Kant's doctrine of the radical evil in human nature invites at least two serious worries: first, it is unclear how Kant could establish the claim that all human beings adopt an evil maxim; second, this claim seems to conflict with central features of Kant's doctrine of freedom. I argue, via criticisms of various charitable interpretations, that these problems are indeed insuperable if we read Kant as trying to establish that all human beings are evil as a matter of fact. I (...) then develop an alternative reading that avoids these problems. On my reading, Kant transforms the complaint that humans are evil into a prescriptive regulative principle. Although we cannot know whether all human beings really are evil, we ought to presuppose “inextirpable” human evil in the context of moral “ascetic”, the practical field that answers to the duty of moral self-perfection and that aims at the development of virtue. (shrink)

This paper discusses a structural analogy between Kant’s theory of regulative ideas, as he develops it in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, and Crispin Wright’s theory of epistemic entitlements. First, I argue that certain exegetical difficulties with respect to the Appendix rest on serious systematic problems, which – given other assumptions of the Critique of Pure Reason – Kant is unable to solve. Second, I argue that because of the identified structural analogy between Kant’s and Wright’s views (...) the project Kant pursues in the Appendix can be rehabilitated by recourse to Wright’s theory. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Kant’s methodological remarks in the ‘Idea for a universal history’ against the background of the Critique of pure reason. I argue that Kant’s approach to the function of regulative ideas of human history as a whole may still be fruitful. This approach allows for regulative ideas that are grand in scope, but modest and fallibilistic in their epistemic status. Kant’s methodological analysis should be distinguished from the specific teleological model of history (...) he developed on its basis, however, because this model can no longer be appropriated for current purposes.Keywords: Immanuel Kant; Philosophy of history; Historiography; Teleology; Regulative ideas. (shrink)

This paper argues that the concept of truth cannot be explained with the help of the idea of justification under ideal conditions. Truth is not a regulative idea. The attempt to replace a metaphysical correspondence theory of truth with one that is conceptually epistemic does not provide an exit from metaphysics. Truth and its justification do not coincide with reference to the ascription of judgements and beliefs. To save the normative power of truth no Archemedean point is needed.

Why is there so much attention on Kant's global politics in present day law and philosophy? This book argues that to understand the complexities of our current legal-institutional arrangements, we first need an insight into Kant's global politics, and highlights the potential fruitfulness of Kant's cosmopolitan thought for contemporary political thinking. It adopts a double methodological strategy by reconstructing a genealogical conceptual journey showing the development of international law, as well as introducing an interpretation of cosmopolitanism centered on Kant's theory (...) of a metaphysics of freedom. The result is a novel focus on Kant's notion of the world republic. Rather than considering such political entity as something empirically realizable, this book argues that the world republic stands as a way of thinking about international politics and that the possibility of progression towards peace would result from a regulative use of the idea of a world republic. (shrink)

With this paper I analyze Kant’s account of the human vocation to cosmopolitanism discussed in the last section of the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (7:321-333) and show how Kant’s notion of cosmopolitanism requires the cooperation of pure reason and pragmatic anthropology. My main thesis is that pure reason provides regulative ideas, thereby maintaining a foundational role, and pragmatic anthropology provides empirical evidence, thereby reinforcing the theoretical and practical status of reason’s ideas. In developing my (...) analysis, I argue that Kant reframes the question ‘What is the human being?’ in a non-essential way, foregrounds a moral practical concern, and assigns freedom an unprecedented role. Finally, I relate my analysis to two questions frequently discussed in Kant scholarship, namely the problem of whether the Anthropology has only a pragmatic or also a moral scope and the problem of the relation between the Anthropology and Kant’s critical system. (shrink)

La critique de la métaphysique dans la Dialectique transcendantale de la Critique de la raison pure débouche sur la doctrine de l’usage régulateur des idées transcendantales de la raison pure. La théorie de l’usage régulateur de ces idées est relativement abstraite et demande à être clarifiée. Kant affirme que ces idées ont un usage dans les sciences empiriques. Cependant il ne spécifie pas quel usage les sciences peuvent faire de ces idées. Dans cet article je compare les caractéristiques des idées (...) transcendantales aux caractéristiques des modèles scientifiques. Ainsi la thèse principale de mon article est que la théorie kantienne de l’usage régulateur des idées est comparable à la modélisation en science. C’est ce que je nomme « l’approche modélisatrice des idées transcendantales chez Kant ». D’après cette interprétation, on trouve chez ce dernier une conception relativement élaborée de la modélisation que l’on peut comprendre comme signifiant que la métaphysique fournit aux sciences les formes les plus universelles de modèles qui peuvent être spécifiés pour des objectifs particuliers par les sciences. (shrink)

