Leibniz’s widely influential account of time provides a significant puzzle for those seeking to locate this account within his hierarchical ontology. Leibniz follows his scholastic predecessors in supposing that there are different grades of being, with substances being the most real and all other things possessing their reality via their relationships to substance. Following this picture, Leibniz suggests that phenomenal bodies only possess the being that they derive from the substances (i.e., monads) that ground them. Some would argue that time (...) likewise only possesses its being based on the bodies that it relates. Contrary to this suggestion (i.e., that time is twice removed from substances), I will argue that time is derived directly from rational souls. Thus, I will argue that time is on an ontological par with the phenomenal world of bodies. (shrink)
Machine generated contents note: Introduction Christopher Gill, Tim Whitmarsh and John Wilkins: 1. Galen's library Vivian Nutton; 2. Conventions of prefatory self-presentation in Galen's On the Order of My Own Books Jason König; 3. Demiurge and emperor in Galen's world of knowledge Rebecca Flemming; 4. Shock and awe: the performance dimension of Galen's anatomy demonstrations Maud Gleason; 5. Galen's un-Hippocratic case-histories G. E. R. Lloyd; 6. Staging the past, staging oneself: Galen on Hellenistic exegetical traditions Heinrich von Staden; (...) 7. Galen and Hippocratic medicine: language and practice Daniela Manetti; 8. Galen's Bios and Methodos: from ways of life to paths of knowledge Ve;ronique Boudon-Millot; 9. Does Galen have a medical programme for intellectuals and the faculties of the intellect? Jacques Jouanna; 10. Galen on the limitations of knowledge R. J. Hankinson; 11. Galen and Middle Platonism Riccardo Chiaradonna; 12. 'Aristotle! What a thing for you to say!' Galen's engagement with Aristotle and Aristotelians Philip van der Eijk; 13. Galen and the Stoics, or: the art of not naming Teun Tieleman. (shrink)
The project that Dan Lloyd has undertaken is admirable and audacious. He has tried to boil down the substrate of information-processing that underlies conscious experience to some very simple elements, in order to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon. Some people will suspect that by considering a model as simple as a connectionist network, Dan has thrown away everything that is interesting about consciousness. Perhaps there is something to that complaint, but I will take a different tack. It (...) seems to me that if we apply his own reasoning, we can see that Dan has not taken things far _enough_. When we have boiled things down to a system as simple as a connectionist network, it seems faint-hearted to stop there, and perhaps a little arbitrary as well. So I will take things further, and ask what seems to be the really interesting question in the vicinity: what is it like to be a thermostat? (shrink)
The nature and legitimacy of commitments. Objectivity vs. commitment, by H. Smith. Institutional commitment: a social scientist's view, by H. R. Davis. The sectarian nature of liberal education, by L. J. Averill. The identity of the Christian college, by W. W. Jellema.--Commitments and the dimensions of learning. Discursive truth and evangelical truth, by A. C. Outler. Natural order and transcendent order, by W. G. Pollard. Limited cognition and ultimate cognition, by R. W. Friedrichs. Academic teaching and human experience, by M. (...) Novak. Academic excellence and moral value, by W. W. Jellema.--Norms and models of commitment. Biblical realism as a norm, by W. Herberg. Christian ethical community as a norm, by W. Beach. A pluralistic model, by W. B. Martin. A singular model, by L. J. Averill. (shrink)
We discuss aspects of the logic of negation bearing on an issue raised by Jean-Yves Béziau, recalled in §1. Contrary- and subcontrary-forming operators are introduced in §2, which examines some of their logical behaviour, leading on naturally to a consideration in §3 of dual intuitionistic negation (as well as implication), and some further operators related to intuitionistic negation. In §4, a historical explanation is suggested as to why some of these negation-related connectives have attracted more attention than others. The remaining (...) sections (§§5, 6) briefly address a question about a certain notion of global contrariety and the provision of Kripke semantics for the various operators in play in our discussion. (shrink)
Introduction, by R. A. Markus.--St. Augustine and Christian Platonism, by A. H. Armstrong.--Action and contemplation, by F. R. J. O'Connell.--St. Augustine on signs, by R. A. Markus.--The theory of signs in St. Augustine's De doctrina Christiana, by B. D. Jackson.--Si fallor, sum, by G. B. Matthews.--Augustine on speaking from memory, by G. B. Matthews.--The inner man, by G. B. Matthews.--On Augustine's concept of a person, by A. C. Lloyd.--Augustine on foreknowledge and free will, by W. L. Rowe.--Augustine on free (...) will and predestination, by J. M. Rist.--Time and contingency in St. Augustine, by R. Jordan.--Empiricism and Augustine's problems about time, by H. M. Lacey.--Political society, by P. R. L. Brown.--The development of Augustine's ideas on society before the Donatist controversy, by F. E. Cranz.--De Civitate Dei, XV, 2, and Augustine's idea of the Christian society, by F. E. Cranz.--Chronological table.--Note on further reading (p. [422]-423). (shrink)
I aim to show how and why some definitions can be benignly circular. According to Lloyd Humberstone, a definition that is analytically circular need not be inferentially circular and so might serve to illuminate the application-conditions for a concept. I begin by tidying up some problems with Humberstone's account. I then show that circular definitions of a kind commonly thought to be benign have inferentially circular truth-conditions and so are malign by Humberstone's test. But his test is too demanding. (...) The inferences we actually use to establish the applicability of, e.g., colour concepts are designed to establish warranted assertability and not truth. Understood thus, dispositional analyses are not inferentially circular. (shrink)
We study a range of issues connected with the idea of replacing one formula by another in a fixed (linguistic) context. The replacement core of a consequence relation ⊢ is the relation holding between a set of formulas { A 1 , ..., A m , ...} and a formula B when for every context C (·), we have C ( A 1 ), ..., C ( A m ), ... ⊢ C ( B ). Section 1 looks at some (...) differences between which inferences are lost on passing to the replacement cores of the classical and intuitionistic consequence relations. For example, we find that while the inference from A and B to , sanctioned by both these initial consequence relations, is retained on passage to the replacement core in the classical case, it is lost in the intuitionistic case. Further discussion of these two (and some other) logics occupies Sections 3 and 4. Section 2 looks at the m = 1 case, describing A as replaceable by B according to ⊢ when B is a consequence of A by the replacement core of ⊢, and inquiring as to which choices of ⊢ render this induced replaceability relation symmetric. Section 5 investigates further conceptual refinements— such as a contrast between horizontal and vertical replaceability—suggested by some work of R. B. Angell and R. Harrop (and a comment on the latter by T. J. Smiley) in the 1950s and 1960s. Appendix 1 examines a related aspect of term-for-term replacement in connection with identity in predicate logic. Appendix 2 is a repository for proofs which would otherwise clutter up Section 3. (shrink)
In mid-May of 2001, I attended a fascinating workshop at Cold Spring Harbor Labs. The conference was held at the lab's Banbury Center, an elegant mansion and its beautiful surrounding estate, located on Banbury Lane, in the outskirts of Lloyd Harbor, overlooking the north shore of Long Island in New York. The estate was formerly owned by Charles Sammis Robertson. In 1976, Robertson donated his estate, and an endowment for its upkeep, to the Lab. The donation included the Robertson's (...) mansion, now called Robertson House, and a large, seven-car garage that would become the actual conference center. The Center was opened on Sunday, June 14, 1977, by Francis Crick who gave a talk entitled "How Scientists Work." For us, Banbury was an idyllic location with great food where we could talk about the most difficult problem in all o f science: what is the nature and cause of consciousness? (shrink)
In the insurance literature, it is often argued that private markets can provide insurance against ‘risks’ but not against ‘uncertainties’ in the sense of Knight ([1921]) or Keynes ([1921]). This claim is at odds with the standard economic model of risk exchange which, in assuming that decision-makers are always guided by point-valued subjective probabilities, predicts that all uncertainties can, in theory, be insured. Supporters of the standard model argue that the insuring of highly idiosyncratic risks by Lloyd's of London (...) proves that this is so even in practice. The purpose of this article is to show that Bruno de Finetti, famous as one of the three founding fathers of the subjective approach to probability assumed by the standard model, actually made a theoretical case for uncertainty within the subjectivist approach. We draw on empirical evidence from the practice of underwriters to show how this case may help explain the reluctance of insurers to cover highly uncertain contingencies. (shrink)
If a certain semantic relation (which we call local consequence) is allowed to guide expectations about which rules are derivable from other rules, these expectations will not always be fulfilled, as we illustrate. An alternative semantic criterion (based on a relation we call global consequence), suggested by work of J.W. Garson, turns out to provide a much better — indeed a perfectly accurate — guide to derivability.
This paper argues that Ellis’ analysis of Fundamentalism as narcissistically disturbed can apply to the very scientific disciplines he relies upon to make his argument. Citing Elizabeth Lloyd’s critique of methodological objectivity, I draw a parallel between the overstated belief that humans can defy finitude through certainty gained via scientific objectivity and Ellis’ charge that the religious faithful deny human limits in their delusional certainty in an afterlife. I link scientism and religious fundamentalism in their apodictic assertions and their (...) instrumentalism. I argue that Ellis’ insight into the narcissistic nature of fundanlentalism is, by being successful, a challenge to his project in so far as it rests on a scientific fundamentalism. Finally, I offer resolution by appealing to Gandhi’s notion of satyagraha or conflict resolution through mutual recognition of the core veridical insights embedded in opposing viewpoints. (shrink)
