Abstract According to Hoffman's theory of moral internalisation, parents? victim?orientated disciplinary strategies may stimulate a child to take another's needs into account. To test this hypothesis a cross?lagged panel design was used with two measurements within a time interval of two years. Data were gathered from 150 families. Victim?orientated discipline was related to a child's experience of guilt. Evidence for Hoffman's hypothesis about long?term effects of parents? disciplinary strategies was not found. Some evidence was found for the hypothesis that a (...) child's level of interpersonal understanding mediates between parental disciplinary strategies and a child's internalisation of moral norms. (shrink)
This paper addresses the near impossibility of writing the social history of knowledge production in India. It also considers the question of the historicity of Sanskrit traditions. It concludes with pointing at a major lacuna in the SKS project, namely the examination or ritual and religious knowledge.
What is the main problem of contemporary education? Rasoul Nejadmehr argues that the cardinal problem with education is that it does not have an adequate notion of truth underpinning it. Thinkers mainly tend to veer towards two poles - absolutism and relativism. While a one-sided tendency toward absolutism leads to reified categories of thought and alienation, a tendency toward relativism leads to lack of universality and nihilism. Education, Science and Truth suggests a way out by bridging not only divides (...) between and within analytical and continental philosophy but also those of modernism and postmodernism. By using a range of issues, disciplines and literature, Nejadmehr formulates a new version of the concept of objectivity based on the inclusion of multiple perspectives, including ones from art, philosophy and marginalized groups. (shrink)
It is argued that Calvin does not veer between two incompatible accounts of grace, freedom and necessity in "Institutes II". 2, but presents a consistent position. The consistency is evident once it is seen that Calvin carefully distinguished between necessity and compulsion. For him not all necessitated acts are compelled, but all human acts which are the outcome of efficacious divine grace are necessitated by that grace. Because Calvin is consistent, there is no need to suppose that he has (...) mistaken the causal sufficiency of divine saving grace for its causal importance. (shrink)
A theme that emerged at the Sheffield Conference with particular force, to my way of thinking, was a new way of recognizing, and then avoiding, a seductive bad idea. One of its many guises is what I have called the Cartesian Theater, but it also appears in the roles of Central Processing, or Central Executive, or Norman and Shallice's SAS, or Fodor's non-modular central arena of belief fixation. What is wrong with this idea is not (just) that it (apparently) postulates (...) an _anatomically_ discernible central region of the brain--maximally non-peripheral, one might say--but that it supposes that there is a functionally identifiable _subsystem_ (however located or even distributed in the brain) that has some all too remarkable competences achieved by some all too remarkable means. There are many routes to it. Here is one that starts off in an excellent direction but then veers off. The mistaken fork is not explicitly endorsed by anybody that I can think of, but I daresay it has covertly influenced a lot of thinking on the topic. (shrink)
The assumption that human socializing instincts are restricted to the community of birth and upbringing was long accepted without question. But today’s modern states have passed from the nation-building stage into that of multicultural belonging, and fluidity of membership allied to perpetual population shifts is the norm. This article traces changing patterns of global migration: first, territoriality plus rooted identity plus ‘gardening’; second, emigration to supposedly ‘empty’ lands; third, interlocked diasporas. How may we now live with and in the right (...) to difference? Identity formation is never fixed, never final, veering between the pole of freedom and that of security. It is an intertwining of continuity and discontinuity that may now hold society together. (shrink)
If the question ``What is a gene?'' proves to be worth asking it must be able to elicit an answer which both recognizes and address the reasons why the concept of the gene ever seemed to be something worth getting excited about in the first place as well analyzing and evaluating the latest develops in the molecular biology of DNA. Each of the preceding papers fails to do one of these and sufferrs the consequences. Where Rolston responds to the apparent (...) failure of molecular biology to make good on the desideratum of the classical gene by veering off into fanciful talk about ``cybernetic genes,'' Griffiths and Stotz lose themselves in the molecular fine print and forget to ask themselves why ``genes'' should be of any special interst anyway. (shrink)
Habermas's recent work in epistemology has been marked by a decisive rejection of his earlier epistemic conception of truth in which he understood truth as 'what may be accepted as rational under ideal conditions'. Arguing that no 'idealization of justificatory conditions' can do justice to both human fallibility and the unconditional nature of truth, he has attempted to develop a realistic conception of truth that severs any conceptual link between truth and justification while respecting the epistemic relevance of justification for (...) ascertaining the truth. But realizing this second goal has proved elusive for Habermas because he veers too close to a form of metaphysical realism in his epistemology. By contrast, Hilary Putnam's recent turn to what he calls 'natural realism' is more successful in articulating a form of realism that, in taking its leave of an epistemic conception of truth, still manages to keep its distance from metaphysical realism. (shrink)
