Search results for 'Reason-giving' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. David Enoch, Giving Someone a Reason to Φ.score: 210.0
    I am writing a mediocre paper on a topic you are not particularly interested in. You don't have, it seems safe to assume, a (normative) reason to read my draft. I then ask whether you would be willing to have a look and tell me what you think. Suddenly you do have a (normative) reason to read my draft. What exactly happened here? Your having the reason to read my draft – indeed, the very fact that there is such a (...)
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  2. Martha S. Cheng & Barbara Johnstone (2002). Reasons for Reason-Giving in a Public-Opinion Survey. Argumentation 16 (4):401-420.score: 192.0
    This paper explores why respondents to a telephone public-opinion survey often give reasons for answering as they do, even though reason-giving is neither required nor encouraged and it is difficult to see the reasons as attempts to deal with disagreement. We find that respondents give reasons for the policy claims they make in their answers three times as frequently as they give reasons for value or factual claims, that their reasons tend to involve appeals to personal experience, and that (...)
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  3. Jason Marsh (2014). Conscientious Refusals and Reason‐Giving. Bioethics 28 (6):313-319.score: 184.0
    Some philosophers have argued for what I call the reason-giving requirement for conscientious refusal in reproductive healthcare. According to this requirement, healthcare practitioners who conscientiously object to administering standard forms of treatment must have arguments to back up their conscience, arguments that are purely public in character. I argue that such a requirement, though attractive in some ways, faces an overlooked epistemic problem: it is either too easy or too difficult to satisfy in standard cases. I close by briefly (...)
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  4. Lisa Bortolotti (2009). The Epistemic Benefits of Reason Giving. Theory and Psychology 19 (5):1-22.score: 180.0
    There is an apparent tension in current accounts of the relationship between reason giving and self knowledge. On the one hand, philosophers like Richard Moran (2001) claim that deliberation and justification can give rise to first-person authority over the attitudes that subjects form or defend on the basis of what they take to be their best reasons. On the other hand, the psychological evidence on the introspection effects and the literature on elusive reasons suggest that engaging in explicit deliberation or (...)
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  5. David Enoch (2011). Reason-Giving and the Law. In Leslie Green & Brian Leiter (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law. Oxford University Press.score: 180.0
    A spectre is haunting legal positivists – and perhaps jurisprudes more generally – the spectre of the normativity of law. Whatever else law is, it is sometimes said, it is normative, and so whatever else a philosophical account of law accounts for, it should account for the normativity of law[1]. But law is at least partially a social matter, its content at least partially determined by social practices. And how can something social and descriptive in this down-to-earth kind of way (...)
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  6. Robert F. Card (2014). Reasonability and Conscientious Objection in Medicine: A Reply to Marsh and an Elaboration of the Reason‐Giving Requirement. Bioethics 28 (6):320-326.score: 152.0
    In this paper I defend the Reasonability View: the position that medical professionals seeking a conscientious exemption must state reasons in support of their objection and allow those reasons to be subject to evaluation. Recently, this view has been criticized by Jason Marsh as proposing a standard that is either too difficult to meet or too easy to satisfy. First, I defend the Reasonability View from this proposed dilemma. Then, I develop this view by presenting and explaining some of the (...)
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  7. Eva Erman (2007). Conflict and Universal Moral Theory: From Reasonableness to Reason-Giving. Political Theory 35 (5):598 - 623.score: 152.0
    The solutions to moral problems offered by contemporary moral theories largely depend on how they understand pluralism. This article compares two different kinds of universal moral theories, liberal impartiality theory and discourse ethics. It defends the twofold thesis that (1) a dialogical theory such as discourse ethics is better equipped to give an account of pluralism than impartiality theory due to a more correct understanding of the nature of conflict, but that (2) discourse ethics cannot, contrary to what Jürgen Habermas (...)
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  8. Hemdat Lerman (2010). Non-Conceptual Experiential Content and Reason-Giving. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):1-23.score: 150.0
    According to John McDowell and Bill Brewer, our experiences have the type of content which can be the content of judgements - content which is the result of the actualization of specific conceptual abilities. They defend this view by arguing that our experiences must have such content in order for us to be able to think about our environment. In this paper I show that they do not provide a conclusive argument for this view. Focusing on Brewer’s version of the (...)
