Search results for 'Reasons' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Instrumental Reasons, Instrumental Reasons.score: 100.0
    As Kant claimed in the Groundwork , and as the idea has been developed (in markedly different ways) by Korsgaard 1997, Bratman 1987, and Broome 2002. This formulation is agnostic on whether reasons for ends derive from our desiring those ends, or from the relation of those ends to things of independent value. However, desire-based theorists may deny, against Hubin 1999, that their theory is a combination of a principle of instrumental transmission and the principle that reasons for (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Pekka Väyrynen (forthcoming). Reasons and Moral Principles. In Daniel Star (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity.score: 21.0
    This paper is a survey of the generalism-particularism debate and related issues concerning the relationship between normative reasons and moral principles.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Douglas W. Portmore (forthcoming). Teleological Reasons. In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.score: 21.0
    I explain what teleological reasons are, distinguish between direct and indirect teleological reasons, and discuss both whether all practical reasons are teleological and whether all teleological reasons are direct.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Reasons and Belief's Justification. In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.score: 21.0
    There has been a considerable amount of debate about the norms of belief, but little discussion to date about what the reasons associated with these norms demand from us. By working out an account of what reasons demand, we can better understand the nature of justification.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Ruth Chang (2009). Voluntarist Reasons and the Sources of Normativity. In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press.score: 19.0
    In virtue of what does a consideration provide a practical reason? Suppose the fact that an experience is painful provides you with a reason to avoid it. In virtue of what does the fact that it’s painful have the normativity of a reason – where, in other words, does its normativity come from? As some philosophers put the question, what is the source of a reason’s normativity?
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Aaron Smuts, In Defense of the No-Reasons View of Love.score: 18.0
    Although we can try to explain why we love, we can never justify our love. Love is neither based on reasons, nor responsive to reasons, nor can it be assessed for normative reasons. Love can be odd, unfortunate, fortuitous, or even sadly lacking, but it can never be appropriate or inappropriate. We may have reasons to act on our love, but we cannot justify our loving feelings. Shakespeare's Bottom is right: "Reason and love keep little company (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Clayton Littlejohn (2009). ‘Ought’, ‘Can’, and Practical Reasons. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):363-73.score: 18.0
    Some recent defenses of the 'ought' implies 'can' (OIC) principle try to derive that principle from uncontroversial claims about reasons for action. Reasons for action, it's said, are reasons only for 'potential' actions, which are actions that an agent can perform. Given that 'ought' implies 'reasons', it seems we have our proof of OIC. In this paper, I argue that this latest strategy for defending OIC fails.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (2009). Reasons as Evidence. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:215-42.score: 18.0
    In this paper, we argue for a particular informative and unified analysis of normative reasons. According to this analysis, a fact F is a reason to act in a certain way just in case it is evidence that one ought to act in that way. Similarly, F is a reason to believe a certain proposition just in case it is evidence for the truth of this proposition. Putting the relatively uncontroversial claim about reasons for belief to one side, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Derek Parfit (1997). Reasons and Motivation. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):99–130.score: 18.0
    When we have a normative reason, and we act for that reason, it becomes our motivating reason. But we can have either kind of reason without having the other. Thus, if I jump into the canal, my motivating reason was provided by my belief; but I had no normative reason to jump. I merely thought I did. And, if I failed to notice that the canal was frozen, I had a reason not to jump that, because it was unknown to (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Roger Crisp (2007). Ethics Without Reasons? Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):40-49.score: 18.0
    This paper is a discussion of Jonathan Dancy's book Ethics Without Principles (2004). Holism about reasons is distinguished into a weak version, which allows for invariant reasons, and a strong, which doesn't. Four problems with Dancy's arguments for strong holism are identified. (1) A plausible particularism based on it will be close to generalism. (2) Dancy rests his case on common-sense morality, without justifying it. (3) His examples are of non-ultimate reasons. (4) There are certain universal principles (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Fred Dretske (1988). Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes. MIT Press.score: 18.0
    In this lucid portrayal of human behavior, Fred Dretske provides an original account of the way reasons function in the causal explanation of behavior.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Dean Lubin (2009). External Reasons. Metaphilosophy 40 (2):273-291.score: 18.0
    Abstract: In this article I consider Bernard Williams's argument against the possibility of external reasons for action and his claim that the only reasons for action are therefore internal. Williams's argument appeals to David Hume's claim that reason is the slave of the passions, and to the idea that reasons are capable of motivating the agent who has them. I consider two responses to Williams's argument, by John McDowell and by Stephen Finlay. McDowell claims that even if (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Constantine Sandis (2009). Hume and the Debate on 'Motivating Reasons'. In Charles Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 18.0
    This paper argues for a novel interpretation of Hume's account of motivation, according to which beliefs can (alone) motivate action though not by standing as reasons which normatively favour it. It si then suggested that a number of contemporary debates about concerning the nature of reasons for action could benefit from such an approach.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Chris Heathwood (2011). Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:79-106.score: 18.0
    One of the most important disputes in the foundations of ethics concerns the source of practical reasons. On the desire-based view, only one’s desires provide one with reasons to act. On the value-based view, reasons are instead provided by the objective evaluative facts, and never by our desires. Similarly, there are desire-based and non-desired-based theories about two other issues: pleasure and welfare. It has been argued, and is natural to think, that holding a desire-based theory about either (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Hamid Vahid (2010). Rationalizing Beliefs: Evidential Vs. Pragmatic Reasons. Synthese 176 (3):447 - 462.score: 18.0
    Beliefs can be evaluated from a number of perspectives. Epistemic evaluation involves epistemic standards and appropriate epistemic goals. On a truthconducive account of epistemic justification, a justified belief is one that serves the goal of believing truths and avoiding falsehoods. Beliefs are also prompted by nonepistemic reasons. This raises the question of whether, say, the pragmatic benefits of a belief are able to rationalize it. In this paper, after criticizing certain responses to this question, I shall argue that, as (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Campbell Brown (2013). The Composition of Reasons. Synthese:1-22.score: 18.0
    How do reasons combine? How is it that several reasons taken together can have a combined weight which exceeds the weight of any one alone? I propose an answer in mereological terms: reasons combine by composing a further, complex reason of which they are parts. Their combined weight is the weight of their combination. I develop a mereological framework, and use this to investigate some structural views about reasons. Two of these views I call “Atomism” and (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Andrew Reisner (2013). Book Review: The Domain of Reasons. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 122 (4):661-664.score: 18.0
    A review of John Skorupski's The Domain of Reasons.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Ulrike Heuer (2010). Reasons and Impossibility. Philosophical Studies 147 (2):235 - 246.score: 18.0
    In this paper, I argue that a person can have a reason to do what she cannot do. In a nutshell, the argument is that a person can have derivate reasons relating to an action that she has a non-derivative reason to perform. There are clear examples of derivative reasons that a person has in cases where she cannot do what she (non-derivatively) has reason to do. She couldn’t have those derivative reasons, unless she also had the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Matthew S. Bedke (2010). Rationalist Restrictions and External Reasons. Philosophical Studies 151 (1):39 - 57.score: 18.0
    Historically, the most persuasive argument against external reasons proceeds through a rationalist restriction: For all agents A, and all actions Φ, there is a reason for A to Φ only if Φing is rationally accessible from A's actual motivational states. Here I distinguish conceptions of rationality, show which one the internalist must rely on to argue against external reasons, and argue that a rationalist restriction that features that conception of rationality is extremely implausible. Other conceptions of rationality can (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Andrew Reisner (2009). The Possibility of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):257 - 272.score: 18.0
    In this paper I argue against the stronger of the two views concerning the right and wrong kind of reasons for belief, i.e. the view that the only genuine normative reasons for belief are evidential. The project in this paper is primarily negative, but with an ultimately positive aim. That aim is to leave room for the possibility that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief. Work is required to make room for this view, because evidentialism of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. John Turri (2009). The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons. Noûs 43 (3):490-512.score: 18.0
    Epistemic reasons are mental states. They are not propositions or non-mental facts. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the topic. Section 2 gives two concrete examples of how our topic directly affects the internalism/externalism debate in normative epistemology. Section 3 responds to an argument against the view that reasons are mental states. Section 4 presents two problems for the view that reasons are propositions. Section 5 presents two problems for the view that reasons are (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Daan Evers (2010). The End-Relational Theory of 'Ought' and the Weight of Reasons. Dialectica 64 (3):405-417.score: 18.0
