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  1. Raul Hakli & Sara Negri (2012). Does the Deduction Theorem Fail for Modal Logic? Synthese 187 (3):849-867.
    Various sources in the literature claim that the deduction theorem does not hold for normal modal or epistemic logic, whereas others present versions of the deduction theorem for several normal modal systems. It is shown here that the apparent problem arises from an objectionable notion of derivability from assumptions in an axiomatic system. When a traditional Hilbert-type system of axiomatic logic is generalized into a system for derivations from assumptions, the necessitation rule has to be modified in a way that (...)
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  2. Raul Hakli (2011). On Dialectical Justification of Group Beliefs‖. In Hans Bernhard Schmid, Daniel Sirtes & Marcel Weber (eds.), Collective Epistemology. Ontos. 119--153.
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  3. Raul Hakli & Sara Negri (2011). Reasoning About Collectively Accepted Group Beliefs. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (4):531-555.
    A proof-theoretical treatment of collectively accepted group beliefs is presented through a multi-agent sequent system for an axiomatization of the logic of acceptance. The system is based on a labelled sequent calculus for propositional multi-agent epistemic logic with labels that correspond to possible worlds and a notation for internalized accessibility relations between worlds. The system is contraction- and cut-free. Extensions of the basic system are considered, in particular with rules that allow the possibility of operative members or legislators. Completeness with (...)
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  4. Raul Hakli, Kaarlo Miller & Raimo Tuomela (2010). Two Kinds of We-Reasoning. Economics and Philosophy 26 (03):291-320.
    Page 1. Economics and Philosophy, 26 (2010) 291--320 Copyright C Cambridge University Press doi: 10.1017 / S0266267110000386 TWO KINDS OF WE-REASONING RAUL HAKLI, KAARLO MILLER AND RAIMO TUOMELA University of Helsinki ..
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  5. Raul Hakli (2007). On the Possibility of Group Knowledge Without Belief. Social Epistemology 21 (3):249 – 266.
    Endorsing the idea of group knowledge seems to entail the possibility of group belief as well, because it is usually held that knowledge entails belief. It is here studied whether it would be possible to grant that groups can have knowledge without being committed to the controversial view that groups can have beliefs. The answer is positive on the assumption that knowledge can be based on acceptance as well as belief. The distinction between belief and acceptance can be seen as (...)
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