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  1. Francis J. Pelletier, Renée Elio & Philip Hanson (2008). Is Logic All in Our Heads? From Naturalism to Psychologism. Studia Logica 88 (1):3 - 66.
    Psychologism in logic is the doctrine that the semantic content of logical terms is in some way a feature of human psychology. We consider the historically influential version of the doctrine, Psychological Individualism, and the many counter-arguments to it. We then propose and assess various modifications to the doctrine that might allow it to avoid the classical objections. We call these Psychological Descriptivism, Teleological Cognitive Architecture, and Ideal Cognizers. These characterizations give some order to the wide range of modern views (...)
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  2. Francis Jeffry Pelletier & Renée Elio (2005). The Case for Psychologism in Default and Inheritance Reasoning. Synthese 146 (1-2):7 - 35.
    Default reasoning occurs whenever the truth of the evidence available to the reasoner does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion being drawn. Despite this, one is entitled to draw the conclusion “by default” on the grounds that we have no information which would make us doubt that the inference should be drawn. It is the type of conclusion we draw in the ordinary world and ordinary situations in which we find ourselves. Formally speaking, ‘nonmonotonic reasoning’ refers to argumentation in (...)
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  3. Murat Baç & Renée Elio (2004). Scheme-Based Alethic Realism: Agency, the Environment, and Truthmaking. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 14 (2):173-196.
    This paper presents a position called Scheme-based Alethic Realism, which reconciles a realist position on the nature of truth with a pluralistic Kantian perspective that allows for multiple environments in which truthmaking relationships are established. We argue that truthmaking functions are constrained by a stable phenomenal world and a stable cognitive architecture. This account takes truth as normatively distinct from epistemic justification while relativizing the truth conditions of our statements to what we call Frameworks. The pluralistic aspect allows that these (...)
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  4. Renée Elio (ed.) (2002). Common Sense, Reasoning, & Rationality. Oxford University Press.
    As the eleventh volume in the New Directions in Cognitive Science series (formerly the Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science series), this work promises superb scholarship and interdisciplinary appeal. It addresses three areas of current and varied interest: common sense, reasoning, and rationality. While common sense and rationality often have been viewed as two distinct features in a unified cognitive map, this volume offers novel, even paradoxical, views of the relationship. Comprised of outstanding essays from distinguished philosophers, it considers what constitutes (...)
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  5. Renée Elio & Francis Jeffry Pelletier (1997). Belief Change as Propositional Update. Cognitive Science 21 (4):419-460.
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  6. Renée Elio & Kui Lin (1994). Simulation Models of the Influence of Learning Mode and Training Variance on Category Learning. Cognitive Science 18 (2):185-219.
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  7. Renée Elio & Peternela B. Scharf (1990). Modeling Novice‐to‐Expert Shifts in Problem‐Solving Strategy and Knowledge Organization. Cognitive Science 14 (4):579-639.
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  8. Renée Elio (1986). Representation of Similar Well‐Learned Cognitive Procedures. Cognitive Science 10 (1):41-73.
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  9. Francis Jeffry Pelletier & Renée Elio, Human Performance in Default Reasoning.
    There has long been a history of studies investigating how people (“ordinary people”) perform on tasks that involve deductive reasoning. The upshot of these studies is that people characteristically perform some deductive tasks well but others badly. For instance, studies show that people will typically perform MP (“modus ponens”: from ‘If A then B’ and ‘A’, infer ‘B’) and bi-conditional MP (from: ‘A if and only if B’ and ‘A’, infer ‘B’) correctly when invited to make the inference and additionally (...)
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