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  1. Reese M. Heitner (2006). From a Phono-Logical Point of View: Neutralizing Quine's Argument Against Analyticity. Synthese 150 (1):15 - 39.
    Though largely unnoticed, in “Two Dogmas” Quine (1951, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Philosophical Review 60, 20–43. Reprinted in From a Logical Point of View, 20–46) himself invokes a distinction: a distinction between logical and analytic truths. Unlike analytic statements equating ‘bachelor’ with ‘unmarried man’, strictly logical tautologies relating two word-tokens of the same word-type, e.g., ‘bachelor’ and ‘bachelor’ are true merely in virtue of basic phonological form, putatively an exclusively non-semantic function of perceptual categorization or brute stimulus behavior. Yet natural (...)
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  2. Reese M. Heitner (2004). Book Review: Language, Brain and Cognitive Development: Essays in Honor of Jacques Mehler. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 14 (3):427-431.
  3. Reese M. Heitner (2004). The Cyclical Ontogeny of Ontology: An Integrated Developmental Account of Object and Speech Categorization. Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):45 – 57.
    More than a decade of experimental research confirms that external linguistic information provided in the form of word labels can induce a "mutually exclusive" bias against double naming and lead children to infer the name of novel objects and parts (Markman, 1989). Linguistic labels have also been shown to encourage more sophisticated reasoning, particularly with respect to superordinate and atypical object categorization (Gelman & Coley, 1990; Waxman & Markow, 1995). By contrast, however, the inverse possibility that the linguistic labeling (...)
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  4. Reese M. Heitner (2002). Dennis Ross, Andrew Brook, and David Thompson, Eds., Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 12 (3):439-443.
  5. Reese M. Heitner (2000). Is Design Relative or Real? Dennett on Intentional Relativism and Physical Realism. Minds and Machines 10 (2):267-83.
    Dennett's intended rapprochement between physical realism and intentional relativism fails because it is premised upon conflicting arguments governing the status of design. Indeed, Dennett's remarks on design serve to highlight tensions buried deep within his theory. For inasmuch as Dennett succeeds in objectifying attributions of design, attributions of intentionality readily follow suit, leading to a form of intentional realism. But inasmuch as Dennett is successful in relativizing attributions of design, scientific realism at large is subject to renewed anti-realistic criticism. Dennettian-inspired (...)
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