Kant's theory of the regulative use of ideas of reason has been clarified considerably in recent scholarship. Little attention has been paid, however, to the question of whether the three classes of transcendental ideas—psychological, cosmological, and theological—may differ with regard to their regulative use. This article argues that there is a fundamental difference between the classes of ideas in this respect and that an examination of this heterogeneity can provide much‐needed insight into Kant's account of (...) the utility of the cosmological ideas. First, I set out Kant's distinction between the cosmological ideas and their psychological and theological counterparts. Second, I clarify the two distinct regulative uses of each cosmological idea. I argue that the two opposed sides of the cosmological antinomies provide two different heuristic functions, aligned with the theoretical and practical interests of reason. (shrink)

Since the 1980s, there has been a steady growth of interest in the psychological mechanisms that regulate normal emotional experience. In this same period, cognitive-experimental researchers have sought to delineate the information processing biases that characterize emotional disorders. Exciting potential synergies exist between these two areas of investigation. In this article, we consider ways in which reciprocal benefits could be gained by the constructive transfer of theoretical ideas and methodological approaches between emotion regulation researchers and cognitive-experimental investigators. We also (...) discuss how recent innovations within each field can profitably impact upon progress within the other. It is concluded that the overlap in conceptual constructs, and the convergence of complementary investigative techniques, between these two research domains, provide opportunities for creative synthesis that could significantly enrich understanding of normal and abnormal emotion across future years. (shrink)

I argue that gendered stereotypes, gendered emotions and attitudes, and display rules can influence extrinsic regulation stages, making failure points likely to occur in gendered-context and for reasons that the emotion regulation literature has not given adequate attention to. As a result, I argue for ‘feminist emotional intelligence’ as a way to help escape these failures. Feminist emotional intelligence, on my view, is a nonideal ability-based approach that equips a person to effectively reason about emotions through an intersectional lens and (...) use emotions to inform how we think and react to the world. This includes being attuned to the ways in which the world and our emotional lives are structured by and favors men. It stresses the need to be attuned to, as well as resist and challenge gender-based stereotypes and attitudes around emotions, paying close attention to the ways those stereotypes, norms, and attitudes differ across race, class, ethnicity, et cetera. (shrink)

Endocrinologists apply the idea of feedback loops to explain how hormones regulate certain bodily functions such as glucose metabolism. In particular, feedback loops focus on the maintenance of the plasma concentrations of glucose within a narrow range. Here, we put forward a different, organicist perspective on the endocrine regulation of glycaemia, by relying on the pivotal concept of closure of constraints. From this perspective, biological systems are understood as organized ones, which means that they are constituted of a set of (...) mutually dependent functional structures acting as constraints, whose maintenance depends on their reciprocal interactions. Closure refers specifically to the mutual dependence among functional constraints in an organism. We show that, when compared to feedback loops, organizational closure can generate much richer descriptions of the processes and constraints at play in the metabolism and regulation of glycaemia, by making explicit the different hierarchical orders involved. We expect that the proposed theoretical framework will open the way to the construction of original mathematical models, which would provide a better understanding of endocrine regulation from an organicist perspective. (shrink)

Scientific models typically contain idealizations, or assumptions that are known not to be true. Philosophers have long questioned the nature of idealizations: Are they heuristic tools that will be abandoned? Or rather fictional representations of reality? And how can we reconcile them with realism about knowledge of nature? Immanuel Kant developed an account of scientific investigation that can inspire a new approach to the contemporary debate. Kant argued that scientific investigation is possible only if guided by ideal assumptions—what he calls (...) “regulative ideas”. These ideas are not true of objects of nature, and yet they are not heuristic tools or fictional represen- tations. They are necessary rules governing the construction and assessment of scientific explanations. In this paper, I suggest that some idealizations can be interpreted as having necessary regulative value and as being compatible with scientific realism. I first analyze the puzzle of the nature of idealization and present the main approaches to this topic in the literature. Second, I reconsider the puzzle vis-a-vis a restricted, Kantian definition of idealization and a novel characterization of the relation between idealization and truth. Finally, I discuss in detail an example of idealization (the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium) along the suggested Kantian lines. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant is strict about the limits of self-knowledge: our inner sense gives us only appearances, never the reality, of ourselves. Kant may seem to begin his inquiries with an uncritical conception of cognitive limits, but in Kant and the Subject of Critique, Avery Goldman argues that, even for Kant, a reflective act must take place before any judgment occurs. Building on Kant’s metaphysics, which uses the soul, the world, and God as regulative principles, Goldman demonstrates how Kant can (...) open doors to reflection, analysis, language, sensibility, and understanding. By establishing a regulative self, Goldman offers a way to bring unity to the subject through Kant’s seemingly circular reasoning, allowing for critique and, ultimately, knowledge. (shrink)

