Search results for 'Reason-giving' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  72
    David Enoch, Giving Someone a Reason to Φ.
    I am writing a mediocre paper on a topic you are not particularly interested in. You don't have, it seems safe to assume, a (normative) reason to read my draft. I then ask whether you would be willing to have a look and tell me what you think. Suddenly you do have a (normative) reason to read my draft. What exactly happened here? Your having the reason to read my draft – indeed, the very fact that there is such a (...)
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  2.  7
    Martha S. Cheng & Barbara Johnstone (2002). Reasons for Reason-Giving in a Public-Opinion Survey. Argumentation 16 (4):401-420.
    This paper explores why respondents to a telephone public-opinion survey often give reasons for answering as they do, even though reason-giving is neither required nor encouraged and it is difficult to see the reasons as attempts to deal with disagreement. We find that respondents give reasons for the policy claims they make in their answers three times as frequently as they give reasons for value or factual claims, that their reasons tend to involve appeals to personal experience, and that (...)
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  3. Jason Marsh (2014). Conscientious Refusals and Reason‐Giving. Bioethics 28 (6):313-319.
    Some philosophers have argued for what I call the reason-giving requirement for conscientious refusal in reproductive healthcare. According to this requirement, healthcare practitioners who conscientiously object to administering standard forms of treatment must have arguments to back up their conscience, arguments that are purely public in character. I argue that such a requirement, though attractive in some ways, faces an overlooked epistemic problem: it is either too easy or too difficult to satisfy in standard cases. I close by briefly (...)
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  4. Lisa Bortolotti (2009). The Epistemic Benefits of Reason Giving. Theory and Psychology 19 (5):1-22.
    There is an apparent tension in current accounts of the relationship between reason giving and self knowledge. On the one hand, philosophers like Richard Moran (2001) claim that deliberation and justification can give rise to first-person authority over the attitudes that subjects form or defend on the basis of what they take to be their best reasons. On the other hand, the psychological evidence on the introspection effects and the literature on elusive reasons suggest that engaging in explicit deliberation or (...)
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  5. David Enoch (2011). Reason-Giving and the Law. In Leslie Green & Brian Leiter (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law. Oxford University Press
    A spectre is haunting legal positivists – and perhaps jurisprudes more generally – the spectre of the normativity of law. Whatever else law is, it is sometimes said, it is normative, and so whatever else a philosophical account of law accounts for, it should account for the normativity of law[1]. But law is at least partially a social matter, its content at least partially determined by social practices. And how can something social and descriptive in this down-to-earth kind of way (...)
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  6. Helen Lauer (1987). Reason-Giving Statements. Dissertation, City University of New York
    It is commonplace to observe that explanations of human behavior diverge from explanations of other sorts, though it is far from commonplace to articulate exactly what this divergence amounts to. One very obvious and rather marvelous fact about explanations in the human sciences is that the subject matter talks and sometimes literally explains itself. This dissertation is an essay about what sort of difference language participation makes to explaining what language participants do. ;Currently, action theorists are recruiting insights from philosophy (...)
     
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  7.  1
    Marco Iorio (2015). Reasons, Reason-Giving and Explanation. In Ralf Stoecker & Marco Iorio (eds.), Actions, Reasons and Reason. De Gruyter 61-76.
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  8.  35
    Robert F. Card (2014). Reasonability and Conscientious Objection in Medicine: A Reply to Marsh and an Elaboration of the Reason‐Giving Requirement. Bioethics 28 (6):320-326.
    In this paper I defend the Reasonability View: the position that medical professionals seeking a conscientious exemption must state reasons in support of their objection and allow those reasons to be subject to evaluation. Recently, this view has been criticized by Jason Marsh as proposing a standard that is either too difficult to meet or too easy to satisfy. First, I defend the Reasonability View from this proposed dilemma. Then, I develop this view by presenting and explaining some of the (...)
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  9.  77
    Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2008). Delusional Beliefs and Reason Giving. Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):801-21.
