Search results for 'Reductivism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  16
    Justin M. Dallmann (2014). A Normatively Adequate Credal Reductivism. Synthese 191 (10):2301-2313.
    It is a prevalent, if not popular, thesis in the metaphysics of belief that facts about an agent’s beliefs depend entirely upon facts about that agent’s underlying credal state. Call this thesis ‘credal reductivism’ and any view that endorses this thesis a ‘credal reductivist view’. An adequate credal reductivist view will accurately predict both when belief occurs and which beliefs are held appropriately, on the basis of credal facts alone. Several well-known—and some lesser known—objections to credal reductivism turn (...)
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  2. Katrina L. Sifferd (2014). What Does It Mean to Be a Mechanism? Stephen Morse, Non-Reductivism, and Mental Causation. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-17.
    Stephen Morse seems to have adopted a controversial position regarding the mindbody relationship: John Searle’s non-reductivism, which claims that conscious mental states are causal yet not reducible to their underlying brain states. Searle’s position has been roundly criticized, with some arguing the theory taken as a whole is incoherent. In this paper I review these criticisms and add my own, concluding that Searle’s position is indeed contradictory, both internally and with regard to Morse's other views. Thus I argue (...)
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  3.  16
    Michael Welbourne (2002). Is Hume Really a Reductivist? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (2):407-423.
    Coady misrepresents Hume as a reductivist about testimony. Hume occasionally writes carelessly as if what goes for beliefs based on induction will also go for beliefs obtained from testimony. But, in fact, he has no theory of testimony at all, though in his more considered remarks he rightly thinks, as does Reid, that the natural response to a bit of testimony is simply to accept the information which it contains. The sense in which we owe the beliefs we get from (...)
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  4.  33
    David Wood (1997). Reductivism, Retributivism, and the Civil Detention of Dangerous Offenders. Utilitas 9 (1):131.
    The paper examines one objection to the suggestion that, rather than being subjected to extended prison sentences on the one hand, or simply released on the other, dangerous offenders should be in principle liable to some form of civil detention on completion of their normal sentences. This objection raises the spectre of a, pursuing various reductivist means outside the criminal justice system. The objection also threatens to undermine dualist theories of punishment, theories which combine reductivist and retributivist considerations. The paper (...)
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  5. Edmund L. Pincoffs (1989). Quadaries and Virtues: Against Reductivism in Ethics. Philosophical Review 98 (2):249-251.
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  6. William Hasker (2003). How Not to Be a Reductivist. Progress in Complexity, Information, and Design 2.
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  7.  15
    David Carr (2002). Metaphysics, Reductivism, and Spiritual Discourse. Zygon 37 (2):491-510.
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  8.  12
    G. Newey (1997). Against Thin-Property Reductivism: Toleration as Supererogatory. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 31 (2):231-249.
  9.  14
    Michael Byron (2000). Virtue and the Reductivist Challenge. Contemporary Philosophy 22:34-41.
    In a recent paper, Philip Kitcher boldly challenges the very idea of objectivism in ethics.1 The structure of his argument is disarmingly simple: objectivist moral theories must take a certain explanatory form. If they take that form, then they fail on their own terms. Hence objectivism cannot be a satisfactory theory. Proving impossibility is a dicey matter, and Kitcher qualifies his premises and conclusions in ways that my summary misses. His arguments are nuanced, and he never states his conclusion as (...)
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  10. Joseph Shieber (1999). Reid on Cartesianism With Regard to Testimony: A Non-Reductivist Reappraisal. Reid Studies 2 (2):59-69.
  11.  6
    Mary Midgley (1984). Reductivism, Fatalism and Sociobiology. Journal of Applied Philosophy 1 (1):107-114.
  12.  1
    Russell W. Gough (1995). On Reaching First Base With a “Science” of Moral Development In Sport: Problems With Scientific Objectivity and Reductivism. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 22 (1):11-25.
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  13. R. Paden (1989). E. Pincoffs, "Quandaries and Virtues: Against Reductivism in Ethics". [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 23 (1):79.
     
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  14. Sebastian Watzl (2011). The Nature of Attention. Philosophy Compass 6 (11):842-853.
    What is attention? Attention is often seen as a subject matter for the hard sciences of cognitive and brain processes, and is understood in terms of sub-personal mechanisms and processes. Correspondingly, there still is a stark contrast between the central role attention plays for the empirical investigation of the mind in psychology and the neurosciences, and its relative neglect in philosophy. Yet, over the past years, several philosophers have challenged the standard conception. A number of interesting philosophical questions concerning the (...)
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  15. Giuseppina D'Oro (2005). Idealism and the Philosophy of Mind. Inquiry 48 (5):395-412.
    This paper defends an idealist form of non-reductivism in the philosophy of mind. I refer to it as a kind of conceptual dualism without substance dualism. I contrast this idealist alternative with the two most widespread forms of non-reductivism: multiple realisability functionalism and anomalous monism. I argue first, that functionalism fails to challenge seriously the claim for methodological unity since it is quite comfortable with the idea that it is possible to articulate a descriptive theory of the mind. (...)
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  16.  21
    Helen Frowe (2014). Defensive Killing: An Essay on War and Self-Defence. Oxford University Press.
    I think that Thomson would want to endorse a permission for Victim to kill a person who maliciously blocks his escape route from some lethal threat—it seems very plausible that such a culpable obstructor would be a legitimate target of ...
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  17.  15
    Helen Frowe & Gerald Lang (eds.) (2014). How We Fight: Ethics in War. OUP.
    How We Fight: Ethics in War contains ten groundbreaking essays by some of the leading philosophers of war. The essays offer new perspectives on key debates including pacifism, punitive justifications for war, the distribution of risk between combatants and non-combatants, the structure of 'just war theory', and bases of individual liability in war.
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  18.  38
    Paul Raymont (2001). Are Mental Properties Causally Relevant? Dialogue 40 (3):509-528.
    Non-reductive physicalists are increasingly regarded as unwitting epiphenomenalists, since their refusal to reduce mental features to physical properties allegedly implies that while there are mental causes, none of these causes produces its effects in virtue of being the type of mental state that it is. I examine, and reject, the “trope” response to this charge. I take the failure of the trope model of causal relevance to be instructive, since it illustrates a confusion that lies at the heart of the (...)
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  19.  26
    Robert Sinclair (2005). The Philosophical Significance of Triangulation: Locating Davidson's Non-Reductive Naturalism. Metaphilosophy 36 (5):708-728.
  20. A. D. Smith (1993). Non-Reductive Physicalism? In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press
  21. Willem M. de Muynck (2003). Wide Physical Realization. Inquiry 46 (1):97-111.
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  22. Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder (2014). Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
    This paper compares two alternative explanations of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge (i.e., the claim that whether an agent knows that p can depend on pragmatic factors). After reviewing the evidence for such pragmatic encroachment, we ask how it is best explained, assuming it obtains. Several authors have recently argued that the best explanation is provided by a particular account of belief, which we call pragmatic credal reductivism. On this view, what it is for an agent to believe a proposition (...)
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  23. Cristian Constantinescu (2014). Moral Vagueness: A Dilemma for Non-Naturalism. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 9. Oxford University Press 152-185.
    In this paper I explore the implications of moral vagueness (viz., the vagueness of moral predicates) for non-naturalist metaethical theories like those recently championed by Shafer-Landau, Parfit, and others. I characterise non-naturalism in terms of its commitment to 7 theses: Cognitivism, Correspondence, Atomism, Objectivism, Supervenience, Non-reductivism, and Rationalism. I start by offering a number of reasons for thinking that moral predicates are vague in the same way in which ‘red’, ‘tall’, and ‘heap’ are said to be. I then argue (...)
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  24. Rich Cameron (2004). How to Be a Realist About Sui Generis Teleology Yet Feel at Home in the 21st Century. The Monist 87 (1):72-95.
    The reigning orthodoxy on biological teleology assumes that teleology either must be reduced (or eliminated) or it depends on a supernatural agent. The dominant orthodox sect rejects supernaturalism and eliminitivism, and, given the poverty of competing views has been allowed to become complacent about the adequacy of favored reductivist accounts. These are beset by more serious problems than proponents acknowledge. Moreover, the assumption underlying orthodoxy is false; there is an alternative scientifically and philosophically plausible naturalistic account of teleology. We can (...)
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  25. Miranda Fricker (1998). Rational Authority and Social Power: Towards a Truly Social Epistemology. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):159–177.
    This paper explores the relation between rational authority and social power, proceeding by way of a philosophical genealogy derived from Edward Craig's Knowledge and the State of Nature. The position advocated avoids the errors both of the 'traditionalist' (who regards the socio-political as irrelevant to epistemology) and of the 'reductivist' (who regards reason as just another form of social power). The argument is that a norm of credibility governs epistemic practice in the state of nature, which, when socially manifested, is (...)
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  26. Mathias Frisch (2011). From Arbuthnot to Boltzmann: The Past Hypothesis, the Best System, and the Special Sciences. Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1001-1011.
