Search results for 'Relativism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Paul Boghossian (2006). What is Relativism? In Patrick Greenough & Michael Lynch (eds.), Truth and Relativism. Clarendon Press. 13--37.score: 27.0
    Many philosophers, however, have been tempted to be relativists about specific domains of discourse, especially about those domains that have a normative character. Gilbert Harman, for example, has defended a relativistic view of morality, Richard Rorty a relativistic view of epistemic justification, and Crispin Wright a relativistic view of judgments of taste.¹ But what exactly is it to be a relativist about a given domain of discourse? The term ‘‘relativism’’ has, of course, been used in a bewildering variety of (...)
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  2. Markus Seidel (2011). Karl Mannheim, Relativism and Knowledge in the Natural Sciences – A Deviant Interpretation. In Richard Schantz & Markus Seidel (eds.), The Problem of Relativism in the Sociology of (Scientific) Knowledge. ontos.score: 27.0
    The paper focuses on one central aspect of Karl Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge: his exemption of the contents of mathematics and the natural sciences from sociological investigations. After emphasizing the importance of Mannheim’s contribution and his exemption-thesis to the history and development of the field and the problem of relativism, I survey several interpretations of the thesis – especially those put forward by proponents of the so-called ‘Strong Programme’. I argue that these interpretations do not get the philosophical background (...)
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  3. John MacFarlane (2007). Relativism and Disagreement. Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.score: 24.0
    The relativist's central objection to contextualism is that it fails to account for the disagreement we perceive in discourse about "subjective" matters, such as whether stewed prunes are delicious. If we are to adjudicate between contextualism and relativism, then, we must first get clear about what it is for two people to disagree. This question turns out to be surprisingly difficult to answer. A partial answer is given here; although it is incomplete, it does help shape what the relativist (...)
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  4. Seungbae Park (2011). Defence of Cultural Relativism. Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology 8 (1):159-170.score: 24.0
    I attempt to rebut the following standard objections against cultural relativism: 1. It is self-defeating for a cultural relativist to take the principle of tolerance as absolute; 2. There are universal moral rules, contrary to what cultural relativism claims; 3. If cultural relativism were true, Hitler’s genocidal actions would be right, social reformers would be wrong to go against their own culture, moral progress would be impossible, and an atrocious crime could be made moral by forming a (...)
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  5. Gideon Rosen (2007). The Case Against Epistemic Relativism: Reflections on Chapter 6 of Fear of Knowledge. Episteme 4 (1):10-29.score: 24.0
    According to one sort of epistemic relativist, normative epistemic claims (e.g., evidence E justifies hypothesis H) are never true or false simpliciter, but only relative to one or another epistemic system. In chapter 6 of Fear of Knowledge, Paul Boghossian objects to this view on the ground that its central notions cannot be explained, and that it cannot account for the normativity of epistemic discourse. This paper explores how the dogged relativist might respond.
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  6. David Capps, Michael P. Lynch & Daniel Massey (2009). A Coherent Moral Relativism. Synthese 166 (2):413 - 430.score: 24.0
    Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by considering a few problems such a position might face.
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  7. Xinli Wang (2009). On Davidson's Refutation of Conceptual Schemes and Conceptual Relativism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):140-164.score: 24.0
    Despite Donald Davidson's influential criticism of the very notion of conceptual schemes, the notion continues enjoying its popularity in contemporary philosophy and, accordingly, conceptual relativism is still very much alive. There is one major reason responsible for Davidson's failure which has not been widely recognized: What Davidson attacks fiercely is not the very notion, but a notion of conceptual schemes, namely, the Quinean notion of conceptual schemes and its underlying Kantian scheme-content dualism. However, such a notion simply cannot carry (...)
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  8. John K. Davis (2010). An Alternative to Relativism. Philosophical Topics 38 (2):17-37.score: 24.0
    Some moral disagreements are so persistent that we suspect they are deep: we would disagree even when we have all relevant information and no one makes any mistakes (this is also known as faultless disagreement). The possibility of deep disagreement is thought to drive cognitivists toward relativism, but most cognitivists reject relativism. There is an alternative. According to divergentism, cognitivists can reject relativism while allowing for deep disagreement. This view has rarely been defended at length, but many (...)
