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  1. Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2004). Evidentialism. Oxford University Press.
    Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view ofjustification.
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  2. Richard Feldman (2006). Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement. In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press 216-236.
    My conclusion will be that, more often than we might have thought, suspension of judgment is the epistemically proper attitude. It follows that in such cases we lack reasonable belief and so, at least on standard conceptions, knowledge. This is a kind of contingent real-world skepticism that has not received the attention it deserves. I hope that this paper will help to bring this issue to life.
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  3. Richard Feldman (2006). Epistemology. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 68 (2):429-429.
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  4. Richard Feldman (2000). The Ethics of Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.
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  5. Richard Feldman & Earl Conee (1985). Evidentialism. Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.
    Evidentialism is a view about the conditions under which a person is epistemically justified in having a particular doxastic attitude toward a proposition. Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view of justification. It is now widely opposed. The essays included in this volume develop and defend the tradition.Evidentialism has many assets. In addition to providing an intuitively plausible account of epistemic justification, it helps to resolve the problem of the (...)
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  6. Richard Feldman & Ted Warfield (eds.) (2009). Disagreement. OUP.
    Disagreement is common: even informed, intelligent, and generally reasonable people often come to different conclusions when confronted with what seems to be the same evidence. Can the competing conclusions be reasonable? If not, what can we reasonably think about the situation? This volume examines the epistemology of disagreement. Philosophical questions about disagreement arise in various areas, notably politics, ethics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion: but this will be the first book focusing on the general epistemic issues arising from informed (...)
     
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  7. Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2008). Evidence. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press
     
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  8. Richard Feldman (2007). Reasonable Religious Disagreements. In Louise Antony (ed.), Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular. OUP 194-214.
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  9. Richard Feldman (1999). Contextualism and Skepticism. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):91-114.
    In the good old days, a large part of the debate about skepticism focused on the quality of the reasons we have for believing propositions of various types. Skeptics about knowledge in a given domain argued that our reasons for believing propositions in that domain were not good enough to give us knowledge; opponents of skepticism argued that they were. The different conclusions drawn by skeptics and non-skeptics could come either from differences in their views about the standards or conditions (...)
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  10.  98
    Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2001). Internalism Defended. In Hilary Kornblith (ed.), American Philosophical Quarterly. Blackwell 1 - 18.
  11. Richard Feldman (2009). Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement. Episteme 6 (3):294-312.
    Evidentialism is the thesis that a person is justified in believing a proposition iff the person's evidence on balance supports that proposition. In discussing epistemological issues associated with disagreements among epistemic peers, some philosophers have endorsed principles that seem to run contrary to evidentialism, specifying how one should revise one's beliefs in light of disagreement. In this paper, I examine the connection between evidentialism and these principles. I argue that the puzzles about disagreement provide no reason (...)
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  12. Richard Feldman (2005). Respecting the Evidence. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):95–119.
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  13.  90
    Richard Feldman & Earl Conee (2001). Internalism Defended. American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1):1 - 18.
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  14. Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2011). Replies. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press
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  15. Branden Fitelson & Richard Feldman (2012). Evidence of Evidence is Not (Necessarily) Evidence. Analysis 72 (1):85-88.
    In this note, I consider various precisifications of the slogan ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’. I provide counter-examples to each of these precisifications (assuming an epistemic probabilistic relevance notion of ‘evidential support’).
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  16.  23
    Richard Feldman (2001). Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation. In Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue. Oxford University Press 77--92.
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  17.  89
    Richard Feldman (1985). Reliability and Justification. The Monist 68 (2):159-174.
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  18. Richard Feldman (1974). An Alleged Defect in Gettier Counter-Examples. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):68 – 69.
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  19. Richard Feldman (2001). Skeptical Problems, Contextualist Solutions. Philosophical Studies 103 (1):61 - 85.
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  20. Richard Feldman (2008). Modest Deontologism in Epistemology. Synthese 161 (3):339 - 355.
    Deontologism in epistemology holds that epistemic justification may be understood in terms of “deontological” sentences about what one ought to believe or is permitted to believe, or what one deserves praise for believing, or in some similar way. If deonotologism is true, and people have justified beliefs, then the deontological sentences can be true. However, some say, these deontological sentences can be true only if people have a kind of freedom or control over their beliefs that they do not in (...)
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  21.  96
    Richard Feldman (1995). In Defence of Closure. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (181):487-494.
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  22. Richard Feldman (1988). Epistemic Obligations. Philosophical Perspectives 2:235-256.
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  23.  50
    Richard Feldman & Earl Conee (2002). Typing Problems. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):98-105.
    Guided by the work of William Alston, Jonathan Adler and Michael Levin propose a solution to the generality problem for reliabilism. In some respects their proposal improves on those we have discussed. We argue that the problem remains unsolved.
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  24. Kris McDaniel, Jason R. Raibley, Richard Feldman & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.) (2005). The Good, the Right, Life And Death: Essays in Honor of Fred Feldman. Ashgate.
  25. Richard Feldman (2006). Clifford's Principle and James's Options. Social Epistemology 20 (1):19 – 33.
    In this paper I discuss William J. Clifford's principle, "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence" and an objection to it based on William James's contention that "Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds." I argue that on one central way of understanding the key terms, there are no genuine options (...)
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  26.  32
    Richard Feldman (1988). Having Evidence. In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Kluwer Academic Publishers 83--104.
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  27.  55
    Richard Feldman (2003). Plantinga on Exclusivism. Faith and Philosophy 20 (1):85-90.
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  28.  56
    Richard Feldman (2007). Knowledge and Lotteries. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):211–226.
  29. Richard H. Feldman (1988). Rationality, Reliability, and Natural Selection. Philosophy of Science 55 (June):218-27.
    A tempting argument for human rationality goes like this: it is more conducive to survival to have true beliefs than false beliefs, so it is more conducive to survival to use reliable belief-forming strategies than unreliable ones. But reliable strategies are rational strategies, so there is a selective advantage to using rational strategies. Since we have evolved, we must use rational strategies. In this paper I argue that some criticisms of this argument offered by Stephen Stich fail because they rely (...)
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  30.  59
    Richard Feldman (1988). ``Subjective and Objective Justification in Ethics and Epistemology&Quot. The Monist 71 (3):405--419.
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  31.  48
    Richard Feldman (2004). Foundational Beliefs and Empirical Possibilities. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):132–148.
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  32.  43
    Richard Feldman (2004). Comments on DeRose's “Single Scoreboard Semantics”. Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):23-33.
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  33.  92
    Richard H. Feldman & Andrei A. Buckareff (2003). Reasons Explanations and Pure Agency. Philosophical Studies 112 (2):135-145.
    We focus on the recent non-causal theory of reasons explanationsof free action proffered by a proponent of the agency theory, Timothy O'Connor. We argue that the conditions O'Connor offersare neither necessary nor sufficient for a person to act for a reason. Finally, we note that the role O'Connor assigns toreasons in the etiology of actions results in further conceptual difficulties for agent-causalism.
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  34. Jonathan L. Kvanvig, Laurence Bonjour, Earl Conee, Richard Feldman, Richard Foley, Peter Klein, Jonathan Kvanvig, Keith Lehrer, William Lycan, Peter Markie, George Pappas, Alvin Plantinga, Ernest Sosa, Marshall Swain & Bas van Fraassen (1996). Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    In his widely influential two-volume work, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper Function, Alvin Plantinga argued that warrant is that which explains the difference between knowledge and true belief. Plantinga not only developed his own account of warrant but also mapped the terrain of epistemology. Motivated by Plantinga's work, fourteen prominent philosophers have written new essays investigating Plantingian warrant and its contribution to contemporary epistemology. The resulting collection, representing a broad array of views, not only gives readers a (...)
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  35.  18
    Richard Feldman (2005). Justification is Internal. In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell 270--84.
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  36.  70
    Richard Feldman (1981). Fallibilism and Knowing That One Knows. Philosophical Review 90 (2):266-282.
