Search results for 'Rationalizing' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Adang Budiman, Amanda Roan & Victor J. Callan (2013). Rationalizing Ideologies, Social Identities and Corruption Among Civil Servants in Indonesia During the Suharto Era. Journal of Business Ethics 116 (1):139-149.score: 20.0
    This study investigated how the social identities assumed by individuals as part of their professional roles influence the nature and use of a range of rationalizations for their corruption or the corrupt acts of others. Thirty senior Indonesian public servants were interviewed about the causes and factors that perpetuated corruption during the Suharto era, and how they rationalized corrupt behavior within the role of being a civil servant. Findings revealed that corruption was routine and embedded in the daily activities and (...)
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  2. Jeffrey Helzner (2013). Rationalizing Two-Tiered Choice Functions Through Conditional Choice. Synthese 190 (6):929-951.score: 18.0
    Set-valued choice functions provide a framework that is general enough to encompass a wide variety of theories that are significant to the study of rationality but, at the same time, offer enough structure to articulate consistency conditions that can be used to characterize some of the theories within this encompassed variety. Nonetheless, two-tiered choice functions, such as those advocated by Isaac Levi, are not easily characterized within the framework of set-valued choice functions. The present work proposes conditional choice functions as (...)
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  3. Jessica Price & Agnes Binagwaho (2010). From Medical Rationing to Rationalizing the Use of Human Resources for Aids Care and Treatment in Africa: A Case for Task Shifting. Developing World Bioethics 10 (2):99-103.score: 18.0
    With a global commitment to scaling up AIDS care and treatment in resource-poor settings for some of the most HIV-affected countries in Africa, availability of antiretroviral treatment is no longer the principal obstacle to expanding access to treatment. A shortage of trained healthcare personnel to initiate treatment and manage patients represents a more challenging barrier to offering life-saving treatment to all patients in need. Physician-centered treatment policies accentuate this challenge. Despite evidence that task shifting for nurse-centered AIDS patient care is (...)
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  4. Duncan MacIntosh (1986). Commentary: Rationalizing Naturalism; On Hilary Kornblith's "Naturalizing Rationality&Quot;. In Newton Garver & Peter H. Hare (eds.), Naturalism and Rationality. Prometheus Books. 135-139.score: 18.0
  5. Alan Millar (2004). Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation. Oxford University Press.score: 17.0
    Alan Millar examines our understanding of why people think and act as they do. His key theme is that normative considerations form an indispensable part of the explanatory framework in terms of which we seek to understand each other. Millar defends a conception according to which normativity is linked to reasons. On this basis he examines the structure of certain normative commitments incurred by having propositional attitudes. Controversially, he argues that ascriptions of beliefs and intentions in and of themselves attribute (...)
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  6. Hamid Vahid (2010). Rationalizing Beliefs: Evidential Vs. Pragmatic Reasons. Synthese 176 (3):447 - 462.score: 16.0
    Beliefs can be evaluated from a number of perspectives. Epistemic evaluation involves epistemic standards and appropriate epistemic goals. On a truthconducive account of epistemic justification, a justified belief is one that serves the goal of believing truths and avoiding falsehoods. Beliefs are also prompted by nonepistemic reasons. This raises the question of whether, say, the pragmatic benefits of a belief are able to rationalize it. In this paper, after criticizing certain responses to this question, I shall argue that, as far (...)
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  7. Maarten C. W. Janssen (2001). Rationalizing Focal Points. Theory and Decision 50 (2):119-148.score: 16.0
    Focal points seem to be important in helping players coordinate their strategies in coordination problems. Game theory lacks, however, a formal theory of focal points. This paper proposes a theory of focal points that is based on individual rationality considerations. The two principles upon which the theory rest are the Principle of Insufficient Reason (IR) and a Principle of Individual Team Member Rationality. The way IR is modelled combines the classic notion of description symmetry and a new notion of pay-off (...)
