Search results for 'Representationalism' (try it on Scholar)

502 found
Sort by:
  1. David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici (2014). Tracking Representationalism. In Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers. Continuum. 209-235.score: 18.0
    This paper overviews the current status of debates on tracking representationalism, the view that phenomenal consciousness is a matter of tracking features of one's environment in a certain way. We overview the main arguments for the view and the main objections and challenges it faces. We close with a discussion of alternative versions of representationalism that might overcome the shortcomings of tracking representationalism.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. David Bourget, A General Reply to the Arguments From Blur, Double Vision, Perspective, and Other Kinds of Perceptual Distortion Against Representationalism.score: 18.0
    This paper offers a general reply to arguments from perceptual distortion (e.g. blur, perspective, double vision) against the representationalist thesis that the phenomenal characters of experiences supervene on their intentional contents. It has been argued that distorted and undistorted experiences are counterexamples to this thesis because they can share contents without sharing phenomenal characters. In reply, I suggest that cases of perceptual distortion do not constitute counterexamples to the representationalist thesis because the contents of distorted experiences are always impoverished in (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. William E. Seager & David Bourget (2007). Representationalism About Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. 261-276.score: 18.0
    A representationalist-friendly introduction to representationalism which covers a number of central problems and objections.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. John O'Dea (2006). Representationalism, Supervenience, and the Cross-Modal Problem. Philosophical Studies 130 (2):285-95.score: 18.0
    The representational theory of phenomenal experience is often stated in terms of a supervenience thesis: Byrne recently characterises it as the thesis that “there can be no difference in phenomenal character without a difference in content”, while according to Tye, “[a]t a minimum, the thesis is one of supervenience: necessarily, experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in their phenomenal character.” Consequently, much of the debate over whether representationalism is true centres on purported counter-examples – that (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Uriah Kriegel (2011). Self-Representationalism and the Explanatory Gap. In J. Liu & J. Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.score: 18.0
    According to the self-representational theory of consciousness – self- representationalism for short – a mental state is phenomenally conscious when, and only when, it represents itself in the right way. In this paper, I consider how self- representationalism might address the alleged explanatory gap between phenomenal consciousness and physical properties. I open with a presentation of self- representationalism and the case for it (§1). I then present what I take to be the most promising self-representational approach to (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Brendan O'Sullivan & Robert Schroer (2012). Painful Reasons: Representationalism as a Theory of Pain. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):737-758.score: 18.0
    It is widely thought that functionalism and the qualia theory are better positioned to accommodate the ‘affective’ aspect (i.e., the hurtfulness) of pain phenomenology than representationalism. In this paper, we attempt to overturn this opinion by raising problems for both functionalism and the qualia theory on this score. With regard to functionalism, we argue that it gets the order of explanation wrong: pain experience gives rise to the effects it does because it hurts, and not the other way around. (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Ryan Perkins & Tim Bayne (2013). Representationalism and the Problem of Vagueness. Philosophical Studies 162 (1):71-86.score: 18.0
    This paper develops a novel problem for representationalism (also known as "intentionalism"), a popular contemporary account of perception. We argue that representationalism is incompatible with supervaluationism, the leading contemporary account of vagueness. The problem generalizes to naive realism and related views, which are also incompatible with supervaluationism.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Todd Ganson & Ben Bronner (2013). Visual Prominence and Representationalism. Philosophical Studies 164 (2):405-418.score: 18.0
    A common objection to representationalism is that a representationalist view of phenomenal character cannot accommodate the effects that shifts in covert attention have on visual phenomenology: covert attention can make items more visually prominent than they would otherwise be without altering the content of visual experience. Recent empirical work on attention casts doubt on previous attempts to advance this type of objection to representationalism and it also points the way to an alternative development of the objection.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Uriah Kriegel (2009). Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):357-381.score: 18.0
    To a first approximation, self-representationalism is the view that a mental state M is phenomenally conscious just in case M represents itself in the appropriate way. Proponents of self-representationalism seem to think that the phenomenology of ordinary conscious experience is on their side, but opponents seem to think the opposite. In this paper, I consider the phenomenological merits and demerits of self-representationalism. I argue that there is phenomenological evidence in favor of self-representationalism, and rather more confidently, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Robert Schroer (2012). Representationalism and the Scene-Immediacy of Visual Experience: A Journey to the Fringe and Back. Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):595 - 615.score: 18.0
