Search results for 'Retributivism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  13
    Some Second Thoughts On Retributivism (2011). Jeffrie G. Murphy. In Mark White (ed.), Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy. Oxford University Press
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  2.  10
    Retrieving Retributivism (2011). RA Duff. In Mark White (ed.), Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy. Oxford University Press 1.
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  3. Ken Levy (2014). Why Retributivism Needs Consequentialism: The Rightful Place of Revenge in the Criminal Justice System. Rutgers Law Review 66:629-684.
    Consider the reaction of Trayvon Martin’s family to the jury verdict. They were devastated that George Zimmerman, the defendant, was found not guilty of manslaughter or murder. Whatever the merits of this outcome, what does the Martin family’s emotional reaction mean? What does it say about criminal punishment – especially the reasons why we punish? Why did the Martin family want to see George Zimmerman go to jail? And why were – and are – they so upset that he didn’t? (...)
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  4. Nathan Hanna (2014). Retributivism Revisited. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):473-484.
    I’ll raise a problem for Retributivism, the view that legal punishment is justified on the basis of desert. I’ll focus primarily on Mitchell Berman’s recent defense of the view. He gives one of the most sophisticated and careful statements of it. And his argument is representative, so the problem I’ll raise for it will apply to other versions of Retributivism. His insights about justification also help to make the problem particularly obvious. I’ll also show how the problem extends (...)
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  5.  68
    Jimmy Chia-Shin Hsu (2015). Does Communicative Retributivism Necessarily Negate Capital Punishment? Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (4):603-617.
    Does communicative retributivism necessarily negate capital punishment? My answer is no. I argue that there is a place, though a very limited and unsettled one, for capital punishment within the theoretical vision of communicative retributivism. The death penalty, when reserved for extravagantly evil murderers for the most heinous crimes, is justifiable by communicative retributive ideals. I argue that punishment as censure is a response to the preceding message sent by the offender through his criminal act. The gravity of (...)
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  6.  4
    Nick Smith (forthcoming). Dialectical Retributivism: Why Apologetic Offenders Deserve Reductions in Punishment Even Under Retributive Theories. Philosophia:1-18.
    This paper makes the counterintuitive argument that apologetic offenders in both criminal and noncriminal contexts deserve reductions in punishment even according to retributive theories of justice. I argue here that accounting for post-offense apologetic meanings can make retributivism more fair and consistent much in the same way that considering pre-offense behavior such as culpable mental states like premeditation provide a more holistic and accurate view of the badness of the offense at issue. On my view, retributivists should endorse the (...)
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  7.  10
    Göran Duus-Otterström (forthcoming). Fairness-Based Retributivism Reconsidered. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-18.
    In this paper, I defend fairness-based retributivism against two important objections, the no-benefit objection and the social injustice objection. I argue that the theory can defeat the no-benefit objection by developing an account of how crimes can be sources of unfairness by inflicting losses on people, and that it can blunt the social injustice objection by toning down the theory’s distributive aspirations. I conclude that fairness-based retributivism, contrary to received wisdom, merits further attention from legal and political philosophers.
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  8.  69
    Jane Johnson (2008). Revisiting Kantian Retributivism to Construct a Justification of Punishment. Criminal Law and Philosophy 2 (3):291-307.
    The standard view of Kant’s retributivism, as well as its more recent reworking in the ‘limited’ or ‘partial’ retributivist reading are, it is argued here, inadequate accounts of Kant on punishment. In the case of the former, the view is too limited and superficial, and in the latter it is simply inaccurate as an interpretation of Kant. Instead, this paper argues that a more sophisticated and accurate rendering of Kant on punishment can be obtained by looking to his construction (...)
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  9.  29
    Jesper Ryberg (2010). Mass Atrocities, Retributivism, and the Threshold Challenge. Res Publica 16 (2):169-179.
    The purpose of this paper is to direct attention to a challenge—referred to as the threshold challenge —facing a non-absolutist retributivist view on international criminal justice. It is argued, on the one hand, that this challenge constitutes a practically pertinent problem for the retributivist approach to the punishment of mass crimes and, on the other, that it is very hard to imagine any principled way of meeting this challenge.
