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Profile: Richard Bradley (London School of Economics)
  1. Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich & Christian List, Aggregating Causal Judgements.
    Decision making typically requires judgements about causal relations: we need to know both the causal e¤ects of our actions and the causal relevance of various environmental factors. Judgements about the nature and strength of causal rela- tions often di¤er, even among experts. How to handle such diversity is the topic of this paper. First we consider the possibility of aggregating causal judgements via the aggregation of probabilistic ones. The broadly negative outcome of this investigation leads us to look at aggregating (...)
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  2. Richard Bradley & Mareile Drechsler (2013). Types of Uncertainty. Erkenntnis:1-24.
    We distinguish three qualitatively different types of uncertainty—ethical, option and state space uncertainty—that are distinct from state uncertainty, the empirical uncertainty that is typically measured by a probability function on states of the world. Ethical uncertainty arises if the agent cannot assign precise utilities to consequences. Option uncertainty arises when the agent does not know what precise consequence an act has at every state. Finally, state space uncertainty exists when the agent is unsure how to construct an exhaustive state space. (...)
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  3. Richard Bradley & Thompson (2012). A (Mainly Epistemic) Case for Multiple-Vote Majority Rule. Episteme 9 (1):63-79.
    Multiple-vote majority rule is a procedure for making group decisions in which individuals weight their votes on issues in accordance with how competent they are on them. When individuals are motivated by the truth and know their relative competence on different issues, multiple-vote majority rule performs nearly as well, epistemically speaking, as rule by an expert oligarchy, but is still acceptable from the point of view of equal participation in the political process.
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  4. Richard Bradley (2011). Conditionals and Supposition-Based Reasoning. Topoi 30 (1):39-45.
    Case-based reasoning is a familiar method of evaluating sentences. But when applied to conditionals, it seems to lead to implausible conclusions. In this paper I argue that the problem arises from equating the probability of a conditional sentence on the evidential supposition of some condition with the conditional probability of the former, given the latter.
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  5. Richard Bradley (2010). Proposition-Valued Random Variables as Information. Synthese 175 (1):17 - 38.
    The notion of a proposition as a set of possible worlds or states occupies central stage in probability theory, semantics and epistemology, where it serves as the fundamental unit both of information and meaning. But this fact should not blind us to the existence of prospects with a different structure. In the paper I examine the use of random variables—in particular, proposition-valued random variables— in these fields and argue that we need a general account of rational attitude formation with respect (...)
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  6. Richard Bradley (2009). Becker's Thesis and Three Models of Preference Change. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 8 (2):223-242.
    This article examines Becker's thesis that the hypothesis that choices maximize expected utility relative to fixed and universal tastes provides a general framework for the explanation of behaviour. Three different models of preference revision are presented and their scope evaluated. The first, the classical conditioning model, explains all changes in preferences in terms of changes in the information held by the agent, holding fundamental beliefs and desires fixed. The second, the Jeffrey conditioning model, explains them in terms of changes in (...)
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  7. Richard Bradley (2009). Revising Incomplete Attitudes. Synthese 171 (2):235 - 256.
    Bayesian models typically assume that agents are rational, logically omniscient and opinionated. The last of these has little descriptive or normative appeal, however, and limits our ability to describe how agents make up their minds (as opposed to changing them) or how they can suspend or withdraw their opinions. To address these limitations this paper represents the attitudinal states of non-opinionated agents by sets of (permissible) probability and desirability functions. Several basic ways in which such states of mind can be (...)
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  8. Richard Bradley & Christian List (2009). Desire-as-Belief Revisited. Analysis 69 (1):31-37.
    On Hume’s account of motivation, beliefs and desires are very different kinds of propositional attitudes. Beliefs are cognitive attitudes, desires emotive ones. An agent’s belief in a proposition captures the weight he or she assigns to this proposition in his or her cognitive representation of the world. An agent’s desire for a proposition captures the degree to which he or she prefers its truth, motivating him or her to act accordingly. Although beliefs and desires are sometimes entangled, they play very (...)
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  9. Richard Bradley (2008). Preference Kinematics. In Till Grune (ed.), Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology.
  10. Richard Bradley (2008). Comparing Evaluations. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1part1):85-100.
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  11. Richard Bradley (2007). A Defence of the Ramsey Test. Mind 116 (461):1-21.
    According to the Ramsey Test hypothesis the conditional claim that if A then B is credible just in case it is credible that B, on the supposition that A. If true the hypothesis helps explain the way in which we evaluate and use ordinary language conditionals. But impossibility results for the Ramsey Test hypothesis in its various forms suggest that it is untenable. In this paper, I argue that these results do not in fact have this implication, on (...)
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  12. Richard Bradley (2007). A Unified Bayesian Decision Theory. Theory and Decision 63 (3):233-263,.