    Stephen Finlay analyses ‘ought’ in terms of probability. According to him, normative ‘ought's are statements about the likelihood that an act will realize some (contextually supplied) end. I raise a problem for this theory. It concerns the relation between ‘ought’ and the balance of reasons. ‘A ought to Φ’ seems to entail that the balance of reasons favours that A Φ-es, and vice versa. Given Finlay's semantics for ‘ought’, it also makes sense to think of reasons and (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Richard Rowland (2013). Moral Error Theory and the Argument From Epistemic Reasons. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (1):1-24.score: 18.0
    In this paper I defend what I call the argument from epistemic reasons against the moral error theory. I argue that the moral error theory entails that there are no epistemic reasons for belief and that this is bad news for the moral error theory since, if there are no epistemic reasons for belief, no one knows anything. If no one knows anything, then no one knows that there is thought when they are thinking, and no one (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. David-Hillel Ruben (2010). The Causal and Deliberative Strength of Reasons for Action. In J. Aguilar & A. Buckareff (eds.), Causing Human Action: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action. Bradford.score: 18.0
    Is the thought that having a reason for action can also be the cause of the action for which it is the reason coherent? This is an attempt to say exactly what is involved in such a thought, with special reference to the case of con-reasons, reasons that count against the action the agent eventually choses.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Attila Tanyi (2011). Desires as Additional Reasons? The Case of Tie-Breaking. Philosophical Studies 152 (2):209-227.score: 18.0
    According to the Desire-Based Reasons Model reasons for action are provided by desires. Many, however, are critical about the Model holding an alternative view of practical reason, which is often called valued-based. In this paper I consider one particular attempt to refute the Model, which advocates of the valued-based view often appeal to: the idea of reason-based desires. The argument is built up from two premises. The first claims that desires are states that we have reason to have. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Pekka Väyrynen (2011). A Wrong Turn to Reasons? In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 18.0
    This paper argues that the recent metaethical turn to reasons as the fundamental units of normativity offers no special advantage in explaining a variety of other normative and evaluative phenomena, unless perhaps a form of reductionism about reasons is adopted which is rejected by many of those who advocate turning to reasons.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Susan L. Hurley (2003). Animal Action in the Space of Reasons. Mind and Language 18 (3):231-256.score: 18.0
    I defend the view that we should not overintellectualize the mind. Nonhuman animals can occupy islands of practical rationality: they can have contextbound reasons for action even though they lack full conceptual abilities. Holism and the possibility of mistake are required for such reasons to be the agent's reasons, but these requirements can be met in the absence of inferential promiscuity. Empirical work with animals is used to illustrate the possibility that reasons for action could be (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Hallvard Lillehammer (2010). Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons. Journal of Ethics 14 (1):17 - 26.score: 18.0
    This paper is about the relationship between two widely accepted and apparently conflicting claims about how we should understand the notion of ‘reason giving’ invoked in theorising about reasons for action. According to the first claim, reasons are given by facts about the situation of agents. According to the second claim, reasons are given by ends. I argue that the apparent conflict between these two claims is less deep than is generally recognised.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Attila Tanyi (2006). An Essay on the Desire-Based Reasons Model. Dissertation, Central European Universityscore: 18.0
    The dissertation argues against the view that normative reasons for action are grounded in desires. It first works out the different versions of the Model. After this, in the next three chapters, it presents and discusses three arguments against the Model, on the basis of which, it concludes that the Model gives us the wrong account of normative practical reasons.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Jussi Suikkanen (2005). Reasons and Value – in Defence of the Buck-Passing Account. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (5):513 - 535.score: 18.0
    In this article, I will defend the so-called buck-passing theory of value. According to this theory, claims about the value of an object refer to the reason-providing properties of the object. The concept of value can thus be analyzed in terms of reasons and the properties of objects that provide them for us. Reasons in this context are considerations that count in favour of certain attitudes. There are four other possibilities of how the connection between reasons and (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Ruth Chang (forthcoming). &Quot;commitment, Reasons, and the Will&Quot;. Oxford Studies in Metaethics.score: 18.0
    This paper argues that there is a particular kind of ‘internal’ commitment typically made in the context of romantic love relationships that has striking meta-normative implications for how we understand the role of the will in practical normativity. Internal commitments cannot plausibly explain the reasons we have in committed relationships on the usual model – as triggering reasons that are already there, in the way that making a promise triggers a reason via a pre-existing norm of the form (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Daniel Whiting (forthcoming). Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action. In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms.score: 18.0
    Subjects appear to take only evidential considerations to provide reason or justification for believing. That is to say that subjects do not take practical considerations—the kind of considerations which might speak in favour of or justify an action or decision—to speak in favour of or justify believing. This is puzzling; after all, practical considerations often seem far more important than matters of truth and falsity. In this paper, I suggest that one cannot explain this, as many have tried, merely by (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Nicholas Shackel (2013). Still Waiting for a Plausible Humean Theory of Reasons. Philosophical Studies (3):1-27.score: 18.0
    In his important recent book Schroeder proposes a Humean theory of reasons that he calls hypotheticalism. His rigourous account of the weight of reasons is crucial to his theory, both as an element of the theory and constituting his defence to powerful standard objections to Humean theories of reasons. In this paper I examine that rigourous account and show it to face problems of vacuity and consonance. There are technical resources that may be brought to bear on (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Ruth Chang (forthcoming). &Quot;practical Reasons: The Problem of Gridlock&Quot;. In Barry Dainton & Howard Robinson (eds.), Companion to Analytic Philosophy. Continuum Press.score: 18.0
    The paper has two aims. The first is to propose a general framework for organizing some central questions about normative practical reasons in a way that separates importantly distinct issues that are often run together. Setting out this framework provides a snapshot of the leading types of view about practical reasons as well as a deeper understanding of what are widely regarded to be some of their most serious difficulties. The second is to use the proposed framework to (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Justin Snedegar (2013). Reason Claims and Contrastivism About Reasons. Philosophical Studies 166 (2):231-242.score: 18.0
    Contrastivism about reasons is the view that ‘reason’ expresses a relation with an argument place for a set of alternatives. This is in opposition to a more traditional theory on which reasons are reasons for things simpliciter. I argue that contrastivism provides a solution to a puzzle involving reason claims that explicitly employ ‘rather than’. Contrastivism solves the puzzle by allowing that some fact might be a reason for an action out of one set of alternatives without (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Andrew Reisner (2008). Weighing Pragmatic and Evidential Reasons for Belief. Philosophical Studies 138 (1):17 - 27.score: 18.0
    In this paper I argue that we can give a plausible account of how to compare pragmatic and evidential normative reasons for belief. The account I offer is given in the form of a ‘defeasing function’. This function allows for a sophisticated comparison of the two types of reasons without assigning complex features to the logical structures of either type of reason.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Matthew S. Bedke (2008). Practical Reasons, Practical Rationality, Practical Wisdom. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (1):85 - 111.score: 18.0
    There are a number of proposals as to exactly how reasons, ends and rationality are related. It is often thought that practical reasons can be analyzed in terms of practical rationality, which, in turn, has something to do with the pursuit of ends. I want to argue against the conceptual priority of rationality and the pursuit of ends, and in favor of the conceptual priority of reasons. This case comes in two parts. I first argue for a (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Errol Lord (2010). Having Reasons and the Factoring Account. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):283 - 296.score: 18.0
    It’s natural to say that when it’s rational for me to φ, I have reasons to φ. That is, there are reasons for φ-ing, and moreover, I have some of them. Mark Schroeder calls this view The Factoring Account of the having reasons relation. He thinks The Factoring Account is false. In this paper, I defend The Factoring Account. Not only do I provide intuitive support for the view, but I also defend it against Schroeder’s criticisms. Moreover, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Neil Sinclair (2012). Promotionalism, Motivationalism and Reasons to Perform Physically Impossible Actions. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):647-659.score: 18.0
    In this paper I grant the Humean premise that some reasons for action are grounded in the desires of the agents whose reasons they are. I then consider the question of the relation between the reasons and the desires that ground them. According to promotionalism , a desire that p grounds a reason to φ insofar as A’s φing helps promote p . According to motivationalism a desire that p grounds a reason to φ insofar as it (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Eric Vogelstein (2011). Morality, Reasons, and Sentiments. Philosophical Studies 155 (3):421-432.score: 18.0
    Morality is commonly thought to be normative in a robust and important way. This is commonly cashed out in terms of normative reasons. It is also commonly thought that morality is necessarily and universally normative, i.e., that moral reasons are reasons for any possible moral agent. Taking these commonplaces for granted, I argue for a novel view of moral normativity. I challenge the standard view that moral reasons are reasons to act. I suggest that moral (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Ulrike Heuer (2010). Wrongness and Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):137 - 152.score: 18.0