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  10.  35
    Jami L. Anderson (1997). Reciprocity as a Justification for Retributivism. Criminal Justice Ethics 16 (1):13-25.
    Retributivism is regarded by many as an attractive theory of punishment. Its primary assumption is that persons are morally responsible agents, and it demands that the social practices of punishment acknowledge that agency. But others have criticized retributivism as being barbaric, claiming that the theory is nothing more than a rationalization for revenge that fails to offer a compelling non-consequentialist justification for the infliction of harm. Much of the contemporary philosophical literature on retributivism has attempted to meet (...)
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  11.  17
    Jami L. Anderson (1999). Annulment Retributivism: A Hegelian Theory of Punishment. Cambridge University Press 5 (4):363-388.
    Despite the bad press that retributivism often receives, the basic assumptions on which this theory of punishment rests are generally regarded as being attractive and compelling. First of these is the assumption that persons are morally responsible agents and that social practices, such as criminal punishment, must acknowledge that fact. Additionally, retributivism is committed to the claim that punishment must be proportionate to the crime, and not determined by such utilitarian concerns as the welfare of society, or the (...)
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  12.  76
    Dimitri Landa (2009). On the Possibility of Kantian Retributivism. Utilitas 21 (3):276-296.
    One of the most potent motivations for retributivist approaches to punishment has been their apparent connection to an ethical background shaped by the Kantian notion of morally autonomous and rational human agency. The present article challenges the plausibility of this connection. I argue that retributivism subverts, rather than embodies, the normative consequences of moral autonomy, justifying a social practice that conflicts with the considered judgments that the proper recognition of moral autonomy would authorize. The core of my case is (...)
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  13.  14
    Linda Radzik (forthcoming). Desert of What? On Murphy’s Reluctant Retributivism. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-13.
    In Punishment and the Moral Emotions, Jeffrie Murphy rejects his earlier, strong endorsements of retributivism. Questioning both our motivations for embracing retributivism and our views about the basis of desert, he now describes himself as a “reluctant retributivist.” In this essay, I argue that Murphy should reject retributivism altogether. Even if we grant that criminals have negative desert, why should we suppose that it is desert of suffering? I argue that it is possible to defend desert-based theories (...)
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  14.  26
    Jesper Ryberg (2005). Retributivism and Multiple Offending. Res Publica 11 (3):213-233.
    This article addresses the question of how multiple offenders – that is, offenders who have committed more than one crime before they are apprehended – should be punished from a retributivist point of view. Two theories are evaluated, both defending the view that there should be a bulk discount for multiple offending. According to the first theory, a bulk discount follows from the idea of a punishment ceiling for types of crimes and the principle of parsimony in punishing. According to (...)
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  15.  52
    Thom Brooks (2005). Kantian Punishment and Retributivism: A Reply to Clark. Ratio 18 (2):237–245.
    In this journal, Michael Clark defends a "A Non-Retributive Kantian Approach to Punishment". I argue that both Kant's and Rawls's theories of punishment are retributivist to some extent. It may then be slightly misleading to say that by following the views of Kant and Rawls, in particular, as Clark does, we can develop a nonretributivist theory of punishment. This matter is further complicated by the fact Clark nowhere addresses Rawls's views on punishment: Rawls endorses a mixed theory combining retributive and (...)
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  16.  15
    Paul Robinson, Joshua S. Barton & Matthew J. Lister (2014). Empirical Desert, Individual Prevention, and Limiting Retributivism: A Reply. New Criminal Law Review 17 (2):312-375.
    A number of articles and empirical studies over the past decade, most by Paul Robinson and co-authors, have suggested a relationship between the extent of the criminal law's reputation for being just in its distribution of criminal liability and punishment in the eyes of the community – its "moral credibility" – and its ability to gain that community's deference and compliance through a variety of mechanisms that enhance its crime-control effectiveness. This has led to proposals to have criminal liability and (...)
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  17.  11
    Thomas Søbirk Petersen (2014). (Neuro)Predictions, Dangerousness, and Retributivism. Journal of Ethics 18 (2):137-151.