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  9. David Enoch (2011). Giving Practical Reasons. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (4).score: 150.0
    I am writing a mediocre paper on a topic you are not particularly interested in. You don't have, it seems safe to assume, a (normative) reason to read my draft. I then ask whether you would be willing to have a look and tell me what you think. Suddenly you do have a (normative) reason to read my draft. By my asking, I managed to give you the reason to read the draft. What does such reason-giving consist in? And (...)
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  10. Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2008). Delusional Beliefs and Reason Giving. Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):801-21.score: 150.0
    Philosophers have been long interested in delusional beliefs and in whether, by reporting and endorsing such beliefs, deluded subjects violate norms of rationality (Campbell 1999; Davies & Coltheart 2002; Gerrans 2001; Stone & Young 1997; Broome 2004; Bortolotti 2005). So far they have focused on identifying the relation between intentionality and rationality in order to gain a better understanding of both ordinary and delusional beliefs. In this paper Matthew Broome and I aim at drawing attention to the extent to which (...)
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  11. Seyla Benhabib (2013). Reason-Giving and Rights-Bearing: Constructing the Subject of Rights. Constellations 20 (1):38-50.score: 150.0
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  12. Donald W. Crawford (1970). Reason-Giving in Kant's Aesthetics. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 28 (4):505-510.score: 150.0
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  13. Jennifer Walter & Susan Dorr Goold (2011). Reason Giving: When Public Leaders Ignore Evidence. American Journal of Bioethics 11 (12):13-16.score: 150.0
    The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 12, Page 13-16, December 2011.
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  14. Robert W. Burch (1973). Reason-Giving and Action-Guiding in Morality. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):29-38.score: 150.0
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  15. David Enoch (2014). Authority and Reason‐Giving1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):296-332.score: 90.0
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  16. Aletta J. Norval (2011). Moral Perfectionism and Democratic Responsiveness: Reading Cavell with Foucault. Ethics and Global Politics 4 (4).score: 90.0
    Starting from existing interpretations of Cavell’s account of moral perfectionism, this article seeks to elaborate an account of democratic responsiveness that foregrounds notions of ‘turning’ and ‘manifesting for another’. In contrast to readings of Cavell that privilege reason-giving, the article draws on the writings of Cavell as well as on Foucault’s work on parreēsia to elaborate a grammar of responsiveness that is attentive to a wider range of practices, forms of embodiment and modes of subjectivity. The article suggests that (...)
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  17. John Stanton-Ife (2006). Resource Allocation and the Duty to Give Reasons. Health Care Analysis 14 (3):145-156.score: 86.0
    In a much cited phrase in the famous English ‘Child B’ case, Mr Justice Laws intimated that in life and death cases of scarce resources it is not sufficient for health care decision-makers to ‘toll the bell of tight resources’: they must also explain the system of priorities they are using. Although overturned in the Court of Appeal, the important question remains of the extent to which health-care decision-makers have a duty to give reasons for their decisions. In this paper, (...)
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  18. Thomas Pink (2007). Normativity and Reason. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):406-431.score: 72.0
    Moral obligation is a demand of reason—a demanding kind of rational justification. How to understand this rational demand? Much recent philosophy, as in the work of Scanlon, takes obligatoriness to be a reason-giving feature of an action. But the paper argues that moral obligatoriness should instead be understood as a mode of justificatory support—as a distinctive justificatory force of demand. The paper argues that this second model of obligation, the Force model, was central to the natural law tradition in (...)
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  19. Bill Brewer (1995). Mental Causation: Compulsion by Reason. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69 (69):237-253.score: 72.0
    The standard paradigm for mental causation is a person’s acting for a reason. Something happens - she intentionally φ’s - the occurrence of which we explain by citing a relevant belief or desire. In the present context, I simply take for granted the following two conditions on the appropriateness of this explanation. First, the agent φ’s _because_ she believes/desires what we say she does, where this is expressive of a _causal_ dependence.1 Second, her believing/desiring this gives her a _reason_ for (...)
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  20. Theo Van Willigenburg (2005). Reason and Love: A Non-Reductive Analysis of the Normativity of Agent-Relative Reasons. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (1-2):45-62.score: 64.0
    Why do agent-relative reasons have authority over us, reflective creatures? Reductive accounts base the normativity of agent-relative reasons on agent-neutral considerations like having parents caring especially for their own children serves best the interests of all children. Such accounts, however, beg the question about the source of normativity of agent-relative ways of reason-giving. In this paper, I argue for a non-reductive account of the reflective necessity of agent-relative concerns. Such an account will reveal an important structural complexity of practical (...)