This paper defends a key aspect of the Peircean conception of truth—the idea that truth is in some sense epistemically-constrained. It does so by exploring parallels between Peirce’s epistemology of inquiry and that of Wittgenstein in On Certainty. The central argument defends a Peircean claim about truth by appeal to a view shared by Peirce and Wittgenstein about the structure of reasons. This view relies on the idea that certain claims have a special epistemic status, or function as what are (...) popularly called ‘hinge propositions’. (shrink)

In July 2014, the roboticist Ronald Arkin suggested that child sex robots could be used to treat those with paedophilic predilections in the same way that methadone is used to treat heroin addicts. Taking this onboard, it would seem that there is reason to experiment with the regulation of this technology. But most people seem to disagree with this idea, with legal authorities in both the UK and US taking steps to outlaw such devices. In this paper, I subject these (...) different regulatory attitudes to critical scrutiny. In doing so, I make three main contributions to the debate. First, I present a framework for thinking about the regulatory options that we confront when dealing with child sex robots. Second, I argue that there is a prima facie case for restrictive regulation, but that this is contingent on whether Arkin’s hypothesis has a reasonable prospect of being successfully tested. Third, I argue that Arkin’s hypothesis probably does not have a reasonable prospect of being successfully tested. Consequently, we should proceed with utmost caution when it comes to this technology. (shrink)

In the ‘Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic’ of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant contends that the idea of God has a positive regulative role in the systematization of empirical knowledge. But why is this regulative role assigned to this specific idea? Kant’s account is rather opaque and this question has also not received much attention in the literature. In this paper I argue that an adequate understanding of the regulative role of the idea of God depends (...) on the specific metaphysical content Kant attributes to it in the Critique and other writings. I show that neither a heuristic principle of conceptual systematicity, nor conceiving God as a hypothesis of an intelligent designer, can satisfy the demands of reason to make the unity and necessity of the laws of nature intelligible. Regarding the positive account about the metaphysical content of the idea of God, I support my argument by referring to Kant’s pre-critical discussion of the usefulness of the conception of God for the project of science, and by expounding Kant’s critical account of the necessity of the laws of nature. Thus my account sheds light on the continuity of Kant’s conception of God and his appropriation of his own rationalistic metaphysics. (shrink)

Recently, several scholars have argued in support of the idea that folk psychology involves a primary capacity for regulating our mental states and patterns of behavior in accordance with a bunch of shared social norms and routines :259–281, 2015; Zawidzki, Philosophical Explorations 11:193–210, 2008; Zawidzki, Mindshaping: A new framework for understanding human social cognition, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2013). This regulative view shares with the classical Dennettian intentional stance its emphasis on the normative character of human socio-cognitive capacities. Given those (...) similarities, it makes sense to assess the regulative view by considering some of the classical arguments against the normative nature of the intentional stance :76–100, 1985; Stich, Philosophical Topics 12:39–62, 1981; Stich, The fragmentation of reason: Preface to a pragmatic theory of cognitive evaluation, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1990). The aim of this paper is to argue that the priority that the regulative view lays on the pluralistic and regulative character of folk psychology leaves the theory well-placed to resist these arguments. In this sense, the regulative view possesses better theoretical options to defend the normative character of human social cognition. (shrink)

The Morphogenetic Régulation approach (MR) contributes to the Morphogenetic Approach by explaining the material and ideational origins of change and stasis in agency, structure, and culture. In this paper, we focus on the expressive quality of ideas and systemic persistence in three research projects. The first demystifies inclusive governance and its adverse impacts. It shows how, contrary to institutions of governance, inclusiveness is not simply a norm but actually the explication of corporate agents’ ideas about rational choice institutionalism (...) which leads to adverse impacts on vulnerable groups and ecologies known as adverse inclusion. The second investigates the role of ideas as adequacy and self-explication in guiding Palestinian actors’ actions towards the deepening of neoliberalization in Palestine. The third explains the relevance of the systemic persistence problematique for understanding how three juxtaposed themes – Web2, Web3, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) – are shaping the political economy and infrastructure of the Internet. (shrink)

