-n/a.score: 240.0
    There has been a long tradition of interpreting Plato as a rational egoist. Over the past few decades, however, some scholars have challenged this reading. While Rational Egoism appeals to many ordinary folk, in sophisticated philosophical circles it has fallen out of favor as a general and complete account of the nature of reasons for action. I argue that while the theory of practical rationality that is often equated with rational egoism—a view that I call (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Dale Jamieson (1981). Rational Egoism and Animal Rights. Environmental Ethics 3 (2):167-171.score: 180.0
    Jan Narveson has suggested that rational egoism might provide a defensible moral perspective that would put animals out of the reach of morality without denying that they are capable of suffering. I argue that rational egoism provides a principled indifference to the fate of animals at high cost: the possibility of principled indifference to the fate of “marginal humans.”.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Robert Shaver (1998). Rational Egoism: A Selective and Critical History. Cambridge University Press..score: 180.0
    This book is the first full-length treatment of rational egoism, and it provides both a selective history of the subject as well as a philosophical analysis of the arguments that have been deployed in its defense.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Michael Cholbi (2011). The Moral Conversion of Rational Egoists. Social Theory and Practice 37 (4):533-556.score: 160.0
    One principal challenge to the rationalist thesis that the demands of morality are requirements of rationality has been that posed by the "rational egoist." In attempting to answer's the egoist's challenge, some rationalists have supposed that an adequate reply must take the form of a deductive argument that "converts" the egoist by showing that her position is contradictory, arbitrary, or violates some precept that defines practical rationality as such. Here I argue (a) that such rationalist replies will fail to (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. David Gauthier (1974). The Impossibility of Rational Egoism. Journal of Philosophy 71 (14):439-456.score: 150.0
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. James Patrick Scanlan (1999). The Case Against Rational Egoism in Dostoevsky's Notes From Underground. Journal of the History of Ideas 60 (3):549-567.score: 150.0
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. R. Crisp (2001). Rational Egoism: A Selective and Critical History. Philosophical Review 110 (1):111-113.score: 150.0
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. David O. Brink (1997). Rational Egoism and the Separateness of Persons. In J. Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit. Blackwell. 96--134.score: 150.0
  9. Rainer Hegselmann (1989). Review: Rational Egoism, Mutual Advantage and Morality -- A Review-Discussion of D. Gauthier: "Morals by Agreement". [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 31 (1):143 - 159.score: 150.0
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. John Marshall (1992). Why Rational Egoism Is Not Consistent. Review of Metaphysics 45 (4):713 - 737.score: 150.0
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. George Cave (1985). Rational Egoism, Animal Rights, and the Academic Connection. Between the Species 1 (2):7.score: 150.0
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. David Brink (1992). Sidgwick and the Rationale for Rational Egoism. In Bart Schultz (ed.), Essays on Henry Sidgwick. Cambridge University Press.score: 150.0
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. R. Shaver (2000). Rational Egoism (R. Shafer-Landau). Philosophical Books 41 (1):60-61.score: 150.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Robert M. Wallace (2005). Hegel's Refutation of Rational Egoism, in True Infinity and the Idea. In David Carlson (ed.), Hegel's Theory of the Subject. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 150.0
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Jaana Woiceshyn (2011). A Model for Ethical Decision Making in Business: Reasoning, Intuition, and Rational Moral Principles. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 104 (3):311-323.score: 120.0
    How do business leaders make ethical decisions? Given the significant and wide-spread impact of business people’s decisions on multiple constituents (e.g., customers, employees, shareholders, competitors, and suppliers), how they make decisions matters. Unethical decisions harm the decision makers themselves as well as others, whereas ethical decisions have the opposite effect. Based on data from a study on strategic decision making by 16 effective chief executive officers (and three not-so-effective ones as contrast), I propose a model for ethical decision making in (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Kai Nielsen (1972). Ethical Egoism and Rational Action. Journal of Philosophy 64 (20):698-700.score: 120.0
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Helen Freeman (1977). Egoism, Community and Rational Moral Education. Educational Philosophy and Theory 9 (2):1–18.score: 120.0
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Disinterest Egoism (2007). Chapter One ThPxEE Views of Love: Egoism, Disinterest, and Harmonism Alan Vincelette. In Thomas Jay Oord (ed.), The Many Facets of Love: Philosophical Explorations. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 1.score: 120.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Christof Miska, Christian Hilbe & Susanne Mayer (2013). Reconciling Different Views on Responsible Leadership: A Rationality-Based Approach. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 125 (2):1-12.score: 100.0