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  21. Michael E. Bratman (1996). Identification, Decision, and Treating as a Reason. Philosophical Topics 24 (2):1-18.score: 60.0
    I [try] to understand identification by appeal to phenomena of deciding to treat, and of treating, a desire of one's as reason-giving in one's practical reasoning, planning, and action. Is identification, so understood, "fundamental," as Frankfurt says, "to any philosophy of mind and of action"? Well, we have seen reason to include in our model of intentional agency such phenomena of deciding to treat, and of treating, certain of one's desires as reason-giving. Identification, at bottom, consists in such (...)
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  22. Christian List (2006). The Discursive Dilemma and Public Reason. Ethics 116 (2):362-402.score: 60.0
    Political theorists have offered many accounts of collective decision-making under pluralism. I discuss a key dimension on which such accounts differ: the importance assigned not only to the choices made but also to the reasons underlying those choices. On that dimension, different accounts lie in between two extremes. The ‘minimal liberal account’ holds that collective decisions should be made only on practical actions or policies and that underlying reasons should be kept private. The ‘comprehensive deliberative account’ stresses the importance of (...)
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  23. R. Jay Wallace (1990). How to Argue About Practical Reason. Mind 99 (395):355-385.score: 54.0
    What are the comparative roles of reason and the passions in explaining human motivation and behaviour? Accounts of practical reason divide on this central question, with proponents of different views falling into rationalist and Humean camps. By 'rationalist' accounts of practical reason, I mean accounts which make the characteristically Kantian claim that pure reason can be practical in its issue. To reject this view is to take the Humean position that reasoning or ratiocination is not by itself capable of giving (...)
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  24. Hallvard Lillehammer (2003). The Idea of a Normative Reason. In P. Schaber & R. Huntelmann (eds.), Grundlagen der Ethik. 41--65.score: 54.0
    Recent work in English speaking moral philosophy has seen the rise to prominence of the idea of a normative reason1. By ‘normative reasons’ I mean the reasons agents appeal to in making rational claims on each other. Normative reasons are good reasons on which agents ought to act, even if they are not actually motivated accordingly2. To this extent, normative reasons are distinguishable from the motivating reasons agents appeal to in reason explanations. Even agents who fail to act on their (...)
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  25. Errol Lord (2008). Dancy on Acting for the Right Reason. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (3):1-7.score: 54.0
    It is a truism that agents can do the right action for the right reason. To put the point in terms more familiar to ethicists, it is a truism that one’s motivating reason can be one’s normative reason. In this short note, I will argue that Jonathan Dancy’s preferred view about how this is possible faces a dilemma. Dancy has the choice between accounting for two plausible constraints while at the same time holding an outlandish philosophy of mind by his (...)
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  26. Mathias Thaler (2009). From Public Reason to Reasonable Accommodation: Negotiating the Place of Religion in the Public Sphere. Diacrítica. Revista Do Centro de Estudos Humanísticos da Universidade de Minho 23 (2):249-270.score: 54.0
    In recent years, debates about the legitimate place of religion in the public sphere have gained prominence in political theory. Departing from Rawls’s view of public reason, it has lately been argued that liberal regimes should not only be compatible with, but endorsing of, arguments originating in religious belief systems. Moreover, it has been maintained that the principle of political autonomy obliges every democratic order to enable all its citizens, be they secular or religious, to become the authors of the (...)
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  27. Fabio Bacchini (2013). Is Nanotechnology Giving Rise to New Ethical Problems? NanoEthics 7 (2):107-119.score: 54.0
    In this paper I focus on the question of whether nanotechnology is giving rise to new ethical problems rather than merely to new instances of old ethical problems. Firstly, I demonstrate how important it is to make a general distinction between new ethical problems and new instances of old problems. Secondly, I propose one possible way of interpreting the distinction and offer a definition of a “new ethical problem”. Thirdly, I examine whether there is good reason to claim that nanotechnology (...)
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  28. Dana Freibach-Heifetz (2008). Giving Sense to Generosity-Ethics: A Philosophical Reading of Dostoevsky's the Idiot. Philosophia 36 (4):575-591.score: 54.0
    This paper presents a philosophical reading of The Idiot , which perceives its main protagonist, Prince Myshkin, as a literary hero who chooses the path of generosity. The paper exposes Dostoevsky’s generosity-ethics against the background of Christian ethics, virtue ethics, and the Nietzschean notion of generosity; it further analyzes the problematic aspects of Myshkin’s version of generosity-ethics, and discusses several possible explanations of its catastrophic outcomes in the novel. The paper consists of three parts. The first part presents the rich (...)
