The idea of legislative intent plays a central role in legal interpretation and constitutional theory, yet is repeatedly challenged as being an illusion. Refuting these challenges, this book develops a robust account of how and why legislatures form intentions, and the importance of these intentions to understanding law and parliamentary democracy.

This article considers what it is for a free people to rule and to be ruled. The rule of a free people is the rule of the whole people, not merely of some part thereof, even if a majority. However, it does not follow that collective self-government requires or warrants judicial supremacy, for the courts are not better placed than the legislature to represent the whole people in choosing what is to be done. The rule of a free people involves (...) the joint action of a united people, the members of which form a purposive group. The group stands ready to recognize authority, which is an exercise in rational agency. The constitution of a free people frames this joint action, making it possible for persons jointly to respond to reasons with coherent choice. A free people consists in free and equal persons, but again this does not require or warrant judicial supremacy. The main arguments to the contrary take for granted an unsound account of the free person, a sound account of whom is central to explaining how a people may be free and why it ought to be. (shrink)

This article considers Dworkin's influential argument against legislative intent in chapter 9 of Law's Empire. The argument proves much less than is often assumed for it fails to address the possibility that the institution of the legislature may form and act on intentions. Indeed, analysis of Dworkin's argument lends support to that possibility. Dworkin aims to refute legislative intent in order to elucidate his own theory of statutory interpretation. That theory fails to explain plausibly legislative action. Dworkin's argument does not (...) refute legislative intent but instead suggests there is reason to think that the legislature is capable of intentional action. (shrink)

This book is part jazz historiography, part autoethnography and part memoir. It sets forth a grounded theory of 'authenticating' as a basic socio-political process, with reference to Richard Ekins' participation in the social worlds of New Orleans jazz, and his life as a social constructionist social scientist and cultural theorist.

Legislated Rights: Securing Human Rights through Legislation aims to correct certain imbalances in constitutional thought and scholarship that burden the legislature and rights with misconceptions...