Search results for 'Reasons for Action' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Kirsten B. Endres & Practical Reasons (2003). O Ne Main Topic in Practical Philosophy is the Question of When Someone has a Reason for a Certain Action. Most Philosophers Agree on the Necessity of a Motivational and a Justificatory Condition, but They Still Disagree About How These Conditions Can Be Fulfilled. Though These Conditions Are Important in Forming Convincing Concepts of Practical. [REVIEW] In P. Schaber & R. Huntelmann (eds.), Grundlagen der Ethik. 1--67.score: 1680.0
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  2. David-Hillel Ruben (2010). The Causal and Deliberative Strength of Reasons for Action. In J. Aguilar & A. Buckareff (eds.), Causing Human Action: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action. Bradford.score: 547.0
    Is the thought that having a reason for action can also be the cause of the action for which it is the reason coherent? This is an attempt to say exactly what is involved in such a thought, with special reference to the case of con-reasons, reasons that count against the action the agent eventually choses.
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  3. Christopher Woodard (2003). Group-Based Reasons for Action. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2):215-229.score: 540.0
    This article endorses a familiar, albeit controversial, argument for the existence of group-based reasons for action, but then rejects two doctrines which other advocates of such reasons usually accept. One such doctrine is the willingness requirement, which says that a group-based reason exists only if (sufficient) other members of the group in question are willing to cooperate. Thus the paper argues that there is sometimes a reason, which derives from the rationality of some group action, to (...)
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  4. Hans-Johann Glock (2014). Reasons for Action: Wittgensteinian and Davidsonian Perspectives in Historical, Meta-Philosophical and Philosophical Context. Nordic Wittgenstein Review 3 (1):7-46.score: 540.0
    My paper reflects on the debate about reasons for action and action explanations between Wittgensteinian teleological approaches and causalist theories inspired by Davidson. After a brief discussion of similarities and differences in the philosophy of language, I sketch the prehistory and history of the controversy. I show that the conflict between Wittgenstein and Davidson revolves neither around revisionism nor around naturalism. Even in the philosophy of mind and action, Davidson is not as remote from Wittgenstein and (...)
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  5. Gerald Beaulieu (2013). Can Explanatory Reasons Be Good Reasons for Action? Metaphilosophy 44 (4):440-450.score: 536.0
    What kind of thing is a reason for action? Are reasons for action subjective states of the agent, such as desires and/or beliefs? Or are they, rather, objective features of situations that favor certain actions? The suggestion offered in this article is that neither strategy satisfies. What is needed is a third category for classifying reasons which makes them out to be neither purely subjective nor purely objective. In brief: a reason for action is a (...)
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  6. Daniel Whiting (2014). Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action. In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms. Oxford University Press.score: 523.0
    Subjects appear to take only evidential considerations to provide reason or justification for believing. That is to say that subjects do not take practical considerations—the kind of considerations which might speak in favour of or justify an action or decision—to speak in favour of or justify believing. This is puzzling; after all, practical considerations often seem far more important than matters of truth and falsity. In this paper, I suggest that one cannot explain this, as many have tried, merely (...)
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  7. Rosemary Lowry (2012). Reasons for Action and Psychological Capacities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (4):521 - 531.score: 486.0
    Most moral philosophers agree that if a moral agent is incapable of performing some act ϕ because of a physical incapacity, then they do not have a reason to ϕ. Most also claim that if an agent is incapable of ϕ-ing due to a psychological incapacity, brought about by, for example, an obsession or phobia, then this does not preclude them from having a reason to ϕ. This is because the 'ought implies can' principle is usually interpreted as a claim (...)
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  8. Susanne Mantel (2013). Acting for Reasons, Apt Action, and Knowledge. Synthese 190 (17):3865-3888.score: 474.0
    I argue for the view that there are important similarities between knowledge and acting for a normative reason. I interpret acting for a normative reason in terms of Sosa’s notion of an apt performance. Actions that are done for a normative reason are normatively apt actions. They are in accordance with a normative reason because of a competence to act in accordance with normative reasons. I argue that, if Sosa’s account of knowledge as apt belief is correct, this means (...)