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  29. Mihaela Czobor-Lupp (2008). Communicative Reason and Intercultural Understanding A Critical Discussion of Habermas. European Journal of Political Theory 7 (4):430-448.score: 54.0
    Although Habermas sees intercultural understanding as a political task, his model of communicative rationality cannot satisfactorily explain how this could happen. One reason is the definition of the aesthetic, form-giving, moment of imagination, which reflects deeper epistemological and linguistic assumptions of discourse ethics. Despite sporadic attempts to recognize the role of rhetoric and poetry as an indispensable part of the communicative praxis, at the end of the day, Habermas sees language as fundamentally geared toward transparency and clarity, and not as (...)
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  30. Svend Brinkmann (2007). Practical Reason and Positioning. Journal of Moral Education 36 (4):415-432.score: 54.0
    This paper argues that an emerging framework for studying social episodes known as positioning theory is a rich tool for practical reasoning. After giving an outline of the Aristotelian conception of practical reason, recently developed by Alasdair MacIntyre, it is argued that positioning theory should be seen not as a detached, scientific theory, but rather as an important resource for learning to think and act in relation to practical and moral matters. I try to demonstrate a number of significant points (...)
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  31. Steven Walt (1996). Practical Reason and the Ontology of Statutes. Law and Philosophy 15 (3):227 - 255.score: 54.0
    A common working assumption of theories of statutory interpretation is that the object of interpretation is uncontroversial. It is assumed that dispute only centers on the epistemics of interpretation. The assumption is unsound. Theories of statutory interpretation are importantly different from other sorts of theories. The subject matter of other sorts of theories can be identified uncontroversially. In the case of statutory interpretation, the object of interpretation is controversial. What counts as the object of interpretation therefore needs specification. Without the (...)
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  32. Andrew Reisner (2008). Does Friendship Give Us Non-Derivative Partial Reasons. Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 3 (1):70-78.score: 52.0
    One way to approach the question of whether there are non-derivative partial reasons of any kind is to give an account of what partial reasons are, and then to consider whether there are such reasons. If there are, then it is at least possible that there are partial reasons of friendship. It is this approach that will be taken here, and it produces several interesting results. The first is a point about the structure of partial reasons. It is at least (...)
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  33. Keith Lehrer (1971). How Reasons Give Us Knowledge, or the Case of the Gypsy Lawyer. Journal of Philosophy 68 (10):311-313.score: 50.0
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  34. C. Andone (2012). Bermejo-Luque, Lilian. Giving Reasons. A Linguistic-Pragmatic Approach to Argumentation Theory. Argumentation 26 (2):291-296.score: 48.0
    Bermejo-Luque, Lilian. Giving Reasons. A Linguistic-Pragmatic Approach to Argumentation Theory Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-6 DOI 10.1007/s10503-011-9258-z Authors C. Andone, Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric, University of Amsterdam, Spuistraat 134, 1012 VB Amsterdam, The Netherlands Journal Argumentation Online ISSN 1572-8374 Print ISSN 0920-427X.
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  35. Lilian Bermejo-Luque (2011). Giving Reasons, A Contribution to Argumentation Theory. Theoria 26 (3):273-277.score: 48.0
    ABSTRACT: In Giving Reasons: A Linguistic-pragmatic-approach to Argumentation Theory (Springer, 2011), I provide a new model for the semantic and pragmatic appraisal of argumentation. This model is based on a characterization of argumentation as a second order speech-act complex. I explain the advantages of this model respecting other proposals within Argumentation Theory, such as Pragma-dialectics, Informal Logic, the New Rhetoric or the Epistemic Approach.RESUMEN: En Giving Reasons: A Linguistic-pragmatic-approach to Argumentation Theory (Springer, 2011), propongo un nuevo modelo para la evaluación (...)
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  36. Yun Xie (2012). Review of Giving Reasons. [REVIEW] Informal Logic 32 (4):440-453.score: 48.0
    Book Review Giving Reasons: A Linguistic-Pragmatic Approach to Argumentation Theory Lilian Bermejo-Luque Springer, Argumentation Library Vol. 20, 2011, Pp. xvi, 1-209 ISBN 978-94-007-1760-2 106.95 € e-ISBN 978-94-007-1761-9 99.99 €.
