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Profile: Reshef Agam-Segal (Virginia Military Institute)
  1. Reshef Agam-Segal (2013). A Splitting “Mind-Ache”. Journal of Philosophical Research 38:43-68.
    I problematize the notion of self-legislation. I follow in Elizabeth Anscombe’s footsteps and suggest that on a plausible reading of Kant, he does not so much misidentify the sources of moral normativity, as fail to identify any such sources in the first place: The set of terms with which the Kantian is attempting to do so is confused. Interpreters today take Kant’s legal language to be merely metaphorical. The language of ‘self-legislation,’ in particular, is replaced by such interpreters with a (...)
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  2. Reshef Agam-Segal (2012). How to Investigate the Grammar of Aspect- Perception: A Question in Wittgensteinian Method. Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):85-105.
    I argue that the typical Wittgensteinian method of philosophical investigation cannot help elucidate the grammar of aspect-seeing. In the typical Wittgensteinian method, we examine meaning in use: We practice language, and note the logical ramifications. I argue that the effectiveness of this method is hindered in the case of aspect-seeing by the fact that aspect-seeing involves an aberrant activity of seeing: Whereas it is normally nonsense to say that we choose what to see (decide to see the White House red, (...)
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  3. Reshef Agam-Segal (2012). Kant's Non-Aristotelian Conception of Morality. Sounthwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):121-133.
    Interpreters today often take Kant’s practical philosophy to share some of the basic insights of Aristotle’s. Such, for instance, is the main tone of Christine Korsgaard’s reading. I make a case for a different, non-Aristotelian, reading of Kant’s moral philosophy. In particular, I distinguish between two senses of self-legislation: Aristotelian and Kantian. Aristotelian self-legislation is a general project we are involved in as humans, and in which we determine the organizing principle of our practical life. Every action of ours takes (...)
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  4. Reshef Agam-Segal (2012). Reflecting on Language From “Sideways-On”: Preparatory and Non-Preparatory Aspects-Seeing. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 1 (6).
    Aspect-seeing, I claim, involves reflection on concepts. It involves letting oneself feel how it would be like to conceptualize something with a certain concept, without committing oneself to this conceptualization. I distinguish between two kinds of aspect-perception: -/- 1. Preparatory: allows us to develop, criticize, and shape concepts. It involves bringing a concept to an object for the purpose of examining what would be the best way to conceptualize it. -/- 2. Non-Preparatory: allows us to express the ingraspability of certain (...)
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  5. Reshef Agam-Segal (2010). Four Introductory Books in Ethics. Teaching Philosophy 33 (4):399-408.
    What do we aim at when we teach general introductory courses in moral philosophy? What should we aim at? In particular, should we focus on practice or theory? Should we make the study of ethics easy for the students, or should we alternatively aim at making the hardness of ethics attractive to them? This review discusses four recently published textbooks in ethics designed for beginners’ level courses. The books are different in organization and emphases. In each case, I have given (...)
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  6. Reshef Agam-Segal (2009). Contours and Barriers: What is It to Draw the Limits of Moral Language? Philosophy 84 (4):549-570.
    I explore the idea of language reaching its limits by distinguishing two kinds of limits language may have: The first are “Boundaries” which lie on the edges of language, and distinguish what makes sense from what does not. These, I claim, are suitable in making theoretical generalizations. The second are “Contours,” which lie within language, and allow for contrasting and comparing meanings and shades of meanings that we capture in language. These are more suitable for characterizations of particulars, and for (...)
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