Recently, several scholars have argued in support of the idea that folk psychology involves a primary capacity for regulating our mental states and patterns of behavior in accordance with a bunch of shared social norms and routines :259–281, 2015; Zawidzki, Philosophical Explorations 11:193–210, 2008; Zawidzki, Mindshaping: A new framework for understanding human social cognition, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2013). This regulative view shares with the classical Dennettian intentional stance its emphasis on the normative character of human socio-cognitive capacities. Given those (...) similarities, it makes sense to assess the regulative view by considering some of the classical arguments against the normative nature of the intentional stance :76–100, 1985; Stich, Philosophical Topics 12:39–62, 1981; Stich, The fragmentation of reason: Preface to a pragmatic theory of cognitive evaluation, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1990). The aim of this paper is to argue that the priority that the regulative view lays on the pluralistic and regulative character of folk psychology leaves the theory well-placed to resist these arguments. In this sense, the regulative view possesses better theoretical options to defend the normative character of human social cognition. (shrink)

Why do laws and regulations marking boundaries between humans and other animals proliferate amid widespread proclamations of the waning of the species concept and the consensus that life is a continuum? Here I consider a recent spate of new guidelines and regulations in the United Kingdom and United States that work to estrange human bodies from other animals in biomedicine. Using the idea of a bioconstitutional moment to understand how state institutions deliberate over “human–animal chimeras,” I address how nations differently (...) establish separations between humans and other animals. New chimeric entities, containing human hereditary material, have consecrated regulatory ground and signify increased attention to fields of research that have long used interspecies mixing. Regulators and policy makers now find themselves in a curious position. On the one hand, they continue to regulate the estrangement between humans and other animals, but on the other, they support the creation of chimeric life––a form of life that draws into question the very basis of such separations. (shrink)

Appeal to the idea of an epistemic virtue promises insight into our practices of epistemic evaluation through employing a distinctive view of the ways in which we formulate and respond to reasons. Traits of ‘epistemic character’ guide our reasoning and reflection, and can be responsible for various forms of irrationality. One component of such a view is that emotions, sentiments and other affective states are far more central to questions of epistemic rationality than is commonly supposed. This paper explains why (...) this is so, and then illustrates the value of this way of looking at the matter by considering two particular examples: the role of states of doubt in regulating our deliberations and inquiries; and the character of our response to some distinctive kinds of irrationality. This will involve a brief discussion of some forms of epistemic akrasia. (shrink)

In his Kant on Laws, Eric Watkins presents an account of reason on which the principles of specification and continuity are regulative instructions to search for different kinds of the unconditioned. I suggest that we correct Watkins’ account in two ways. First, we need to complete Watkins’ claim to the plurality of the unconditioned: reason aims for three kinds of the unconditioned, associated with the lowest, next and highest concepts. Second, we need to look beyond reason’s search for the (...) unconditioned in order to properly understand the nature of the aim of reason. I argue that we construe reason’s aim as the systematic unity of cognition considered as a whole or, in Kant’s teleological terms, as the realization of an ‘idea’, or a ‘purposive unity’. (shrink)

Much contemporary biology consists of identifying the molecular components that associate to perform biological functions, then discovering how these functions are controlled. The concept of control is key to biological understanding, at least of the physiological kind; identifying regulators of processes underpins ideas of causality and allows complicated, multicomponent systems to be summarized in relatively simple diagrams and models. Unfortunately, as this article demonstrates by drawing on published articles, there is a growing tendency for authors to claim that a (...) molecule is a ‘regulator’ of something on evidence that cannot support the conclusion. In particular, gene knockout experiments, which can demonstrate only that a molecule is necessary for a process, are all too frequently being misinterpreted as revealing regulation. This logical error threatens to blur the important distinction between regulation and mere necessity and therefore to weaken one of our strongest tools for comprehending how organisms work. (shrink)