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  9. H. G. Callaway (2009). Fear of Knowledge, Against Relativism and Constructivism – by Paul Artin Boghossian. Dialectica 63 (3):357-360.score: 24.0
    My review of Boghossian's book, Fear of Knowledge, is generally sympathetic toward his rejection of epistemic relativism and turns toward an examination of "constructivist" themes in light of an anti-nominalist perspective. In general terms, this is a fine little book, tightly argued, and well worth considerable attention--especially from the friends of relativism and those supporting versions of constructivism. (Constructivism + radical nominalism = relativism.).
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  10. Gilbert Harman (1996). Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Blackwell.score: 24.0
    Do moral questions have objective answers? In this great debate, Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, and moral scepticism.
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  11. Ram Neta (2007). In Defense of Epistemic Relativism. Episteme 4 (1):30-48.score: 24.0
    In Fear of Knowledge, Paul Boghossian argues against various forms of epistemic relativism. In this paper, I criticize Boghossian’s arguments against a particular variety of relativism. I then argue in favor of a thesis that is very similar to this variety of relativism.
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  12. Crispin Wright (2007). New Age Relativism and Epistemic Possibility: The Question of Evidence. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):262--283.score: 24.0
    What I am calling New Age Relativism is usually proposed as a thesis about the truth-conditions of utterances, where an utterance is an actual historic voicing or inscription of a sentence of a certain type. Roughly, it is the view that, for certain discourses, whether an utterance is true depends not just on the context of its making—when, where, to whom, by whom, in what language, and so on—and the “circumstances of evaluation”—the state of the world in relevant respects—but (...)
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  13. Mark Kalderon (2009). Epistemic Relativism. Philosophical Review 118 (2):225-240.score: 24.0
    A critical review of Paul Boghossian's Fear of Knowledge. I argue that the central argument against epistemic relativism fails and that even if the arguments of Fear of Knowledge worked perfectly on their own terms, Fear of Knowledge would fail to persuade the relativistically inclined.
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  14. J. Adam Carter (2013). Disagreement, Relativism and Doxastic Revision. Erkenntnis (1):1-18.score: 24.0
    I investigate the implication of the truth-relativist’s alleged ‘faultless disagreements’ for issues in the epistemology of disagreement. A conclusion I draw is that the type of disagreement the truth-relativist claims (as a key advantage over the contextualist) to preserve fails in principle to be epistemically significant in the way we should expect disagreements to be in social-epistemic practice. In particular, the fact of faultless disagreement fails to ever play the epistemically significant role of making doxastic revision (at least sometimes) rationally (...)
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  15. Andy Egan (2007). Epistemic Modals, Relativism and Assertion. Philosophical Studies 133 (1):1--22.score: 24.0
    I think that there are good reasons to adopt a relativist semantics for epistemic modal claims such as ``the treasure might be under the palm tree'', according to which such utterances determine a truth value relative to something finer-grained than just a world (or a <world, time> pair). Anyone who is inclined to relativise truth to more than just worlds and times faces a problem about assertion. It's easy to be puzzled about just what purpose would be served by assertions (...)
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  16. Max Kölbel (2009). The Evidence for Relativism. Synthese 166 (2):375-395.score: 24.0
    The aim of this paper is to examine the kind of evidence that might be adduced in support of relativist semantics of a kind that have recently been proposed for predicates of personal taste, for epistemic modals, for knowledge attributions and for other cases. I shall concentrate on the case of taste predicates, but what I have to say is easily transposed to the other cases just mentioned. I shall begin by considering in general the question of what kind of (...)
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  17. Gunnar Björnsson & Alexander Almér (2009). Contextualism, Assessor Relativism, and Insensitive Assessments. Logique Et Analyse 52 (208):363-372.score: 24.0
    Recently, contextualism about epistemic modals and predicates of taste have come under fire from advocates of assessment relativistic analyses. Contextualism, they have argued, fails to account for what we call "felicitous insensitive assessments". In this paper, we provide one hitherto overlooked way in which contextualists can embrace the phenomenon by slightly modifying an assumption that has remained in the background in most of the debate over contextualism and relativism. Finally, we briefly argue that the resulting contextualist account is at (...)
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  18. Stefano Predelli (2012). Indexicality, Intensionality, and Relativist Post-Semantics. Synthese 184 (2):121-136.score: 24.0
    This essay argues that relativist semantics provide fruitful frameworks for the study of the relationships between meaning and truth-conditions, and consequently for the analysis of the logical properties of expressions. After a discussion of the role of intensionality and indexicality within classic double-indexed semantics, I explain that the non-relativistic identification of the parameters needed for the definition of truth and for the interpretation of indexicals is grounded on considerations that are irrelevant for the assessment of the relationships between meaning and (...)
