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Renée Smith [11]Renée J. Smith [1]Renee Janelle Smith [1]
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  1. Renée Smith (2014). Fire Alarms, Juries, and Moral Judgment. Think 13 (37):27-34.
    It's nearly 10:00 AM on a Thursday morning and the courtroom is filled with more than 100 members of the jury pool. Court officials, state police officers, and defendants line the halls waiting to be called for pre-trial conferences and for jury selection to begin, then the fire alarm sounds. There is no obvious evidence of fire, no smoke, no shouts, and no other warnings. At the same time, no one announces that there is a fire drill in progress, that (...)
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  2. Renée Smith (2012). Moore and Descartes Meet in a Bar. Think 11 (31):21-26.
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  3. Renée Smith (2011). The Broad Perception Model and the Transparency of Qualia. Behavior and Philosophy 39:69-81.
  4. Renée Smith & Julinna Oxley (2011). The Summer Ethics Academy. Questions: Philosophy for Young People 11:1-5.
    An overview of how the Summer Ethics Academy, at the Jackson Family Center for Ethics and Values at Coastal Carolina University—part of its outreachProgram—encourages children to develop desirable characteristics for middle school children to emulate. The article includes applicable project goals and activities.
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  5. Renee Smith (2010). Against Treating Introspection as Perception-Like. Psyche 16 (1):79-86.
    : A perceptual theory of introspection is one that treats introspection as a species of perception or as a special case of perception. Additionally, a perceptual theory of introspection is one for which introspection shares at least some of the essential features of perception. However, I will show that there are certain essential features of perception that introspection lacks. Moreover, those features common to perception and introspection are insufficient to distinguish perception from belief. Thus, there is good reason to deny (...)
     
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  6. Renée Smith (2010). Can the Use of 'Nanny Cams' Be Morally Justified? Think 9 (24):91-96.
    Parents concerned with what goes on when they leave their children at home under the care of someone else might wonder whether or not they should invest in video surveillance equipment. Such technology has become readily available and is relatively inexpensive, but is it morally permissible to use this sort of technology to monitor the care of one's children?
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  7. Renée Smith (2007). Representationalism, Inversion and Color Constancy. Kriterion 21 (1):1-15.
    Sydney Shoemaker has gone to great lengths to defend a representationalist view of phenomenal character, and yet he describes this view as breaking with standard representationalism in two ways. First, he thinks his representationalist position is consistent with the possibility of spectrum inversion, and second, he thinks there are qualia. Thus, we can think of his position in the qualia debate as moderate representationalism by taking up some middle ground between these two major camps. This \moderate" view faces several problems. (...)
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  8. Renée J. Smith (2007). Shoemaker’s Moderate Qualia Realism and the Transparency of Qualia. My Cms 2 (22):1 - 13.
  9. Renée Smith (2006). Van Cleve and Putnam on Kant's View of Secondary Qualities. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 27 (1):83-102.
  10. Renée Smith (2005). The Transparency of Qualia and the Nature of Introspection. Philosophical Writings 29 (2):21-44.
    The idea that the phenomenal character of experience is determined by non-intentional properties of experience, what philosophers commonly call qualia, seems to conflict with the phenomenology of introspection. Qualia seem to be transparent, or unavailable, to introspection. This has led intentionalists to deny that the phenomenal character of experience is a non-intentional property of experience—to deny there are qualia. It has led qualia realists to deny the transparency of qualia or to question the reliability of introspection. In this paper, I (...)
     
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