    Business leaders are increasingly responsible for the societal and environmental impacts of their actions. Yet conceptual views on responsible leadership differ in their definitions and theoretical foundations. This study attempts to reconcile these diverse views and uncover the phenomenon from a business leader’s point of view. Based on rational egoism theory, this article proposes a formal mathematical model of responsible leadership that considers different types of incentives for stakeholder engagement. The analyses reveal that monetary and instrumental incentives are (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Brian P. Simpson (2009). Wealth and Income Inequality: An Economic and Ethical Analysis. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 89 (4):525 - 538.score: 90.0
    I perform an economic and ethical analysis on wealth and income inequality. Economists have performed many statistical studies that reveal a number of, often contradictory, findings in connection with the distribution of wealth and income. Hence, the statistical findings leave us with no better knowledge of the effects that inequality has on economic progress. At the same time, the existing theoretical results have not provided us with a definitive answer concerning the effects of inequality on progress. By gaining knowledge of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Douglas W. Portmore, Acts, Attitudes, and Rational Choice.score: 72.0
    In this paper, I argue that we have obligations not only to perform certain actions, but also to have certain attitudes (such as desires, beliefs, and intentions), and this despite the fact that we rarely, if ever, have direct voluntary control over our attitudes. Moreover, I argue that whatever obligations we have with respect to actions derive from our obligations with respect to attitudes. More specifically, I argue that an agent is obligated to perform an action if and only if (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Alison Hills (2010/2012). The Beloved Self: Morality and the Challenge From Egoism. Oxford University Press.score: 66.0
    The Beloved Self is about the holy grail of moral philosophy, an argument against egoism that proves that we all have reasons to be moral. Part One introduces three different versions of egoism. Part Two looks at attempts to prove that egoism is false, and shows that even the more modest arguments that do not try to answer the egoist in her own terms seem to fail. But in part Three, Hills defends morality and develops a new (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Tara Smith (2008). Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics: The Virtuous Egoist. Business Ethics Quarterly 18 (1):117-126.score: 66.0
    Ayn Rand is well known for advocating egoism, but the substance of that instruction is rarely understood. Far from representing the rejection of morality, selfishness, in Rand's view, actually demands the practice of a systematic code of ethics. This book explains the fundamental virtues that Rand considers vital for a person to achieve their objective well-being: rationality, honesty, independence, justice, integrity, productiveness, and pride. Tracing Rand's account of the value and harmony of human beings' rational interests, Smith examines (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. John E. Atwell (1995). Fallacies in Two Objections to Kant's First Defense of the Duty of Beneficence in the Grundlegung. Argumentation 9 (4):633-643.score: 66.0
    The two best known objections to Kant's first defense of the duty of beneficence are examined and found to be fallacious. The first objection relies on the possibility of imagining an individual who would be willing for the maxim of nonbeneficence to be a universal law (but it fails to recognize that such an individual is not a rational person and thus not subject to morality at all); and the second objection, while granting the nonuniversalizability of the maxim of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Robert Shaver, Egoism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 60.0
    Egoism can be a descriptive or a normative position. Psychological egoism, the most famous descriptive position, claims that each person has but one ultimate aim: her own welfare. Normative forms of egoism make claims about what one ought to do, rather than describe what one does do. Ethical egoism claims that it is necessary and sufficient for an action to be morally right that it maximize one's self-interest. Rational egoism claims that it is necessary (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Richard Brandt (1972). Rationality, Egoism, and Morality. Journal of Philosophy 64 (20):681-697.score: 60.0
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Olga Stuchebrukhov (2007). “Ridiculous” Dream Versus Social Contract: Dostoevskij, Rousseau, and the Problem of Ideal Society. Studies in East European Thought 59 (1-2):101 - 169.score: 60.0
    Drawing on the Second Discourse and the Social Contract and Notes from Underground and “The Dream of a Ridiculous Man,” this essay examines the striking similarities and fundamental differences between Dostoevskij’s and Rousseau’s treatment of the problem of individual vs. society and their notions of ideal social relations. The essay investigates Rousseau’s attempt to absorb morality into politics and “to concretize” Diderot’s universal moral man into citizen. It also suggests that Dostoevskij takes Rousseau’s attempt at concretization a step further by (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. W. D. Glasgow (1978). Broad on Psychological Egoism. Ethics 88 (4):361-368.score: 54.0