    In recent work on the foundations of statistical mechanics and the arrow of time, Barry Loewer and David Albert have developed a view that defends both a best system account of laws and a physicalist fundamentalism. I argue that there is a tension between their account of laws, which emphasizes the pragmatic element in assessing the relative strength of different deductive systems, and their reductivism or funda- mentalism. If we take the pragmatic dimension in their account seriously, then the (...)
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  27.  89
    Jesper Kallestrup (2009). Knowledge-Wh and the Problem of Convergent Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):468-476.
    Call knowledge where so-and-so, knowledge who so-and-so, etc., knowledge-wh. The reductive view says that knowledge-wh reduces to the two-place knowledge relation Ksp. Schaffer argues that this view has no viable response to the problem of convergent knowledge: how can a knowing-wh ascription be reduced to a Ksp ascription if a second knowing-wh ascription intuitively inequivalent to the first can be reduced to the same Ksp ascription? Instead he suggests that knowledge-wh be understood as a three-place knowledge relation Kspq, where q (...)
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  28. Rich Cameron (2003). The Ontology of Aristotle's Final Cause. Apeiron 35 (2):153-79.
    Modern philosophy is, for what appear to be good reasons, uniformly hostile to sui generis final causes. And motivated to develop philosophically and scientifically plausible interpretations, scholars have increasingly offered reductivist and eliminitivist accounts of Aristotle's teleological commitment. This trend in contemporary scholarship is misguided. We have strong grounds to believe Aristotle accepted unreduced sui generis teleology, and reductivist and eliminitivist accounts face insurmountable textual and philosophical difficulties. We offer Aristotelians cold comfort by replacing his apparent view with failed accounts. (...)
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  29.  63
    Lorraine Code (1996). What Is Natural About Epistemology Naturalized? American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1):1 - 22.
    I evaluate post-Quinean naturalized epistemology as a resource for postcolonial and feminist epistemology. I argue that naturalistic inquiry into material conditions and institutions of knowledge production has most to offer epistemologists committed to maintaining continuity with the knowledge production of specifically located knowers. Yet naturalistic denigrations of folk epistemic practices and stereotyped, hence often oppressive, readings of human nature challenge the naturalness of the nature they claim to study. I outline an ecologically modelled epistemology that focuses on questions of epistemic (...)
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  30.  15
    Karyn L. Freedman (2015). Testimony and Epistemic Risk: The Dependence Account. Social Epistemology 29 (3):251-269.
    In this paper, I give an answer to the central epistemic question regarding the normative requirements for beliefs based on testimony. My suggestion here is that our best strategy for coming up with the conditions for justification is to look at cases where the adoption of the belief matters to the person considering it. This leads me to develop, in Part One of the paper, an interest-relative theory of justification, according to which our justification for a proposition p depends on (...)
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  31.  66
    Helen Frowe (2011). Self-Defence and the Principle of Non-Combatant Immunity. Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (4):530-546.
    The reductivist view of war holds that the moral rules of killing in war can be reduced to the moral rules that govern killing between individuals. Noam Zohar objects to reductivism on the grounds that the account of individual self-defence that best supports the rules of war will inadvertently sanction terrorist killings of non-combatants. I argue that even an extended account of self-defence—that is, an account that permits killing at least some innocent people to save one's own life—can support (...)
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  32.  31
    Agustin Vicente & Adrian Sampedro Leon (2014). Personas en el mundo: la perspectiva de la primera persona y el naturalismo. Análisis: Revista de Investigación Filosófica 1:161-180.
    In this paper we examine different answers to the question of what we are, focusing in particular on eliminative and reductivist proposals about persons or selves. We conclude that, as of today, dualism seems more reasonable than naturalism, if by naturalism we understand the thesis that psychological entities can be reduced or eliminated.
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  33.  20
    Jonathan Parry (2015). Liability, Community, and Just Conduct in War. Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3313-3333.
    Those of us who are not pacifists face an obvious challenge. Common-sense morality contains a stringent constraint on intentional killing, yet war involves homicide on a grand scale. If wars are to be morally justified, it needs be shown how this conflict can be reconciled. A major fault line running throughout the contemporary just war literature divides two approaches to attempting this reconciliation. On a ‘reductivist’ view, defended most prominently by Jeff McMahan, the conflict is largely illusory, since such killing (...)
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  34.  38
    Sebastian Watzl (2011). Review of Christopher Mole 'Attention is Cognitive Unison: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology'. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    A relatively detailed review (~ 4000 words) of Christopher Mole's (2010) book "Attention is Cognitive Unison". I suggest that Mole makes a good case against many types of reductivist accounts of attention, using the right kind of methodology. Yet, I argue that his adverbialist theory is not the best articulation of the crucial anti-reductivist insight. The distinction between adverbial and process-first phenomena he draws remains unclear, anti-reductivist process theories can escapte his arguments, and finally I provide an argument for (...)