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  37. Lilian Bermejo Luque (2011). Giving Reasons, A Contribution to Argumentation Theory. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 26 (72):273-278.score: 48.0
    En Giving Reasons: A Linguistic-pragmatic-approach to Argumentation Theory (Springer, 2011), propongo un nuevo modelo para la evaluación semántica y pragmática de la argumentación. Este modelo se basa en una caracterización de la argumentación como un acto de habla compuesto de segundo orden. Explico las ventajas de este modelo respecto de otras propuestas dentro de la Teoría de la Argumentación, tales como la Pragma-dialéctica, la Lógica Informal, la Nueva Retórica o el Enfoque Epistémico.
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  38. Luis Vega Reñón (2011). Pensar por sistemas y pensar por ideas a tener en cuenta. Unas notas a propósito de Giving Reasons. A linguistic-pragmaticapproach to Argumentation Theory (Thinking through Systems and Thinking through Ideas to be taken into account. Some Remarks on Giving Reasons. A Linguistic-Pragmatic Approach to Argumentation Theory). [REVIEW] Theoria 26 (3):321-327.score: 48.0
    RESUMEN: Giving Reasons pretende ofrecer una aproximación no solo precisa, sino comprensiva, a una teoría sistemática de la argumentación. A la luz de una distinción de Vaz Ferreira entre «pensar por sistemas» y «pensar por ideas a tener en cuenta», me gustaría hacer unas observaciones para complementar y, digamos, “abrir” la incipiente clausura teórica del sistema lingüístico-pragmático de Giving Reasons. Voy a considerar dos casos en particular: el tratamiento del concepto mismo de argumentación y la conversión del principio de cooperación (...)
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  39. Luis Vega Reñón (2011). Pensar por sistemas y pensar por ideas a tener en cuenta. Unas notas a propósito de Giving Reasons. A linguistic-pragmatic approach to Argumentation Theory. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 26 (72):321-328.score: 48.0
    Giving Reasons pretende ofrecer una aproximación no solo precisa, sino comprensiva, a una teoría sistemática de la argumentación. A la luz de una distinción de Vaz Ferreira entre «pensar por sistemas» y «pensar por ideas a tener en cuenta», me gustaría hacer unas observaciones para complementar y, digamos, �abrir� la incipiente clausura teórica del sistema lingüístico-pragmático de Giving Reasons. Voy a considerar dos casos en particular: el tratamiento del concepto mismo de argumentación y la conversión del principio de cooperación y (...)
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  40. Luis Vega (2011). Pensar por sistemas y pensar por ideas a tener en cuenta. Unas notas a propósito de Giving Reasons. A linguistic-pragmatic approach to Argumentation Theory. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 26 (72):321-328.score: 48.0
    Giving Reasons pretende ofrecer una aproximación no solo precisa, sino comprensiva, a una teoría sistemática de la argumentación. A la luz de una distinción de Vaz Ferreira entre «pensar por sistemas» y «pensar por ideas a tener en cuenta», me gustaría hacer unas observaciones para complementar y, digamos, �abrir� la incipiente clausura teórica del sistema lingüístico-pragmático de Giving Reasons. Voy a considerar dos casos en particular: el tratamiento del concepto mismo de argumentación y la conversión del principio de cooperación y (...)
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  41. Aaron Cardon & J. S. Blumenthal-Barby (2011). Should Repugnance Give Us Pause? On the Neuroscience of Daily Moral Reasoning. American Journal of Bioethics- Neuroscience 2 (2):47-48.score: 46.0
    In our commentary we briefly review the work on the neurological differences between the rational ethical analysis used in professional contexts and the reflexive emotional responses of our daily moral reasoning, and discuss the implications for the claim that our normative arguments should not rely on the emotion of repugnance.
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  42. Neema Sofaer (2014). Reciprocity‐Based Reasons for Benefiting Research Participants: Most Fail, the Most Plausible is Problematic. Bioethics 28 (9):456-471.score: 46.0
    A common reason for giving research participants post-trial access to the trial intervention appeals to reciprocity, the principle, stated most generally, that if one person benefits a second, the second should reciprocate: benefit the first in return. Many authors consider it obvious that reciprocity supports PTA. Yet their reciprocity principles differ, with many authors apparently unaware of alternative versions. This article is the first to gather the range of reciprocity principles. It finds that: most are false. The most plausible principle, (...)