    Philosophers have been long interested in delusional beliefs and in whether, by reporting and endorsing such beliefs, deluded subjects violate norms of rationality (Campbell 1999; Davies & Coltheart 2002; Gerrans 2001; Stone & Young 1997; Broome 2004; Bortolotti 2005). So far they have focused on identifying the relation between intentionality and rationality in order to gain a better understanding of both ordinary and delusional beliefs. In this paper Matthew Broome and I aim at drawing attention to the extent to which (...)
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  10. Hemdat Lerman (2010). Non-Conceptual Experiential Content and Reason-Giving. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):1-23.
    According to John McDowell and Bill Brewer, our experiences have the type of content which can be the content of judgements - content which is the result of the actualization of specific conceptual abilities. They defend this view by arguing that our experiences must have such content in order for us to be able to think about our environment. In this paper I show that they do not provide a conclusive argument for this view. Focusing on Brewer’s version of the (...)
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  11.  20
    Seyla Benhabib (2013). Reason-Giving and Rights-Bearing: Constructing the Subject of Rights. Constellations 20 (1):38-50.
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  12.  17
    Eva Erman (2007). Conflict and Universal Moral Theory: From Reasonableness to Reason-Giving. Political Theory 35 (5):598 - 623.
    The solutions to moral problems offered by contemporary moral theories largely depend on how they understand pluralism. This article compares two different kinds of universal moral theories, liberal impartiality theory and discourse ethics. It defends the twofold thesis that (1) a dialogical theory such as discourse ethics is better equipped to give an account of pluralism than impartiality theory due to a more correct understanding of the nature of conflict, but that (2) discourse ethics cannot, contrary to what Jürgen Habermas (...)
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  13.  7
    Robert W. Burch (1973). Reason-Giving and Action-Guiding in Morality. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):29-38.
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  14.  10
    Donald W. Crawford (1970). Reason-Giving in Kant's Aesthetics. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 28 (4):505-510.
  15.  7
    Jennifer Walter & Susan Dorr Goold (2011). Reason Giving: When Public Leaders Ignore Evidence. American Journal of Bioethics 11 (12):13-16.
    The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 12, Page 13-16, December 2011.
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  16. E. Erman (2007). Conflict and Universal Moral Theory: From Reasonableness to Reason-Giving. Political Theory 35 (5):598-623.
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  17.  6
    Daniel H. Cohen (forthcoming). Argumentative Virtues as Conduits for Reason’s Causal Efficacy: Why the Practice of Giving Reasons Requires That We Practice Hearing Reasons. Topoi:1-8.
    Psychological and neuroscientific data suggest that a great deal, perhaps even most, of our reasoning turns out to be rationalizing. The reasons we give for our positions are seldom either the real reasons or the effective causes of why we have those positions. We are not as rational as we like to think. A second, no less disheartening observation is that while we may be very effective when it comes to giving reasons, we are not that good at getting reasons. (...)
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  18.  92
    David Enoch (2011). Giving Practical Reasons. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (4).
    I am writing a mediocre paper on a topic you are not particularly interested in. You don't have, it seems safe to assume, a (normative) reason to read my draft. I then ask whether you would be willing to have a look and tell me what you think. Suddenly you do have a (normative) reason to read my draft. By my asking, I managed to give you the reason to read the draft. What does such reason-giving consist in? And (...)
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  19.  7
    Neil C. Manson (forthcoming). Permissive Consent: A Robust Reason-Changing Account. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    There is an ongoing debate about the “ontology” of consent. Some argue that it is a mental act, some that it is a “hybrid” of a mental act plus behaviour that signifies that act; others argue that consent is a performative, akin to promising or commanding. Here it is argued that all these views are mistaken—though some more so than others. We begin with the question whether a normatively efficacious act of consent can be completed in the mind alone. Standard (...)
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  20. David Enoch (2014). Authority and Reason‐Giving1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):296-332.
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  21.  18
    Aletta J. Norval (2011). Moral Perfectionism and Democratic Responsiveness: Reading Cavell with Foucault. Ethics and Global Politics 4 (4):207-229.