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  35.  25
    J. K. Swindler (1996). Social Intentions: Aggregate, Collective, and General. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 26 (1):61-76.
    The literature on collective action largely ignores the constraints that moral principle places on action-prompting intentions. Here I suggest that neither individualism nor holism can account for the generality of intentional contents demanded by universalizability principles, respect for persons, or proactive altruism. Utilitarian and communitarian ethics are criticized for nominalism with respect to social intentions. The failure of individualism and holism as grounds for moral theory is confirmed by comparing Tuomela's reductivist analysis of we-intentions with Gilbert's analysis of social facts. (...)
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  36. Amie Thomasson, Ingarden and the Ontology of Cultural Objects.
    While Roman Ingarden is well known for his work in aesthetics and studies in ontology, one of his most important and lasting contributions has been largely overlooked: his approach to a general ontology of social and cultural objects. Ingarden himself discusses cultural objects other than works of art directly in the first section of “The Architectural Work”1, where he develops a particularly penetrating view of the ontology of buildings, flags, and churches. This text provides the core insight into how his (...)
     
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  37.  23
    Jeff Engelhardt (2015). Property Reductive Emergent Dualism. Philosophia 43 (1):63-75.
    This paper sketches and motivates a metaphysics of mind that is both substance dualist and, to a large extent, property reductive. Call it “property reductive emergent dualism”. Section “Emergent Dualism” gives the broad outlines of the view. Sections “Problems of Mental Causation” and “Theoretical Virtues” argue that it can claim several advantages over non-reductive physicalist theories of mind. Section “Problems of Mental Causation” considers metaphysical challenges to mental causation in detail. Section “Theoretical Virtues” considers overall theoretical virtues: ontological and ideological (...)
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  38.  59
    JeeLoo Liu (2008). From Realizer Functionalism to Nonreductive Physicalism. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:149-160.
    It has been noted in recent literature (e.g., Ross & Spurrett 2004, Kim 2006, McLaughlin 2006 and Cohen 2005) that functionalism can be separated into two varieties: one that emphasizes the role state, the other that emphasizes the realizer state. The former is called “role functionalism” while the latter has been called “realizer functionalism” (Ross & Spurrett 2004, Kim 2006, Cohen 2005) or “filler functionalism” (McLaughlin 2006). The separation between role functionalism and realizer functionalism mars the distinction traditionally made between (...)
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  39.  23
    Nicholas Laskowski (2014). How to Pull a Metaphysical Rabbit Out of an End-Relational Semantic Hat. Res Philosophica 91 (4):589-607.
    Analytic reductivism in metaethics has long been out of philosophical vogue. In Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normativity (2014), Stephen Finlay tries to resuscitate it by developing an analytic metaethical reductive naturalistic semantics for ‘good.’ He argues that an end-relational semantics is the simplest account that can explain all of the data concerning the term, and hence the most plausible theory of it. I argue that there are several assumptions that a reductive naturalist would need to make about (...)
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  40.  95
    Randolph Clarke (1999). Nonreductive Physicalism and the Causal Powers of the Mental. Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):295-322.
    Nonreductive physicalism is currently one of the most widely held views about the world in general and about the status of the mental in particular. However, the view has recently faced a series of powerful criticisms from, among others, Jaegwon Kim. In several papers, Kim has argued that the nonreductivist's view of the mental is an unstable position, one harboring contradictions that push it either to reductivism or to eliminativism. The problems arise, Kim maintains, when we consider the causal (...)
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  41.  5
    Naomi Choi (2011). The Post-Analytic Roots of Humanist Liberalism. History of European Ideas 37 (3):280-292.
    Isaiah Berlin and Stuart Hampshire's early engagements with logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy are examined as historical and philosophical reference points for locating an alternative – interpretive and humanist – tradition that developed within analytic philosophy at Oxford in the 20th C. Berlin and Hampshire's writings show the legacy of an enduring Idealist philosophy, one that nonetheless had to be revised and reinvented against the new empiricist challenges brought on by the rise of analytic philosophy. Berlin and Hampshire rejected (...)
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  42.  86
    Luís Duarte D'Almeida (2011). Legal Statements and Normative Language. Law and Philosophy 30 (2):167-199.