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  37. Richard Feldman (1993). ``Proper Functionalism&Quot. Noûs 72:34-50.
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  38.  9
    Richard Feldman (2004). 12 Freedom and Contextualism. In M. O.’Rourke J. K. Campbell (ed.), Freedom and Determinism. MIT 255.
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  39.  53
    Richard Feldman (2001). Alvin Goldman Knowledge in a Social World. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):163-168.
  40. Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.) (2010). Disagreement. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Disagreement is common: even informed, intelligent, and generally reasonable people often come to different conclusions when confronted with what seems to be the same evidence. Can the competing conclusions be reasonable? If not, what can we reasonably think about the situation? This volume examines the epistemology of disagreement. Philosophical questions about disagreement arise in various areas, notably politics, ethics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion: but this will be the first book focusing on the general epistemic issues arising from informed (...)
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  41.  79
    Richard H. Feldman & Edward Wierenga (1979). Thalberg on the Irreducibility of Events. Analysis 39 (1):11 - 16.
    Several debates in contemporary metaphysics provoke us to ask what an event is. One theory, Pioneered by chisholm, Develops the analogy between the occurrence of events and the truth of corresponding propositions. I call these propositional analyses. It is unclear whether their adherents wish to jettison our event-Concepts, And replace them with concepts from another category, Such as semantics. The other theory of what events are that I scrutinize, Namely kim's and goldman's property-Exemplification analysis, Seems reductive. My suspicion is that (...)
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  42.  30
    Richard Feldman & Earl Conee (2005). Some Virtues of Evidentialism. Veritas: Revista de Filosofia da PUCRS 50 (4):95-108.
    O evidencialismo é, primordialmente, uma tese sobre a justificação epistêmica e, secundariamente, uma tese sobre o conhecimento. Sustenta que a justificação epistêmica é superveniente da evidência. As versões do evidencialismo diferem quanto ao que conta como evidência, quanto ao que seja possuir algo como evidência e quanto ao que um dado corpo de evidência apóia. A tese secundária é a de que o apoio evidencial é necessário ao conhecimento. O evidencialismo ajuda a formular as questões epistemológicas de uma forma que (...)
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  43.  17
    Richard Feldman (1997). Review Essay. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):205-221.
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  44.  8
    Richard Feldman (2004). Foundational Justification. In Greco John (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics. 2004--42.
  45. Richard Feldman (2006). BonJour and Sosa on Internalism, Externalism, and Basic Beliefs. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 131 (3):713 - 728.
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  46.  23
    Richard Feldman (2003). Chisholm's Internalism and Its Consequences. Metaphilosophy 34 (5):603-620.
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  47.  17
    Richard Feldman (1995). Authoritarian Epistemology. Philosophical Topics 23 (1):147-169.
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  48.  11
    Richard Feldman (1980). Saying Different Things. Philosophical Studies 38 (1):79 - 84.
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  49.  17
    Richard Feldman (2005). Deep Disagreement, Rational Richard Resolutions, and Critical Thinking. Informal Logic 25 (1):12-23.
    According to Robert Fogelin, deep disagreements are disagreements about fundamental principles. He argues that deep disagreements cannot be rationally resolved. In this paper I argue against this thesis. A key part of the response depends upon the claim that disagreements can be rationally resolved not only by one participant rationally coming around to the other's point of view, but also by both of them rationally suspending judgment about the disputed proposition. I also claim that suspension of judgment may be the (...)
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    Richard H. Feldman (1986). Davidson's Theory of Propositional Attitudes. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (December):693-712.
    Donald davidson has proposed an account of indirect discourse that has been the subject of a great deal of discussion. Critics have contended that the theory saddles sentences in indirect discourse with implications they do not have, That the theory rests on an unsuitably obscure primitive notion that it cannot be extended to "de re" constructions and that it cannot be extended to sentences about other propositional attitudes such as belief. In this paper, I formulate davidson's theory more precisely than (...)
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