    Starting from existing interpretations of Cavell’s account of moral perfectionism, this article seeks to elaborate an account of democratic responsiveness that foregrounds notions of ‘turning’ and ‘manifesting for another’. In contrast to readings of Cavell that privilege reason-giving, the article draws on the writings of Cavell as well as on Foucault’s work on parreēsia to elaborate a grammar of responsiveness that is attentive to a wider range of practices, forms of embodiment and modes of subjectivity. The article suggests that (...)
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  22. Thomas Pink (2007). Normativity and Reason. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):406-431.
    Moral obligation is a demand of reason—a demanding kind of rational justification. How to understand this rational demand? Much recent philosophy, as in the work of Scanlon, takes obligatoriness to be a reason-giving feature of an action. But the paper argues that moral obligatoriness should instead be understood as a mode of justificatory support—as a distinctive justificatory force of demand. The paper argues that this second model of obligation, the Force model, was central to the natural law tradition in (...)
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  23. Bill Brewer (1995). Mental Causation: Compulsion by Reason. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69 (69):237-253.
    The standard paradigm for mental causation is a person’s acting for a reason. Something happens - she intentionally φ’s - the occurrence of which we explain by citing a relevant belief or desire. In the present context, I simply take for granted the following two conditions on the appropriateness of this explanation. First, the agent φ’s _because_ she believes/desires what we say she does, where this is expressive of a _causal_ dependence.1 Second, her believing/desiring this gives her a _reason_ for (...)
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  24.  24
    Chrisoula Andreou (2007). Non-Relative Reasons and Humean Thought: If What is a Reason for You is a Reason for Me, Where Does That Leave the Humean? Metaphilosophy 38 (5):654-668.
    A variety of strategies have been used to oppose the influential Humean thesis that all of an agent’s reasons for action are provided by the agent’s current wants. Among these strategies is the attempt to show that it is a conceptual truth that reasons for action are non-relative. I introduce the notion of a basic reason- giving consideration and show that the non-relativity thesis can be understood as a corollary of the more fundamental thesis that basic reason-giving considerations are (...)
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  25.  17
    Jeremy Williams (2015). Public Reason and Prenatal Moral Status. Journal of Ethics 19 (1):23-52.
    This paper provides a new analysis and critique of Rawlsian public reason’s handling of the abortion question. It is often claimed that public reason is indeterminate on abortion, because it cannot say enough about prenatal moral status, or give content to the political value which Rawls calls ‘respect for human life’. I argue that public reason requires much greater argumentative restraint from citizens debating abortion than critics have acknowledged. Beyond the preliminary observation that fetuses do not meet the criteria of (...)
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  26.  92
    Christian List (2006). The Discursive Dilemma and Public Reason. Ethics 116 (2):362-402.
    Political theorists have offered many accounts of collective decision-making under pluralism. I discuss a key dimension on which such accounts differ: the importance assigned not only to the choices made but also to the reasons underlying those choices. On that dimension, different accounts lie in between two extremes. The ‘minimal liberal account’ holds that collective decisions should be made only on practical actions or policies and that underlying reasons should be kept private. The ‘comprehensive deliberative account’ stresses the importance of (...)
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  27.  14
    Andy Norman (forthcoming). Why We Reason: Intention-Alignment and the Genesis of Human Rationality. Biology and Philosophy:1-20.
    Why do humans reason? Many animals draw inferences, but reasoning—the tendency to produce and respond to reason-giving performances—is biologically unusual, and demands evolutionary explanation. Mercier and Sperber advance our understanding of reason’s adaptive function with their argumentative theory of reason. On this account, the “function of reason is argumentative… to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade.” ATR, they argue, helps to explain several well-known cognitive biases. In this paper, I develop a neighboring hypothesis called the intention alignment model (...)
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  28. Michael E. Bratman (1996). Identification, Decision, and Treating as a Reason. Philosophical Topics 24 (2):1-18.
    I [try] to understand identification by appeal to phenomena of deciding to treat, and of treating, a desire of one's as reason-giving in one's practical reasoning, planning, and action. Is identification, so understood, "fundamental," as Frankfurt says, "to any philosophy of mind and of action"? Well, we have seen reason to include in our model of intentional agency such phenomena of deciding to treat, and of treating, certain of one's desires as reason-giving. Identification, at bottom, consists in such (...)