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  19. Robin McKenna (2012). Epistemic Contextualism, Epistemic Relativism and Disagreement. Philosophical Writings.score: 24.0
    In the recent philosophy of language literature there is a debate over whether contextualist accounts of the semantics of various terms can accommodate intuitions of disagreement in certain cases involving those terms. Relativists such as John MacFarlane have claimed that this motivates adopting a form of relativist semantics for these terms because the relativist can account for the same data as contextualists but doesn’t face this problem of disagreement (MacFarlane 2005, 2007 and 2009). In this paper I focus on the (...)
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  20. Aaron Z. Zimmerman (2007). Against Relativism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 133 (3):313-348.score: 24.0
    Recent years have brought relativistic accounts of knowledge, first-person belief, and future contingents to prominence. I discuss these views, distinguish non-trivial from trivial forms of relativism, and then argue against relativism in all of its substantive varieties.
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  21. Michael Glanzberg (2007). Context, Content, and Relativism. Philosophical Studies 136 (1):1--29.score: 24.0
    This paper argues against relativism, focusing on relativism based on the semantics of predicates of personal taste. It presents and defends a contextualist semantics for these predicates, derived from current work on gradable adjectives. It then considers metasemantic questions about the kinds of contextual parameters this semantics requires. It argues they are not metasemantically different from those in other gradable adjectives, and that contextual parameters of this sort are widespread in natural language. Furthermore, this paper shows that if (...)
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  22. Steven D. Hales (2009). Moral Relativism and Evolutionary Psychology. Synthese 166 (2):431 - 447.score: 24.0
    I argue that evolutionary strategies of kin selection and game-theoretic reciprocity are apt to generate agent-centered and agent- neutral moral intuitions, respectively. Such intuitions are the building blocks of moral theories, resulting in a fundamental schism between agent-centered theories on the one hand and agent-neutral theories on the other. An agent-neutral moral theory is one according to which everyone has the same duties and moral aims, no matter what their personal interests or interpersonal relationships. Agent-centered moral theories deny this and (...)
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  23. Ruth Macklin (1999). Against Relativism: Cultural Diversity and the Search for Ethical Universals in Medicine. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    This book provides an analysis of the debate surrounding cultural diversity, and attempts to reconcile the seemingly opposing views of "ethical imperialism," the belief that each individual is entitled to fundamental human rights, and cultural relativism, the belief that ethics must be relative to particular cultures and societies. The author examines the role of cultural tradition, often used as a defense against critical ethical judgments. Key issues in health and medicine are explored in the context of cultural diversity: the (...)
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  24. Duncan Pritchard (2009). Defusing Epistemic Relativism. Synthese 166 (2):397 - 412.score: 24.0
    This paper explores the question of whether there is an interesting form of specifically epistemic relativism available, a position which can lend support to claims of a broadly relativistic nature but which is not committed to relativism about truth. It is argued that the most plausible rendering of such a view turns out not to be the radical thesis that it is often represented as being.
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  25. Ugo Zilioli (2013). Protagoras Through Plato and Aristotle: A Case for the Philosophical Significance of Ancient Relativism. In Jan Van Ophuijsen, Marlein Van Raalte & Peter Stork (eds.), Protagoras of Abdera: the Man, his measure. Brill.score: 24.0
    In this contribution, I explore the treatment that Plato devotes to Protagoras’ relativism in the first section of the Theaetetus (151 E 1–186 E 12) where, among other things, the definition that knowledge is perception is put under scrutiny. What I aim to do is to understand the subtlety of Plato’s argument about Protagorean relativism and, at the same time, to assess its philosophical significance by revealing the inextric¬ability of ontological and epistemological aspects on which it is built (...)
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  26. Martin Montminy (2009). Contextualism, Relativism and Ordinary Speakers' Judgments. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):341 - 356.score: 24.0
    Some authors have recently claimed that relativism about knowledge sentences accommodates the context sensitivity of our use of such sentences as well as contextualism, while avoiding the counterintuitive consequences of contextualism regarding our inter-contextual judgments, that is, our judgments about knowledge claims made in other contexts. I argue that relativism, like contextualism, involves an error theory regarding a certain class of inter-contextual judgments.
