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  1. Richard Double (1991). The Non-Reality of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
    The traditional disputants in the free will discussion--the libertarian, soft determinist, and hard determinist--agree that free will is a coherent concept, while disagreeing on how the concept might be satisfied and whether it can, in fact, be satisfied. In this innovative analysis, Richard Double offers a bold new argument, rejecting all of the traditional theories and proposing that the concept of free will cannot be satisfied, no matter what the nature of reality. Arguing that there is unavoidable conflict within our (...)
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  2.  93
    Richard Double (1996). Metaphilosophy and Free Will. Oxford University Press.
    Why is debate over the free will problem so intractable? In this broad and stimulating look at the philosophical enterprise, Richard Double uses the free will controversy to build on the subjectivist conclusion he developed in The Non-Reality of Free Will (OUP 1991). Double argues that various views about free will--e.g., compatibilism, incompatibilism, and even subjectivism--are compelling if, and only if, we adopt supporting metaphilosophical views. Because metaphilosophical considerations are not provable, we cannot show any free will theory to be (...)
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  3. Richard Double (1996). Honderich on the Consequences of Determinism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):847-854.
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  4.  21
    Richard Double (2004). The Price of Access. The Philosophers' Magazine 26 (26):17-18.
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  5.  51
    Richard Double (2004). How to Accept Wegner's Illusion of Conscious Will and Still Defend Moral Responsibility. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):479 - 491.
    In "The Illusion of Conscious Will," Daniel Wegner (2002) argues that our commonsense belief that our conscious choices cause our voluntary actions is mistaken. Wegner cites experimental results that suggest that brain processes initiate our actions before we become consciously aware of our choices, showing that we are systematically wrong in thinking that we consciously cause our actions. Wegner's view leads him to conclude, among other things, that moral responsibility does not exist. In this article I propose some ways that (...)
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  6. Richard Double (1997). Misdirection on the Free Will Problem. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (3):359-68.
    The belief that only free will supports assignments of moral responsibility -- deserved praise and blame, punishment and reward, and the expression of reactive attitudes and moral censure -- has fueled most of the historical concern over the existence of free will. Free will's connection to moral responsibility also drives contemporary thinkers as diverse in their substantive positions as Peter Strawson, Thomas Nagel, Peter van Inwagen, Galen Strawson, and Robert Kane. A simple, but powerful, reason for thinking that philosophers are (...)
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  7.  61
    Richard Double (1989). Puppeteers, Hypnotists, and Neurosurgeons. Philosophical Studies 56 (June):163-73.
    The objection to R-S accounts that was raised by the possibility of external agents requires the acceptance of two premises, viz., that all R-S accounts allow for puppeteers and that puppeteers necessarily make us unfree. The Metaphilosophical reply shows that to the extent that puppeteers are more problematic than determinism per se, pup-peteers may be explicitly excluded since they violate our paradigm of free will. The Metaphilosophical reply also suggests that we should not expect our mature R-S account to supply (...)
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  8.  85
    Richard Double (1988). Fear of Sphexishness. Analysis 48 (January):20-26.
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  9.  82
    Richard Double (1994). How to Frame the Free Will Problem. Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):149-72.
  10.  99
    Richard Double (2004). The Ethical Advantages of Free Will Subjectivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):411-422.
    Adopting meta-level Free Will Subjectivism is one among several ways to maintain that persons never experience moral freedom in their choices. The other ways of arguing against moral freedom I consider are presented by Saul Smilansky, Ted Honderich, Bruce Waller, Galen Strawson, and Derk Pereboom. In this paper, without arguing for the acceptance of free will subjectivism, I argue that subjectivism has some moral and theoretical advantages over its kindred theories.
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  11.  23
    Richard Double (1976). The Inconclusiveness of Kripke's Argument Against the Identity Theory. Auslegung 3 (June):156-65.
  12.  34
    Richard Double (1984). Searle's Answer to 'Hume's Problem'. Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):435-438.