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  29.  66
    Ian Werkheiser (2014). Asking for Reasons as a Weapon: Epistemic Justification and the Loss of Knowledge. Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 2 (1):173-190.
    In this paper, I will look at what role being able to provide justification plays in several prominent conceptions of epistemology, and argue that taking the ability to provide reasons as necessary for knowledge leads to a biasing toward false negatives. However, I will also argue that asking for reasons is a common practice among the general public, and one that is endorsed by “folk epistemology.” I will then discuss the fact that this asking for reasons is done neither constantly (...)
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  30.  6
    Sven Nyholm (2015). Reason with Me: Confabulation and Interpersonal Moral Reasoning. Ethical Perspectives 22 (2):315-332.
    According to Haidt’s “social intuitionist model”, empirical moral psychology supports the following conclusion: intuition comes first, strategic reasoning second. Critics have responded by arguing that intuitions can depend on non-conscious reasons, that not being able to articulate one’s reasons doesn’t entail not being responsive to reasons, and that the relations between intuitions and reasoning can be truth-tracking and principled in ways overlooked by Haidt. This debate involves a false dichotomy: that either reasoning is truth-tracking, or else our reasoning is purely (...)
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  31.  45
    Theo Van Willigenburg (2005). Reason and Love: A Non-Reductive Analysis of the Normativity of Agent-Relative Reasons. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (1-2):45-62.
    Why do agent-relative reasons have authority over us, reflective creatures? Reductive accounts base the normativity of agent-relative reasons on agent-neutral considerations like having parents caring especially for their own children serves best the interests of all children. Such accounts, however, beg the question about the source of normativity of agent-relative ways of reason-giving. In this paper, I argue for a non-reductive account of the reflective necessity of agent-relative concerns. Such an account will reveal an important structural complexity of practical (...)
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  32.  5
    William Smith (2011). Deliberation Beyond Borders: The Public Reason of a Society of Peoples. Journal of International Political Theory 7 (2):117-139.
    The aim of this article is to contribute to the elaboration of a deliberative approach to global institutional design. A deliberative approach aims to embed processes of mutual reason-giving at the heart of international relations and global decision-making. The theoretical framework that orientates this discussion is the liberal approach to international law developed by John Rawls. It may seem strange to invoke this model: after all, Rawls does not specifically discuss the issue of global institutional design and indeed has (...)
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  33.  21
    Mark L. Johnson (1987). The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason. University of Chicago Press.
    "There are books—few and far between—which carefully, delightfully, and genuinely turn your head inside out. This is one of them. It ranges over some central issues in Western philosophy and begins the long overdue job of giving us a radically new account of meaning, rationality, and objectivity."—Yaakov Garb, _San Francisco Chronicle_.
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  34. Errol Lord (2008). Dancy on Acting for the Right Reason. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (3):1-7.
    It is a truism that agents can do the right action for the right reason. To put the point in terms more familiar to ethicists, it is a truism that one’s motivating reason can be one’s normative reason. In this short note, I will argue that Jonathan Dancy’s preferred view about how this is possible faces a dilemma. Dancy has the choice between accounting for two plausible constraints while at the same time holding an outlandish philosophy of mind by his (...)
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  35. R. Jay Wallace (1990). How to Argue About Practical Reason. Mind 99 (395):355-385.
    What are the comparative roles of reason and the passions in explaining human motivation and behaviour? Accounts of practical reason divide on this central question, with proponents of different views falling into rationalist and Humean camps. By 'rationalist' accounts of practical reason, I mean accounts which make the characteristically Kantian claim that pure reason can be practical in its issue. To reject this view is to take the Humean position that reasoning or ratiocination is not by itself capable of giving (...)
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  36.  19
    Fabio Bacchini (2013). Is Nanotechnology Giving Rise to New Ethical Problems? NanoEthics 7 (2):107-119.