    In what follows, I shall first outline Broad's description of, and attitude to, psychological egoism. Then, I shall examine briefly the form which a defense against his criticisms might take. This raises the query whether such a defense is consistent with the doctrine's empirical character. It is suggested that the egoist could evade this difficulty by questioning an assumption which Broad (and others) make about psychological egoism. By abandoning this assumption, we can state the doctrine in a more (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Colin Jerolmack & Douglas Porpora (2004). Religion, Rationality, and Experience: A Response to the New Rational Choice Theory of Religion. Sociological Theory 22 (1):140-160.score: 54.0
    This paper is a critical response to the newest version of the rational choice theory of religion (RCTR). In comparison with previous critiques, this paper takes aim at RCTR's foundational assumption of psychological egoism and argues that the thesis of psychological egoism is untenable. Without that thesis, the normative aspects of religious commitment cannot be reduced validly to instrumental reason. On neither conceptual nor empirical grounds therefore can religion or religious commitment be defined comprehensively in terms of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. David M. Holley (2002). Sidgwick's Problem. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (1):45-65.score: 54.0
    <span class='Hi'>Henry</span> Sidgwick regarded his failure to reconcile the claims of rational egoism with those of utilitarianism to reveal a fundamental contradiction within practical reason. However, the conflict that concerns him arises only in relation to a particular kind of agent. While Sidgwick construes his version of the problem to be a systematic formulation of a conflict that arises within the practical reasoning of ordinary people, it is actually an example of a worst-case scenario that reflects the common (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Steven M. Sanders (1981). Egoism, Rationality and Community. Educational Philosophy and Theory 13 (2):51–60.score: 50.0
  32. Helen Freeman (1980). Egoism, Rationality and Community in Moral Education: A Postscript. Educational Philosophy and Theory 12 (1):49–64.score: 50.0
  33. Ulrich Krause (1998). Solidarity Among Rational Egoists: A Reply to Hegselmann. In Christoph Fehige & Ulla Wessels (eds.), Preferences. De Gruyter. 19--321.score: 50.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. David P. Gauthier (1970). Morality and Rational Self-Interest. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.score: 48.0
    Reason, egoism, and utilitarianism, by H. Sidgwick.--Is egoism reasonable? By G. E. Moore.--Ultimate principles and ethical egoism, by B. Medlin.--In defense of egoism, by J. Kalin.--Virtuous affections and self-love, by F. Hutcheson.--Our obligation to virtue, by D. Hume.--Duty and interest, by H. A. Prichard.--The natural condition of mankind and the laws of nature, by T. Hobbes.--Why should we be moral? By K. Baier.--Morality and advantage, by D. P. Gauthier.--Bibliographical essay (p. 181-184).
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Stephen Darwall (2014). On Sterba’s Argument From Rationality to Morality. Journal of Ethics 18 (3):243-252.score: 46.0
    James Sterba argues for morality as a principled compromise between self-regarding and other-regarding reasons and that either egoists or altruists, who always give overriding weight to self-regarding and other-reasons, respectively, can be shown to beg the question against morality. He concludes that moral conduct is “rationally required.” Sterba’s dialectic assumes that both egoists and altruists accept that both self-regarding and other-regarding considerations are genuine pro tanto reasons, but then hold that their respective reasons always outweigh. Against this, I argue that (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Jonathan Harrison (1995). Ethical Egoism, Utilitarianism and the Fallacy of Pragmatic Inconsistency. Argumentation 9 (4):595-609.score: 44.0
    In this paper I shall consider the difficulty for Ethical Egoism, Act Utilitarianism and later what I shall call Cumulative Effect Utilitarianism, that they both commit the fallacy of pragmatic inconsistency. I shall distinguish various forms of the fallacy of pragmatic inconsistency; in particular I shall distinguish between the fallacy of direct and indirect pragmatic inconsistency, and shall argue that though both Ethical Egoism and Act Utilitarianism probably commit both, Cumulative Effect Utilitarianism does not.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Kai Nielsen (1974). Rationality and Egoism. International Studies in Philosophy 6:49-60.score: 40.0
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Chong Kim Chong (1987). Egoism in Ethics: Rationality and Motivational Considerations. In John D. Greenwood (ed.), The Idea of Psychology: Conceptual and Methodological Issues. Singapore University Press, National University of Singapore.score: 40.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Richard L. Lippke (1987). The Rationality of the Egoist's Half-Way House. Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):515-528.score: 40.0
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Colin Farrelly (2003). A Challenge to Brink's Metaphysical Egoism. Res Publica 9 (3):243-256.score: 38.0
    Those who subscribe to a prudential conception of practical reason do not believe that there is a conflict between other-regarding and self-regarding norms as the former are held to be founded on the latter. Moral conduct, they maintain, is always rationally justifiable. The reasons we should fulfil the demands of other-regarding norms are the same as those we have for fulfilling self-regarding norms. David Brink has put forth an interesting and novel account of this approach to practical reason which he (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Francesco Orsi (2008). The Dualism of the Practical Reason: Some Interpretations and Responses. Etica and Politica / Ethics and Politics 10 (2):19-41.score: 36.0
    Sidgwick’s dualism of the practical reason is the idea that since egoism and utilitarianism aim both to have rational supremacy in our practical decisions, whenever they conflict there is no stronger reason to follow the dictates of either view. The dualism leaves us with a practical problem: in conflict cases, we cannot be guided by practical reason to decide what all things considered we ought to do. There is an epistemic problem as well: the conflict of egoism (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Duncan MacIntosh (2014). Sterba's Argument From Non-Question-Beggingness for the Rationality of Morality. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (1):171-189.score: 34.0
    James Sterba describes the egoist as thinking only egoist reasons decide the rationality of choices of action, the altruist, only altruistic reasons, that each in effect begs the question of what reasons there are against the other, and that the only non-question-begging and therefore rationally defensible position in this controversy is the middle-ground position that high-ranking egoistic reasons should trump low ranking-altruistic considerations and vice versa, this position being co-extensive with morality. Therefore it is rationally obligatory choose morally. I object (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Milan Zafirovski (2003). The Rational Choice Approach to Human Studies: A Reexamination. [REVIEW] Human Studies 26 (1):41-66.score: 32.0
    This article reexamines the rational choice or economic approach to human studies. Its adherents claim that its extension beyond its original domain to all human behavior can finally lead to integration of the human studies, especially social theory, and thus their elevation from what they see as a chaotic state. Specifically, they propose grounding human studies on the premise that humans are rational egoists or self-interested utility maximizers. Although this premise has been the conceptual foundation of orthodox economic (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Bernard A. O. Williams (1973). Egoism and Altruism. In Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press.score: 30.0
    A discussion of egoism and altruism as related both to ethical theory and moral psychology. Williams considers and rejects various arguments for and against the existence of egoistic motives and the rationality of someone motivated by self-interest. He ultimately attempts to give a more Humean defense of altruism, as opposed to the more Kantian defenses found in Thomas Nagel, for example.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Marc Champagne (2011). What About Suicide Bombers? A Terse Response to a Terse Objection. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 11 (2):233–236.score: 30.0
    Stressing that the pronoun "I" picks out one and only one person in the world (i.e., me), I argue against Hunt (and other like-minded Rand commentators) that the supposed "hard case" of destructive people who do not care for their own lives poses no special difficulty for rational egoism. I conclude that the proper response to a terse objection like "What about suicide bombers?" is the equally terse assertion "But I don't want to get blown up.".
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Henry E. Allison (2007). Comments on Guyer. Inquiry 50 (5):480 – 488.score: 30.0
    Guyer argues for four major theses. First, in his early, pre-critical discussions of morality, Kant advocated a version of rational egoism, in which freedom, understood naturalistically as a freedom from domination by both one's own inclinations and from other people, rather than happiness, is the fundamental value. From this point of view, the function of the moral law is to prescribe rules best suited to the preservation and maximization of such freedom, just as on the traditional eudaemonistic account (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2012). The Objectivity of Ethics and the Unity of Practical Reason. Ethics 123 (1):9-31.score: 30.0
    Evolutionary accounts of the origins of human morality may lead us to doubt the truth of our moral judgments. Sidgwick tried to vindicate ethics from this kind of external attack. However, he ended The Methods in despair over another problem—an apparent conflict between rational egoism and universal benevolence, which he called the “dualism of practical reason.” Drawing on Sidgwick, we show that one way of defending objectivity in ethics against Sharon Street’s recent evolutionary critique also puts us in (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Massimo Pigliucci (2001). The Ethics of Tit-for-Tat. Philosophy Now 33:28-29.score: 30.0
    Taking a quick look at game theory, rational egoism and the evolution of fairness.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. J. McKie, H. Kuhse, J. Richardson & P. Singer (1996). Double Jeopardy, the Equal Value of Lives and the Veil of Ignorance: A Rejoinder to Harris. Journal of Medical Ethics 22 (4):204-208.score: 30.0
    Harris levels two main criticisms against our original defence of QALYs (Quality Adjusted Life Years). First, he rejects the assumption implicit in the QALY approach that not all lives are of equal value. Second, he rejects our appeal to Rawls's veil of ignorance test in support of the QALY method. In the present article we defend QALYs against Harris's criticisms. We argue that some of the conclusions Harris draws from our view that resources should be allocated on the basis of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000