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  1. Robin Pope & Reinhard Selten (2010/2011). ‘Risk in a Simple Temporal Framework for Expected Utility Theory and for SKAT, the Stages of Knowledge Ahead Theory’, Risk and Decision Analysis, 2(1), 5-32. Selten Co-Author. Risk and Decision Analysis 2 (1).
    The paper re-expresses arguments against the normative validity of expected utility theory in Robin Pope (1983, 1991a, 1991b, 1985, 1995, 2000, 2001, 2005, 2006, 2007). These concern the neglect of the evolving stages of knowledge ahead (stages of what the future will bring). Such evolution is fundamental to an experience of risk, yet not consistently incorporated even in axiomatised temporal versions of expected utility. Its neglect entails a disregard of emotional and financial effects on well-being before a particular risk is (...)
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  2. Reinhard Selten, Abdolkarim Sadrieh & Klaus Abbink (1999). Money Does Not Induce Risk Neutral Behavior, but Binary Lotteries Do Even Worse. Theory and Decision 46 (3):213-252.
    If payoffs are tickets for binary lotteries, which involve only two money prizes, then rationality requires expected value maximization in tickets. This payoff scheme was increasingly used to induce risk neutrality in experiments. The experiment presented here involved lottery choice and evaluation tasks. One subject group was paid in binary lottery tickets, another directly in money. Significantly greater deviations from risk neutral behavior are observed with binary lottery payoffs. This discrepancy increases when subjects have easy access to the alternatives' expected (...)
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  3. Reinhard Selten (1998). Multistage Game Models and Delay Supergames. Theory and Decision 44 (1):1-36.
    The order of stages in a multistage game is often interpreted by looking at earlier stages as involving more long term decisions. For the purpose of making this interpretation precise, the notion of a delay supergame of a bounded multistage game is introduced. A multistage game is bounded if the length of play has an upper bound. A delay supergame is played over many periods. Decisions on all stages are made simultaneously, but with different delays until they become effective. The (...)
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  4. Reinhard Selten & Peter Hammerstein (1984). Gaps in Harley's Argument on Evolutionarily Stable Learning Rules and in the Logic of “Tit for Tat”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):115.
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  5. Reinhard Selten (1978). The Chain Store Paradox. Theory and Decision 9 (2):127-159.
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  6. Reinhard Selten (1977). Comments on Zadeh's Paper. Erkenntnis 11 (1):448 -.
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