Appeal to the idea of an epistemic virtue promises insight into our practices of epistemic evaluation through employing a distinctive view of the ways in which we formulate and respond to reasons. Traits of ‘epistemic character’ guide our reasoning and reflection, and can be responsible for various forms of irrationality. One component of such a view is that emotions, sentiments and other affective states are far more central to questions of epistemic rationality than is commonly supposed. This paper explains why (...) this is so, and then illustrates the value of this way of looking at the matter by considering two particular examples: the role of states of doubt in regulating our deliberations and inquiries; and the character of our response to some distinctive kinds of irrationality. This will involve a brief discussion of some forms of epistemic akrasia. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this paper I argue that liberal democratic communities are justified in regulating the activities of their members because of the inevitable existence of conflicting conceptions of what is considered as morally right. This will often lead to tension and disputes, and in such circumstances, reliance on peaceful or orderly co‐existence will not normally suffice. In such pluralistic societies, the boundary between permissible and impermissible activities will be unclear; and this becomes a particular concern in controversial issues which raise (...) specific anxieties and uncertainty. One context that has repeatedly raised issues in this regard is that of biotechnology and, in particular, the recent stem cell debate, on which this paper concentrates. While such developments have the potential to make significant improvements to therapeutic progress, we should also be sceptical because predicting the impact of these developments remains uncertain and complex. For the sake of socio‐political stability, it will therefore be necessary to enact and enforce rules which limit these competing claims in public policy but which may not be compatible with what individual moral commitments ideally permit. One way to achieve this is to establish procedural frameworks to resolve potential disputes in the public sphere about what is right, wrong, or permissible conduct. I argue that for one to commit to authoritative regulation, an idea of harm prevention through state intervention is necessary; and that this requires optimum mechanisms of procedure which allow the individual the opportunity to compromise and yet to continue to oppose or fight for changes as demanded by his or her moral position. (shrink)

This essay focuses on the interrelationship of regulation and private life in human rights. It argues three main points. Article 8 connects the question of protection of private lives and privacies with the question of their management. Thus, Article 8 orients regulatory practices to private lives and privacies. Article 8’s holders are autonomous to the extent that laws respect their private lives and privacies. They are not autonomous in a ‘pre-political’ sense, where we might expect legal rules to protect an (...) already autonomous private life or privacy. Article 8 does not simply prohibit or permit acts. In certain cases, it also ‘enables’ acts. Then, this essay introduces the idea of oikopolitics. This idea allows us to capture these three points in a useful manner. By this idea, this essay means the context where the interpretation of privacy reaches out to broader social practices and norms and where the status of rights-holders living their private lives makes them objects of attention. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that liberal democratic communities are justified in regulating the activities of their members because of the inevitable existence of conflicting conceptions of what is considered as morally right. This will often lead to tension and disputes, and in such circumstances, reliance on peaceful or orderly co‐existence will not normally suffice. In such pluralistic societies, the boundary between permissible and impermissible activities will be unclear; and this becomes a particular concern in controversial issues which raise specific (...) anxieties and uncertainty. One context that has repeatedly raised issues in this regard is that of biotechnology and, in particular, the recent stem cell debate, on which this paper concentrates. While such developments have the potential to make significant improvements to therapeutic progress, we should also be sceptical because predicting the impact of these developments remains uncertain and complex.For the sake of socio‐political stability, it will therefore be necessary to enact and enforce rules which limit these competing claims in public policy but which may not be compatible with what individual moral commitments ideally permit. One way to achieve this is to establish procedural frameworks to resolve potential disputes in the public sphere about what is right, wrong, or permissible conduct. I argue that for one to commit to authoritative regulation, an idea of harm prevention through state intervention is necessary; and that this requires optimum mechanisms of procedure which allow the individual the opportunity to compromise and yet to continue to oppose or fight for changes as demanded by his or her moral position. (shrink)

This book presents a thorough overview of a model of human functioning based on the idea that behavior is goal-directed and regulated by feedback control processes. It describes feedback processes and their application to behavior, considers goals and the idea that goals are organized hierarchically, examines affect as deriving from a different kind of feedback process, and analyzes how success expectancies influence whether people keep trying to attain goals or disengage. Later sections consider a series of emerging themes, including dynamic (...) systems as a model for shifting among goals, catastrophe theory as a model for persistence, and the question of whether behavior is controlled or instead 'emerges'. Three chapters consider the implications of these various ideas for understanding maladaptive behavior, and the closing chapter asks whether goals are a necessity of life. Throughout, theory is presented in the context of diverse issues that link the theory to other literatures. (shrink)