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  27. Mohan Matthen (1985). Perception, Relativism, and Truth: Reflections on Plato's Theaetetus 152–160. Dialogue 24 (01):33-.score: 24.0
    The standard interpretation of "Theaetetus" 152-160 has Plato attribute to Protagoras a relativistic theory of truth and existence. It is argued here that in fact the individuals of Protagorean worlds are inter-Personal. (thus the Protagorean theory has public objects, but private truth). Also, a new interpretation is offered of Plato's use of heraclitean flux to model relativism. The philosophical and semantic consequences of the interpretation are explored.
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  28. Kevin Schilbrack (2009). Rationality, Relativism, and Religion: A Reinterpretation of Peter Winch. [REVIEW] Sophia 48 (4):399-412.score: 24.0
    Many point to Peter Winch’s discussion of rationality, relativism, and religion as a paradigmatic example of cultural relativism. In this paper, I argue that Winch’s relationship to relativism is widely misinterpreted in that, despite his pluralistic understanding of rationality, Winch does allow for universal features of culture in virtue of which cross-cultural understanding and even critique is possible. Nevertheless, I also argue that given the kind of cultural universals that Winch produces, he fails to avoid relativism. (...)
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  29. Howard Sankey (2011). Epistemic Relativism and the Problem of the Criterion. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (4):562-570.score: 24.0
    This paper explores the relationship between scepticism and epistemic relativism in the context of recent history and philosophy of science. More specifically, it seeks to show that significant treatments of epistemic relativism by influential figures in the history and philosophy of science draw upon the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. The paper begins with a presentation of the problem of the criterion as it occurs in the work of Sextus Empiricus. It is then shown that significant treatments of (...)
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  30. Berit Brogaard (2009). Perceptual Content and Monadic Truth: On Cappelen and Hawthorne's Relativism and Monadic Truth. Philosophical Books 50 (4):213-226.score: 24.0
    I will begin with a brief presentation of C & H’s arguments against nonindexical contextualism, temporalism, and relativism. I will then offer a general argument against the monadic truth package. Finally, I will offer arguments in favor of nonindexical contextualism and temporalism.
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  31. Reese M. Heitner (2000). Is Design Relative or Real? Dennett on Intentional Relativism and Physical Realism. Minds and Machines 10 (2):267-83.score: 24.0
    Dennett's intended rapprochement between physical realism and intentional relativism fails because it is premised upon conflicting arguments governing the status of design. Indeed, Dennett's remarks on design serve to highlight tensions buried deep within his theory. For inasmuch as Dennett succeeds in objectifying attributions of design, attributions of intentionality readily follow suit, leading to a form of intentional realism. But inasmuch as Dennett is successful in relativizing attributions of design, scientific realism at large is subject to renewed anti-realistic criticism. (...)
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  32. Denis Robinson (2010). Reflections on Moral Disagreement, Relativism, and Skepticism About Rules. Philosophical Topics 38 (2):131-156.score: 24.0
    Part I of this paper discusses some uses of arguments from radical moral disagreement — in particular, as directed against absolutist cognitivism — and surveys some semantic issues thus made salient. It may be argued that parties to such a disagreement cannot be using the relevant moral claims with exactly the same absolutist cognitive content. That challenges the absolutist element of absolutist cognitivism, which, combined with the intractable nature of radical moral disagreement, in turn challenges the viability of a purely (...)
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  33. Robert Lockie (2003). Relativism and Reflexivity. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (3):319 – 339.score: 24.0
    This paper develops a version of the self-refutation argument against relativism in the teeth of the prevailing response by relativists: that this argument begs the question against them. It is maintained that although weaker varieties of relativism are not self-refuting, strong varieties are faced by this argument with a choice between making themselves absolute (one thing is absolutely true - relativism); or reflexive (relativism is 'true for' the relativist). These positions are in direct conflict. The commonest (...)
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  34. J. David Velleman (2013). Foundations for Moral Relativism. OpenBook Publishers.score: 24.0
    In Foundations for Moral Relativism, J. David Velleman shows that different communities can indeed be subject to incompatible moralities, because their local mores are rationally binding. At the same time, he explains why the mores of different communities, even when incompatible, are still variations on the same moral themes. The book thus maps out a universe of many moral worlds without, as Velleman puts it, "moral black holes”. The five self-standing chapters discuss such diverse topics as online avatars and (...)