    This paper provides new foundations for Bayesian Decision Theory based on a representation theorem for preferences defined on a set of prospects containing both factual and conditional possibilities. This use of a rich set of prospects not only provides a framework within which the main theoretical claims of Savage, Ramsey, Jeffrey and others can be stated and compared, but also allows for the postulation of an extended Bayesian model of rational belief and desire from which they can be derived as (...)
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  13. Richard Bradley (2007). Consensus by Aggregation and Deliberation. In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (ed.), Homage à Wlodek: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz.
    On the face of it both aggregation and deliberation represent alternative ways of producing a consensus. I argue, however, that the adequacy of aggregation mechanisms should be evaluated with an eye to the effects, both possible and actual, of public deliberation. Such an evaluation is undertaken by sketching a Bayesian model of deliberation as learning from others.
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  14. Richard Bradley (2007). Impartiality in Weighing Lives. Philosophical Books 48 (4):292-302.
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  15. Richard Bradley (2007). Reaching a Consensus. Social Choice and Welfare 29:609-632.
    This paper explores some aspects of the relation between aggregation and deliberation as ways of achieving a consensus amongst a group of indviduals on some set of issues. I argue firstly that the framing of an aggregation problem itself generates information about the judgements of others that individuals are rationally obliged to take into account. And secondly that the constraints which aggregation theories typically place on consensual or collective judgements need not be consistent with the outcomes of rational deliberative processes (...)
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  16. Richard Bradley (2007). The Kinematics of Belief and Desire. Synthese 156 (3):513-535.
    Richard Jeffrey regarded the version of Bayesian decision theory he floated in ‘The Logic of Decision’ and the idea of a probability kinematics—a generalisation of Bayesian conditioning to contexts in which the evidence is ‘uncertain’—as his two most important contributions to philosophy. This paper aims to connect them by developing kinematical models for the study of preference change and practical deliberation. Preference change is treated in a manner analogous to Jeffrey’s handling of belief change: not as mechanical outputs of combinations (...)
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  17. Richard Bradley (2006). Adams Conditionals and Non-Monotonic Probabilities. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (1-2):65-81.
    Adams' famous thesis that the probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities is incompatible with standard probability theory. Indeed it is incompatible with any system of monotonic conditional probability satisfying the usual multiplication rule for conditional probabilities. This paper explores the possibility of accommodating Adams' thesis in systems of non-monotonic probability of varying strength. It shows that such systems impose many familiar lattice theoretic properties on their models as well as yielding interesting logics of conditionals, but that a standard complementation operation (...)
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  18. Richard Bradley (2006). Taking Advantage of Difference in Opinion. Episteme 3 (3):141-155.
    Diversity of opinion both presents problems and aff ords opportunities. Diff erences of opinion can stand in the way of reaching an agreement within a group on what decisions to take. But at the same time, the fact that the differences in question could derive from access to different information or from the exercise of diff erent judgemental skills means that they present individuals with the opportunity to improve their own opinions. This paper explores the implications for solutions to the (...)
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  19. Richard Bradley (2005). Radical Probabilism and Bayesian Conditioning. Philosophy of Science 72 (2):342-364.
    Richard Jeffrey espoused an antifoundationalist variant of Bayesian thinking that he termed ‘Radical Probabilism’. Radical Probabilism denies both the existence of an ideal, unbiased starting point for our attempts to learn about the world and the dogma of classical Bayesianism that the only justified change of belief is one based on the learning of certainties. Probabilistic judgment is basic and irreducible. Bayesian conditioning is appropriate when interaction with the environment yields new certainty of belief in some proposition but leaves one’s (...)
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  20. Michael Dickson, Elisabeth A. Lloyd, C. Kenneth Waters, Matthew Dunn, Jennifer Cianciollo, Costas Mannouris, Richard Bradley & James Mattingly (2005). 1. From the New Editor From the New Editor (P. Iii). Philosophy of Science 72 (2).
     
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  21. Richard Bradley (2004). Ramsey's Representation Theorem. Dialectica 58 (4):483–497.
    This paper reconstructs and evaluates the representation theorem presented by Ramsey in his essay 'Truth and Probability', showing how its proof depends on a novel application of Hölder's theory of measurement. I argue that it must be understood as a solution to the problem of measuring partial belief, a solution that in many ways remains unsurpassed. Finally I show that the method it employs may be interpreted in such a way as to avoid a well known objection to it due (...)
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  22. Richard Bradley (2002). Ethics Out of Economics. Mind 111 (444):837-841.
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  23. Richard Bradley (2002). Indicative Conditionals. Erkenntnis 56 (3):345-378.