The dominant understanding of political corporate social responsibility suggests new, broader political roles for businesses in the globalized economy, challenging the classical liberal social order. In this paper, we show how the major framing of the political CSR discussion not only challenges the classical liberal social order but also goes against the more general political economic perspective of the regulated market economy. We argue that this latter tendency of the political CSR discussion is its main weakness. We introduce a Rawlsian (...) reframing of political CSR that is in line with the idea of a global-regulated market economy and compatible with some of the basic global ethical aims of the political CSR movement. (shrink)

Much health and safety regulation can be understood as the product of political coalitions between two groups. The first, consisting of persons with self-control issues, enlists the government as an intermediary. The second either expects to benefit from the success of the first, or anticipates gains from a tax imposed on the first group’s behavior. A political entrepreneur might plausibly turn these groups’ preferences into law. This public choice perspective on regulation provides a positive explanation of why it is more (...) likely that a legal system will engage in some health and safety programs than in others. The important break from the conventional view of regulation, as something that either controls externalities or is imposed paternalistically, is in advancing the idea that the government is an intermediary deployed by those who want help. Internalities, associated with collective action problems or with time inconsistent preferences, deserve equal billing. The discussion considers smoking regulation and other health and safety regulation, and then contrasts these with anti-obesity efforts where private contracting is a more feasible means of controlling internalities, and where political coalitions are less likely. (shrink)

Although modern technical and scientific developments in medicine are followed closely in Turkey, it cannot be claimed that the same is true in the field of bioethics. Yet, more and more attention is now being paid to bioethics and ethics training in health sciences. In addition, there are also legal regulations in bioethics, some of which are not so new. The objective of these regulations is to provide technical and administrative control. Ethical concerns are rather few. What attracts our attention (...) most in these regulations is the presence of the idea of "consent". (shrink)

ABSTRACT In discussions of the regulation of teaching, there are a number of issues which arise concerning how teachers understand the professional expectations upon them and the role that such standards play in supporting and maintaining the ethical dimensions of teachers’ practice. Arguably, teachers’ professional standards evolve to meet the needs of the societies in which they exist. Consequently, they provide a locus for analysis of the desires, aspirations and philosophical perspectives of the social and educational systems to which they (...) belong. Durkheim’s ideas about professional ethics provide a means of making sense of the complex and varied landscape of teacher regulation. They provide a way of seeing teacher professional standards as not constrained by neoliberal conceptions of regulation in which the fear of sanction may limit imaginative engagement with the profession. Instead, even within highly managerial systems, we begin to see professional standards as a prompt to engaged and ethical action for the greater good. In this sense, Durkheim’s work facilitates a way of seeing professional standards as having the capacity to magnify teachers’ innate potential for positive social impact regardless of the context in which they work. (shrink)

Feminist legal scholars and health care lawyers have long engaged with law's responses to the female reproductive body, especially on what the legal regulation of women's reproductive lives can tell us about the broader relationship between law and gender. Acknowledging this work and building upon it, Endowed considers the interaction of law and ideas of male reproductivity. In particular, it seeks to uncover what these regulatory moments can tell us about contemporary ideas and ideals of masculinity and the (...) male sexed body. Spanning topics such as male circumcision and the regulation of state access to Viagra, the book uncovers recurring motifs that define masculinity and the male body in the legal imagination. In looking to these understandings the book engages with broader questions regarding the relationship between law and gender and between masculinity and social organization. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to discuss theoretical arguments concerning the idea that emotional mimicry is an intrinsic part of our social being and thus can be considered a social act. For this, we will first present the theoretical assumptions underlying the Emotional Mimicry as Social Regulator view. We then provide a brief overview of recent developments in emotional mimicry research and specifically discuss new developments regarding the role of emotional mimicry in actual interactions and relationships, and individual differences (...) in emotional mimicry. We conclude with open questions for future research. (shrink)

In his Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kant asserts that laws of nature “carry with them an expression of necessity”. There is, however, widespread interpretive disagreement regarding the nature and source of the necessity of empirical laws of natural sciences in Kant's system. It is especially unclear how chemistry—a science without a clear, straightforward connection to the a priori principles of the understanding—could contain such genuine, empirical laws. Existing accounts of the necessity of causal laws unfortunately fail to illuminate the possibility (...) of non-physical laws. In this paper, I develop an alternative, ‘ideational’ account of natural laws, according to which ideas of reason necessitate the laws of some non-physical sciences. Chemical laws, for instance, are grounded on ideas of the elements, and the chemist aims to reduce her phenomena to these elements via experimentation. Although such ideas are beyond the possibility of experience, their postulation is necessary for the achievement of reason's theoretical ends: the unification and explanation of the cognitions of science. (shrink)