There are some intriguing and inviting complexities around the twin concepts of nature and naturalism. For too many evolutionary biologists, and even evolutionary psychologists, who should know better, Nature with a capital "N" is rarely analyzed and when done so it is with the crudest of instruments. And for those of us who do know better, we register with some vexation that the reigning concept of naturalism has been flattened into a dull-witted colorless perspective that veers toward some kind of (...) materialism; a belief in the exhaustive correlation of chance and law, alas, with no help from Peirce; a tendency toward a mind/brain identity thesis; an emergentism vis-à-vis consciousness (and the corollary rejection .. (shrink)
The current interest in bioregionalism, stimulated in part by Kirkpatrick Sale’s Dwellers in the Land, shows that people are looking for a form of political praxis which addresses the importance of region. In this paper, I argue that much of the bioregional literature written to date mystifies the concept of region, discounting the role of subjectivity and culture in shaping regional boundaries and veers toward asimplistic view of “nature knows best.” Bioregionalism can be rehabilitated, provided we treat it not as (...) a “revealed wisdom” for the reconstruction of human society, but as a sensibility and environmental ethic that can infuse our work even as we make use of the functional regionalisms that increasingly shape people’s consciousness. I conclude by citing Lewis Mumford’s concept of a region as capturing the dialectical interplay of natural and cultural elements. (shrink)
During the last decades, the cognitive sciences and cognitive anthropology have increasingly veered away from each other. Cognitive anthropologists have become so rare within the cognitive sciences that Beller, Bender, and Medin (this issue) even propose a division of the cognitive sciences and cognitive anthropology. However, such a divorce might be premature. This commentary tries to illustrate the benefits that cognitive anthropologists have to offer, not despite, but because of their combination of humanistic and scientific elements. It argues that the (...) cognitive sciences (among others) profit from these benefits, as culture will become crucial for cognitive research. At the same time, problems within cognitive anthropology are discussed, including, for example, the responsibility of cognitive anthropologists to promote young academics. Finally, ideas are presented that might support future interdisciplinary collaboration. (shrink)
Does the matter of the sensible world, for Plotinus as for Plato and Aristotle, exist without a cause of its existence? Long divided on the answer to that question, scholarly opinion now veers in favour of a derivation of matter from principles prior to matter, with disagreement limited to the details of the theory. What exactly is implied by the various passages of the Enneads where Plotinus writes of soul or physis in relation to `darkness' and `non-being', matter and form? (...) In the pages that follow, I argue that the soul's `making' of a `non-being' that by implication is matter, in Enn. III 9 [13] 3, is logically antecedent to the `making' of `visible form' ascribed to physis in Enn. III 8 [30] 2. A detailed study of the context and the syntax of the latter passage shows that, contrary to an interpretation put forward recently in this Journal, the two `makings' cannot be the same. (shrink)
This essay investigates the possibility of veering from an approach of doing bad to the offender as the primary response to crime to one of requiring the offender to do good. This approach, in effect, has us offset the evil which the offender has placed on the scales of justice with good which the offender is required to produce; hence the conception of New Balance. The specific focus here is to identify important deficiencies in the major approaches of retributivism and (...) utilitarian-deterrence theory to pave the way for New Balance. (shrink)
The vast body of Lawrence scholarship has veered between the extremes of uncritical celebration and violent denigration. This first extended study of Lawrence's aesthetics draws on a number of modern critical approaches to present an original and balanced analysis of Lawrence's literary and art criticism, and of the complex cultural context from which it emerged. -/- Emphasising the influence on this most`English' of writers of a German intellectual and cultural heritage, Anne Fernihough focuses on Lawrence's connections with the völkisch ideologies (...) prevalent in Germany from 1910-1930, from which both Heideggerian philosophy and Nazism emerged. The deep-seated affinities between Lawrentian and Heideggerian aesthetics are examined for the first time, and the author highlights Lawrence's `green' critique of industrialization. New light is shed on Lawrence's hostility towards Freud, contrasting the two writers' thinking on art and the unconscious. The book's reassessment of Lawrence's relationship with Bloomsbury opposes the received view that Lawrence and the Bloomsbury art critics were poles apart. -/- This fascinating and lucid study reveals Lawrence's art criticism as pluralistic and anti-authoritarian, a necessary antidote to his sometimes brutally authoritarian politics and to the dogma and rigidity that pervades so many other areas of Lawrence's thought. (shrink)
