9 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Rene Jagnow (University of Georgia)
  1. René Jagnow (2012). Colour Discrimination And Monitoring Theories of Consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):57 - 74.
    According to the monitoring theory of consciousness, a mental state is conscious in virtue of being represented in the right way by a monitoring state. David Rosenthal, William Lycan, and Uriah Kriegel have developed three different influential versions of this theory. In order to explain colour experiences, each of these authors combines his version of the monitoring theory of consciousness with a specific account of colour representation. Even though Rosenthal, Lycan, and Kriegel disagree on the specifics, they all hold that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. René Jagnow (2012). Representationalism and the Perspectival Character of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 157 (2):227-249.
    Perceptual experiences inform us about objective properties of things in our environment. But they also have perspectival character in the sense that they differ phenomenally when objects are viewed from different points of view. Contemporary representationalists hold, at a minimum, that phenomenal character supervenes on representational content. Thus, in order to account for perspectival character, they need to indentify a type of representational content that changes in appropriate ways with the perceiver’s point of view. Many representationlists, including Shoemaker and Lycan, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. René Jagnow (2011). Ambiguous Figures and the Spatial Contents of Perceptual Experience: A Defense of Representationalism. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):325-346.
    Representationalists hold that the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is identical with, or supervenes on, an aspect of its representational content. As such, representationalism could be disproved by a counter-example consisting of two experiences that have the same representational content but differ in phenomenal character. In this paper, I discuss two recently proposed counter-examples to representationalism that involve ambiguous or reversible figures. I pursue two goals. My first, and most important, goal is to show that the representationalist can offer (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. René Jagnow (2010). Shadow-Experiences and the Phenomenal Structure of Colors. Dialectica 64 (2):187-212.
    It is a common assumption among philosophers of perception that phenomenal colors are exhaustively characterized by the three phenomenal dimensions of the color solid: hue, saturation and lightness. The hue of a color is its redness, blueness or yellowness, etc. The saturation of a color refers to the strength of its hue in relation to gray. The lightness of a color determines its relation to black and white. In this paper, I argue that the phenomenology of shadows forces us to (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. René Jagnow (2009). How Representationalism Can Account for the Phenomenal Significance of Illumination. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):551-572.
    In this paper, I defend a representationalist account of the phenomenal character of color experiences. Representationalism, the thesis that phenomenal character supervenes on a certain kind of representational content, so-called phenomenal content, has been developed primarily in two different ways, as Russellian and Fregean representationalism. While the proponents of Russellian and Fregean representationalism differ with respect to what they take the contents of color experiences to be, they typically agree that colors are exhaustively characterized by the three dimensions of the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. René Jagnow (2008). Disappearing Appearances: On the Enactive Approach to Spatial Perceptual Content. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):45-67.
    Many viewers presented with a round plate tilted to their line of sight will report that they see a round plate that looks elliptical from their perspective. Alva Noë thinks that we should take reports of this kind as adequate descriptions of the phenomenology of spatial experiences. He argues that his so-called enactive or sensorimotor account of spatial perceptual content explains why both the plate’s circularity and itselliptical appearance are phenomenal aspects of experience. In this paper, I critique the phenomenal (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. René Jagnow (2007). Lisa A. Shabel. Mathematics in Kant's Critical Philosophy: Reflections on Mathematical Practice. Studies in Philosophy Outstanding Dissertations, Robert Nozick, Ed. New York & London: Routledge, 2003. ISBN 0-415-93955-0. Pp. 178 (Cloth). [REVIEW] Philosophia Mathematica 15 (3):366-386.
  8. René Jagnow (2006). Edmund Husserl on the Applicability of Formal Geometry. In Emily Carson & Renate Huber (eds.), Intuition and the Axiomatic Method. Springer. 67--85.
    In this paper, I reconstruct Edmund Husserl's view on the relationship between formal inquiry and the life-world, using the example of formal geometry. I first outline Husserl's account of geometry and then argue that he believed that the applicability of formal geometry to intuitive space (the space of everyday-experience) guarantees the conceptual continuity between different notions of space.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. René Jagnow, Geometry and Spatial Intuition: A Genetic Approach.
    In this thesis, I investigate the nature of geometric knowledge and its relationship to spatial intuition. My goal is to rehabilitate the Kantian view that Euclid's geometry is a mathematical practice, which is grounded in spatial intuition, yet, nevertheless, yields a type of a priori knowledge about the structure of visual space. I argue for this by showing that Euclid's geometry allows us to derive knowledge from idealized visual objects, i.e., idealized diagrams by means of non-formal logical inferences. By developing (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation