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  1. Jorie Koster-Hale, Marina Bedny & Rebecca Saxe (2014). Thinking About Seeing: Perceptual Sources of Knowledge Are Encoded in the Theory of Mind Brain Regions of Sighted and Blind Adults. Cognition 133 (1):65-78.
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  2. Swethasri Dravida, Rebecca Saxe & Marina Bedny (2013). People Can Understand Descriptions of Motion Without Activating Visual Motion Brain Regions. Frontiers in Psychology 4.
    What is the relationship between our perceptual and linguistic representations of the same event? We approached this question by asking to whether visual perception of motion and understanding linguistic depictions of motion rely on the same neural architecture. The same group of participants took part in two language tasks and one visual task. In task 1, participants made semantic similarity judgments with high (e.g. “to bounce”) and low motion (e.g. “to look”) words. In task 2, participants made plausibility judgments for (...)
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  3. Jorie Koster-Hale & Rebecca Saxe (2013). Functional Neuroimaging of Theory of Mind. In Simon Baron-Cohen, Michael Lombardo & Helen Tager-Flusberg (eds.), Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives From Developmental Social Neuroscience. Oup Oxford. 132.
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  4. Elizabeth Redcay, Katherine Rice & Rebecca Saxe (2013). Interaction Versus Observation: A Finer Look at This Distinction and its Importance to Autism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):435 - 435.
    Although a second-person neuroscience has high ecological validity, the extent to which a second- versus third-person neuroscience approach fundamentally alters neural patterns of activation requires more careful investigation. Nonetheless, we are hopeful that this new avenue will prove fruitful in significantly advancing our understanding of typical and atypical social cognition.
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  5. James Dungan & Rebecca Saxe (2012). Matched False-Belief Performance During Verbal and Nonverbal Interference. Cognitive Science 36 (6):1148-1156.
    Language has been shown to play a key role in the development of a child’s theory of mind, but its role in adult belief reasoning remains unclear. One recent study used verbal and nonverbal interference during a false-belief task to show that accurate belief reasoning in adults necessarily requires language (Newton & de Villiers, 2007). The strength of this inference depends on the cognitive processes that are matched between the verbal and nonverbal inference tasks. Here, we matched the two interference (...)
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  6. Elizabeth Redcay, Mario Kleiner & Rebecca Saxe (2012). Look at This: The Neural Correlates of Initiating and Responding to Bids for Joint Attention. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6.
    When engaging in joint attention, one person directs another person’s attention to an object (Initiating Joint Attention, IJA), and the second person’s attention follows (Responding to Joint Attention, RJA). As such, joint attention must occur within the context of a social interaction. This ability is critical to language and social development; yet the neural bases for this pivotal skill remain understudied. This paucity of research is likely due to the challenge in acquiring functional MRI data during a naturalistic, contingent social (...)
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  7. Liane Young & Rebecca Saxe (2011). Moral Universals and Individual Differences. Emotion Review 3 (3):323-324.
    Contemporary moral psychology has focused on the notion of a universal moral sense, robust to individual and cultural differences. Yet recent evidence has revealed individual differences in the psychological processes for moral judgment: controlled cognition, mental-state reasoning, and emotional responding. We discuss this evidence and its relation to cross-cultural diversity in morality.
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  8. Liane Young & Rebecca Saxe (2011). The Role of Intent for Distinct Moral Domains. Cognition 120:202-214.
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  9. Liane Young & Rebecca Saxe (2011). When Ignorance is No Excuse: Different Roles for Intent Across Moral Domains. Cognition 120 (2):202-214.
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  10. Elizabeth Baraff Bonawitz, Darlene Ferranti, Rebecca Saxe, Alison Gopnik, Andrew N. Meltzoff, James Woodward & Laura E. Schulz (2010). Just Do It? Investigating the Gap Between Prediction and Action in Toddlers' Causal Inferences. Cognition 115 (1):104-117.
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  11. Rebecca Saxe, Matthew Brett & Nancy Kanwisher (2010). Divide and Conquer: A Defense of Functional Localizers. In Stephen Hanson & Martin Bunzl (eds.), Foundational Issues in Human Brain Mapping. Mit Press. 25--42.
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  12. Liane Young, Shaun Nichols & Rebecca Saxe (2010). Investigating the Neural and Cognitive Basis of Moral Luck. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):333-349.
    Moral judgments, we expect, ought not to depend on luck. A person should be blamed only for actions and outcomes that were under the person’s control. Yet often, moral judgments appear to be influenced by luck. A father who leaves his child by the bath, after telling his child to stay put and believing that he will stay put, is judged to be morally blameworthy if the child drowns (an unlucky outcome), but not if his child stays put and doesn’t (...)
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  13. Liane Young & Rebecca Saxe (2010). It's Not Just What You Do, but What's on Your Mind: A Review of Kwame Anthony Appiah's “Experiments in Ethics”. [REVIEW] Neuroethics 3 (3):201-207.
    What is the impact of science on philosophy? In “Experiments in Ethics”, Kwame Anthony Appiah addresses this question for morality and ethics. Appiah suggests that scientific results may undermine moral intuitions by undermining our confidence in the actual sources of our intuitions, or by invalidating our factual assumptions about the causes of human behavior. Appiah worries that scientific results showing situational causes on human behavior force us to abandon the intuition, formalized in virtue ethics, that what matters is “who you (...)
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  14. Chris L. Baker, Rebecca Saxe & Joshua B. Tenenbaum (2009). Action Understanding as Inverse Planning. Cognition 113 (3):329-349.
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  15. Rebecca Saxe (2009). The Neural Evidence for Simulation is Weaker Than I Think You Think It Is. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 144 (3):447 - 456.
    Simulation theory accounts of mind-reading propose that the observer generates a mental state that matches the state of the target and then uses this state as the basis for an attribution of a similar state to the target. The key proposal is thus that mechanisms that are primarily used online, when a person experiences a kind of mental state, are then co-opted to run Simulations of similar states in another person. Here I consider the neuroscientific evidence for this view. I (...)
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  16. Lisa Aziz-Zadeh, Daniel Casasanto, Jerome Feldman, Rebecca Saxe & Leonard Talmy (2008). Discovering the Conceptual Primitives. In B. C. Love, K. McRae & V. M. Sloutsky (eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society.
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  17. Rebecca Saxe (2005). Hybrid Vigour: Reply to Mitchell. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (8):364-364.
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  18. Rebecca Saxe (2005). Mirror Neurones and False Beliefs. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):174-179.
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  19. Rebecca Saxe (2005). On Ignorance and Being Wrong: Reply to Gordon. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (8):362-363.
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