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  35. Alexander Almér & Dag Westerståhl (2010). Review of Relativism and Monadic Truth. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 33 (1):37-50.score: 24.0
    This is a review of Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne’s book Relativism and Monadic Truth (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009).
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  36. Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1985). Is Moral Relativism Consistent? Analysis 45 (1):40-44.score: 24.0
    Let C1 and C2 be distinct moral codes formulated in English. Let C1 contain a norm N and C2 its negation. The paper construes the moral relativist as saying that if both codes are consistent, then, in the strongest sense of correctness applicable to moral norms, they are also both correct in the sense that they contain only correct moral norms. If we believe that the physical statements of English are true (false) in English, we will reject an analogous statement (...)
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  37. Teresa Marques (2010). What Can Modes Do for (Moderate) Relativism. [REVIEW] Critica - Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofia 42 (124):77-100.score: 24.0
    I critically discuss some aspects of Recanati's Perspectival Thought, while offering a detailed overview of the book. I suggest that the main aim Recanati proposes to achieve —that a moderate relativist should adopt a Kaplanian framework with three levels of content, rather than a Lewisian framework with only two— seems nonetheless insufficiently motivated, and the arguments offered do not settle the issue. I suggest furthermore that the claim that subjects’ mental states and cognitive situations can determine parameters or indices in (...)
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  38. Lawrence Torcello (2011). Sophism and Moral Agnosticism, or, How to Tell a Relativist From a Pluralist. The Pluralist 6 (1):87-108.score: 24.0
    Is it possible to recognize the limits of rationality, and thus to embrace moral pluralism, without embracing moral relativism? My answer is yes; nevertheless, certain anti-foundational positions, both recent and ancient, take a cynical stance toward the possibility of any critical moral judgment, and as such, must be regarded as relativistic.1 It is such cynicism, I argue, whether openly announced or unknowingly implied, that marks the distinction between relativism and pluralism.2 The danger of this cynicism is not so (...)
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  39. Howard Sankey (2012). Scepticism, Relativism and the Argument From the Criterion. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):182-190.score: 24.0
    This article explores the relationship between epistemic relativism and Pyrrhonian scepticism. It is argued that a fundamental argument for contemporary epistemic relativism derives from the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. Pyrrhonian scepticism is compared and contrasted with Cartesian scepticism about the external world and Humean scepticism about induction. Epistemic relativism is characterized as relativism due to the variation of epistemic norms, and is contrasted with other forms of cognitive relativism, such as truth relativism, conceptual (...)
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  40. Dirk Kindermann (2013). Relativism, Sceptical Paradox, and Semantic Blindness. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):585-603.score: 24.0
    Abstract Relativism about knowledge attributions is the view that a single occurrence of ‘S knows [does not know] that p’ may be true as assessed in one context and false as assessed in another context. It has been argued that relativism is equipped to accommodate all the data from speakers’ use of ‘know’ without recourse to an error theory. This is supposed to be relativism’s main advantage over contextualist and invariantist views. This paper argues that relativism (...)
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  41. Joe Salerno, Epistemic Modal Eavesdropping: A Straight Solution to a Relativist Challenge.score: 24.0
    A primary challenge from the relativist to the contextualist about epistemic modals is to explain eavesdropping data—i.e., why the eavesdropper is inclined to judge the speaker as having uttered an epistemic modal falsehood (when she is so inclined), even though the speaker’s utterance is true according to reasonable contextualist truth conditions. The issue turns in large part on the strength and shape of the data, both of which are in dispute. One complaint is that an eavesdropper’s truth value judgments fluctuate (...)
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  42. Markus Seidel (2014). Epistemic Relativism. A Constructive Critique. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 24.0
    Are our beliefs justified only relatively to a specific culture or society? Is it possible to give reasons for the superiority of our scientific, epistemic methods? Markus Seidel sets out to answer these questions in his critique of epistemic relativism. Focusing on the work of the most prominent, explicitly relativist position in the sociology of scientific knowledge – so-called 'Edinburgh relativism' or the 'Strong Programme' –, he scrutinizes the key arguments for epistemic relativism from a philosophical perspective: (...)