    In this paper I focus on the question of whether nanotechnology is giving rise to new ethical problems rather than merely to new instances of old ethical problems. Firstly, I demonstrate how important it is to make a general distinction between new ethical problems and new instances of old problems. Secondly, I propose one possible way of interpreting the distinction and offer a definition of a “new ethical problem”. Thirdly, I examine whether there is good reason to claim that nanotechnology (...)
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  37. Hallvard Lillehammer (2003). The Idea of a Normative Reason. In P. Schaber & R. Huntelmann (eds.), Grundlagen der Ethik. 41--65.
    Recent work in English speaking moral philosophy has seen the rise to prominence of the idea of a normative reason1. By ‘normative reasons’ I mean the reasons agents appeal to in making rational claims on each other. Normative reasons are good reasons on which agents ought to act, even if they are not actually motivated accordingly2. To this extent, normative reasons are distinguishable from the motivating reasons agents appeal to in reason explanations. Even agents who fail to act on their (...)
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  38.  3
    Anton Kabeshkin (2016). James Kreines, Reason in the World: Hegel's Metaphysics and Its Philosophical Appeal. Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 36 (3):124-126.
    This book defends a new interpretation of Hegel's theoretical philosophy, according to which it has a single organizing focus, giving philosophical force to his arguments in his central Science of Logic, and undercutting prominent worries. The focus is not epistemology or skepticism, but the metaphysics of reason in the world.
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  39.  8
    Svend Brinkmann (2007). Practical Reason and Positioning. Journal of Moral Education 36 (4):415-432.
    This paper argues that an emerging framework for studying social episodes known as positioning theory is a rich tool for practical reasoning. After giving an outline of the Aristotelian conception of practical reason, recently developed by Alasdair MacIntyre, it is argued that positioning theory should be seen not as a detached, scientific theory, but rather as an important resource for learning to think and act in relation to practical and moral matters. I try to demonstrate a number of significant points (...)
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  40. Mathias Thaler (2009). From Public Reason to Reasonable Accommodation: Negotiating the Place of Religion in the Public Sphere. Diacrítica. Revista Do Centro de Estudos Humanísticos da Universidade de Minho 23 (2):249-270.
    In recent years, debates about the legitimate place of religion in the public sphere have gained prominence in political theory. Departing from Rawls’s view of public reason, it has lately been argued that liberal regimes should not only be compatible with, but endorsing of, arguments originating in religious belief systems. Moreover, it has been maintained that the principle of political autonomy obliges every democratic order to enable all its citizens, be they secular or religious, to become the authors of the (...)
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  41.  38
    Hilary Kornblith (2004). Social Prerequisites for the Proper Function of Individual Reason. Episteme 1 (3):169-176.
    Human beings form beliefs by way of a variety of psychological processes. Some of these processes of belief acquisition are innate; others are acquired. A good deal of interesting work has been done in assessing the reliability of these processes. Any such assessment must examine not only features intrinsic to the psychological processes themselves, but also features of the environments in which those processes are exercised; a mechanism which is reliable in one sort of environment may be quite unreliable in (...)
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  42.  7
    Mihaela Czobor-Lupp (2008). Communicative Reason and Intercultural Understanding A Critical Discussion of Habermas. European Journal of Political Theory 7 (4):430-448.
    Although Habermas sees intercultural understanding as a political task, his model of communicative rationality cannot satisfactorily explain how this could happen. One reason is the definition of the aesthetic, form-giving, moment of imagination, which reflects deeper epistemological and linguistic assumptions of discourse ethics. Despite sporadic attempts to recognize the role of rhetoric and poetry as an indispensable part of the communicative praxis, at the end of the day, Habermas sees language as fundamentally geared toward transparency and clarity, and not as (...)
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  43.  8
    Steven Walt (1996). Practical Reason and the Ontology of Statutes. Law and Philosophy 15 (3):227 - 255.
    A common working assumption of theories of statutory interpretation is that the object of interpretation is uncontroversial. It is assumed that dispute only centers on the epistemics of interpretation. The assumption is unsound. Theories of statutory interpretation are importantly different from other sorts of theories. The subject matter of other sorts of theories can be identified uncontroversially. In the case of statutory interpretation, the object of interpretation is controversial. What counts as the object of interpretation therefore needs specification. Without the (...)