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  8. E. Jensen (2008). Through Thick and Thin: Rationalizing the Public Bioethical Debate Over Therapeutic Cloning. Clinical Ethics 3 (4):194-198.score: 16.0
    Beauchamp and Childress (1994) elaborated an approach to bioethical deliberations based on four universalistic principles. This framework of ‘principlism’ has been criticized from within biomedical ethics as insufficient and problematic. However, this article considers a more radical sociological critique by John Evans (2002) that rejects the entire approach of defining ‘principles’ a priori. This sociological critique is based on classical sociologist Max Weber's (1925) distinction between instrumental (‘thin’) and substantive (‘thick’) rationality. As an exploratory assessment of Evans' critique, his conceptualization (...)
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  9. Alfred R. Mele (1998). Noninstrumental Rationalizing. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (3):236–250.score: 16.0
    A central notion in Donald Davidson's philosophy of mind and action is "rationalization," a species of causal explanation designed in part to reveal the point or purpose of the explananda. An analogue of this notion - noninstrumental rationalization - merits serious attention. I develop an account of this species of rationalization and display its utility in explaining the production of certain desires and of motivationally biased beliefs.
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  10. Alan Millar, A Précis of Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation.score: 12.0
    The article provides a summary of the author's book Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004). It details three areas in which the notion of a normative commitment is made central. These are (1) believing and intending, (2) practices conceived as essentially rule-governed activities, and (3) meaning and concepts. An account is given of how we may best explain the commitments incurred by beliefs and intentions. It is held that those states are themselves essentially normative. A (...)
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  11. Michael Brownstein (2014). Rationalizing Flow: Agency in Skilled Unreflective Action. Philosophical Studies 168 (2):545-568.score: 10.0
    In recent work, Peter Railton, Julia Annas, and David Velleman aim to reconcile the phenomenon of “flow”—broadly understood as describing the “unreflective” aspect of skilled action—with one or another familiar conception of agency. While there are important differences between their arguments, Railton, Annas, and Velleman all make, or are committed to, at least one similar pivotal claim. Each argues, directly or indirectly, that agents who perform skilled unreflective actions can, in principle, accurately answer “Anscombean” questions—”what” and “why” questions— about what (...)
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  12. J. Barrett (1994). Rationalizing Explanation and Causally Relevant Mental Properties. Philosophical Studies 74 (1):77-102.score: 10.0
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  13. Neil C. Manson (2004). Reason Explanation a First-Order Rationalizing Account. Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):113 – 129.score: 10.0
    How do reason explanations explain? One view is that they require the deployment of a tacit psychological theory; another is that even if no tacit theory is involved, we must still conceive of reasons as mental states. By focusing on the subjective nature of agency, and by casting explanations as responses to 'why' questions that assuage agents' puzzlement, reason explanations can be profitably understood as part of our traffic in first-order content amongst perspectival subjects. An outline is offered of such (...)
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  14. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, Reason-Based Rationalization.score: 10.0
    We introduce a “reason-based” way of rationalizing an agent’s choice behaviour, which explains choices by specifying which properties of the options or choice context the agent cares about (the “motivationally salient properties”) and how he or she cares about these properties (the “fundamental preference relation”). Reason-based rationalizations can explain non-classical choice behaviour, including boundedly rational and sophisticated rational behaviour, and predict choices in unobserved contexts, an issue neglected in standard choice theory. We characterize the behavioural implications of different reason-based (...)
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  15. A. Morton (2006). Review: Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation. [REVIEW] Mind 115 (459):777-780.score: 10.0
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  16. Hallvard Lillehammer (2005). Review of Alan Millar, Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (8).score: 10.0
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  17. Michelle M. Mello (2008). Rationalizing Vaccine Injury Compensation. Bioethics 22 (1):32–42.score: 10.0
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  18. Jeffrey B. Kaufmann, Tim West & Sue P. Ravenscroft (2005). Ethical Distancing: Rationalizing Violations of Organizational Norms. Business and Professional Ethics Journal 24 (3):101-134.score: 10.0
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  19. Stanley G. Korenman (2010). LaFleur, William R., Gernot Bohme and Susumu Shimazono, Eds. 2007. Dark Medicine: Rationalizing Unethical Medical Research. [REVIEW] Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 7 (1):123-124.score: 10.0
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  20. Ran Spiegler (2011). 'But Can't We Get the Same Thing with a Standard Model?' Rationalizing Bounded-Rationality Models. Economics and Philosophy 27 (1):23-43.score: 10.0
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  21. David K. Henderson (1989). The Role and Limitations of Rationalizing Explanation in the Social Sciences. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):267 - 287.score: 10.0
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  22. Stuart E. Rosenbaum (1984). A Note on the Impossibility of Rationalizing Desire. Journal of Value Inquiry 18 (1):63-67.score: 10.0
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  23. Joanne Godley (2009). Review of William R. LaFleur, Gernot Bohme, and Susumu Shimazono, Eds., Dark Medicine: Rationalizing Unethical Medical Research. [REVIEW] American Journal of Bioethics 9 (8):73-74.score: 10.0
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  24. Gregor McLennan (2004). Rationalizing Musicality: A Critique of Alexander's 'Strong Program' in Cultural Sociology. Thesis Eleven 79 (1):75-86.score: 10.0
    This article argues that the long-standing tension in Jeffrey Alexander’s work between theoretical multidimensionality and socio-cultural idealism has intensified in his recent writings, to problematical effect. Whilst Alexander has shifted of late towards a more substantive and normative style of thinking, his new emphases continue to be grounded in arguments pitched at the general theoretical level. One of these involves a particular reading of the nature of post-positivist meta-theory today, and the other, within this, is a determined effort to distinguish (...)
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  25. P. H. Brazier (2014). C.S. Lewis on Atonement: A Unified Model and Event, the Drama of Redemption—Understanding and Rationalizing the Tradition. Heythrop Journal 55 (6):n/a-n/a.score: 10.0
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  26. Daniel Greenberg (2005). When Economists Go to Washington, DC: Randall Lutter and Jason F. Shogren (Eds.), Painting the White House Green: Rationalizing Environmental Policy Inside the Executive Office of the President (Washington, DC: RFF Press, 2004), 201 Pp., ISBN 1-891853-73-2 (Cloth) and ISBN 1-89153-72-4 (Paper). [REVIEW] Minerva 43 (1):109-112.score: 10.0
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  27. David K. Henderson (1991). Rationalizing Explanation, Normative Principles, and Descriptive Generalizations. Behavior and Philosophy 19 (1):1 - 20.score: 10.0
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  28. Denis Thieffry (2001). Rationalizing Early Embryogenesis in the 1930s: Albert Dalcq on Gradients and Fields. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Biology 34 (1):149 - 181.score: 10.0
    The present account aims to contribute to a better characterization of the state and the dynamics of embryological knowledge at the dawn of the molecular revolution in biology. In this study, Albert Dalcq (1893-1973) was chosen as a representative of a generation of embryologists who found themselves at the junction of two very different approaches to the study of life: the first, focusing on global properties of organisms; the second focusing on the characterization of basic molecular constituents. Though clearly belonging (...)
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  29. Jerzy Topolski (2011). The Directive of Rationalizing Human Actions. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 97 (1):121-136.score: 10.0
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  30. Gregory J. Wawro (2006). The Rationalizing Public? Critical Review 18 (1-3):279-296.score: 10.0
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  31. A. G. Carmichael (2006). David Shumway Jones. Rationalizing Epidemics: Meanings and Uses of American Indian Mortality Since 1600. Early Science and Medicine 11 (2):244.score: 10.0
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  32. Steven G. Crowell & Christian J. Emden (2012). Georgina Born is Professor of Music and Anthropology at the University of Oxford. Previously, She Was Professor of Sociology, Anthropology, and Music at the University of Cambridge. Honorary Professor of Anthropol-Ogy at University College London and a Fellow of the Center for Cultural Sociology at Yale University, She is the Author of Rationalizing Culture. [REVIEW] In Christian Emden & David R. Midgley (eds.), Beyond Habermas: Democracy, Knowledge, and the Public Sphere. Berghahn Books. 218.score: 10.0
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  33. Ron Eyerman (1985). Rationalizing Intellectuals. Theory and Society 14 (6):777-807.score: 10.0
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  34. Mario Kaiser (2006). Drawing the Boundaries of Nanoscience ? Rationalizing the Concerns? Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 34 (4):667-674.score: 10.0
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  35. S. G. Korenman (2010). Lafleur, William R., Gernot Bohme and Susumu Shimazono, Eds. 2007. Dark Medicine: Rationalizing Unethical Medical Research: Bloomington, IND: Indiana University Press., ISBN 9780253348722, Pp. 280. [REVIEW] Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 7 (1):123-124.score: 10.0
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  36. R. Maulitz (2000). Rationalizing Medical Work: Decision-Support Techniques and Medical Practices. Knowledge Technology and Policy 13 (1):112-113.score: 10.0
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  37. Bruno Verbeek (2007). Rational Self-Commitment. In Fabienne Peter & Hans Bernhard Schmidt (eds.), rationality and commitment. Oup Oxford.score: 9.0
    Abstract: The standard picture of rationality requires that the agent acts so as to realize her most preferred alternative in the light of her own desires and beliefs. However, there are circumstances where such an agent can predict that she will act against her preferences. The story of Ulysses and the Sirens is the paradigmatic example of such cases. In those circumstances the orthodoxy requires the agent to be ‘sophisticated’. That is to say, she should take into account her expected (...)
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  38. Timothy Lane & Georg Northoff (forthcoming). Is Depressive Rumination Rational? In T. W. Hung (ed.), Reason and Rationality. Elsevier.score: 9.0
    Most mental disorders affect only a small segment of the population. On the reasonable assumption that minds or brains are prone to occasional malfunction, these disorders do not seem to pose distinctive explanatory problems. Depression, however, because it is so prevalent and costly, poses a conundrum that some try to explain by characterizing it as an adaptation—a trait that exists because it performed fitness-enhancing functions in ancestral populations. Heretofore, proposed evolutionary explanations of depression did not focus on thought processes; instead, (...)
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  39. Duncan MacIntosh (1998). Categorically Rational Preferences and the Structure of Morality. In Peter Danielson (ed.), Modeling Rationality, Morality and Evolution; Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science, Volume 7. Oxford.score: 9.0
    David Gauthier suggested that all genuine moral problems are Prisoners Dilemmas (PDs), and that the morally and rationally required solution to a PD is to co-operate. I say there are four other forms of moral problem, each a different way of agents failing to be in PDs because of the agents’ preferences. This occurs when agents have preferences that are malevolent, self-enslaving, stingy, or bullying. I then analyze preferences as reasons for action, claiming that this means they must not target (...)
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  40. Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (2004). Introduction: Aspects of Rationality. In Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford University Press.score: 9.0
    This article examines the nature of rationality. The domain of rationality is customarily divided into the theoretical and the practical. Whereas theoretical or epistemic rationality is concerned with what it is rational to believe, and sometimes with rational degrees of belief, practical rationality is concerned with what it is rational to do, or intend or desire to do. This article raises some of the main issues relevant to philosophical discussion of the nature of rationality. Discussions of the nature of practical (...)
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  41. E. J. Lowe (2011). The Rationality of Metaphysics. Synthese 178 (1):99-109.score: 8.0
    In this paper, it is argued that metaphysics, conceived as an inquiry into the ultimate nature of mind-independent reality, is a rationally indispensable intellectual discipline, with the a priori science of formal ontology at its heart. It is maintained that formal ontology, properly understood, is not a mere exercise in conceptual analysis, because its primary objective is a normative one, being nothing less than the attempt to grasp adequately the essences of things, both actual and possible, with a view to (...)