    Through the criminal justice system so-called dangerous offenders are, besides the offence that they are being convicted of and sentenced to, also punished for acts that they have not done but that they are believe to be likely to commit in the future. The aim of this paper is to critically discuss whether some adherents of retributivism give a plausible rationale for punishing offenders more harshly if they, all else being equal, by means of predictions are believed to be (...)
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  18.  7
    Jesper Ryberg (2014). When Should Neuroimaging Be Applied in the Criminal Court? On Ideal Comparison and the Shortcomings of Retributivism. Journal of Ethics 18 (2):81-99.
    When does neuroimaging constitute a sufficiently developed technology to be put into use in the work of determining whether or not a defendant is guilty of crime? This question constitutes the starting point of the present paper. First, it is suggested that an overall answer is provided by what is referred to as the “ideal comparative view.” Secondly, it is—on the ground of this view—argued that the answer as to whether neuroimaging technology should be applied presupposes penal theoretical considerations. Thirdly, (...)
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  19.  4
    Darin Clearwater (forthcoming). ‘‘If the Cloak Doesn’T Fit, You Must Acquit’: Retributivist Models of Preventive Detention and the Problem of Coextensiveness. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-22.
    Persons who are dangerous and legally responsible, but who have not yet committed any currently recognised criminal offence, fall within the gap left between the domains of criminal justice and civil commitment. Many jurisdictions operate legal regimes that permit the detention of such persons in order to prevent the occurrence of anticipated criminal harms. These regimes often either fail to respect the principle of proportionality or contradictorily treat a dangerous offender as both legally responsible and not responsible at the same (...)
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  20. Thom Brooks (2004). Retributivist Arguments Against Capital Punishment. Journal of Social Philosophy 35 (2):188–197.
    This article argues that even if we grant that murderers may deserve death in principle, retributivists should still oppose capital punishment. The reason? Our inability to know with certainty whether or not individuals possess the necessary level of desert. In large part due to advances in science, we can only be sure that no matter how well the trial is administered or how many appeals are allowed or how many years we let elapse, we will continue to execute innocent persons (...)
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  21. David Dolinko (1991). Some Thoughts About Retributivism. Ethics 101 (3):537-559.
    Retributive accounts of the justification of criminal punishment are increasingly fashionable, yet their proponents frequently rely more on suggestive metaphor than on reasoned explanation. This article seeks to question whether any such coherent explanations are possible. I briefly sketch some general doubts about the validity of retributivist views and then critique three recent efforts (by George Sher, Jean Hampton, and Michael Moore) to put retributivism on a sound basis.
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  22. Nathan Hanna (2008). Say What? A Critique of Expressive Retributivism. Law and Philosophy 27 (2):123-150.
    Some philosophers think that the challenge of justifying punishment can be met by a theory that emphasizes the expressive character of punishment. A particular type of theories of this sort - call it Expressive Retributivism [ER] - combines retributivist and expressivist considerations. These theories are retributivist since they justify punishment as an intrinsically appropriate response to wrongdoing, as something wrongdoers deserve, but the expressivist element in these theories seeks to correct for the traditional obscurity of retributivism. Retributivists often (...)
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  23.  12
    Thomas Nadelhoffer, Saeideh Heshmati, Deanna Kaplan & Shaun Nichols (2013). Folk Retributivism And The Communication Confound. Economics and Philosophy 29 (2):235-261.
    Retributivist accounts of punishment maintain that it is right to punish wrongdoers, even if the punishment has no future benefits. Research in experimental economics indicates that people are willing to pay to punish defectors. A complementary line of work in social psychology suggests that people think that it is right to punish wrongdoers. This work suggests that people are retributivists about punishment. However, all of the extant work contains an important potential confound. The target of the punishment is expected to (...)
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  24.  8
    Iskra Fileva & Jon Tresan (2015). Will Retributivism Die and Will Neuroscience Kill It? Cognitive Systems Research 34:54-70.
    In a widely read essay, “For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything,” Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen argue that the advance of neuroscience will result in the widespread rejection of free will, and with it – of retributivism. They go on to propose that consequentialist reforms are in order, and they predict such reforms will take place. We agree that retributivism should be rejected, and we too are optimistic that rejected it will be. But we don’t think (...)