    Is the wrongness of an action a reason not to perform it? Of course it is, you may answer. That an action is wrong both explains and justifies not doing it. Yet, there are doubts. Thinking that wrongness is a reason is confused, so an argument by Jonathan Dancy. There can’t be such a reason if ‘ϕ-ing is wrong’ is verdictive, and an all things considered judgment about what (not) to do in a certain situation. Such judgments are based on (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Eric Vogelstein (2012). Subjective Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):239-257.score: 18.0
    In recent years, the notion of a reason has come to occupy a central place in both metaethics and normative theory more broadly. Indeed, many philosophers have come to view reasons as providing the basis of normativity itself . The common conception is that reasons are facts that count in favor of some act or attitude. More recently, philosophers have begun to appreciate a distinction between objective and subjective reasons, where (roughly) objective reasons are determined by (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Richard H. Feldman & Andrei A. Buckareff (2003). Reasons Explanations and Pure Agency. Philosophical Studies 112 (2):135-145.score: 18.0
    We focus on the recent non-causal theory of reasons explanationsof free action proffered by a proponent of the agency theory, Timothy O'Connor. We argue that the conditions O'Connor offersare neither necessary nor sufficient for a person to act for a reason. Finally, we note that the role O'Connor assigns toreasons in the etiology of actions results in further conceptual difficulties for agent-causalism.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Kimberley Brownlee (2010). Reasons and Ideals. Philosophical Studies 151 (3):433-444.score: 18.0
    This paper contributes to the debate on whether we can have reason to do what we are unable to do. I take as my starting point two papers recently published in Philosophical Studies , by Bart Streumer and Ulrike Heuer, which defend the two dominant opposing positions on this issue. Briefly, whereas Streumer argues that we cannot have reason to do what we are unable to do, Heuer argues that we can have reason to do what we are unable to (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. John Brunero (2013). Reasons as Explanations. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):805-824.score: 18.0
    Can a normative reason be understood as a kind of explanation? I here consider and argue against two important analyses of reasons as explanations. John Broome argues that we can analyze reasons in terms of the concepts of explanation and ought. On his view, reasons to ϕ are either facts that explain why one ought to ϕ (what he calls “perfect reasons”) or facts that play a for-ϕ role in weighing explanations (what he calls “pro tanto (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. T. H. Ho (2014). Naturalism and the Space of Reasons in Mind and World. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (1):49-62.score: 18.0
    This paper aims to show that many criticisms of McDowell’s naturalism of second nature are based on what I call ‘the orthodox interpretation’ of McDowell’s naturalism. The orthodox interpretation is, however, a misinterpretation, which results from the fact that the phrase ‘the space of reasons’ is used equivocally by McDowell in Mind and World. Failing to distinguish two senses of ‘the space of reasons’, I argue that the orthodox interpretation renders McDowell’s naturalism inconsistent with McDowell’s Hegelian thesis that (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2006). Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of Reasons. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):114–120.score: 18.0
    The ‘buck-passing’ account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the ‘wrong kind of reasons’ problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of the right kind only (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. André J. Abath (2008). Empirical Beliefs, Perceptual Experiences and Reasons. Manuscrito 31 (2):543-571.score: 18.0
    John McDowell and Bill Brewer famously defend the view that one can only have empirical beliefs if one’s perceptual experiences serve as reasons for such beliefs, where reasons are understood in terms of subject’s reasons. In this paper I show, first, that it is a consequence of the adoption of such a requirement for one to have empirical beliefs that children as old as 3 years of age have to considered as not having genuine empirical beliefs at (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Carl Ginet (2008). In Defense of a Non-Causal Account of Reasons Explanations. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):229 - 237.score: 18.0
    This paper defends my claim in earlier work that certain non-causal conditions are sufficient for the truth of some reasons explanations of actions, against the critique of this claim given by Randolph Clarke in his book, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Rob van Someren Greve (2012). Can Reasons Be Self-Undermining? Philosophia 40 (2):411-414.score: 18.0
    The characterization of objective, normative reasons to φ as facts (or truths) that count in favor of φ-ing is widely accepted. But are there any further conditions that considerations which count in favor of φ-ing must meet, in order to count as a reason to φ? In this brief paper, I consider and reject one such condition, recently proposed by Caspar Hare.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000