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  1. Richard Creath (forthcoming). Logical Empiricism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  2. Richard Creath (2012). Analyticity in the Theoretical Language: Is a Different Account Really Necessary?. In. In R. Creath (ed.), Rudolf Carnap and the Legacy of Logical Empiricism. Springer Verlag. 57--66.
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  3. Richard Creath (2012). Before Explication. In Pierre Wagner (ed.), Carnap's Ideal of Explication and Naturalism. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  4. Richard Creath (2010). The Construction of Reason: Kant, Carnap, Kuhn, and Beyond. In Michael Friedman, Mary Domski & Michael Dickson (eds.), Discourse on a New Method: Reinvigorating the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Science. Open Court.
  5. Richard Creath (2010). The Role of History in Science. Journal of the History of Biology 43 (2):207 - 214.
    The case often made by scientists (and philosophers) against history and the history of science in particular is clear. Insofar as a field of study is historical as opposed to law-based, it is trivial. Insofar as a field attends to the past of science as opposed to current scientific issues, its efforts are derivative and, by diverting attention from acquiring new knowledge, deplorable. This case would be devastating if true, but it has almost everything almost exactly wrong. The study of (...)
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  6. Richard Creath (2009). The Gentle Strength of Tolerance : The Logical Syntax of Language and Carnap's Philosophical Programme. In Pierre Wagner (ed.), Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language. Palgrave Macmillan. 203--214.
  7. Richard Creath & Michael Friedman (eds.) (2007). Cambridge Companion to Rudolf Carnap. Cambridge University Press.
  8. Jane Maienschein & Richard Creath (2007). Body Worlds as Education and Humanism. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (4):26 – 27.
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  9. Richard Creath (2004). Review of Parrini. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 71 (4):623-626.
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  10. Richard Creath & Jane Maienschein (eds.) (2000). Biology and Epistemology. Cambridge University Press.
    This set of original essays by some of the best names in philosophy of science explores a range of diverse issues in the intersection of biology and epistemology. It asks whether the study of life requires a special biological approach to knowledge and concludes that it does not. The studies, taken together, help to develop and deepen our understanding of how biology works and what counts as warranted knowledge and as legitimate approaches to the study of life. The first section (...)
     
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  11. David Magnus, Richard Creath & Jane Maienschein (2000). Biology & Epistemology. In Richard Creath & Jane Maienschein (eds.), Biology and Epistemology. Cambridge University Press.
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  12. Richard Creath (1998). Quine and the Limit Assumption in Peirce's Theory of Truth. Philosophical Studies 90 (2):109-112.
    Quine rejects Peirce's theory of truth because, among other things, its notion of a limit of a sequence of theories is defective in that the notion of a limit depends on that of nearer than which is defined for numbers but not for theories. This paper shows that the missing definition of nearer than applied to theories can be supplied from within Quine's own epistemology. The upshot is that either Quine's epistemology must be rejected or Peirce's pragmatic theory of truth (...)
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  13. Richard Creath (1996). The Unity of Science: Carnap, Neurath, and Beyond. In Peter Galison & David J. Stump (eds.), The Disunity of Science: Boundaries, Contexts, and Power. Stanford University Press. 158--169.
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  14. Richard Creath (1995). Are Dinosaurs Extinct? Foundations of Science 1 (2):285-297.
    It is widely believed that empiricism, though once dominant, is now extinct. This turns out to be mistaken because of incorrect assumption about the initial dominance of logical empiricism and about the content and variety of logical empiricist views. In fact, prominent contemporary philosophers (Quine and Kuhn) who are thought to have demolished logical empiricism are shown to exhibit central views of the logical empiricists rather than having overthrown them.
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  15. Richard Creath (1995). From Königsberg to Vienna: Coffa on the Rise of Modern Semantics. Dialogue 34 (01):113-.
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  16. Richard Creath (1993). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Mind 102 (406):339-340.
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  17. Richard Creath (1993). Book Review:Reflexive Epistemology: The Philosophical Legacy of Otto Neurath Danilo Zolo, D. McKie. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 60 (2):359-.
  18. L. R. S., W. V. Quine, R. Carnap & Richard Creath (1993). Dear Carnap, Dear Van: The Quine--Carnap Correspondence and Related Work. Philosophical Quarterly 43 (170):121.
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  19. Richard Creath (1992). Carnap's Conventionalism. Synthese 93 (1-2):141 - 165.
  20. Richard Creath (1992). Induction and the Gettier Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):401-404.
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  21. Richard Creath (1991). Convention, Neutrality, and the Limits of Logic. Journal of Philosophy 88 (10):522-523.
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  22. Richard Creath (1991). Every Dogma has its Day. Erkenntnis 35 (1-3):347 - 389.