    Can there be a non-reductivist, source-based explanation of the use of normative language in statements describing the law and legal situations? This problem was formulated by Joseph Raz, who also claimed to have solved it. According to his well-known doctrine of ‘detached’ statements, normative legal statements can be informatively made by speakers who merely adopt, without necessarily sharing, the point of view of someone who accepts that legal norms are justified and ought to be followed. In this paper I defend (...)
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  43.  21
    Alessandro Salice (2015). There Are No Primitive We-Intentions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):695-715.
    John Searle’s account of collective intentions in action appears to have all the theoretical pros of the non-reductivist view on collective intentionality without the metaphysical cons of committing to the existence of group minds. According to Searle, when we collectively intend to do something together, we intend to cooperate in order to reach a collective goal. Intentions in the first-person plural form therefore have a particular psychological form or mode, for the we-intender conceives of his or her intended actions as (...)
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  44.  39
    Giuseppina D’Oro (2008). The Ontological Backlash: Why Did Mainstream Analytic Philosophy Lose Interest in the Philosophy of History? Philosophia 36 (4):403-415.
    This paper seeks to explain why mainstream analytic philosophy lost interest in the philosophy of history. It suggests that the reasons why the philosophy of history no longer commands the attention of mainstream analytical philosophy may be explained by the success of an ontological backlash against the linguistic turn and a view of philosophy as a form of conceptual analysis. In brief I argue that in the 1950s and 1960s the philosophy of (...)
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  45.  5
    David Wood (2002). Retribution, Crime Reduction and the Justification of Punishment. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 22 (2):301-321.
    The ‘dualist project’ in the philosophy of punishment is to show how retributivist and reductivist (utilitarian) considerations can be combined to provide an adequate justification of punishment. Three types of dualist theories can be distinguished—‘split‐level’, ‘integrated’ and ‘mere conjunction’. Split‐level theories (e.g. Hart, Rawls) must be rejected, as they relegate retributivist considerations to a lesser role. An attempted integrated theory is put forward, appealing to the reductivist means of deterrence. However, it cannot explain how the two types of considerations, retributivist (...)
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  46.  3
    Keith R. Peterson (2010). All That We Are: Philosophical Anthropology and Ecophilosophy. Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 6 (1):91-113.
    Ecophilosophers have long argued that addressing the environmental crisis not only demands reassessing the ethical aspects of human and nature relations, but also prevailing theories of human nature. Philosophical anthropology has historically taken this as its calling, and its resources may be profitably utilized in the context of ecophilosophy. Distinguishing between conservative and emancipatory naturalism leads to a critical discussion of the Cartesian culture/nature dualism. Marjorie Grene is discussed as a resource in the tradition of philosophical anthropology which enables us (...)
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  47.  91
    Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay, Semantic Naturalism and the New Naturalistic Fallacy.
    More than a century ago, G. E. Moore famously offered an extended inference to reject what are in effect two substantially different types of ethical naturalism. Although some naturalistic doctrines targeted by that inference make semantic claims that, if true, would entail certain metaphysical claims, it is also possible that those semantic doctrines could be false and the metaphysical ones true at the same time. For if semantic naturalism is true, then moral terms and sentences are reducible, by an analysis (...)
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  48.  20
    Jennifer Parks (2009). Rethinking Radical Politics in the Context of Assisted Reproductive Technology. Bioethics 23 (1):20-27.
    Radical feminists have argued for both the radical potential of assisted reproductive technology (ART) and its oppressive and damaging effects for women. This paper will address the question of what constitutes a radical feminist position on ART; I will argue that the very debate over whether ART liberates or oppresses women is misguided, and that instead the issue should be understood dialectically. Reproductive technologies are neither inherently liberating nor entirely oppressive: we can only understand the potential and effects by considering (...)
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  49.  82
    José Luis Bermúdez (1997). Reduction and the Self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4-5):458-466.
    Galen Strawson's keynote paper offers us one way of modelling the self, one that starts from the phenomenology of the sense of self and derives from that metaphysical conclusions about the nature of the self. Strawson is surely correct to hold that phenomenological considerations cannot be ignored in thinking about the metaphysics of the self. I am not as convinced as he is, however, that phenomenology is the royal road to metaphysics. What I want to sketch out in this short (...)
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  50.  15
    Hugh McCann (1995). Intention and Motivational Strength. Journal of Philosophical Research 20:571-583.
    One of the principal preoccupations of action theory is with the role of intention in the production of action. It should be expected that this role would be important, since an item of behavior appears to count as action just when there is some respect in which it is intended by the agent. This being the case, an account of the function of intention should provide insight into how human action might differ from other sorts of events, what the foundations (...)
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