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  43. Hallvard Lillehammer (2010). Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons. Journal of Ethics 14 (1):17 - 26.score: 44.0
    This paper is about the relationship between two widely accepted and apparently conflicting claims about how we should understand the notion of ‘reason giving’ invoked in theorising about reasons for action. According to the first claim, reasons are given by facts about the situation of agents. According to the second claim, reasons are given by ends. I argue that the apparent conflict between these two claims is less deep than is generally recognised.
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  44. Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson (forthcoming). Reasons and Theories of Sensory Affect. In David Bain, Michael Brady & Jennifer Corns (eds.), The Nature of Pain.score: 44.0
    [Penultimate draft] Some sensory experiences are pleasant, some unpleasant. This is a truism. But understanding what makes these experiences pleasant and unpleasant is not an easy job. Various difficulties and puzzles arise as soon as we start theorizing. There are various philosophical theories on offer that seem to give different accounts for the positive or negative affective valences of sensory experiences. In this paper, we will look at the current state of art in the philosophy of mind, present the main (...)
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  45. Christian Coons & David Faraci (2010). First-Personal Authority and the Normativity of Rationality. Philosophia 38 (4):733-740.score: 42.0
    In “Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality,” Nicholas Southwood proposes that rational requirements are best understood as demands of one’s “first-personal standpoint.” Southwood argues that this view can “explain the normativity or reason-giving force” of rationality by showing that they “are the kinds of thing that are, by their very nature, normative.” We argue that the proposal fails on three counts: First, we explain why demands of one’s first-personal standpoint cannot be both reason-giving and resemble requirements of rationality. Second, (...)
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  46. Mark Schroeder, Knowledge is Belief for Sufficient (Objective and Subjective) Reason.score: 42.0
    This paper defends a simple thesis: that knowledge is belief for reasons that are both objectively and subjectively sufficient. I take a dogmatic approach, devoting the bulk of the paper to an explanation of what this means, and of why it explains both what knowledge is like, and why it is important; the theory is justified by its fruits. I go on to illustrate, by appeal to my main thesis, how knowledge comes to play some of the key roles that (...)
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  47. David Sherry (2009). Reason, Habit, and Applied Mathematics. Hume Studies 35 (1/2):57-85.score: 42.0
    Hume describes the sciences as "noble entertainments" that are "proper food and nourishment" for reasonable beings (EHU 1.5-6; SBN 8).1 But mathematics, in particular, is more than noble entertainment; for millennia, agriculture, building, commerce, and other sciences have depended upon applying mathematics.2 In simpler cases, applied mathematics consists in inferring one matter of fact from another, say, the area of a floor from its length and width. In more sophisticated cases, applied mathematics consists in giving scientific theory a mathematical form (...)
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  48. William A. Edmundson (2013). Because I Said So. Problema: Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría Del Derecho 7:41-61.score: 42.0
    Political authority is the moral power to impose moral duties upon a perhaps unwilling citizenry. David Enoch has proposed that authority be understood as a matter of "robust" duty-giving. This paper argues that Enoch's conditions for attempted robust duty- or reason-giving are, along with his non-normative success condition, implausibly strong. Moreover, Enoch's attempt and normative- success conditions ignore two facts. The first is that success requires that citizens be tolerant of modest errors by the authority, which means that, in (...)
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  49. Adrienne S. Chambon & Allan Irving (2003). “They Give Reason a Responsibility Which It Simply Can't Bear”: Ethics, Care of the Self, and Caring Knowledge. [REVIEW] Journal of Medical Humanities 24 (3-4):265-278.score: 42.0
    We explore briefly Foucault's ideas about the care of the self, creating ourselves and what he meant by ethics. We then examine the work of five artists–Mark Rothko, Cindy Sherman, Helena Hietanen, Samuel Beckett, and Betty Goodwin–to help us begin to think very differently about illness and human suffering. Taking our lead from Beckett, we regard reason as being given too much responsibility for the work of a caring knowledge, and that it is through the arts that new ideas about (...)
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  50. Robert C. Pinto (2011). The Account of Warrants in Bermejo-Luque's Giving Reasons. Theoria 26 (3):311-320.score: 42.0
    ABSTRACT: This paper highlights the difference between Lilian Bermejo-Luque’s account of warrants with the quite different accounts of warrants offered by Toulmin, Hitchcock, and myself, and lays out some of the reasons why I think a “Toulminesque” account of warrants captures crucial aspects of arguing more adequately than her account does.RESUMEN: Este artículo subraya la diferencia entre el análisis de los garantes que nos propone Lilian Bermejo-Luque con los de Toulmin, Hitchcok y el mío propio. Presento algunas razones por las (...)
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