    This paper is a reexamination of Two Dogmas in the light of Quine's ongoing debate with Carnap over analyticity. It shows, first, that analytic is a technical term within Carnap's epistemology. As such it is intelligible, and Carnap's position can meet Quine's objections. Second, it shows that the core of Quine's objection is that he (Quine) has an alternative epistemology to advance, one which appears to make no room for analyticity. Finally, the paper shows that Quine's alternative epistemology is (...)
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  23. Richard Creath (1990). Carnap, Quine, and the Rejection of Intuition. In Barret And Gibson (ed.), Perspectives on Quine. 55--66.
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  24. Richard Creath (1990). The Unimportance of Semantics. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:405 - 416.
    Philosophers often divide Carnap's work into syntactic, semantic, and later periods, but this disguises the importance of his early syntactical writing. In Logical Syntax Carnap is a thoroughgoing conventionalist and pragmatist. Once we see that, it is easier to see as well that these views were retained throughout the rest of his life, that the breaks between periods are not as important as the continuities, and that our understanding of such Carnapian notions as analyticity and probability needs reevaluation.
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  25. Richard Creath (1989). Counterfactuals for Free. Philosophical Studies 57 (1):95 - 101.
    Quine does not like counterfactuals. He thinks them unclear, and so he eschews them. It is enough, he thinks, for science to say of what it is that it is and that it is all that is. There is no need to say of what is not that it is not, or even worse, to say of what is not what it would be if ...
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  26. Richard Creath (1988). The Pragmatics of Observation. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:149 - 153.
    To assess van Fraassen's anti-realism, I examine observation and its relation to judging. I argue that the boundary of observability is determined pragmatically, because observing depends on the context of inquiry and because the 'able' in 'observable' implicitly involves human interests and concerns. Thus, observability is like van Fraassen's notions of simplicity and explanation. While a non-pragmatic notion of observability can be devised, then virtually any event is potentially observable. Consequently, van Fraassen's attempt to divide empirical adequacy from the pragmatic (...)
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  27. Rudolf Carnap, Richard Creath & Richard Nollan (1987). On Protocol Sentences. Noûs 21 (4):457-470.
  28. Richard Creath (1987). Some Remarks on "Protocol Sentences". Noûs 21 (4):471-475.
  29. Richard Creath (1987). The Initial Reception of Carnap's Doctrine of Analyticity. Noûs 21 (4):477-499.
  30. Richard Creath (1986). Carnap's Early Conventionalism. An Inquiry Into the Historical Background of the Vienna Circle. Journal of the History of Philosophy 24 (3):430-431.
  31. Richard Creath (1985). Taking Theories Seriously. Synthese 62 (3):317 - 345.
    This paper defends scientific realism, the doctrine that we should interpret theories as being just as ontologically committing as beliefs at the observational level. I examine the character of observation to show that the difference in interpretation suggested by anti-realists is unwarranted. Second, I discuss Wilfrid Sellars'' approach to the issue. Finally, I provide a detailed study of recent work by Bas van Fraassen. While van Fraassen''s work is the focus of the paper, the conclusions are far broader: That a (...)
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  32. Richard Creath (1984). Smart, Salmon, and Scientific Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):404 – 409.
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  33. Richard Creath (1982). Was Carnap a Complete Verificationist in the Aufbau? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:384 - 393.
    It is argued that Carnap was not a complete verificationist in the Aufbau despite the widespread view that he was. That doctrine would be intrinsic to constructionalism only if either of two additional assumptions are made, and there is no reason to believe that Carnap made these assumptions. Further, in the Aufbau Carnap did not demand verifiability independently of constructionalism, and his clear rejection of verifiability in Pseudoproblems counts heavily against his ever having accepted it in the Aufbau.
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  34. Richard Creath (1980). Benacerraf and Mathematical Truth. Philosophical Studies 37 (4):335 - 340.
  35. Richard Creath (1980). Nominalism by Theft. American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (4):311 - 318.
  36. Richard Creath (1978). A Query on Entrenchment. Philosophy of Science 45 (3):474-477.
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  37. Richard Creath (1977). The Root of the Problem. Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (2):273 - 275.
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  38. Richard Creath (1976). On Kaplan on Carnap on Significance. Philosophical Studies 30 (6):393 - 400.
    In 'the methodological character of theoretical concepts' carnap offered a sophisticated criterion of empirical significance. Unfortunately, Shortly thereafter david kaplan devised a pair of devastating counter-Examples which appeared to show that carnap's criterion was simultaneously too wide and too narrow. In this note I show that kaplan's first counter-Example misses its mark and that his second counter-Example can be avoided by a natural generalization of carnap's method.
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