7 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Ray Buchanan (University of Texas at Austin)
  1. Ray Buchanan (forthcoming). Conversational Implicature, Communicative Intentions, and Content. Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
    Conversational implicature, communicative intentions, and content. . ???aop.label???
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Ray Buchanan (2013). Reference, Understanding, and Communication. Australasian Journal of Philosophy (1):1-16.
  3. Ray Buchanan (2012). Is Belief a Propositional Attitude? Philosophers' Imprint 12 (1).
    According to proponents of the face-value account, a beliefreport of the form ‘S believes that p’ is true just in case the agentbelieves a proposition referred to by the that-clause. As againstthis familiar view, I argue that there are cases of true beliefreports of the relevant form in which there is no proposition that thethat-clause, or the speaker using the that-clause, can plausibly betaken as referring to. Moreover, I argue that given the distinctiveway in which the face-value theory of belief-reports (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Ray Buchanan (2012). Meaning, Expression, and Evidence. Thought 1 (2):152-157.
    Grice's (1957) analysis of non-natural meaning generated a huge industry, where new analyses were put forward to respond to successively more complex counterexamples. Davis (2003) offers a novel and refreshingly simple analysis of meaning in terms of the expression of belief, where (roughly) an agent expresses the belief that p just in case she performs a publicly observable action with the intention that it be an indication that she occurrently believes that p. I argue that Davis's analysis fails to capture (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Ray Buchanan (2010). A Puzzle About Meaning and Communication. Noûs 44 (2):340-371.
  6. Ray Buchanan & Gary Ostertag (2005). Has the Problem of Incompleteness Rested on a Mistake? Mind 114 (456):889-913.
    A common objection to Russell's theory of descriptions concerns incomplete definite descriptions: uses of (for example) ‘the book is overdue’ in contexts where there is clearly more than one book. Many contemporary Russellians hold that such utterances will invariably convey a contextually determined complete proposition, for example, that the book in your briefcase is overdue. But according to the objection this gets things wrong: typically, when a speaker utters such a sentence, no facts about the context or the speaker's communicative (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Ray Buchanan (2003). Are Truth and Reference Quasi-Disquotational? Philosophical Studies 113 (1):43 - 75.
    In a number of influential papers, Hartry Fieldhas advanced an account of truth and referencethat we might dub quasi-disquotationalism. According to quasi-disquotationalism, truth and reference are to be explained in terms of disquotationand facts about what constitute a goodtranslation into our language. Field suggeststhat we might view quasi-disquotationalism aseither (a) an analysis of our ordinarytruth-theoretic concepts of reference andtruth, or (b) an account of certain otherconcepts that improve upon our ordinaryconcepts. In this paper, I argue that (i) ifthe view is (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation