21 found
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  1.  10
    Chris L. Baker, Rebecca Saxe & Joshua B. Tenenbaum (2009). Action Understanding as Inverse Planning. Cognition 113 (3):329-349.
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  2.  20
    Liane Young & Rebecca Saxe (2011). When Ignorance is No Excuse: Different Roles for Intent Across Moral Domains. Cognition 120 (2):202-214.
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  3.  9
    Elizabeth Baraff Bonawitz, Darlene Ferranti, Rebecca Saxe, Alison Gopnik, Andrew N. Meltzoff, James Woodward & Laura E. Schulz (2010). Just Do It? Investigating the Gap Between Prediction and Action in Toddlers’ Causal Inferences. Cognition 115 (1):104-117.
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  4.  35
    James Dungan & Rebecca Saxe (2012). Matched False-Belief Performance During Verbal and Nonverbal Interference. Cognitive Science 36 (6):1148-1156.
    Language has been shown to play a key role in the development of a child’s theory of mind, but its role in adult belief reasoning remains unclear. One recent study used verbal and nonverbal interference during a false-belief task to show that accurate belief reasoning in adults necessarily requires language (Newton & de Villiers, 2007). The strength of this inference depends on the cognitive processes that are matched between the verbal and nonverbal inference tasks. Here, we matched the two interference (...)
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  5.  87
    Liane Young, Shaun Nichols & Rebecca Saxe (2010). Investigating the Neural and Cognitive Basis of Moral Luck. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):333-349.
    Moral judgments, we expect, ought not to depend on luck. A person should be blamed only for actions and outcomes that were under the person’s control. Yet often, moral judgments appear to be influenced by luck. A father who leaves his child by the bath, after telling his child to stay put and believing that he will stay put, is judged to be morally blameworthy if the child drowns (an unlucky outcome), but not if his child stays put and doesn’t (...)
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  6.  60
    Rebecca Saxe (2009). The Neural Evidence for Simulation is Weaker Than I Think You Think It Is. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 144 (3):447 - 456.
    Simulation theory accounts of mind-reading propose that the observer generates a mental state that matches the state of the target and then uses this state as the basis for an attribution of a similar state to the target. The key proposal is thus that mechanisms that are primarily used online, when a person experiences a kind of mental state, are then co-opted to run Simulations of similar states in another person. Here I consider the neuroscientific evidence for this view. I (...)
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  7.  17
    Jorie Koster-Hale & Rebecca Saxe (2013). Functional Neuroimaging of Theory of Mind. In Simon Baron-Cohen, Michael Lombardo & Helen Tager-Flusberg (eds.), Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives From Developmental Social Neuroscience. OUP Oxford 132.
  8.  5
    Elizabeth Redcay, Katherine Rice & Rebecca Saxe (2013). Interaction Versus Observation: A Finer Look at This Distinction and its Importance to Autism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):435 - 435.
    Although a second-person neuroscience has high ecological validity, the extent to which a second- versus third-person neuroscience approach fundamentally alters neural patterns of activation requires more careful investigation. Nonetheless, we are hopeful that this new avenue will prove fruitful in significantly advancing our understanding of typical and atypical social cognition.
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  9.  9
    Rebecca Saxe (2005). Hybrid Vigour: Reply to Mitchell. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (8):364-364.
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  10.  40
    Anna Jenkins, David Dodell-Feder, Rebecca Saxe & Joshua Knobe (2014). The Neural Bases of Directed and Spontaneous Mental State Attributions to Group Agents. PLoS ONE 9.
    In daily life, perceivers often need to predict and interpret the behavior of group agents, such as corporations and governments. Although research has investigated how perceivers reason about individual members of particular groups, less is known about how perceivers reason about group agents themselves. The present studies investigate how perceivers understand group agents by investigating the extent to which understanding the ‘mind’ of the group as a whole shares important properties and processes with understanding the minds of individuals. Experiment 1 (...)