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  25.  10
    David O. Brink (2012). Retributivism and Legal Moralism. Ratio Juris 25 (4):496-512.
    This article examines whether a retributivist conception of punishment implies legal moralism and asks what liberalism implies about retributivism and moralism. It makes a case for accepting the weak retributivist thesis that culpable wrongdoing creates a pro tanto case for blame and punishment and the weak moralist claim that moral wrongdoing creates a pro tanto case for legal regulation. This weak moralist claim is compatible with the liberal claim that the legal enforcement of morality is rarely all‐thing‐considered desirable. Though (...)
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  26. J. Angelo Corlett (2001). Making Sense of Retributivism. Philosophy 76 (1):77-110.
    This paper explicates and challenges John Rawl's argument concerning a rule-utilitarian theory of punishment. In so doing, it argues in favour of a retributivist theory of punishment, one that seeks to justify, not only particular forms of punishment, but the institution of punishment itself. Some crucial objections to retributivism are then considered: one regarding the adverse effects of punishment on the innocent, another concerning proportional punishment, a third pertaining to vengeance and retribution, a Marxian concern with retributive punishment, and (...)
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  27.  8
    Richard L. Lippke (2014). Some Surprising Implications of Negative Retributivism. Journal of Applied Philosophy 31 (1):49-62.
    Negative retributivism is the view that though the primary justifying aim of legal punishment is the reduction of crime, the state's efforts to do so are subject to side-constraints that forbid punishment of the innocent and disproportionate punishment of the guilty. I contend that insufficient attention has been paid to what the side-constraints commit us to in constructing a theory of legal punishment, even one primarily oriented toward reducing crime. Specifically, I argue that the side-constraints limit the kinds of (...)
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  28. D. Dolinko (1997). Retributivism, Consequentialism, and the Intrinsic Goodness of Punishment. Law and Philosophy 16 (5):507-528.
    Retributivism is commonly taken as an alternative to a consequentialist justification of punishment. It has recently been suggested, however, that retributivism can be recast as a consequentialist theory. This suggestion is shown to be untenable. The temptation to advance it is traced to an ``intrinsic good'' claim prominent in retributive thinking. This claim is examined, and is argued to be of little help in coping with the difficulties besetting the retributive theory, as well as clashing with a ``desert'' (...)
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  29. Larry Alexander (1983). Retributivism and the Inadvertent Punishment of the Innocent. Law and Philosophy 2 (2):233 - 246.
    Retributivism is generally thought to forbid the punishment of the innocent, even if such punishment would produce otherwise good results, such as deterrence. It has recently been argued that because capital punishment always entails the risk of executing an innocent person, instituting capital punishment is tantamount to intentionally taking innocent lives and therefore cannot be justified on retributive grounds. I argue that there are several versions of retributivism, only one of which might categorically forbid risking punishing innocent persons. (...)
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  30. Daniel Z. Korman (2003). The Failure of Trust-Based Retributivism. Law and Philosophy 22 (6):561-575.
    Punishment stands in need of justification because it involves intentionally harming offenders. Trust-based retributivists attempt to justify punishment by appeal to the offender’s violation of the victim’s trust, maintaining that the state is entitled to punish offenders as a means of restoring conditions of trust to their pre-offense levels. I argue that trust-based retributivism fails on two counts. First, it entails the permissibility of punishing the legally innocent and fails to justify the punishment of some offenders. Second, it cannot (...)
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  31.  9
    M. Tunick (1996). Is Kant a Retributivist? History of Political Thought 17 (1):60-78.
    Retributivists are often thought to give 'deontological' theories of punishment, arguing that we should punish not for the beneficial consequences of doing so such as deterrence or incapacitation, but purely because justice demands it. Kant is often regarded as the paradigmatic retributivist. In some passages Kant does appear to give a deontological theory of punishment. For example, Kant insists that on an island where all the people were to leave the next day, forever dissolving and dispersing the community, the last (...)
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  32.  3
    Thom Brooks (2011). Is Bradley a Retributivist? History of Political Thought 32 (1):83-95.
    Perhaps the least controversial area of F.H. Bradley's writings relates to his views on punishment. Commentators universally recognize Bradley's theory of punishment as a retributivist theory of punishment. This article challenges the received wisdom. I argue that Bradley does not endorse retributivism as commonly understood. Instead, he defends the view that punishment is non-retributivist and serves the end of societal maintenance. Moreover, Bradley defends this view consistently from Ethical Studies to later work on punishment. Instead of holding a theory (...)
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  33.  73
    J. Angelo Corlett (2003). Making More Sense of Retributivism: Desert as Responsibility and Proportionality. Philosophy 78 (2):279-287.
    This paper is an elaboration of my previous paper published in Philosophy, ‘Making Sense of retributivism,’ which was a criticism of John Rawls' attempt in ‘Two Concepts of Rules’ to develop a rule utilitarian theory of punishment wherein utilitarianism is best construed as a justificatory basis for the institution of punishment and retributivism is best construed as serving as a justificatory basis for particular forms of punishment. I challenge this claim, arguing that retributivism must and can provide (...)
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  34.  25
    Jesper Ryberg (2013). Retributivism and Resources. Utilitas 25 (1):66-79.
    A traditional overall distinction between the various versions of retributive theories of punishment is that between positive and negative retributivism. This article addresses the question of what positive retributivism implies for a society in which the state has many other types of obligation. Several approaches to this question are considered. It is argued that the resource priority question constitutes a genuine and widely ignored challenge for positive retributivist theories of punishment.
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  35.  22
    Jules Holroyd (2015). Mark D. White : Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy. [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (1):177-188.
    It is customary to remark, in writings on retributivism, that the meaning of the term is so diffuse and variably applied that there is no one concept or justificatory principle picked out by the term. Cottingham identified 9 different ideas captured by the term retributivism, and a similar paper could today no doubt identify as many again. This edited volume of essays on retributivism does justice to that customary remark, by bringing together a range of writings on (...)
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  36.  33
    David Wood (1997). Reductivism, Retributivism, and the Civil Detention of Dangerous Offenders. Utilitas 9 (1):131.
    The paper examines one objection to the suggestion that, rather than being subjected to extended prison sentences on the one hand, or simply released on the other, dangerous offenders should be in principle liable to some form of civil detention on completion of their normal sentences. This objection raises the spectre of a, pursuing various reductivist means outside the criminal justice system. The objection also threatens to undermine dualist theories of punishment, theories which combine reductivist and retributivist considerations. The paper (...)
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  37.  28
    George Schedler (2011). Retributivism and Fallible Systems of Punishment. Criminal Justice Ethics 30 (3):240-266.
    Abstract I argue for the following, which I dub the ?fallibility syllogism?: (1) All systems of criminal punishment that inflict suffering on the innocent are unjust from a desert-based, retributivist point of view. (2) All past or present human systems of criminal punishment inflict suffering on the innocent. (3) Therefore, all such human systems of criminal punishment are unjust from a desert-based, retributivist point of view. My argument for the first premise is organized in the following way. I define what (...)
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  38.  6
    Stephen G. Morris (2015). Vargas-Style Revisionism and the Problem of Retributivism. Acta Analytica 30 (3):305-316.
    Manuel Vargas advocates a revised understanding of the terms “free will” and “moral responsibility” that eliminates the problematic libertarian commitments inherent to the commonsense understanding of these terms. I argue that in order to make a plausible case for why philosophers ought to adopt his recommendations, Vargas must explain why we ought to retain the retributivist elements that figure prominently in both commonsense views about morality and philosophical discussions concerning free will and moral responsibility. Furthermore, I argue that his revisionist (...)
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  39.  21
    Vincent Luizzi (2007). The "New Balance" Approach to Punishment and Its Utilitarian and Retributivist Rivals. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 3:23-28.
    This essay investigates the possibility of veering from an approach of doing bad to the offender as the primary response to crime to one of requiring the offender to do good. This approach, in effect, has us offset the evil which the offender has placed on the scales of justice with good which the offender is required to produce; hence the conception of New Balance. The specific focus here is to identify important deficiencies in the major approaches of retributivism (...)