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  9. Ulrich Mees & Annette Schmitt (2008). Goals of Action and Emotional Reasons for Action. A Modern Version of the Theory of Ultimate Psychological Hedonism. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 38 (2):157–178.score: 459.0
  10. Ruth Chang (2001). Review: Two Conceptions of Reasons for Action. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):447 - 453.score: 378.0
    On a ‘comparative’ conception of practical reasons, reasons are like ‘weights’ that can make an action more or less rational. Bernard Gert adopts instead a ‘toggle’ conception of practical reasons: something counts as a reason just in case it alone can make some or other otherwise irrational action rational. I suggest that Gert’s conception suffers from various defects, and that his motivation for adopting this conception – his central claim that actions can be rational without (...)
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  11. Pamela Hieronymi (2011). Reasons for Action. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):407-427.score: 360.0
    Donald Davidson opens ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’ by asking, ‘What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did?’ His answer has generated some confusion about reasons for action and made for some difficulty in understanding the place for the agent's own reasons for acting, in the explanation of an action. I offer here a different account of (...)
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  12. Stephen Finlay & Mark Schroeder, Reasons for Action: Internal Vs. External. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 360.0
    Often, when there is a reason for you to do something, it is the kind of thing to motivate you to do it. For example, if Max and Caroline are deciding whether to go to the Alcove for dinner, Caroline might mention as a reason in favor, the fact that the Alcove serves onion rings the size of doughnuts, and Max might mention as a reason against, the fact that it is so difficult to get parking there this time of (...)
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  13. Andrei Buckareff & Allen Plug (2009). Escapism, Religious Luck, and Divine Reasons for Action. Religious Studies 45 (1):63-72.score: 360.0
    In our paper, ‘Escaping hell: divine motivation and the problem of hell’, we defended a theory of hell that we called ‘escapism’. We argued that given God’s just and loving character it would be most rational for God to maintain an open door policy to those who are in hell, allowing them an unlimited number of chances to be reconciled with God and enjoy communion with God. In this paper we reply to two recent objections to our original paper. The (...)
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  14. Christopher Tollefsen (2006). Reasons for Action and Reasons for Belief. Social Epistemology 20 (1):55 – 65.score: 360.0
    As Alan Wood has recently pointed out, there is "a long and strong philosophical traditionthat parcels out cognitive tasks to human faculties in such a way that belief is assigned to the will".1 Such an approach lends itself to addressing the ethics of belief as an extension of practical ethics. It also lends itself to a treatment of reasons for belief that is an extension of its treatment of reasons for action, for our awareness of reasons (...)
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  15. Anthony Robert Booth (2006). Can There Be Epistemic Reasons for Action? Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):133-144.score: 360.0
    In this paper I consider whether there can be such things as epistemic reasons for action. I consider three arguments to the contrary and argue that none are successful, being either somewhat question-begging or too strong by ruling out what most epistemologists think is a necessary feature of epistemic justification, namely the epistemic basing relation. I end by suggesting a "non-cognitivist" model of epistemic reasons that makes room for there being epistemic reasons for action and (...)
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  16. Ralph Wedgwood (2009). Intrinsic Values and Reasons for Action. In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics. Wiley Periodicals, Inc.. 342-363.score: 360.0
    What reasons for action do we have? What explains why we have these reasons? This paper articulates some of the basic structural features of a theory that would provide answers to these questions. According to this theory, reasons for action are all grounded in intrinsic values, but in a way that makes room for a thoroughly non-consequentialist view of the way in which intrinsic values generate reasons for aaction.
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  17. David Sobel (2001). Explanation, Internalism, and Reasons for Action. Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (02):218-.score: 360.0
    These days, just about every philosophical debate seems to generate a position labeled internalism. The debate I will be joining in this essay concerns reasons for action and their connection, or lack of connection, to motivation. The internalist position in this debate posits a certain essential connection between reasons and motivation, while the externalist position denies such a connection. This debate about internalism overlaps an older debate between Humeans and Kantians about the exclusive reason-giving power of desires. (...)