    John searle has recently claimed to have dissolved what daniel dennett calls 'hume's problem'--The question whether the explanation of behavior by appeal to mental representations can be done without circularity or infinite regress. Searle argues that a careful analysis of the concept of an intentional state shows that mental representations do not require intentional "homunculi" to explain how intentional states have their contents, And, Hence dennett's worry is groundless. I argue that searle's conceptual analysis of intentional states, Even if correct, (...)
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  13. Richard Double (2002). Metaethics, Metaphilosophy, and Free Will Subjectivism. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press
  14.  18
    Richard Double (1987). Intentionality. Philosophical Studies 31:481-482.
  15.  15
    Richard Double (1992). Two Types of Autonomy Accounts. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):65 - 80.
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  16.  21
    Richard Double (2005). Blaming the Victim and Blaming the Culprit. Think 4 (10):21-24.
    Psychologists and common sense recognize blaming the victim as a cognitive error (fallacy) that many of us use to support the just-world hypothesis — the view that life is basically fair. In this article Richard Double compares a related phenomenon, blaming the culprit. When we commit the fallacy of blaming the culprit we mistakenly conclude that judging a culprit to deserve blame for an action exonerates everyone else from blame for that action. Double provides several examples of the fallacy.
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  17.  18
    Richard Double (1999). In Defense of the Smart Aleck: A Reply to Ted Honderich. Journal of Philosophical Research 24 (January):305-9.
    In “Honderich on the Consequences of Determinism” I argued that contrary to Ted Honderich’s thesis in his How Free Are You? determinism has no consequences, whether logical, moral, or psychological, about how we must view persons we beIieve to be determined. Honderich replied in “Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and the Smart Aleck” that there is a sense in which our belief in determinism has consequences that any reasonable human being must recognize. My present paper examines Honderich’s reply.
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  18.  33
    Richard Double (1983). Nagel's Argument That Mental Properties Are Nonphysical. Philosophy Research Archives 9:217-22.
    One of Thomas Nagel’s premises in his argument for panpsychism is criticized. The principal criticisms are: Nagel has failed to provide a clear sense in which mental properties are nonphysical. Even within the framework of Nagel’s argumeent, there is no strong reason to think that the psychological lies outside the explanatory web of physical properties. This is because certain reducing properties common to both the psychological and nonpsychological may well be physical.
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  19.  12
    Richard Double (1982). A Concise Introduction to Philosophy, Fourth Edition. Teaching Philosophy 5 (2):177-178.
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  20.  16
    Richard Double (1985). The Case Against the Case Against Belief. Mind 94 (375):420-430.
  21.  9
    Richard Double (2004). Informal Fallacies in James's the Will to Believe. Think 2 (6):29.
    Richard Double takes us through James' defence of belief in God, exposing a few fallacies along the way.
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  22.  13
    Richard Double (1999). Morality, Impartiality, and What We Can Ask of Persons. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (2):149 - 158.
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  23.  46
    Richard Double (2007). Value and Intelligent Collegiate Depression. Metaphilosophy 38 (1):111–121.
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  24.  15
    Richard Double (2002). Double Freedom. The Philosophers' Magazine 18:17-18.
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  25.  20
    Richard Double (1983). Commissurotomy, Consciousness and Unity of Mind. Review of Metaphysics 36 (3):726-728.
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  26.  24
    Richard Double (1979). Taylor's Refutation of Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Critical Analysis 8 (1):23-28.
    In "metaphysics" richard taylor argues that epiphenomenalism is implausible because it leaves open the possibility that human behavior occurs without the presence of mental events. in my paper i examine the sort of possibility involved and conclude that the logical possibility of "mind-less behavior" which epiphenomenalism must allow is an equal possibility for all competing theories of mind. thus, epiphenomenalism is seen to be no worse off in this respect than other theories and taylor's objection fails.
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  27.  43
    Richard Double (1985). Phenomenal Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (March):383-92.
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  28.  30
    Richard Double (2002). The Moral Hardness of Libertarianism. Philo 5 (2):226-234.