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  43. Michael Brannigan (2000). Cultural Diversity and the Case Against Ethical Relativism. Health Care Analysis 8 (3):321-327.score: 24.0
    The movement to respect culturaldiversity, known as multiculturalism, poses a dauntingchallenge to healthcare ethics. Can we construct adefensible passage from the fact of culturaldifferences to any claims regarding morality? Or doesmulticulturalism lead to ethical relativism? Macklinargues that, in view of a leading distinction betweenuniversalism in ethics and moral absolutism, the onlyreasonable passage avoids both absolutism andrelativism. She presents a strong case againstethical relativism and its pernicious consequences forcross-cultural issues in healthcare. She alsoprovides sound criteria for the assessment of (...)
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  44. Marie Guillot (2013). The Limits of Selflessness: Semantic Relativism and the Epistemology of de Se Thoughts. Synthese 190 (10):1793-1816.score: 24.0
    It has recently been proposed that the framework of semantic relativism be put to use to describe mental content, as deployed in some of the fundamental operations of the mind. This programme has inspired in particular a novel strategy of accounting for the essential egocentricity of first-personal or de se thoughts in relativist terms, with the advantage of dispensing with a notion of self-representation. This paper is a critical discussion of this strategy. While it is based on a plausible (...)
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  45. Brian Weatherson (2009). Conditionals and Indexical Relativism. Synthese 166 (2):333-357.score: 24.0
    I set out and defend a view on indicative conditionals that I call “indexical relativism”. The core of the view is that which proposition is (semantically) expressed by an utterance of a conditional is a function of (among other things) the speaker’s context and the assessor’s context. This implies a kind of relativism, namely that a single utterance may be correctly assessed as true by one assessor and false by another.
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  46. Gilbert Harman (forthcoming). Moral Relativism is Moral Realism. Philosophical Studies:1-9.score: 24.0
    I begin by describing my relation with Nicholas Sturgeon and his objections to things I have said about moral explanations. Then I turn to issues about moral relativism. One of these is whether a plausible version of moral relativism can be formulated as a claim about the logical form of certain moral judgments. I (now) agree that is not a good way to think of moral relativism. Instead, I think of moral relativism as a version of (...)
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  47. Howard Sankey (2013). Methodological Incommensurability and Epistemic Relativism. Topoi 32 (1):33-41.score: 24.0
    This paper revisits one of the key ideas developed in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In particular, it explores the methodological form of incommensurability which may be found in the original edition of Structure. It is argued that such methodological incommensurability leads to a form of epistemic relativism. In later work, Kuhn moved away from the original idea of methodological incommensurability with his idea of a set of epistemic values that provides a basis for rational theory choice, but do (...)
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  48. Ragnar Francén (2007). Metaethical Relativism: Against the Single Analysis Assumption. Dissertation, University of Gothenburgscore: 24.0
    This dissertation investigates the plausibility of metaethical relativism, or more specifically, what I call “moral truth-value relativism”: the idea that the truth of a moral statement or belief depends on who utters or has it, or who assesses it. According to the most prevalent variants of this view in philosophical literature – “standard relativism” – the truth-values are relative to people’s moralities, often understood as some subset of their affective or desirelike attitudes. Standard relativism has two (...)
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  49. Ragnar Francén Olinder (2013). Moral Relativism, Error-Theory, and Ascriptions of Mistakes. Journal of Philosophy 110 (10):564-580.score: 24.0
    Moral error-theorists and relativists agree that there are no absolute moral facts, but disagree whether that makes all moral judgments false. Who is right? This paper examines a type of objection used by moral error-theorists against relativists, and vice versa: objections from implausible ascriptions of mistakes. Relativists (and others) object to error-theory that it implausibly implies that people, in having moral beliefs, are systematically mistaken about what exists. Error-theorists (and others) object to relativism that it implausibly implies that people (...)
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  50. Paresh Kathrani (2012). Quality Circles and Human Rights: Tackling the Universalism and Cultural Relativism Divide. [REVIEW] AI and Society 27 (3):369-375.score: 24.0
    The implementation of international human rights law has traditionally been undermined by the dichotomy between universalism and cultural relativism. Some groups regard human rights as more reflective of other culture’s and are unwilling to subscribe to them. One response to this is to enable groups to take co-ownership of human rights. Quality Circles based on institutions and technology, and the collaboration they encourage, provide one such means for doing so. What is required is for states to facilitate rather than (...)
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