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  40.  9
    Hegel On Punishment & A. More (2011). Sophisticated Retributivism. In Mark White (ed.), Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy. Oxford University Press
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  41.  5
    Ted Honderich (1984). Punishment, the New Retributivism, and Political Philosophy. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 18:117-147.
    This paper will in good part concern six arguments taken as making up what is called the New Retributivism. It will also have to do with a seventh retributivist argument, and with the unexamined idea that reflection on punishment can lead a life of its own, independently of political philosophy. Both that idea and the arguments bear on the main question of whether punishment in our societies is right or wrong. It is a question not worn to a frazzle, (...)
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  42.  6
    Tunick M. (1996). Is Kant a Retributivist? History of Political Thought 17 (1):60-78.

    The label ‘retributive’ has been sloppily attached to Kant. Kant is wrongly said to give a deontological theory of legal punishment, or to be a paradigmatic ‘bold retributivist’. By exploring precisely in what sense we can speak of Kant as a retributivist I hope at the very least to have promoted a more accurate understanding of his theory of legal punishment, an understanding that is not obfuscated by a loose label.

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  43.  3
    Eoin O'Connell (2014). Kantian Moral Retributivism: Punishment, Suffering, and the Highest Good. Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (4):477-495.
    Against the view of some contemporary Kantians who wish to downplay Kant's retributivist commitments, I argue that Kant's theory of practical of reason implies a retributive conception of punishment. I trace this view to Kant's distinction between morality and well-being and his attempt to synthesize these two concerns in the idea of the highest good. Well-being is morally valuable only insofar as it is proportional to virtue, and the suffering inflicted on wrongdoers as punishment for wrongdoing is morally good so (...)
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  44.  13
    Igor Primorac (1981). Is Retributivism Analytic? Philosophy 56 (216):203 - 211.
    Most of the standard arguments against the retributive theory of punishment are hardly new. That the retributive view of punishment is but a rationalization of a primitive urge for revenge; that the retributivists, instead of providing an answer to the question about the source of our moral right to add a new evil to an already perpetrated one , simply assert dogmatically that punishment is an intrinsic good, i.e. something that needs no further moral justification; that it is impossible to (...)
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  45.  3
    Mark White (2011). Introduction to 'Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy'. In Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy. Oxford University Press 16.
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  46. Arnulf Zweig (1995). Retributivism, Resentment And Amnesty. Jahrbuch für Recht Und Ethik 3.
    In this paper I explore some of the moral pros and cons of pardoning or granting amnesty to people who have committed or participated in serious crimes. I believe that we are pulled in two directions when faced with questions of clemency, pardoning, amnesty, especially when it comes to war criminals or people who are guilty of flagrant violations of human rights. Our everyday morality provides us with fairly strong intuitions when the culprits are "remorseless villains". Remorseless villains don't deserve (...)
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  47.  84
    Richard Oxenberg, Retributivism and Outraged Love: A Search for the Heart of Retributive Justice.
    "An eye for an eye will make the whole world blind." This quote, often attributed to Gandhi, suggests the illegitimacy of the retributive urge. On the other hand, many feel a strong intuitive sense that "justice must be served" and that violators of justice must be fittingly punished. In this paper I examine the urge for retributive justice and argue that, at its base, it is rooted in a profound desire to have a wrongdoer see the nature of his or (...)
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  48.  31
    Douglas Husak (2013). Retributivism In Extremis. Law and Philosophy 32 (1):3-31.
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  49.  16
    Alfonso Donoso (2015). Justifying Liberal Retributive Justice: Punishment, Criminalization, and Holistic Retributivism. Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 56 (132):495-520.
    ABSTRACT In this article I explore whether liberal retributive justice should be conceived of either individualistically or holistically. I critically examine the individualistic account of retributive justice and suggest that the question of retribution – i.e., whether and when punishment of an individual is compatible with just treatment of that individual – must be answered holistically. By resorting to the ideal of sensitive reasons, a model of legitimacy at the basis of our best normative models of democracy, the article argues (...)
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  50.  7
    Jesper Ryberg (2015). Youth Discounts, Diminished Culpability, and Retributivism. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 29 (2):253-269.
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