    The following is a criticism designed to apply to most libertarian free will theorists. I argue that most libertarians hold three beliefs that jointly show them to be unsympathetic or hard-hearted to persons whom they hold morally responsible: that persons are morally responsible only because they make libertarian choices, that we should hold persons responsible, and that we lack epistemic justification for thinking persons make such choices. Softhearted persons who held these three beliefs would espouse hard determinism, which exonerates all (...)
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  29.  13
    Richard Double (1981). On a Wittgensteinian Objection to Kripke's Dualism Argument. Philosophy Research Archives 1414.
    In 'kripke's argument against the identity theory' michael levin argues that the private language argument can be used to undermine saul kripke's cartesian claim to be able to imagine mental states and brain states existing apart, and, thus, refute his argument for dualism. in this paper it is argued that levin's use of the private language argument relies implicitly upon the descriptivist theory of mental language, to which kripke has provided a plausible alternative, "viz"., the causal theory of reference. thus, (...)
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  30.  18
    Richard Double (1988). Libertarianism and Rationality. Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):431-439.
  31. Richard Double (1987). The Computational Model of the Mind and Philosophical Functionalism. Behaviorism 15 (2):131-39.
    A distinction between the use of computational models in cognitive science and a philosophically inspired reductivist thesis is developed. PF is found questionable for phenomenal states, and, by analogy, dubious for the nonphenomenal introspectible mental states of common sense. PF is also shown to be threatened for the sub-cognitive theoretical states of cognitive science by the work of the so-called New Connectionists. CMM is shown to be less vulnerable to these criticisms.
     
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  32.  29
    Richard Double (1993). The Principle of Rational Explanation Defended. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (2):133-142.
  33.  22
    Richard Double (2004). The Price of Access. The Philosophers' Magazine 26 (26):17-18.
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  34.  8
    Richard Double (1984). The Character of Mind. Philosophical Studies 30:252-257.
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  35. Richard Double (1983). Searle, Programs and Functionalism. Nature and System 5 (March-June):107-14.
     
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  36.  29
    Richard Double (1992). How Rational Must Free Will Be? Metaphilosophy 23 (3):268-78.
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  37.  16
    Richard Double (1981). Central State Materialism. Philosophical Studies 28:229-37.
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  38.  5
    Richard Double (1988). Free Will and Values. Philosophical Books 29 (2):96-97.
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  39.  14
    Richard Double (1987). Skeptical Essays. Philosophical Studies 31:482-485.
  40.  7
    David Cockburn, Richard Double & Susan Wolf (1992). The Non-Reality of Free Will.Freedom Within Reason. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168):383.
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  41.  7
    Adam Swift, Richard Swinburne, Frank Jackson, Piers Benn, Richard Double, Marilyn Mason, Roy Jackson, Michael Ruse, Alan Sidelle & Michael Bradie (2009). Issue Six• Spring 2004. In David Papineau (ed.), Philosophy. Oxford University Press 175003.
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  42.  13
    Richard Double (2003). Living Without Free Will. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):494-497.
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  43.  16
    Richard Double (1990). Sayre-McCord on Evaluative Facts. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (2):165-169.
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  44.  16
    Richard Double (2003). When Subjectivism Matters. Metaphilosophy 34 (4):510-523.
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  45. Richard Double (1991). Determinism and the Experience of Freedom. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (March):1-8.
     
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  46.  15
    Richard Double (1978). Hume's Empirical Argument for Empiricism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 16 (4):329-337.
  47.  5
    Richard Double (1984). The Will. Philosophical Studies 30:370-371.
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  48.  10
    Richard Double (1984). Sports and Athletics. Teaching Philosophy 7 (1):73-75.
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  49.  10
    Richard Double (1981). Teaching the Philosophy of Sport. Teaching Philosophy 4 (1):47-53.
  50.  4
    Richard Double (1995). How Free Are You? Philosophical Books 36 (4):265-266.
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