    Both visual experience and conscious thought represent external objects, but in visual experience these objects seem present before the mind and available for direct access in a way that they don?t in conscious thought. In this paper, I introduce a couple of challenges that this ?Scene-Immediacy? of visual experience raises for traditional versions of Representationalism. I then identify a resource to which Representationalists can appeal in addressing these challenges: the low-detail fringe of visual experience. I argue that low-detail contents (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Boyd Millar (2013). Colour Constancy and Fregean Representationalism. Philosophical Studies 164 (1):219-231.score: 18.0
    All representationalists maintain that there is a necessary connection between an experience’s phenomenal character and intentional content; but there is a disagreement amongst representationalists regarding the nature of those intentional contents that are necessarily connected to phenomenal character. Russellian representationalists maintain that the relevant contents are composed of objects and/or properties, while Fregean representationalists maintain that the relevant contents are composed of modes of presentation of objects and properties. According to Fregean representationalists such as David Chalmers and Brad Thompson, the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Fiona Macpherson (2005). Colour Inversion Problems for Representationalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):127-152.score: 18.0
    In this paper I examine whether representationalism can account for various thought experiments about colour inversions. Representationalism is, at minimum, the view that, necessarily, if two experiences have the same representational content then they have the same phenomenal character. I argue that representationalism ought to be rejected if one holds externalist views about experiential content and one holds traditional exter- nalist views about the nature of the content of propositional attitudes. Thus, colour inver- sion scenarios are more (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Ben Bronner (2013). Representationalism and the Determinacy of Visual Content. Philosophical Psychology:1-13.score: 18.0
    DETERMINACY is the claim that covert shifts in visual attention sometimes affect the determinacy of visual content (capital letters will distinguish the claim from the familiar word, 'determinacy'). Representationalism is the claim that visual phenomenology supervenes on visual representational content. Both claims are popular among contemporary philosophers of mind, and DETERMINACY has been employed in defense of representationalism. I claim that existing arguments in favor of DETERMINACY are inconclusive. As a result, DETERMINACY-based arguments in support of representationalism (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Brad J. Thompson (2006). Color Constancy and Russellian Representationalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):75-94.score: 18.0
    Representationalism, the view that phenomenal character supervenes on intentional content, has attracted a wide following in recent years. Most representationalists have also endorsed what I call 'standard Russellianism'. According to standard Russellianism, phenomenal content is Russellian in nature, and the properties represented by perceptual experiences are mind-independent physical properties. I argue that standard Russellianism conflicts with the everyday experience of colour constancy. Due to colour constancy, standard Russellianism is unable to simultaneously give a proper account of the phenomenal content (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Uriah Kriegel (2012). In Defense of Self-Representationalism: Reply to Critics. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):475-484.score: 18.0
    In defense of self-representationalism: reply to critics Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-10 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9764-8 Authors Uriah Kriegel, Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Bence Nanay (2014). The Representationalism Versus Relationalism Debate: Explanatory Contextualism About Perception. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2).score: 18.0
    There are two very different ways of thinking about perception. According to representationalism, perceptual states are representations: they represent the world as being a certain way. They have content, which may or may not be different from the content of beliefs. They represent objects as having properties, sometimes veridically, sometimes not. According to relationalism, perception is a relation between the agent and the perceived object. Perceived objects are literally constituents of our perceptual states and not of the contents thereof. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Anthony Chemero (2000). Anti-Representationalism and the Dynamical Stance. Philosophy of Science 67 (4):625-647.score: 18.0
    Arguments in favor of anti-representationalism in cognitive science often suffer from a lack of attention to detail. The purpose of this paper is to fill in the gaps in these arguments, and in so doing show that at least one form of anti- representationalism is potentially viable. After giving a teleological definition of representation and applying it to a few models that have inspired anti- representationalist claims, I argue that anti-representationalism must be divided into two distinct theses, (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Amy Kind (2007). Restrictions on Representationalism. Philosophical Studies 134 (3):405-427.score: 18.0
    According to representationalism, the qualitative character of our phenomenal mental states supervenes on the intentional content of such states. Strong representationalism makes a further claim: the qualitative character of our phenomenal mental states _consists in_ the intentional content of such states. Although strong representationalism has greatly increased in popularity over the last decade, I find the view deeply implausible. In what follows, I will attempt to argue against strong representationalism by a two-step argument. First, I suggest (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Farid Masrour, Space Perception, Visual Dissonance and the Fate of Standard Representationalism.score: 18.0