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  18. Michael Smith (2012). Agents and Patients, Or: What We Learn About Reasons for Action by Reflecting on Our Choices in Process‐of‐Thought Cases. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (3):309-331.score: 360.0
    Can we draw substantive conclusions about the reasons for action agents have from premisses about the desires of their idealized counterparts? The answer is that we can. The argument for this conclusion is Rawlsian in spirit, focusing on the choices that our idealized counterparts must make simply in virtue of being ideal, and inferring from these choices the contents of the desires that they must have. It turns out that our idealized counterparts must have desires in which we (...)
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  19. Kyle Swan (2009). Hell and Divine Reasons for Action. Religious Studies 45 (1):51-61.score: 360.0
    Escapism, a theory of hell proposed by Andrei Buckareff and Allen Plug, explicitly relies on claims about divine reasons for action. However, they say surprisingly little about the general account of reasons for action that would justify the inferences in the argument for escapism. I provide a couple of plausible interpretations of such an account and argue that they help revive the ‘Job objection’ to escapism that Buckareff and Plug had dismissed.
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  20. Anthony Robert Booth (2009). Motivating Epistemic Reasons for Action. Grazer Philosophische Studien 78 (1):265 - 271.score: 360.0
    Rowbottom (2008) has recently challenged my definition of epistemic reasons for action and has offered an alternative account. In this paper, I argue that less than giving an 'alternative' definition, Rowbottom has offered an additional condition to my original account. I argue, further, that such an extra condition is unnecessary, i.e. that the arguments designed to motivate it do not go through.
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  21. Maria Alvarez (2010). Reasons for Action and Practical Reasoning. Ratio 23 (4):355-373.score: 357.0
    This paper seeks a better understanding of the elements of practical reasoning: premises and conclusion. It argues that the premises of practical reasoning do not normally include statements such as ‘I want to ϕ’; that the reasoning in practical reasoning is the same as in theoretical reasoning and that what makes it practical is, first, that the point of the relevant reasoning is given by the goal that the reasoner seeks to realize by means of that reasoning and the subsequent (...)
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  22. Noa Latham (2003). Are There Any Nonmotivating Reasons for Action? In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. 273.score: 357.0
    When performing an action of a certain kind, an agent typically has se- veral reasons for doing so. I shall borrow Davidson’s term and call these rationalising reasons (Davidson 1963, 3). These are reasons that allow us to understand what the agent regarded as favourable features of such an action. (There will also be reasons against acting, expressing unfavour- able features of such an action, from the agent’s point of view.) I shall say (...)
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  23. Darrell P. Rowbottom (2008). An Alternative Account of Epistemic Reasons for Action: In Response to Booth. Grazer Philosophische Studien 76 (1):191-198.score: 351.0
    In a recent contribution to Grazer Philosophische Studien, Booth argues that for S to have an epistemic reason to ψ means that if S ψ's then he will have more true beliefs and less false beliefs than if he does not ψ. After strengthening this external account in response to the objection that one can improve one's epistemic state in other fashions, e.g. by having a gain in true beliefs which outweighs one's gain in false beliefs, I provide a challenge (...)
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  24. Robert Streiffer (2003). Moral Relativism and Reasons for Action. Routledge.score: 312.0
    This book provides a sophisticated analysis of various types of moral relativism, showing how arguments both for and against them fail to account for the basic intuitions such theories were inteded to address. Streiffer then constructs a compelling alternative model of reasons for acting which avoids the pitfalls of theories earlier discussed.
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  25. Michael Ridge, Reasons for Action: Agent-Neutral Vs. Agent-Relative. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 306.0
    The agent-relative/agent-neutral distintion is widely and rightly regarded as a philosophically important one. Unfortunately, the distinction is often drawn in different and mutually incompatible ways. The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction has historically been drawn three main ways: the ‘principle-based distinction’, the ‘reason-statement-based distinction’ and the ‘perspective-based distinction’. Each of these approaches has its own distinctive vices (Sections 1-3). However, a slightly modified version of the historically influential principle-based approach seems to avoid most if not all of these vices (Section 4). The distinction (...)