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  44. Philip Stratton-Lake (1990). The Future of Reason: Kant's Conception of the Finitude of Thinking. Dissertation, University of Essex (United Kingdom)
    Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;Kant's fundamental problematic is the articulation of a finite rationality. The central problematic of the finitude of reason is how to think of a manner of thinking which is appropriate to a finite being. The relevant aspect of the finitude of a finite being is its temporality: a finite being is a temporal historical being. A finite rationality will, therefore, be a manner of thinking appropriate to this temporality--that (...)
     
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  45.  51
    Janelle DeWitt (2014). Respect for the Moral Law: The Emotional Side of Reason. Philosophy 89 (1):31-62.
    Respect, as Kant describes it, has a duality of nature that seems to embody a contradiction – i.e., it is both a moral motive and a feeling, where these are thought to be mutually exclusive. Most solutions involve eliminating one of the two natures, but unfortunately, this also destroys what is unique about respect. So instead, I question the non-cognitive theory of emotion giving rise to the contradiction. In its place, I develop the cognitive theory implicit in Kant's work, one (...)
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  46.  36
    Dana Freibach-Heifetz (2008). Giving Sense to Generosity-Ethics: A Philosophical Reading of Dostoevsky's the Idiot. Philosophia 36 (4):575-591.
    This paper presents a philosophical reading of The Idiot , which perceives its main protagonist, Prince Myshkin, as a literary hero who chooses the path of generosity. The paper exposes Dostoevsky’s generosity-ethics against the background of Christian ethics, virtue ethics, and the Nietzschean notion of generosity; it further analyzes the problematic aspects of Myshkin’s version of generosity-ethics, and discusses several possible explanations of its catastrophic outcomes in the novel. The paper consists of three parts. The first part presents the rich (...)
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  47. William A. Edmundson (2013). Because I Said So. Problema: Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría Del Derecho 7:41-61.
    Political authority is the moral power to impose moral duties upon a perhaps unwilling citizenry. David Enoch has proposed that authority be understood as a matter of "robust" duty-giving. This paper argues that Enoch's conditions for attempted robust duty- or reason-giving are, along with his non-normative success condition, implausibly strong. Moreover, Enoch's attempt and normative- success conditions ignore two facts. The first is that success requires that citizens be tolerant of modest errors by the authority, which means that, in (...)
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  48. Christian Coons & David Faraci (2010). First-Personal Authority and the Normativity of Rationality. Philosophia 38 (4):733-740.
    In “Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality,” Nicholas Southwood proposes that rational requirements are best understood as demands of one’s “first-personal standpoint.” Southwood argues that this view can “explain the normativity or reason-giving force” of rationality by showing that they “are the kinds of thing that are, by their very nature, normative.” We argue that the proposal fails on three counts: First, we explain why demands of one’s first-personal standpoint cannot be both reason-giving and resemble requirements of rationality. Second, (...)
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  49.  94
    Antti Kauppinen (forthcoming). Practical Reasoning. In Daniel Star (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press
    This chapter presents two contemporary pictures of practical reasoning. According to the Rule-Guidance Conception, roughly, practical reasoning is a rule-guided operation of acquiring (or retaining or giving up) intentions so as to meet synchronic requirements of rationality. According to the Reasons-Responsiveness Conception, practical reasoning is a process of responding to reasons we take ourselves to have, and its standards of correctness derive from what we objectively have reason to do, if things are as we suppose them to be. I argue (...)
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  50.  38
    David Sherry (2009). Reason, Habit, and Applied Mathematics. Hume Studies 35 (1/2):57-85.
    Hume describes the sciences as "noble entertainments" that are "proper food and nourishment" for reasonable beings (EHU 1.5-6; SBN 8).1 But mathematics, in particular, is more than noble entertainment; for millennia, agriculture, building, commerce, and other sciences have depended upon applying mathematics.2 In simpler cases, applied mathematics consists in inferring one matter of fact from another, say, the area of a floor from its length and width. In more sophisticated cases, applied mathematics consists in giving scientific theory a mathematical form (...)
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