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  42. Derek Parfit (1982). Personal Identity and Rationality. Synthese 53 (2):227-241.score: 8.0
    There are two main views about the nature of personal identity. I shall briehy describe these views, say without argument which I believe to be true, and then discuss the implications of this view for one of the main conceptions of rationality. This conception I shall call "C1assical Prudence." I shall argue that, on what I believe to be the true view about personal identity, Classical Prudence is indefensible.
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  43. Nicholas Southwood (2008). Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality. Ethics 119 (1):9-30.score: 8.0
    I argue that the "why be rational?" challenge raised by John Broome and Niko Kolodny rests upon a mistake that is analogous to the mistake that H.A. Pritchard famously claimed beset the “why be moral?” challenge. The failure to locate an independent justification for obeying rational requirements should do nothing whatsoever to undermine our belief in the normativity of rationality. I suggest that we should conceive of the demand for a satisfactory vindicating explanation of the normativity of rationality instead in (...)
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  44. Nomy Arpaly (2000). On Acting Rationally Against One's Best Judgment. Ethics 110 (3):488-513.score: 8.0
    I argue that akrasia is not always significantly irrational. To be more precise, I argue that an agent is sometimes more rational for being akratic then she would have been for being enkratic or strong-willed.
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  45. Andrew Reisner (2013). Is the Enkratic Principle a Requirement of Rationality? Organon F 20 (4):436-462.score: 8.0
    In this paper I argue that the enkratic principle in its classic formulation may not be a requirement of rationality. The investigation of whether it is leads to some important methodological insights into the study of rationality. I also consider the possibility that we should consider rational requirements as a subset of a broader category of agential requirements.
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  46. Declan Smithies (2011). Attention is Rational-Access Consciousness. In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press. 247--273.score: 8.0
    This chapter argues that attention is a distinctive mode of consciousness, which plays an essential functional role in making information accessible for use in the rational control of thought and action. The main line of argument can be stated quite simply. Attention is what makes information fully accessible for use in the rational control of thought and action. But what makes information fully accessible for use in the rational control of thought and action is a distinctive mode of consciousness. Therefore, (...)
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  47. Jonathan Way (2010). The Normativity of Rationality. Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1057-1068.score: 8.0
    This article is an introduction to the recent debate about whether rationality is normative – that is, very roughly, about whether we should have attitudes which fit together in a coherent way. I begin by explaining an initial problem – the “detaching problem” – that arises on the assumption that we should have coherent attitudes. I then explain the prominent “wide-scope” solution to this problem, and some of the central objections to it. I end by considering the options that arise (...)
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  48. Lara Buchak (2012). Can It Be Rational to Have Faith? In Jacob Chandler & Victoria Harrison (eds.), Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press. 225.score: 8.0
    This paper provides an account of what it is to have faith in a proposition p, in both religious and mundane contexts. It is argued that faith in p doesn’t require adopting a degree of belief that isn’t supported by one’s evidence but rather it requires terminating one’s search for further evidence and acting on the supposition that p. It is then shown, by responding to a formal result due to I.J. Good, that doing so can be rational in a (...)
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  49. Duncan MacIntosh (1991). Retaliation Rationalized: Gauthier's Solution to the Deterrence Dilemma. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):9-32.score: 8.0
    Gauthier claims: (1) a non-maximizing action is rational if it maximized to intend it. If one intended to retaliate in order to deter an attack, (2) retaliation is rational, for it maximized to intend it. I argue that even on sympathetic theories of intentions, actions and choices, (1) is incoherent. But I defend (2) by arguing that an action is rational if it maximizes on preferences it maximized to adopt given one's antecedent preferences. (2) is true because it maximized to (...)
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  50. Allen Coates (2012). Rational Epistemic Akrasia. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):113-24.score: 8.0
    Epistemic akrasia arises when one holds a belief even though one judges it to be irrational or unjustified. While there is some debate about whether epistemic akrasia is possible, this paper will assume for the sake of argument that it is in order to consider whether it can be rational. The paper will show that it can. More precisely, cases can arise in which both the belief one judges to be irrational and one’s judgment of it are epistemically rational in (...)
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