    Adams Thesis has much evidence in its favour, but David Lewis famously showed that it cannot be true, in all but the most trivial of cases, if conditionals are proprositions and their probabilities are classical probabilities of truth. In this paper I show thatsimilar results can be constructed for a much wider class of conditionals. The fact that these results presuppose that the logic of conditionals is Boolean motivates a search for a non-Boolean alternative. It is argued that the exact (...)
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  24. Richard Bradley (2002). Review: Ethics Out of Economics. [REVIEW] Mind 111 (444):837-841.
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  25. Richard Bradley (2002). Review. John Broome 'Ethics Out of Economics' [Book Review]. Mind 11 (444):837-841.
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  26. Richard Bradley (2001). Foundations of Causal Decision Theory, James M. Joyce. Cambridge University Press, 1999, XII + 268 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 17 (2):275-294.
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  27. Richard Bradley (2001). Ramsey and the Measurement of Belief. In David Corfield & Jon Williamson (eds.), Foundations of Bayesianism.
    Foundations of Bayesianism is an authoritative collection of papers addressing the key challenges that face the Bayesian interpretation of probability today. Some of these papers seek to clarify the relationships between Bayesian, causal and logical reasoning. Others consider the application of Bayesianism to artificial intelligence, decision theory, statistics and the philosophy of science and mathematics. The volume includes important criticisms of Bayesian reasoning and also gives an insight into some of the points of disagreement amongst advocates of the Bayesian approach. (...)
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  28. Richard Bradley (2001). Review. James M. Joyce 'Foundations of Causal Decision Theory' [Book Review]. Economics and Philosophy 17 (2):275-294.
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  29. Richard Bradley (2001). The Birth of Architecture. Proceedings of the British Academy 110:69-92.
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  30. Richard Bradley (2000). A Preservation Condition for Conditionals. Analysis 60 (3):219–222.
  31. Richard Bradley (2000). Conditionals and the Logic of Decision. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):32.
    In this paper Richard Jeffrey's 'Logic of Decision' is extended by examination of agents' attitudes to the sorts of possibilities identified by indicative conditional sentences. An expression for the desirability of conditionals is proposed and, along with Adams' thesis that the probability of a conditional equals the conditional probability of its antecedent given its consequent, is defended by informally deriving it from Jeffrey's notion of desirability and some weak constraints on rational preference for conditional possibilities. Finally a statement is given (...)
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  32. Richard Bradley (2000). Models and Reality in Economics, Steven Rappaport. Edward Elgar, 1998, VI + 233 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 16 (1):147-174.
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  33. Richard Bradley (2000). Review. Steven Rappaport 'Models and Reality in Economics' [Book Review]. Economics and Philosophy 16 (1):159-163.
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  34. Richard Bradley (1999). Conditional Desirability. Theory and Decision 47 (1):23-55.
    Conditional attitudes are not the attitudes an agent is disposed to acquire in event of learning that a condition holds. Rather they are the components of agent's current attitudes that derive from the consideration they give to the possibility that the condition is true. Jeffrey's decision theory can be extended to include quantitative representation of the strength of these components. A conditional desirability measure for degrees of conditional desire is proposed and shown to imply that an agent's degrees of conditional (...)
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  35. Richard Bradley (1999). More Triviality. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (2):129-139.
    This paper uses the framework of Popper and Miller's work on axiom systems for conditional probabilities to explore Adams' thesis concerning the probabilities of conditionals. It is shown that even very weak axiom systems have only a very restricted set of models satisfying a natural generalisation of Adams' thesis, thereby casting severe doubt on the possibility of developing a non-Boolean semantics for conditionals consistent with it.
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  36. Richard Bradley (1999). Review. Roger Backhouse 'Explorations in Economic Methodology: From Lakatos to Empirical Philosophy of Science' [Book Review]. British Journal of Philosophy of Science 50 (2):316-318.
  37. Richard Bradley, Roya Sorensen, Mirror Notation & Philip Kremer (1999). Colin Oakes/Interpretations of Intuitionist Logic in Non-Normal Modal Logics 47–60 Aviad Heifetz/Iterative and Fixed Point Common Belief 61–79 Dw Mertz/the Logic of Instance Ontology 81–111. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 28:661-662.
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  38. Richard Bradley (1998). A Representation Theorem for a Decision Theory with Conditionals. Synthese 116 (2):187-229.
    This paper investigates the role of conditionals in hypothetical reasoning and rational decision making. Its main result is a proof of a representation theorem for preferences defined on sets of sentences (and, in particular, conditional sentences), where an agent’s preference for one sentence over another is understood to be a preference for receiving the news conveyed by the former. The theorem shows that a rational preference ordering of conditional sentences determines probability and desirability representations of the agent’s degrees of belief (...)
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  39. Richard Bradley (1994). The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany From the Napoleonic Wars Through the Third Reich. History of European Ideas 18 (6):944-946.
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