    This paper argues that a common form of representationalism has trouble accommodating empirical findings about visual space perception. Vision science tells us that the visual system systematically gives rise to different experiences of the same spatial property. This, combined with a naturalistic account of content, suggests that the same spatial property can have different veridical looks. I use this to argue that a common form of representationalism about spatial experience must be rejected. I conclude by considering alternatives to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. René Jagnow (2011). Ambiguous Figures and the Spatial Contents of Perceptual Experience: A Defense of Representationalism. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):325-346.score: 18.0
    Representationalists hold that the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is identical with, or supervenes on, an aspect of its representational content. As such, representationalism could be disproved by a counter-example consisting of two experiences that have the same representational content but differ in phenomenal character. In this paper, I discuss two recently proposed counter-examples to representationalism that involve ambiguous or reversible figures. I pursue two goals. My first, and most important, goal is to show that the representationalist (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Neil Mehta (2013). Is There a Phenomenological Argument for Higher-Order Representationalism? Philosophical Studies 164 (2):357-370.score: 18.0
    In his 2009 article “Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology,” Uriah Kriegel argues for self-representationalism about phenomenal consciousness primarily on phenomenological grounds. Kriegel’s argument can naturally be cast more broadly as an argument for higher-order representationalism. I examine this broadened version of Kriegel’s argument in detail and show that it is unsuccessful for two reasons. First, Kriegel’s argument (in its strongest form) relies on an inference to the best explanation from the claim that all experiences of normal adult human beings (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Berit Brogaard (2010). Strong Representationalism and Centered Content. Philosophical Studies 151 (3):373 - 392.score: 18.0
    I argue that strong representationalism, the view that for a perceptual experience to have a certain phenomenal character just is for it to have a certain representational content (perhaps represented in the right sort of way), encounters two problems: the dual looks problem and the duplication problem. The dual looks problem is this: strong representationalism predicts that how things phenomenally look to the subject reflects the content of the experience. But some objects phenomenally look to both have and (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Wayne Wright (2003). Projectivist Representationalism and Color. Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):515-529.score: 18.0
    This paper proposes a subjectivist approach to color within the framework of an externalist form of representationalism about phenomenal consciousness. Motivations are presented for accepting both representationalism and color subjectivism, and an argument is offered against the case made by Michael Tye on behalf of the claim that colors are objective, physical properties of objects. In the face of the considerable difficulties associated with finding a workable realist theory of color, the alternative account of color experience set out, (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Dimitris Platchias (2009). Representationalism, Symmetrical Supervenience and Identity. Philosophia 37 (1):31-46.score: 18.0
    According to some representationalists (M. Tye, Ten problems of consciousness, MIT Press, Massachusetts, USA, 1995; W.G. Lycan, Consciousness and experience, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 1996; F. Dretske, Naturalising the mind, MIT Press, Massachusetts, USA 1995), qualia are identical to external environmental states or features. When one perceives a red rose for instance, one is visually representing the actual redness of the rose. The represented redness of the rose is the actual redness of the rose itself. Thus redness is not (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. René Jagnow (2009). How Representationalism Can Account for the Phenomenal Significance of Illumination. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):551-572.score: 18.0
    In this paper, I defend a representationalist account of the phenomenal character of color experiences. Representationalism, the thesis that phenomenal character supervenes on a certain kind of representational content, so-called phenomenal content, has been developed primarily in two different ways, as Russellian and Fregean representationalism. While the proponents of Russellian and Fregean representationalism differ with respect to what they take the contents of color experiences to be, they typically agree that colors are exhaustively characterized by the three (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Philipp Koralus (2013). Descriptions, Ambiguity, and Representationalist Theories of Interpretation. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):275-290.score: 18.0
    Abstract Theories of descriptions tend to involve commitments about the ambiguity of descriptions. For example, sentences containing descriptions are widely taken to be ambiguous between de re , de dicto , and intermediate interpretations and are sometimes thought to be ambiguous between the former and directly referential interpretations. I provide arguments to suggest that none of these interpretations are due to ambiguities (or indexicality). On the other hand, I argue that descriptions are ambiguous between the above family of interpretations and (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Athanasios Raftopoulos (2011). Ambiguous Figures and Representationalism. Synthese 181 (3):489-514.score: 18.0
    Macpherson (Nous 40(1):82–117, 2006) argues that the square/regular diamond figure threatens representationalism, construed as the theory which holds that the phenomenal character is explained by the nonconceptual content of experience. Her argument is the claim that representationalism is committed to the thesis that differences in the experience of ambiguous figures, the gestalt switch, should be explained by differences in the NCC of perception of these figures. However, with respect to the square/regular diamond and some other ambiguous figure (...) fails to offer a unified account of how representational content makes them ambiguous. In this paper, I aim, first, to offer a representationalist account of ambiguous figures and, second, to examine and rebut Macpherson’s arguments. My main point is that in each ambiguous figure Macpherson discusses there are differences in representational content that can explain differences in phenomenal character or content. The representational differences are due to the ways the Cartesian frame of reference in which perceptual content is always cast cuts the figure, underlying different properties of the figure with respect to the axes of the Cartesian frame of reference. (shrink)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Pim Haselager, A. de Groot & H. van Rappard (2003). Representationalism Vs. Anti-Representationalism: A Debate for the Sake of Appearance. Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):5-23.score: 18.0
    In recent years the cognitive science community has witnessed the rise of a new, dynamical approach to cognition. This approach entails a framework in which cognition and behavior are taken to result from complex dynamical interactions between brain, body, and environment. The advent of the dynamical approach is grounded in a dissatisfaction with the classical computational view of cognition. A particularly strong claim has been that cognitive systems do not rely on internal representations and computations. Focusing on this claim, we (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Dachun Yang (2008). Representationalism and the Linguistic Question in Early Modern Philosophy. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 3 (4):595-606.score: 18.0
    The view of language is greatly changed from early modern philosophy to later modern philosophy and to postmodern philosophy. The linguistic question in early modern philosophy, which is characterized by rationalism and empiricism, is discussed in this paper. Linguistic phenomena are not at the center of philosophical reflections in early modern philosophy. The subject of consciousness is at the center of the philosophy, which makes language serve purely as an instrument for representing thoughts. Locke, Leibniz and Descartes consider language from (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Jonathan S. Spackman & Stephen C. Yanchar (2014). Embodied Cognition, Representationalism, and Mechanism: A Review and Analysis. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 44 (1):46-79.score: 18.0
    Embodied cognition has attracted significant attention within cognitive science and related fields in recent years. It is most noteworthy for its emphasis on the inextricable connection between mental functioning and embodied activity and thus for its departure from standard cognitive science's implicit commitment to the unembodied mind. This article offers a review of embodied cognition's recent empirical and theoretical contributions and suggests how this movement has moved beyond standard cognitive science. The article then clarifies important respects in which embodied cognition (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Tom McClelland (2012). Self-Representationalism and the Neo-Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis: A Hybrid Account of Phenomenal Consciousness. Dissertation, Sussexscore: 18.0
    This thesis introduces the Problem of Consciousness as an antinomy between Physicalism and Primitivism about the phenomenal. I argue that Primitivism is implausible, but is supported by two conceptual gaps. The ‘–tivity gap’ holds that physical states are objective and phenomenal states are subjective, and that there is no entailment from the objective to the subjective. The ‘–trinsicality gap’ holds that physical properties are extrinsic and phenomenal qualities are intrinsic, and that there is no entailment from the extrinsic to the (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Matteo Colombo (2014). Neural Representationalism, the Hard Problem of Content and Vitiated Verdicts. A Reply to Hutto & Myin (2013). Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):257-274.score: 18.0
    Colombo’s (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2013) plea for neural representationalism is the focus of a recent contribution to Phenomenology and Cognitive Science by Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin. In that paper, Hutto and Myin have tried to show that my arguments fail badly. Here, I want to respond to their critique clarifying the type of neural representationalism put forward in my (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2013) piece, and to take the opportunity to make a few (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Ryan Hickerson (2009). Twardowski And Representationalism. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 4 (1).score: 18.0
    Normal.dotm 0 0 1 50 252 Kansas State University 4 1 352 12.0 0 false 18 pt 18 pt 0 0 false false false /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman";} My task in this paper is twofold. On the one hand, I want to provide an account of Twardowski’s treatment of content , as can be found in his book Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Rocco J. Gennaro (2008). Representationalism, Peripheral Awareness, and the Transparency of Experience. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):39-56.score: 16.0
    It is often said that some kind of peripheral (or inattentional) conscious awareness accompanies our focal (attentional) consciousness. I agree that this is often the case, but clarity is needed on several fronts. In this paper, I lay out four distinct theses on peripheral awareness and show that three of them are true. However, I then argue that a fourth thesis, commonly associated with the so-called "self-representational approach to consciousness," is false. The claim here is that we have outer focal (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Nicoletta Orlandi (2011). Ambiguous Figures and Representationalism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):307-323.score: 16.0
    Ambiguous figures pose a problem for representationalists, particularly for representationalists who believe that the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual (MacPherson in Nous 40(1):82–117, 2006). This is because, in viewing ambiguous figures, subjects have perceptual experiences that differ in phenomenal properties without differing in non-conceptual content. In this paper, I argue that ambiguous figures pose no problem for non-conceptual representationalists. I argue that aspect shifts do not presuppose or require the possession of sophisticated conceptual resources and that, although viewing ambiguous (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. René Jagnow (2012). Representationalism and the Perspectival Character of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 157 (2):227-249.score: 16.0
    Perceptual experiences inform us about objective properties of things in our environment. But they also have perspectival character in the sense that they differ phenomenally when objects are viewed from different points of view. Contemporary representationalists hold, at a minimum, that phenomenal character supervenes on representational content. Thus, in order to account for perspectival character, they need to indentify a type of representational content that changes in appropriate ways with the perceiver’s point of view. Many representationlists, including Shoemaker and Lycan, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Richard Gray (2003). Tye's Representationalism: Feeling the Heat? Philosophical Studies 115 (3):245-256.score: 15.0
    According to Tye's PANIC theory of consciousness, perceptual states of creatures which are related to a disjunction of external contents will fail to represent sensorily, and thereby fail to be conscious states. In this paper I argue that heat perception, a form of perception neglected in the recent literature, serves as a counterexample to Tye's radical externalist claim. Having laid out Tye's absent qualia scenario, the PANIC theory from which it derives and the case of heat perception as a counterexample, (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Amy Kind (2010). Transparency and Representationalist Theories of Consciousness. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):902-913.score: 15.0
  39. Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (2005). The Limits of Representationalism: A Phenomenological Critique of Thomas Metzinger's Self-Model Theory. Synthesis Philosophica 2 (40):355-371.score: 15.0
  40. Brian Cutter & Michael Tye (2011). Tracking Representationalism and the Painfulness of Pain. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):90-109.score: 15.0
  41. Brad J. Thompson (2008). Representationalism and the Conceivability of Inverted Spectra. Synthese 160 (2):203-213.score: 15.0
    Most philosophers who have endorsed the idea that there is such a thing as phenomenal content—content that supervenes on phenomenal character—have also endorsed what I call Standard Russellianism. According to Standard Russellianism, phenomenal content is Russellian in nature, and the properties represented by perceptual experiences are mind-independent physical properties. In agreement with Sydney Shoemaker [Shoemaker, S. (1994). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54 249–314], I argue that Standard Russellianism is incompatible with the possibility of spectrum inversion without illusion. One defense of (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Sydney Shoemaker (1998). Two Cheers for Representationalism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):671-678.score: 15.0
  43. Edmond L. Wright (1990). New Representationalism. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 20 (1):65-92.score: 15.0
  44. Raamy Majeed (2013). A Representationalist Argument Against Contemporary Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (5-6):105-123.score: 15.0
    Consider (i) the humility thesis that we only know the causal natures of the external world and (ii) the thesis we are directly acquainted with the intrinsic natures of our phenomenal experiences. The conjunction of these two theses has motivated a version of panpsychism, which states that the intrinsic nature of all matter is phenomenal. Contemporary panpsychists, such as Lockwood (1991, 1993), Rosenberg (1999, 2004) and Maxwell (2002), have taken it upon themselves to flesh out a plausible story of how (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Andrew Ward (1988). Representationalism and Hume's Problem. Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):423-430.score: 15.0
  46. Neil Mehta & George A. Mashour (2013). General and Specific Consciousness: A First-Order Representationalist Approach. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 15.0
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. A. E. Pitson (1986). The New Representationalism. Philosophical Papers 15 (August):41-49.score: 15.0
  48. Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (2004). Representationalism and Beyond: A Phenomenological Critique of Thomas Metzinger's Self-Model Theory. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11):88-108.score: 15.0
  49. Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen (2013). Representationalism and Non-Representationalism in Historiography. Journal of the Philosophy of History 7 (3):453-479.score: 15.0
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Robert J. Matthews (1991). Is There Vindication Through Representationalism? In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.score: 15.0
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 502