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  11.  40
    Liane Young & Rebecca Saxe (2010). It's Not Just What You Do, but What's on Your Mind: A Review of Kwame Anthony Appiah's “Experiments in Ethics”. [REVIEW] Neuroethics 3 (3):201-207.
    What is the impact of science on philosophy? In “Experiments in Ethics”, Kwame Anthony Appiah addresses this question for morality and ethics. Appiah suggests that scientific results may undermine moral intuitions by undermining our confidence in the actual sources of our intuitions, or by invalidating our factual assumptions about the causes of human behavior. Appiah worries that scientific results showing situational causes on human behavior force us to abandon the intuition, formalized in virtue ethics, that what matters is “who you (...)
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  12.  10
    Lisa Aziz-Zadeh, Daniel Casasanto, Jerome Feldman, Rebecca Saxe & Leonard Talmy (2008). Discovering the Conceptual Primitives. In B. C. Love, K. McRae & V. M. Sloutsky (eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society
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  13. Liane Young, Jonathan Scholz & Rebecca Saxe (2011). Neural Evidence for "Intuitive Prosecution": The Use of Mental State Information for Negative Moral Verdicts. Social Neuroscience 6 (3):302-315.
    Moral judgment depends critically on theory of mind, reasoning about mental states such as beliefs and intentions. People assign blame for failed attempts to harm and offer forgiveness in the case of accidents. Here we use fMRI to investigate the role of ToM in moral judgment of harmful vs. helpful actions. Is ToM deployed differently for judgments of blame vs. praise? Participants evaluated agents who produced a harmful, helpful, or neutral outcome, based on a harmful, helpful, or neutral intention; participants (...)
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  14. Liane Young, Joan Albert Camprodon, Marc Hauser, Alvaro Pascual-Leone & Rebecca Saxe (2010). Disruption of the Right Temporoparietal Junction with Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation Reduces the Role of Beliefs in Moral Judgments. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
    When we judge an action as morally right or wrong, we rely on our capacity to infer the actor's mental states. Here, we test the hypothesis that the right temporoparietal junction, an area involved in mental state reasoning, is necessary for making moral judgments. In two experiments, we used transcranial magnetic stimulation to disrupt neural activity in the RTPJ transiently before moral judgment and during moral judgment. In both experiments, TMS to the RTPJ led participants to rely less on the (...)
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  15.  22
    Liane Young & Rebecca Saxe (2011). Moral Universals and Individual Differences. Emotion Review 3 (3):323-324.
    Contemporary moral psychology has focused on the notion of a universal moral sense, robust to individual and cultural differences. Yet recent evidence has revealed individual differences in the psychological processes for moral judgment: controlled cognition, mental-state reasoning, and emotional responding. We discuss this evidence and its relation to cross-cultural diversity in morality.
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  16. Liane Young, Fiery Cushman, Marc Hauser & Rebecca Saxe (2007). The Neural Basis of the Interaction Between Theory of Mind and Moral Judgment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104 (20):8235-8240.
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  17.  10
    Rebecca Saxe, Matthew Brett & Nancy Kanwisher (2010). Divide and Conquer: A Defense of Functional Localizers. In Stephen Hanson & Martin Bunzl (eds.), Foundational Issues in Human Brain Mapping. MIT Press 25--42.
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  18.  10
    Liane Young & Rebecca Saxe (2011). The Role of Intent for Distinct Moral Domains. Cognition 120:202-214.
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  19.  8
    Rebecca Saxe (2005). On Ignorance and Being Wrong: Reply to Gordon. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (8):362-363.
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  20.  6
    Rebecca Saxe (2005). Mirror Neurones and False Beliefs. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):174-179.
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  21.  4
    Jorie Koster-Hale, Marina Bedny & Rebecca Saxe (2014). Thinking About Seeing: Perceptual Sources of Knowledge Are Encoded in the Theory of Mind Brain Regions of Sighted and Blind Adults. Cognition 133 (1):65-78.
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