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  26. Constantine Sandis (2009). Hume and the Debate on 'Motivating Reasons'. In Charles Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 297.0
    This paper argues for a novel interpretation of Hume's account of motivation, according to which beliefs can (alone) motivate action though not by standing as reasons which normatively favour it. It si then suggested that a number of contemporary debates about concerning the nature of reasons for action could benefit from such an approach.
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  27. Dean Lubin (2009). External Reasons. Metaphilosophy 40 (2):273-291.score: 297.0
    Abstract: In this article I consider Bernard Williams's argument against the possibility of external reasons for action and his claim that the only reasons for action are therefore internal. Williams's argument appeals to David Hume's claim that reason is the slave of the passions, and to the idea that reasons are capable of motivating the agent who has them. I consider two responses to Williams's argument, by John McDowell and by Stephen Finlay. McDowell claims that (...)
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  28. Attila Tanyi (2011). Desires as Additional Reasons? The Case of Tie-Breaking. Philosophical Studies 152 (2):209-227.score: 297.0
    According to the Desire-Based Reasons Model reasons for action are provided by desires. Many, however, are critical about the Model holding an alternative view of practical reason, which is often called valued-based. In this paper I consider one particular attempt to refute the Model, which advocates of the valued-based view often appeal to: the idea of reason-based desires. The argument is built up from two premises. The first claims that desires are states that we have reason to (...)
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  29. Andrew Reisner (2008). Does Friendship Give Us Non-Derivative Partial Reasons. Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 3 (1):70-78.score: 297.0
    One way to approach the question of whether there are non-derivative partial reasons of any kind is to give an account of what partial reasons are, and then to consider whether there are such reasons. If there are, then it is at least possible that there are partial reasons of friendship. It is this approach that will be taken here, and it produces several interesting results. The first is a point about the structure of partial (...). It is at least a necessary condition of a reason’s being partial that it has an explicit relational component. This component, technically, is a rela- tum in the reason relation that itself is a relation between the person to whom the reason applies and the person whom the action for which there is a reason concerns. The second conclusion of the paper is that this relational component is also required for a number of types of putatively impartial reasons. In order to avoid trivialising the distinction between partial and impartial rea- sons, some further sufficient condition must be applied. Finally, there is some prospect for a way of distinguishing between impartial reasons that contain a relational component and partial rea- sons, but that this approach suggests that the question of whether ethics is partial or impartial will be settled at the level of normative ethical discourse, or at least not at the level of discourse about the nature of reasons for action. (shrink)
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  30. Ulrike Heuer (2010). Reasons and Impossibility. Philosophical Studies 147 (2):235 - 246.score: 294.0
    In this paper, I argue that a person can have a reason to do what she cannot do. In a nutshell, the argument is that a person can have derivate reasons relating to an action that she has a non-derivative reason to perform. There are clear examples of derivative reasons that a person has in cases where she cannot do what she (non-derivatively) has reason to do. She couldn’t have those derivative reasons, unless she also had (...)
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  31. Constantine Sandis (2006). The Explanation of Action in History. Essays in Philosophy 7 (2):12.score: 294.0
    This paper focuses on two conflations which frequently appear within the philosophy of history and other fields concerned with action explanation. The first of these, which I call the Conflating View of Reasons, states that the reasons for which we perform actions are reasons why (those events which are) our actions occur. The second, more general conflation, which I call the Conflating View of Action Explanation, states that whatever explains why an agent performed a certain (...)
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  32. Ruth Chang (2001). Two Conceptions of Reasons for Action. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):447–453.score: 288.0
  33. James Lenman, Reasons for Action: Justification Vs. Explanation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 288.0
    Modern philosophical literature distinguishes between explanatory reasons and justifying reasons. The former are reasons we appeal to in attempting to explain actions and attitudes. The latter are reasons we appeal to in attempting to justify them.
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  34. Duncan Macintosh (2007). Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action - By G.F. Schueler. Philosophical Books 48 (1):86-88.score: 288.0
  35. Attila Tanyi (2010). Reason and Desire: The Case of Affective Desires. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6 (2):67-89.score: 279.0
    The paper begins with an objection to the Desire-Based Reasons Model. The argument from reason-based desires holds that since desires are based on reasons (first premise), which they transmit but to which they cannot add (second premise), they cannot themselves provide reasons for action. In the paper I investigate an attack that has recently been launched against the first premise of this argument by Ruth Chang. Chang invokes a counterexample: affective desires. The aim of the paper (...)
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  36. Attila Tanyi (2011). Sobel on Pleasure, Reason, and Desire. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):101-115.score: 279.0
    The paper begins with a well-known objection to the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires. The objection holds that since desires are based on reasons (first premise), which they transmit but to which they cannot add (second premise), they cannot themselves provide reasons for action. In the paper I investigate an attack that has recently been launched against the first premise of the argument by David Sobel. Sobel invokes a counterexample: hedonic desires, (...)
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  37. Bart Streumer (2011). Review of David Sobel and Steven Wall, Reasons for Action. [REVIEW] Analysis 71 (1):200-202.score: 279.0
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  38. Stephen Everson (2009). What Are Reasons for Action? In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan. 22--47.score: 279.0
  39. Jonathan Baron (1986). Tradeoffs Among Reasons for Action. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 16 (2):173–195.score: 279.0
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  40. B. C. Postow (1999). Reasons for Action: Toward a Normative Theory and Meta-Level Criteria. Kluwer Academic.score: 279.0
    What, ultimately, is there good reason to do? This book proposes a unified theory of agent-dependent reasons and agent-independent reasons. It holds that principles which assign reasons to agents are valid if and only if they make maximally good sense in the light of relevant data and background theories. The theory avoids problems encountered by views associated with Nagel, Parfit, Brandt, Hubin, Gert, Baier, and Tiberius, amongst others. By what criteria should a normative theory of ultimate (...) be judged? Plausible meta-level criteria emerge from a process of identifying the criteria that have been used, sometimes unwittingly, by various theorists; categorizing and evaluating the criteria in the light of each other; and proposing revisions on that basis. This method escapes the drawbacks of rival approaches, such as those associated with Parfit, Gert, and Darwall. The resulting criteria cast a favorable light on the proposed normative theory of ultimate reasons. (shrink)
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  41. David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.) (2009). Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press.score: 276.0
  42. Robert Audi (1997). Moral Judgment and Reasons for Action. In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press. 125--160.score: 273.0
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  43. Ruth Chang (2004). Can Desires Provide Reasons for Action? In R. Jay Wallace (ed.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford University Press. 56--90.score: 273.0
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  44. Alan Millar (2009). How Reasons for Action Differ From Reasons for Belief. In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason. Oxford University Press.score: 273.0
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  45. Alan Millar (2002). Reasons for Action and Instrumental Normativity. In José Luis Bermúdez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature: Essays in the Theory of Rationality. Oxford University Press.score: 273.0
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  46. Robert Audi (2009). Moral Virtue and Reasons for Action. Philosophical Issues 19 (1):1-20.score: 270.0
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  47. Susan L. Hurley (2003). Animal Action in the Space of Reasons. Mind and Language 18 (3):231-256.score: 270.0
    I defend the view that we should not overintellectualize the mind. Nonhuman animals can occupy islands of practical rationality: they can have contextbound reasons for action even though they lack full conceptual abilities. Holism and the possibility of mistake are required for such reasons to be the agent's reasons, but these requirements can be met in the absence of inferential promiscuity. Empirical work with animals is used to illustrate the possibility that reasons for action (...)
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  48. David Sobel (2011). Parfit's Case Against Subjectivism. In Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 6. Oup Oxford.score: 270.0
    I argue that Parfit's On What Matters does not make a compelling case against subjective accounts of reasons for action.
     
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